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Paper No. 10
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UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

GOOGLE INC.,
Petitioner,

v.

SPRING VENTURES, LTD.,
Patent Owner.

Case IPR2017-01652
Patent 8,661,094 B2

Before MICHAEL R. ZECHER, MINN CHUNG, and SCOTT E. BAIN, *Administrative Patent Judges*.

ZECHER, *Administrative Patent Judge*.

DECISION
Denying Institution of *Inter Partes* Review
35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.108

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, Google Inc. ("Google"), filed a Petition requesting an *inter partes* review of claims 1–16 of U.S. Patent No. 8,661,094 B2 (Ex. 1001, "the '094 patent"). Paper 1 ("Pet."). Patent Owner, Spring Ventures, Ltd. ("Spring Ventures"), filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 7 ("Prelim. Resp.").

Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an *inter partes* review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows "there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition." Taking into account the arguments presented in Spring Ventures' Preliminary Response, we conclude that the information presented in the Petition does not establish that there is a reasonable likelihood that Google would prevail in challenging claims 1–16 of the '094 patent as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We, therefore, *deny* the Petition.

A. Related Matters

The '094 patent is involved in a district court case captioned *Spring Ventures Ltd. v. Google Inc.*, No. 1:16-cv-00470-GMS (D. Del.). Pet. 3; Paper 3, 2. In addition to this Petition, Google filed another petition challenging the patentability of claims 1–16 of the '094 patent (Case IPR2017-01653). Pet. 3.

B. The '094 Patent

The '094 patent, titled "WWW Addressing," issued February 25, 2014, from U.S. Patent Application No. 12/316,050, filed on December 8, 2008. Ex. 1001, at [54], [45], [21], [22]. The '094 patent is a continuation

of U.S. Patent Application No. 09/529,792, which was filed as No. PCT/IL99/00055 on January 28, 1999—now U.S. Patent No. 7,596,609. *Id.* at [63].

The ’094 patent generally relates to World Wide Web (“WWW”) page retrieval and, in particular, to performing such retrieval using minimally restrictive syntax. Ex. 1001, 1:11–13. As background, the ’094 patent discloses that webpages are downloaded from host computers by entering a URL (“Uniform Resource Locator”) on a web browser. *Id.* at 1:17–23. According to the ’094 patent, a host is mapped to one or more domain names, and a URL includes the domain name of the host (i.e., the website) where the web page is located. *Id.* at 1:23–32. The ’094 patent further discloses that, under the current Internet standards, the naming conventions for domains, websites, and URLs are restricted, such as allowing only the alphanumeric characters from the Latin Character Set (“ISO Latin 1”) and the hyphen character in a web address. *Id.* at 1:33–46. Typically, a website address attempts to identify a particular site with the website owner (e.g., “http://www.ibm.com”) so that the address is meaningful. *Id.* at 1:46–52.

The ’094 patent discloses that at least one problem in many countries is that English is not the native tongue and, as a result, meaningful WWW addresses are created typically by transliterating the name of the website owner into Latin alphabet letters. Ex. 1001, 1:57–60. Unfortunately, many native languages do not have an acceptable and widely known standard of transliteration. *Id.* at 1:60–61. There may be several plausible transliterations for a single name, thereby resulting in several possible meaningful addresses, only one of which is correct. *Id.* at 1:61–63.

Another problem addressed by the '094 patent is that the current WWW address name scheme is not user friendly. Ex. 1001, 1:65–66. In countries where most people do not speak English, the use of certain letters and/or English spelling conventions may be burdensome to many users, especially inexperienced users. *Id.* at 1:66–2:2. In many cases, there is no direct relationship between the name of the website owner and the address of his/her website. *Id.* at 2:2–4. Nor is guessing the address typically an option. *Id.* at 2:4–5. In countries where transliteration is required, even if a meaningful WWW address is created, there is still no guarantee that a user will correctly transliterate that name from his/her native language. *Id.* at 2:5–9. In many cases, the website address may be a mnemonic so that it is easier to remember. *Id.* at 2:9–11. Nonetheless, it is often impossible to reconstruct the correct address from the name of the website owner. *Id.* at 2:11–12.

