

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

CLOVER NETWORK, LLC,
Petitioner,

v.

CLOUDOFCHANGE, LLC,
Patent Owner

IPR2023-00287
Patent 11,226,793 B2

Before HUBERT C. LORIN, JEREMY M. PLENZLER, and
CARL M. DEFRANCO, *Administrative Patent Judges*.

PLENZLER, *Administrative Patent Judge*.

DECISION

Granting Institution of *Inter Partes* Review

35 U.S.C. § 314

Granting Motion for Joinder 35 U.S.C. § 315(c)

37 C.F.R. § 42.122

I. INTRODUCTION

A. *Background and Summary*

Clover Network, LLC (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition requesting *inter partes* review of claims 1–4, 7–28, and 31–44 of U.S. Patent No. 11,226,793

B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’793 patent”). Paper 4 (“Pet.”). CloudfChange, LLC (“Patent Owner”) file a Preliminary Response. Paper 13 (“Prelim. Resp.”).

Concurrently with the Petition, Petitioner filed a Motion for Joinder in which it sought to join IPR2022-01143 (the “1143 IPR”) as a party. Paper 3 (“Mot.” or “Motion”). Patent Owner opposed the Motion. Paper 8 (“Opp.” or “Opposition”). Petitioner filed a reply in support of the Motion. Paper 9.

Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an *inter partes* review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We hereby institute an *inter partes* review in this proceeding.

Additionally, for the reasons set forth below, we exercise our discretion to join Petitioner (Clover Network LLC) as a party to the 1143 IPR. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c).

B. Related Matters

In addition to the 1143 IPR, the parties indicate that the ’793 patent is involved in *CloudfChange, LLC v. Lightspeed POS Inc.*, 6:21-cv-01102 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 22, 2021) (“the Lightspeed Litigation”). Pet. 1; Paper 6, 3. The parties also indicate that the ’793 patent was previously involved in a lawsuit *CloudfChange, LLC v. NCR Corporation*, 6-19-cv-00513 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2019) (“the NCR Litigation”), which resulted in a jury verdict for Patent Owner, but is still pending final judgment. Pet. 2; Paper 6, 3.

C. The ’793 Patent

The ’793 patent relates to “a system and a method for online, web-based point of sale (POS) building and configuration.” Ex. 1001, Abstract.

According to the '793 patent, “[c]urrent practice in the field of assembling point of sale systems includes manually coding front-of-screen information,” which “contains menu selections, page selections, and general answers to business questions.” *Id.* at 1:33–37.

The '793 patent explains that “in the prior art, a specialized programmer had to design the layout and data for these POS touch keys,” but “[w]ith this invention, the store operator will be able to build his POS screens online over the Internet.” Ex. 1001, 3:5–7, 13–14.

The '793 patent explains that its “POS builder system can be provided as a service or deployed within a corporation,” and notes that “[f]or example, Software as a Service (SAAS) is a software distribution model in which applications are hosted by a vendor or service provider and made available to customers over a network, typically the Internet.” Ex. 1001, 6:11–16.

D. Illustrative Claim

1. A web-based point of sale (POS) builder system comprising:
 - at least one server configured to:
 - communicate with one or more POS terminals over a network comprising the Internet, wherein the one or more POS terminals are configured to display one or more POS screens;
 - receive, over the network from a POS builder interface, information used for creating or modifying the one or more POS screens including creating or modifying one or more display interfaces for display on the one or more POS screens, the one or more display interfaces being associated with one or more items;
 - receive, from at least one of the one or more POS terminals over the network, further information regarding

one or more POS transactions corresponding to the one or more items;

configure the one or more POS terminals with the information over the network to create or modify based on the further information regarding one or more POS transactions the one or more POS screens displayed on the one or more POS terminals; and

wherein the further information regarding the one or more POS transactions, the information used for creating or modifying the one or more POS screens, or a combination thereof comprises one or more of employee clock information, customer add/update information, item add/update information, promotion information, loyalty point information, discount information, taxation information, item cost information, or inventory information;

wherein said further information regarding the one or more POS transactions relate to one or more transactions by corresponding customers respectively associated with at least one of said one or more POS terminals.

