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Johnson et al.

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[54] **CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY RECOVERY SYSTEM**

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[21] Appl. No.: **629,815**

[22] Filed: **Apr. 10, 1996**

[51] **Int. Cl.**[6] **H04K 1/00**

[52] **U.S. Cl.** **380/21**; 380/30

[58] **Field of Search** 380/30, 28, 23, 380/4

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Primary Examiner—David C. Cain
Attorney, Agent, or Firm—W. A. Kinnaman, Jr.

[57] **ABSTRACT**

A cryptographic key recovery system for generating a cryptographic key for use by a pair of communicating parties while simultaneously providing for its recovery using one or more key recover agents. A plurality of m-bit shared key parts (P, Q) are generated which are shared with respective key recovery agents, while an n-bit nonshared key part (R) is generated that is not shared with any key recovery agent. The shared key parts (P, Q) are combined to generate an m-bit value which is concatenated with the nonshared key part (R) to generate an (m+n)-bit value from which an encryption key is generated. The cryptographic system has the effective work factor of an n-bit key to all of the key recovery agents acting in concert, but has the effective work factor of an (m+n)-bit to any other combination of third parties. The quantity n is selected to make authorized key recovery feasible, but not so trivial as to permit routine decryption of intercepted communications, while the quantity m is selected to make decryption by unauthorized third parties infeasible. Means are provided for verifying that the shared key parts have been shared with the key recovery agents before permitting encrypted communications using the thus generated key.

27 Claims, 8 Drawing Sheets



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
104
106
108
102
P
112 BITS
Q
112 BITS
R
56 BITS
PQR VALUE
+
110
100
108
114
P+Q
BITS
R
56 BITS
INTERMEDIATE VALUE
112
1-WAY
HASH
116
RESULTANT KEY VALUE
118

FIG.1


COUNTRY X
COUNTRY Y
ALICE
COMMUNICATIONS
CHANNEL
BOB

FIG.1A



FIG.2A



FIG.2B



FIG.2C



FIG.3A



FIG.3B



FIG.3C



FIG.4

FIG.5A



FIG.5B


SENDER (ALICE)
GENERATE SECRET SPQR VALUE
502
GENERATE ENCRYPTED SPQR USING PUBLIC KEY OF RECEIVER
504
GENERATE ENCRYPTED P AND Q VALUES USING PUBLIC KEYS OF KEY RECOVERY AGENTS
506
PACKAGE ENCRYPTED SPQR, ENCRYPTED P AND Q VALUES AND RECOVERY INFORMATION INTO SESSION CONTEXT
508
GENERATE DIGITAL SIGNATURE ON SESSION CONTEXT
510
APPEND DIGITAL SIGNATURE TO SESSION CONTEXT TO FORM SESSION HEADER
512
GENERATE KEY FROM SECRET SPQR VALUE
514
ENCRYPT MESSAGE WITH KEY
516
TRANSMIT HEADER AND ENCRYPTED MESSAGE 1 TO RECEIVER
518
END

FIG.5


RECEIVER (BOB)
VALIDATE SIGNATURE ON SESSION CONTEXT
602
DECRYPT SPQR
604
VALIDATE ENCRYPTED PQ'S
606
GENERATE SECRET KEY FROM SPQR
608
DECRYPT ENCRYPTED MESSAGE 1 FROM SENDER
610
END

FIG.6

COUNTRY	ENCRYPT ALGORITHM	MAXIMUM ALLOWED KEY LENGTH (BITS)			PUBLIC KEYS			
		WITHOUT PQR INTRA-COUNTRY	WITH PQR INTER-COUNTRY		KEY RECOVERY AGENT 1	KEY RECOVERY AGENT 2	...	KEY RECOVERY AGENT n
			R = r1 XOR r2	ENTIRE KEY				
X	DES	INF.	40	64	1FCD38...	74901A...		30FA67...
	RC5	INF.	40	64	1FCD38...	74901A...		30FA67...
Y	DES	128	40	128	E52AC3...	F32AB7...	...	5EF200...
	RC5	128	40	128	E52AC3...	F32AB7...	...	5EF200...
Z	DES	64	64	128	6494FF...	66673E...		342781...
	RC5	64	64	128	6494FF...	66673E...		342781...
W	DES	00	00	128	AF88C2...	CBE8F9...		1BF87C...
	RC5	00	00	128	AF88C2...	CBE8F9...		1BF87C...
.	.	.	.	.	.	.		.
.	.	.	.	.	.	.		.