The '094 patent purportedly addresses these and other problems by enabling a user to enter a substantially free-form designation of a WWW site—preferably in the user's native language—and directly obtain the information from that website, without the necessity of using a search engine or the exact address of the website. Ex. 1001, 8:43–48. This information is entered by the user in the same way in which a standard URL would be entered. *Id.* at 5:50–52. As one example, this information may be entered into a window overlaying the browser window. *Id.* at 5:52–55.

Figure 3 of the '094 patent, reproduced below, illustrates a schematic block diagram of a web page translator configuration in accordance with one embodiment. Ex. 1001, 8:24–26.



FIG.3

As reproduced above, Figure 3 illustrates system 31 that includes translator 32 acting as a front end to browser 30, which, in turn, downloads web pages from remote site 34. *Id.* at 9:35–37. In one embodiment, translator 32 includes a separate input window overlaid on at least a portion of the browser window. *Id.* at 9:37–40. This separate window remains on top of the browser window and has a fixed relationship to at least one feature of the browser display. *Id.* at 9:40–42. This separate input window also provides font and data entry support for non-Latin character sets, even if the underlying browser and operating system do not. *Id.* at 9:42–45.

C. Challenged Claims

Claims 1 and 13 are independent. Each of independent claims 1 and 13 is directed to "[a] method of WWW page retrieval for enabling a user using a computer having a web browser with a browser window having a URL entry field running on the computer and a connection to the Internet to retrieve a desired webpage to the browser." Ex. 1001, 15:14–18, 16:26–30. Claims 2–12 directly or indirectly depend from independent claim 1; and claims 14–16 directly depend from independent claim 13. Independent claim 1 is illustrative of the challenged claims and is reproduced below:

1. A method of WWW page retrieval for enabling a user using a computer having a web browser with a browser window having a URL entry field running on the computer and a connection to the Internet to retrieve a desired webpage to the browser, comprising:

(a) enabling a translator input window to be overlaid on a portion of the browser window for allowing a user to enter an input of a non-URL-address text string therein;

(b) enabling a translator entity having software operable on a computer, which translator entity is operatively coupled to the browser and to said translator input window overlaid on the browser window for receiving information of one or more words of an input text string that is not a URL address entered by a user through the translator input window overlaid on a portion of the browser window,

(c) said translator entity being operative to determine a URL address for a web page which is most likely to be a desired webpage associated with the input text string information received from the user, based on statistical data of web pages in web search results for said information; and

(d) said translator entity being operative for sending the URL address to the web browser of the user's computer to enable retrieval of the web page responsive to the URL address to be directly displayed on the user's browser, without any additional user intervention beyond the entry of said input text string information.

Ex. 1001, 15:14–41.

D. Prior Art References Relied Upon

Google relies upon the prior art references set forth in the tables below:

Inventor[1]	U.S. Patent No.	Relevant Dates	Exhibit No.
Breese	6,006,218	issued Dec. 21, 1999, filed Feb. 28, 1997	1004
Osaku	6,061,738	issued May 9, 2000, filed Oct. 28, 1997	1005
Belfiore	6,009,459	issued Dec. 28, 1999, filed Jan. 10, 1997	1019

Non-Patent Literature	Exhibit No.
Richard Seltzer et. al., *The AltaVista Search Revolution*, Osborn/McGraw-Hill (1997) ("Seltzer")	1021

E. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability

Google challenges claims 1–16 of the '094 patent based on the asserted grounds of unpatentability ("grounds") set forth in the table below. Pet. 5–6, 21–63.

References	Basis	Challenged Claims
Seltzer and Belfiore	§ 103(a)	1, 2, 5, 8, 9, and 10
Seltzer, Belfiore, and Osaku	§ 103(a)	7, 13, and 14
Seltzer, Belfiore, and Breese	§ 103(a)	3, 4, 6, 11, and 12
Seltzer, Belfiore, Breese, and Osaku	§ 103(a)	15 and 16

[1] For clarity and ease of reference, we only list the first named inventor.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Claim Construction

In an *inter partes* review proceeding, claim terms of an unexpired patent are given their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); *see also Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee*, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142–46 (2016) (upholding the use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard as the claim construction standard to be applied in an *inter partes* review proceeding). Under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, claim terms are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, in the context of the entire disclosure. *In re Translogic Tech., Inc.*, 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

In its Petition, Google proposes constructions for the following claim phrases: (1) "a translator input window to be overlaid on a portion of the browser window"/"translator input window overlaid on the browser window" (all challenged claims); and (2) "the domain name server sends the web page responsive to the URL address to the user's web browser" (claim 14). Pet. 14–21. In response, Spring Ventures contends that Google's proposed constructions are unreasonable and do not comply with governing statutes and rules. Prelim. Resp. 3–9, 15–21. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that the only claim phrases requiring construction are "a translator input window to be overlaid on a portion of the browser window"/"translator input window overlaid on the browser window," and only to the extent necessary to resolve the dispositive issue discussed

below—namely, whether the asserted prior art properly accounts for these particular limitations. *See, e.g.*, *Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc.*, 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that only those claim terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).