Ex. 1001, 6:29–64.

E. Evidence and Asserted Grounds

Petitioner asserts that claims 1–4, 7–28, 31–44 would have been unpatentable on the following grounds:

Claim(s) Challenged	35 U.S.C. §	Reference(s)/Basis
1–4, 7–28, 31–44	103	Woycik ¹
1–4, 7–28, 31–44	103	Tengler ²

¹ US Patent Pub. No. US 2007/0265935 A1, published Nov. 15, 2007 (Ex. 1004).

² US Patent Pub. No. US 2005/0049921 A1, published Mar. 3, 2005 (Ex. 1005).

The grounds listed above are virtually identical to those at issue in the 1143 IPR. Petitioner submits a declaration from Todd Mowry (Ex. 1002). Patent Owner submits a declaration from Alex Cheng. (Ex. 2008).

II. ANALYSIS

A. *Legal Standards*

Petitioner bears the burden of persuasion to prove unpatentability, by a preponderance of the evidence, of the claims challenged in the Petition. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). This burden never shifts to Patent Owner. *Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat'l Graphics, Inc.*, 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Board may authorize an *inter partes* review if we determine that the information presented in the Petition and Patent Owner's Preliminary Response shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). "When instituting *inter partes* review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim."³ 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2021).

B. *Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art*

Petitioner contends that "[a] 'person of ordinary skill in the art' (POSITA) at the time of the effective filing date of the '793 patent would have been someone with a working knowledge of designing, developing, and deploying web-based software and systems" and "would have had a Bachelor of Science in computer science or a related field, and approximately two years of professional experience or equivalent study in the design and development of web-based software and systems, including

³ Our discussion below focuses on claim 1.

web-based POS systems.” Pet. 8. Petitioner contends that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” *Id.*

Patent Owner responds: “Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA does not require any experience with retail POS systems—let alone **building POS screens**—that are the field of the ’793 Patent.” Prelim. Resp.

16. According to Patent Owner, “Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA makes experience in retail POS systems optional.” *Id.* Patent Owner contends that its “proposed definition of a POSITA remedies this deficiency by including experience or equivalent study in the field of the ’793 Patent, retail point of sale (“POS”) systems, including experience with building POS screens.” *Id.*

We fail to see how the alleged differences in the level of ordinary skill in the art advanced by Patent Owner affects our decision to institute in this proceeding. Accordingly, for purposes of this decision, we apply the level of skill set forth by Patent Owner.

C. Claim Construction

In an *inter partes* review, we construe a patent claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2021). Under this standard, the words of a claim generally are given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. *Phillips v. AWH Corp.*, 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).

Petitioner proposes constructions for several claim terms, similar to those proposed in IPR2022-01143. Pet. 9–11. Patent Owner reproduces the

claim constructions from the Lightspeed Litigation (Prelim. Resp. 19) and “proposes that the PTAB adopt the Judge Albright’s constructions in the Lightspeed Litigation and the final constructions in the NCR Litigation” (*id.* at 19–20).

We do not need to construe any terms expressly to reach our decision. *See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu*, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting *Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc.*, 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).

D. Discretion on Whether to Institute Trial

1. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d)

Patent Owner asks that we exercise our discretion and deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Prelim. Resp. 23–30.

35 U.S.C. § 325(d) states, in relevant part: “In determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter, chapter 30, or chapter 31, the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” The Board uses a two-part framework for evaluating arguments under § 325(d):

(1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and

(2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of [the] challenged claims.

Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential).

“[T]he *Becton, Dickinson* factors provide useful insight into how to apply the framework under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” *Id.* at 9 (footnote omitted). The non-exclusive *Becton, Dickinson* factors are:

(a) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination;

(b) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination;

(c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection;

(d) the extent of the overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which Petitioner relies on the prior art or Patent Owner distinguishes the prior art;

(e) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and

(f) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the Petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art or arguments.

Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to § III.C.5, first paragraph). *Becton, Dickinson* factors (a), (b), and (d) relate to the first part of the *Advanced Bionics* framework (whether the same or substantially the same art or arguments previously were presented to the Office), and *Becton, Dickinson* factors (c), (e), and (f) relate to the second part of that framework (previous Office error). *Advanced Bionics*, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 9–11.

Patent Owner’s request has already been considered and determined unpersuasive in the 1143 IPR. Moreover, we also question the merit of

exercising discretion to deny institution under § 325(d) in a proceeding that simply seeks to have Petitioner joined as a party to an already instituted proceeding where the same art and arguments asserted in this proceeding are already being evaluated in the 1143 IPR. For the reasons explained in the 1143 IPR we decline Patent Owner’s invitation for us to apply our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to deny the petition in this proceeding. *See* IPR2022-01143, Paper 8 at 9–12.

2. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)

Patent Owner additionally asks that we deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) in view of the Lightspeed Litigation. Prelim. Resp. 30–44.

The recent guidance from the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office regarding discretionary denials⁴ requires that “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Guidance Memo 3.

In this proceeding, Petitioner stipulates that “if this IPR is instituted and *Fintiv*^[5] remains precedential at the time of institution, Petitioner stipulates not to pursue in the district court any ground raised or that could have reasonably been raised in IPR (i.e., under §§ 102 or 103 based on prior art patents or printed publications alone).” Paper 14, 2.

⁴ USPTO, Memorandum on Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (June 21, 2022), available at [uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf](https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf) (“Guidance Memo”).

⁵ *Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.*, IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (designated precedential May 5, 2020).

Moreover, any timing issues or inefficiencies are moot in view of our decision on Petitioner's Joinder Motion.

Accordingly, we decline Patent Owner's invitation for us to apply our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny the petition.

E. Secondary Considerations

Patent Owner alleges that the "Petitioner's failure to address known secondary considerations evidence makes the Petition deficient." Prelim. Resp. 81. Based on the specific circumstances of this case, we decline Patent Owner's invitation to impose a requirement on Petitioner to predict and address, proactively in this proceeding, the particular evidence of secondary considerations that Patent Owner may or may not assert based on past proceedings, or that Patent Owner currently asserts in the 1143 IPR. Patent Owner further contends that even if we do not impose such a requirement on Petitioner, "here Petitioner failed to address secondary considerations evidence at all." *Id.* at 81–82. But it is unclear how this is any different than imposing the requirement that Petitioner proactively address particular evidence of secondary considerations that Patent Owner may or may not assert as noted above.

We appreciate that consideration of evidence of non-obviousness is part of the obviousness analysis. Because, as explained below, we grant Petitioner's Motion, any evidence of secondary considerations will be addressed in the 1143 IPR. Based on the record before us, consideration of that evidence in this decision is premature.

F. Asserted Grounds

Based on the specific circumstances of this case, we determine it appropriate to address only one of the asserted grounds presented by Petitioner and only one of the claims challenged in that ground. Because

Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of success on at least that claim, we are able to consider the Joinder Motion, which we grant as explained below. And ultimately, it is simply the party (Petitioner) that is joined to the 1143 IPR. We see no need to provide any further guidance on the particular Petition in this proceeding. Further, the 1143 IPR is at an advanced stage, where virtually all Papers have been submitted, other than Patent Owner's Sur-Reply, which is due shortly after this institution decision.

We address claim 1 with respect to the Woycik ground below. Petitioner asserts that claims 1–4, 7–28, and 31–44 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Woycik in view of the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 15–71.