700

FIG.7

InductEV, Inc.
Exhibit 1025
Page 009



FIG.8

CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY RECOVERY SYSTEM

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

1. Field of the Invention

This invention relates to a cryptographic key recovery system and, more particularly, to a method and apparatus for generating a cryptographic key for use by a pair of communicating parties while simultaneously providing for its recovery using one or more key recover agents.

2. Description of the Related Art

Data encryption systems are well known in the data processing art. In general, such systems operate by performing an encryption operation on a plaintext input block, using an encryption key, to produce a ciphertext output block. The receiver of an encrypted message performs a corresponding decryption operation, using a decryption key, to recover the plaintext block.

Encryption systems fall into two general categories. Symmetric (or private key) encryption systems such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES) system use the same secret key for both encrypting and decrypting messages. In the DES system, a key having 56 independently specifiable bits is used to convert 64-bit plaintext blocks to ciphertext blocks, or vice versa.

Asymmetric (or public key) encryption systems, on the other hand, use different keys that are not feasibly derivable from one another for encryption and decryption. A person wishing to receive messages generates a pair of corresponding encryption and decryption keys. The encryption key is made public, while the corresponding decryption key is kept secret. Anyone wishing to communicate with the receiver may encrypt a message using the receiver's public key. Only the receiver may decrypt the message, however, since only he has the private key. Perhaps the best-known asymmetric encryption system is the RSA encryption system, named after its originators Rivest, Shamir and Adleman.

Asymmetric encryption systems are generally more computationally intensive than symmetric encryption systems, but have the advantage that they do not require a secure channel for the transmission of encryption keys. For this reason, asymmetric encryption systems are often used for the one-time transport of highly sensitive data such as symmetric encryption keys.

Data encryption systems of all types have attracted the attention of government intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies, since the same cryptographic strength that prevents decryption by unauthorized third parties also prevents decryption by intelligence or law enforcement officials having a legitimate reason for wanting to access the plaintext data. Because of such concerns, governments have either prohibited the use or export of strong encryption systems or have conditioned their approval on the use of weakened keys that are susceptible to key-exhaustion attacks (i.e., systematically testing all possible keys until the right one is found). Such weak encryption systems have the obvious disadvantage that they are just as vulnerable to unauthorized third parties as they are to authorized government officials.

One solution to this dilemma is the use of a so-called key recovery system, in which an encryption key is shared with a key recovery agent. The key recovery agent will reveal the key to a government requester upon the presentation of sufficient credentials (such as a court order), but will otherwise keep the key secret. Key recovery systems have the

advantage that they address the legitimate concerns of intelligence and law enforcement agencies while at the same time permitting the use of encryption systems that strongly resist attacks by unauthorized third parties. Several such systems are described in D. E. Denning and D. K. Branstad, "A Taxonomy for Key Escrow Encryption Systems", *Communications of the ACM*, vol. 39, no. 3, Mar. 1996, pp. 34–40, incorporated herein by reference.

One recently developed key recovery system is the system described in the copending application of C. W. Kaufman and R. E. Ozzie, Ser. No. 08/573,228, filed Dec. 15, 1995, entitled "DIFFERENTIAL WORK FACTOR METHOD AND SYSTEM", as well as in the similarly entitled, concurrently filed copending application of C. W. Kaufman and S. M. Matyas, Ser. No. 08/573,110, both of which applications are incorporated herein by reference.

The Kaufman et al. applications disclose a system in which only part of a cryptographic key is disclosed to a key recovery agent in each of one or more countries. Thus, as disclosed in these applications, a portion of a cryptographic key is provided to a key recovery agent so that an entity having access to the key portion (as pursuant to a court order) only has to ascertain the remaining key bits rather than the entire cryptographic key. The size of the key portion provided to the key recovery agent is such that the work factor involved in recovering the remaining key portion is reduced to a feasible level, though not entirely eliminated. The work factor for unauthorized third parties remains the same, however, hence the notion of a "differential work factor".