Google contends that, with one exception, it accords each claim term its broadest reasonable interpretation. Pet. 13. Google readily admits that it unreasonably interprets the claim term "translator input window" in order to be consistent with how Spring Ventures interprets the same claim term in the related district court case. *Id.* That is, in the related district court case, Google argues that Spring Ventures proposes to construe the claim term "translator input window" as "[a]n input field or window, other than the URL entry field in a browser window, that 'allow[s] a user to enter an input of a non-URL-address text string therein'. The translator input window is 'operatively coupled' to the translator entity." *Id.* at 14 (second alteration in original) (quoting Ex. 1024, 1). Google asserts that Spring Ventures' proposed construction in the related district court case runs afoul of the specification of the '094 patent and the plain language of the challenged claims, but nonetheless may be instructive. *Id.* at 14–15 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:40–42).

Google further contends that, in the related district court case, Spring Ventures proposes to construe the claim term "overlaid on a portion of the browser window" as "displayed on any portion of the browser window, including the browser window's content display area." Pet. 17 (quoting Ex. 1024, 2). According to Google, Spring Ventures' construction of "overlaid" in the related district court case contorts its meaning beyond

reason and is belied by the specification of the '094 patent. *Id.* (citing Ex. 1001, 5:52–55). Stated differently, Google argues that Spring Ventures' construction of "overlaid" to mean merely "displaying" effectively rewrites the challenged claims to encompass a far broader scope than previously allowed by the Examiner. *Id.*

In its Preliminary Response, Spring Ventures contends that, because Google readily admits that its proposed construction is unreasonable, we should not apply this construction as a basis for determining whether the challenged claims are unpatentable. Prelim. Resp. 6. Spring Ventures argues that litigation statements should not be used to determine whether or not to institute an *inter partes* review. *Id.* at 7 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 301(d)); *see also id.* at 3–6 (arguing the same). Spring Ventures further argues that, even if we were to consider litigation statements in our claim construction analysis, the documents that Google relies upon are preliminary and cannot be relied upon for proposed constructions. *Id.* at 7. Indeed, Spring Ventures asserts that its claim construction positions in the related district court case have changed to reflect progress in that case. *Id.* (citing Exs. 2001–2004).

Spring Ventures further contends that, putting aside that Google does not formulate its own construction in the Petition, but rather proposes a construction based on litigation statements made in the related district court case, Google characterizes its own position as unreasonable. Prelim. Resp. 15–16. Consequently, Spring Ventures asserts that its proposed construction of the claim term "translator input window" as "a viewing area on a screen in which data may be input, separate from input fields displayed by a web browser application when run, for use by the translator entity" should govern in this proceeding. *Id.* at 16 (citing Ex. 2001, 17–20). To support its

proposed construction, Spring Ventures directs us to various disclosures in the specification of the '094 patent. *Id.* at 16–18 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:36–39, 4:44, 5:54–55, 9:37–40, 9:50–54, 9:63–67, 12:28–29). Lastly, Spring Ventures argues that, after exchanging preliminary constructions in the related district court case, both parties agreed that the claim term "overlaid on a portion of the browser window" does not require construction. *Id.* at 19 (citing Ex. 2001, 5 n.1).

The parties' dispute regarding the claim phrases "translator input window to be overlaid on a portion of the browser window"/"translator input window overlaid on the browser window" centers on the scope and meaning of the claim term "translator input window." With this in mind, we turn to whether Google's proposed construction of this claim term in the instant Petition is, indeed, reasonable. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained that, even when giving claim terms their broadest reasonable interpretation, we cannot construe the claims "so broadly that [the] constructions are *unreasonable* under general claim construction principles." *Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc.*, 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015). "[T]he protocol of giving claims their broadest reasonable interpretation . . . does not include giving claims a legally incorrect interpretation" that is "divorced from the specification and the record evidence." *Id.* (first quoting *In re Skvorecz*, 580 F.3d 1262, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2009); and then quoting *In re NTP, Inc.*, 654 F.3d 1279, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).