1. Woycik

Woycik “relates generally to computer-based systems used for ordering goods and services and, more particularly, to self-service terminals and software tools for administering self-service terminals.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 4. Woycik explains that “Point of Sale (POS) systems provide a means by which ordering and purchasing transactions can be carried out electronically at the store or other venue where the goods or services are supplied.” *Id.* ¶ 6. According to Woycik, “[s]elf-service POS systems typically have a central computer acting as a server and one or more terminals which are the individual client units that are used by customers to input their orders.” *Id.* ¶ 7.

Woycik describes an “administration tool application [that] includes a menu editor that enables the administrator to create and edit the interactive menu screens provided by the self-order application at the self-service client terminals.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 16. “The menu editor enables the administrator to,

during creation/editing of an interactive menu screen, select a template for the interactive menu screen and associate functions with the buttons included on the selected template.” *Id.* ¶ 19.

Woycik explains that “there are many possible arrangements and the administrative tool application may be located at a variety of locations, including . . . an offsite location provided that the administrative tool application is able to communicate with the server.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 17. One “approach is to have the administrative tool loaded on the central server 22 and then provide the chain operator 20 with web access to the central server 22.” *Id.* ¶ 75.

With Woycik’s administration tool, “the store owner or chain operator can carry out administration of the system using a simplified user interface that requires little if any training or experience with computers.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 80. “Furthermore, the web services platform provided by .NET can be used to provide remote administration by the chain operator from any Internet-connected computer (such as a home office computer) so that various store locations can be configured from a single computer.” *Id.* According to Woycik, “[t]he programming needed to implement this software architecture strategy is known to those skilled in the art.” *Id.*

2. *Petitioner’s Challenge Based on Woycik*

Initially, we note that there does not appear to be any dispute that Woycik’s administration tool would be understood as point of sale builder software by one skilled in the art. Prelim. Resp. 45–64.⁶ Indeed, based on

⁶ Patent Owner acknowledges that Woycik’s “administrative tool can ‘perform various administrative functions such as configuring kiosks, creating and editing menus and available food items, and specifying tax and payment features of the system.’” Prelim. Resp. 50 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 73).

the record before us, we do not see any less disclosure in Woycik regarding its administration tool than that disclosed in the '793 patent for its point of sale builder software.

Patent Owner presents a number of contentions that do not appear tied to any particular claim requirement. For example, Patent Owner presents contentions regarding the use of a local server *in addition to* the web server in Woycik, without clearly explaining how those contentions relate to any particular claim requirement. *See, e.g.*, Prelim. Resp. 59–60 (alleging that Woycik’s “local server as the middleman for all communications”). The actual dispute with respect to Woycik’s teachings as related to claim 1, appears to be based on whether Woycik teaches its administration tool running on a web server. *Id.* at 47–61. We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions regarding the other limitations recited in claim 1, which Patent Owner does not dispute at this time, and determine that Petitioner has established sufficiently that Woycik teaches those limitations. Our discussion below is directed to the disputed limitations.

Petitioner contends that Woycik teaches point of sale builder software (the administration tool) running on a web server (central server 22/84). Pet. 19–26 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1004 ¶ 75). Paragraph 75 of Woycik provides a number of different approaches. As explained above, Woycik expressly states that one “approach is to have the administrative tool loaded on the central server 22 and then provide the chain operator 20 with web access to the central server 22.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 75.

Patent Owner contends, for example, that, “[i]n each different version of [Woycik’s] administrative tool, the tool is used to update the configuration information at the in-store server 16.” Prelim. Resp. 50–51

(citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 75; Ex. 2008 ¶ 77). The testimony of Mr. Chen repeats Patent Owner's contentions.

Patent Owner does not appear to address the approach from paragraph 75 of Woycik cited by Petitioner. There does not appear to be any dispute that Woycik's central server 22 is a web server. And, as noted above, Woycik expressly states that "the administrative tool [can be] loaded on the central server 22." Ex. 1004 ¶ 75. That is, Woycik teaches its point of sale builder software (the administration tool) can be loaded on a web server (central server 22), consistent with Petitioner's contentions noted above. It is unclear, based on the record before us, what from claim 1 Patent Owner believes to be missing from Woycik. Moreover, we note that Patent Owner does not appear to allege any particular deficiency in our institution decision from IPR2022-01143, which was based on essentially the same arguments and evidence as before us now.