Google readily admits that its proposed construction of the claim term "translator input window" is unreasonable and that it only advances this construction in the instant Petition because it is consistent with how Spring

Ventures interprets the same claim term in the related district court case. *See* Pet. 13. Given this admission, and because Google's explanation in this regard is divorced from the specification of the '094 patent (*see generally id.* at 14–17), we decline to adopt Google's proposed construction of the claim term "translator input window." Our determination not to adopt Google's proposed construction of this claim term is vindicated further by the fact that Google filed a second petition challenging the same claims of the '094 patent at issue in the instant Petition, in which Google applies the broadest reasonable interpretation standard. *See id.* at 14 n.2 ("The claims [of the '094 patent] are addressed under the correct [broadest reasonable interpretation] in [Google's] separate, concurrently filed petition.").

Turning now to the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim term "translator input window" in light of the specification of '094 patent, we note the following disclosure:

> [i]n accordance with one preferred embodiment of the invention, translator 32 includes a separate input window, which is preferably overlaid on a portion of the browser window. Preferably, this separate window remains on top [of] the browser and at a fixed relationship to at least one feature of the browser display.

Ex. 1001, 9:37–42. The specification also discloses another embodiment in which translator 32 may be hidden from the user in the form of "a transparent window [that] is overlaid on the browser address entry window." *Id.* at 9:50–54. Each of the aforementioned embodiments clearly explains that the translator input window is a separate window from that which it overlays—namely, the browser window.

Although Spring Ventures directs us to the aforementioned disclosures in the specification to support its proposed construction for the

claim term "translator input window," Spring Ventures seeks to further define the "input window" as "a viewing area on the screen in which data may be input" and seeks to further clarify that such "input window" is "for use by the translator entity." *See* Prelim. Resp. 16–19. The Federal Circuit has explained that, if features in the disclosure are not necessary to give meaning to what the inventors mean by a claim term, they would be "extraneous" and should not be read into the claim. *Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni*, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998); *E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.*, 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988). We decline to adopt Spring Ventures' proposed construction as the broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification because it would import extraneous features into the challenged claims. That is, Spring Ventures' attempt to describe the "input window" as "a viewing area on the screen in which data may be input," as well as its attempt to clarify that such "input window" is "for use by the translator entity," is not necessary to give meaning to the claim term "translator input window." Consequently, we cannot discern how these extraneous features add any clarity to the claim term "translator input window" itself and, therefore, determine that they should not be read into the challenged claims that recite this term.

In summary, we determine for purposes of this Decision that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim term "translator input window" in light of the specification of the '094 patent is "an input window that is separate from the browser window." We further clarify that, based on the plain language of the challenged claims, as well as the supporting disclosures in the specification identified above, "this input window

overlays—at least in part—the browser window." We note that our construction in this regard is consistent with the construction adopted by the U.S. District Judge presiding over the related district court case. Ex. 1036, 1 & n.2.

B. Obviousness Over the Combined Teachings of Seltzer and Belfiore

Google contends that claims 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, and 10 of the '094 patent are unpatentable under § 103(a) over the combined teachings of Seltzer and Belfiore. Pet. 21–45. Google explains how this proffered combination teaches or suggests the subject matter of each challenged claim. *Id.* Google also relies upon the Declaration of Michael I. Shamos, Ph.D., to support its positions. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 42–73. On this record, we are not persuaded that Google demonstrates that Seltzer properly accounts for "enabling a translator input window to be overlaid on a portion of the browser window for allowing a user to enter an input of a non-URL-address text string therein," as recited in independent claim 1.

We begin our analysis with the principles of law that generally apply to a ground based on obviousness, followed by a brief overview of Seltzer and Belfiore, and then we address the dispositive issue with respect to independent claim 1.

1. Principles of Law

A claim is unpatentable under § 103(a) if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. *KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.*, 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of

obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations, including (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of skill in the art;[2] and (4) when in evidence, objective indicia of non-obviousness (i.e., secondary considerations). *Graham v. John Deere Co.*, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). We analyze this asserted ground based on obviousness with the principles identified above in mind.

2. Seltzer Overview

Seltzer generally relates to the AltaVista Search Public Service ("AltaVista"). Ex. 1021, 4.[3] According to Seltzer, AltaVista is a search engine that has unique search capabilities and provides information more effectively. *Id.* In Figure 5-2, reproduced below with annotations added by Google, the AltaVista search engine interface is displayed as a hypertext markup language ("HTML") page running on a browser. *Id.* at 10.

[2] Relying upon the testimony of Dr. Shamos, Google offers an assessment as to the level of skill in the art as of 1998, which is prior to the earliest effective filing date on the face of the '094 patent. Pet. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 11). To the extent necessary, and for purposes of this Decision, we accept the assessment offered by Google as it is consistent with the '094 patent and the asserted prior art.

[3] All references to the page numbers in Seltzer refer to the page numbers inserted by Google in the bottom, right-corner of each page in Exhibit 1021.



Alta Vista Search Results

FIGURE 5-2

As shown by Google's annotations, Figure 5-2 illustrates a search field that is located in the browser window. *Id.* The search field allows a prospective user to enter search terms in the form of a non-URL text string (e.g., the text string "HTML document style"). *Id.*

3. Belfiore Overview

Belfiore discloses automatically initiating a search to locate resources within a distributed environment, particularly those on the WWW, in response to a user entering text via a user interface element. Ex. 1019, Abstract. In one embodiment, Belfiore discloses an enhanced web browser that includes a browser search capability. *Id.* The web browser includes a text box in which the user can enter a URL. *Id.* When the user enters a valid URL, the web browser accesses the corresponding website. *Id.* However, when the user enters text that is not a valid URL, the web browser may automatically format a search engine query using such text and forward the query to an Internet search engine. *Id.* The search engine then locates

webpages containing the query terms and, as one option, may redirect the web browser to the most relevant website discovered in the search. *Id.*

4. Claim 1

Independent clam 1 recites, in relevant part, "enabling a translator input window to be overlaid on a portion of the browser window for allowing a user to enter an input of a non-URL-address text string therein." Ex. 1001, 15:19–21. Google contends that, when applying its proposed construction of the claim term "translator input window," Seltzer teaches enabling a translator input window to be overlaid on a portion of the browser window for allowing a user to enter a non-URL text string. Pet. 29–30 (citing Ex. 1021, 10). In particular, Google argues that the AltaVista search engine interface includes a search field displayed in the browser window that satisfies the claimed "translator input window" because (1) the search field is not a URL entry field; and (2) the search field is displayed in the content display area of the browser window. *Id.* at 30–31 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 54). Google does not rely upon the teachings of Belfiore in any respect to account for this limitation. *See generally id.* at 29–31.

On this record, we are not persuaded that Google has shown that Seltzer teaches or suggests "a translator input window to be overlaid on a portion of the browser window," as recited in independent claim 1. As explained in our claim construction section above, we do not adopt Google's proposed construction of the claim term "translator input window" because it is unreasonable and divorced from the specification of the '094 patent. *See supra* Section II.A. Instead, we construe this claim term for purposes of this Decision as "an input window that is separate from the browser

window." We further clarify that "this input window overlays—at least in part—the browser window."

Under the proper construction for the claim term "translator input window," Seltzer's AltaVista search engine interface that includes a search field for entering a non-URL text string does not meet the disputed claim limitation identified above because it is not a separate window from the browser window, but rather runs in the browser itself. Ex. 1021, 10. Moreover, as Spring Ventures asserts, the AltaVista search engine interface does not overlay—at least in part—the browser window because Seltzer's AltaVista search engine interface is not a separate window from the browser window. *See* Prelim. Resp. 21–22 (arguing that Seltzer does not teach or suggest "a translator input window overlaid on the browser window"). Google does not apply the teachings of Belfiore in such a way that remedies these deficiencies in Seltzer.

We also are not persuaded by Dr. Shamos' supporting testimony on this particular issue. *See* Ex. 1002 ¶ 54. His testimony is predicated on Google's proposed construction of the claim term "translator input window," which, as we explain in our claim construction section above, we decline to adopt. *See supra* Section II.A. In addition, he provides no additional analysis beyond merely repeating the same arguments presented and developed in the Petition that we already have determined are not persuasive. *Compare* Pet. 29–31, *with* Ex. 1002 ¶ 54.