Based on the record before us, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of success on at least its challenge to claim 1 based on Woycik.

III. JOINDER

The Petition in this proceeding was filed on December 1, 2022. The 1143 IPR had an institution date of November 10, 2022. Petitioner filed its Motion on December 1, 2022, which is within one month of the 1143 IPR's institution date.

The statutory provision governing joinder in *inter partes* review proceedings is 35 U.S.C. § 315(c), which reads:

If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 or the expiration of the time for filing such a

response, determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314.

Section 315(c) “authorizes joinder of a person as a party, not ‘joinder’ of two proceedings” and “does not authorize the joined party to bring new issues from its new proceeding into the existing proceeding.” *Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC*, 973 F.3d 1321, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2020).

Here, Petitioner’s Motion requests no more than the statute allows. Petitioner represents that the current Petition and that from the 1143 IPR are identical in all substantive respects, including “identical grounds, prior art, and analysis.” Mot. 3. And although Petitioner used a different declarant that the one used in the 1143 IPR, there is no briefing remaining for the petitioner in the 1143 IPR, as Petitioner’s Reply in that proceeding was entered on May 16, 2023. *See* IPR2022-01143, Paper 16. Moreover, Petitioner agrees to use the declarant from the 1143 IPR if joinder is granted. *See* Paper 14, 2; Ex. 1030, 11:8–15:24; Ex. 1031, 16:13–17:7.

Given the advanced stage of the 1143 IPR proceeding, if Petitioner is joined as a party to the 1143 IPR, Petitioner’s only possible remaining role would be to present oral argument or potentially request rehearing or appeal our final written decision in the 1143 IPR if the initial petitioner in that proceeding drops out.

Patent Owner opposes the Motion, contending that joinder would increase complexity and costs, as well as delay the schedule of the 1143 IPR. Paper 8, 6–12. But those concerns are unfounded, particularly in view of the advanced stage of the 1143 IPR. Indeed, Patent Owner acknowledges that, at this stage of the proceeding, there is nothing left for Petitioner to deal with as far as briefing or declarant testimony in the 1143 IPR. *See, e.g.*, Ex. 1030, 18:2–20.

We see no increase in complexity and costs, or any schedule delay in the 1143 IPR as asserted by Patent Owner. Accordingly, we grant Petitioner's Motion, and add it as a party to the 1143 IPR.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we institute *inter partes* review and grant Petitioner's Motion for joinder.

V. ORDER

In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby:

ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an *inter partes* review of claims 1–4, 7–28, and 31–44 in the '012 patent is instituted on all challenges included in the Petition;

FURTHER ORDERED that, according to 35 U.S.C. § 314(c) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial that commences on the entry date of this Decision;

FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Joinder is *granted*, and Clover Network, LLC is hereby joined as a petitioner in IPR2022-01143;

FURTHER ORDERED that the grounds on which trial was instituted in IPR2022-01143 are unchanged, and no other grounds are added;

FURTHER ORDERED that Clover Network, LLC's role in IPR2022-01143 shall be limited to understudy, unless and until Lightspeed Commerce, Inc. is terminated from that proceeding;

FURTHER ORDERED that the Scheduling Order in place for IPR2022-01143 (Papers 9 and 15) shall continue to govern the proceeding after the joinder of Clover Network, LLC as a petitioner;

FURTHER ORDERED that all future filings are to be made only in IPR2022-01143

FURTHER ORDERED that the case caption in IPR2022-01143 shall be changed to reflect the joinder of Clover Network, LLC in accordance with the example below; and

FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Decision shall be entered into the record of IPR2022-01143.

IPR2023-00287
Patent 11,226,793 B2

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