In summary, Google has not shown that the combined teachings of Seltzer and Belfiore properly account for "a translator input window to be overlaid on a portion of the browser window," as recited in independent claim 1. Accordingly, Google has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood

that it will prevail on its assertion that the subject matter of independent claim 1 would have been obvious over the teachings of Seltzer and Belfiore.

5. Claims 2, 5, 8, 9, and 10

By virtue of their dependency, claims 2, 5, 8, 9, and 10 include the same limitations as independent claim 1. Therefore, for the same reasons discussed above with respect to independent claim 1, Google has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail on its assertion that the subject matter of dependent claims 2, 5, 8, 9, and 10 would have been obvious over the teachings of Seltzer and Belfiore.

C. Obviousness Over the Combined Teachings of Seltzer, Belfiore, and Osaku

Google contends that claims 7, 13, and 14 of the '094 patent are unpatentable under § 103(a) over the combined teachings of Seltzer, Belfiore, and Osaku. Pet. 45–54. Google explains how this proffered combination teaches or suggests the subject matter of each challenged claim, and provides reasoning as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been prompted to modify or combine the references' respective teachings. *Id.* Google also relies upon the Declaration of Dr. Shamos to support its positions. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 74–83. On this record, we are not persuaded that Google demonstrates that Seltzer properly accounts for "enabling a translator input window to be overlaid on a portion of the browser window for allowing a user to enter an input of a non-URL-address text string therein," as recited in independent claim 13.

1. Claim 13

Independent claim 13 recites, in relevant part, "enabling a translator input window to be overlaid on a portion of the browser window for allowing a user to enter an input of a non-URL-address text string therein." Ex. 1001, 16:31–33. In its Petition, Google relies upon the same analysis discussed above with respect to independent claim 1 to account for this particular limitation. *Compare* Pet. 29–31, *with id.* at 49. Google does not apply the teachings of Osaku in such a way that remedies the deficiencies in the combined teachings of Seltzer and Belfiore identified above. Therefore, for the same reasons discussed above, Google has not shown that the combined teachings of Seltzer, Belfiore, and Osaku properly account for "a translator input window to be overlaid on a portion of the browser window," as recited independent claim 13. Accordingly, Google has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail on its assertion that the subject matter of independent claim 13 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Seltzer, Belfiore, and Osaku.

2. Claims 7 and 14

By virtue of their dependency, claims 7 and 14 include the same limitations as independent claims 1 and 13, respectively. Therefore, for the same reasons discussed above with respect to independent claims 1 and 13, Google has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail on its assertion that the subject matter of dependent claims 7 and 14 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Seltzer, Belfiore, and Osaku.

D. Obviousness Over the Combined Teachings of Seltzer, Belfiore, and Breese

Google contends that claims 3, 4, 6, 11, and 12 of the '094 patent are unpatentable under § 103(a) over the combined teachings of Seltzer, Belfiore, and Breese. Pet. 54–62. By virtue of their dependency, claims 3, 4, 6, 11, and 12 include the same limitations as independent claim 1. Google does not apply the teachings of Breese in such a way that remedies the deficiencies in the combined teachings of Seltzer and Belfiore identified above. Therefore, for the same reasons discussed above with respect to independent claim 1, Google has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail on its assertion that the subject matter of dependent claims 3, 4, 6, 11, and 12 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Seltzer, Belfiore, and Breese.

E. Obviousness Over the Combined Teachings of Seltzer, Belfiore, Osaku, and Breese

Google contends that claims 15 and 16 of the '094 patent are unpatentable under § 103(a) over the combined teachings of Seltzer, Belfiore, Osaku, and Breese. Pet. 62–63. By virtue of their dependency, claims 15 and 16 include the same limitations as independent claim 13. Google does not apply the teachings of Breese in such a way that remedies the deficiencies in the combined teachings of Seltzer, Belfiore, and Osaku identified above. Therefore, for the same reasons discussed above with respect to independent claim 13, Google has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail on its assertion that the subject matter of dependent claims 15 and 16 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Seltzer, Belfiore, Osaku, and Breese.

III. CONCLUSION

Taking into account the arguments presented in Spring Ventures' Preliminary Response, we conclude that the information presented in the Petition does not demonstrate that there is a reasonable likelihood that Google will prevail in challenging claims 1–16 of the '094 patent as unpatentable under § 103(a).

IV. ORDER

In consideration of the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the Petition is DENIED and no trial is instituted.

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