Although the system described in the copending Kaufman et al. applications addresses many of the shortcomings of previous key recovery systems, there remains the problem of a corrupt or compromised key recovery agent. Access to the partial key information provided to the key recovery agent will permit the discovery of the entire cryptographic key (although with some difficulty). This security exposure is a matter of concern to some users of cryptosystems, who might hesitate to entrust such critical key information to a key recovery agent over whom they have no control.

OBJECTS OF THE INVENTION

One object of the present invention is to provide a key recovery system that accommodates the competing demands of several different entities, including governments, corporate customers, hardware and software providers, law enforcement agencies and private individuals.

Another object of the present invention is to provide a key recovery system that can be implemented in software or hardware.

Another object of the present invention is to provide a key recovery system that does not require communication with a third party during message creation or connection setup.

Another object of the present invention is to provide a key recovery system that provides interoperability between users in different countries, even if it requires providing keys to multiple authorities simultaneously.

Another object of the present invention is to provide a key recovery system that uses publicly known algorithms.

Another object of the present invention is to provide a key recovery system whose design is open and can be implemented by multiple vendors based on published specifications.

Another object of the present invention is to provide a key recovery system that provides a key recovery capability independently for each country.

Another object of the present invention is to provide a key recovery system that provides, in a single system, the flexibility for different levels of security in different environments.

Another object of the present invention is to provide a key recovery system that provides the highest level of cryptographic security allowable by law.

Another object of the present invention is to provide a key recovery system that guards against a single point of attack (e.g., a corrupt key recovery agent).

Another object of the present invention is to provide a key recovery system that supports all forms of electronic communication.

Another object of the present invention is to provide a key recovery system that provides a scalable solution.

Another object of the present invention is to provide a key recovery system that supports both store-and-forward and interactive environments.

Another object of the present invention is to provide a key recovery system that does not require communication with a third party for installation (i.e., it works "out of the box").

Another object of the present invention is to provide a key recovery system that supports the policy option of requiring the collaboration of multiple key recovery agents to recover the key.

Another object of the present invention is to provide a key recovery system that allows an external verifier (without access to the key recovery keys) to have some level of confidence that the key recovery values are in compliance with an unpatched implementation of the invention.

Another object of the present invention is to provide a key recovery system in which a patched implementation that avoids sending the key recovery values cannot interoperate with an unpatched implementation which needs to validate them.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The present invention is based upon the "differential work factor" system described in the Kaufman et al. applications referred to above. The present invention contemplates providing one or more key parts to key recovery agents within the host countries consistent with the laws and regulations of the country where communication is taking place. The user may still retain a portion of the key which is unknown to any key recovery agent. This feature should satisfy users who may otherwise be reluctant to use a key recovery system.

A simple example will help explain the invention. The example will demonstrate how, for instance, one can achieve triple-DES protection against unauthorized third parties while presenting the government with only a single-DES work factor. Assume that a party in country X wishes to communicate with a party in country Y with a 168-bit key. To accomplish this, the two parties use a 280-bit value (PQR) which they randomly generate. The first two 112-bit portions (P and Q) are exclusive-ORed to generate one 112-bit value, which is appended to the remaining 56-bit portion (R) to generate a 168-bit resultant value. The 56-bit R value is never divulged to anyone. A one-way hash function is then used on the 168-bit resultant value to derive the session key (or any other key used by the parties).

The value P is encrypted with the public key of one key recovery agent in each country, and the value Q is encrypted with the public key of a second key recovery agent in each country. Therefore, if one key recovery agent was corrupt and revealed the value P, it would not pose a problem since the value of Q is still unknown to an attacker. Not knowing the value of Q, nor the value of R, the attacker would still be required to break a 168-bit key in order to decipher the communication. Users should find this solution to be more palatable than an system where the entire key is known to one or more key recovery agents. When the two companies communicate, the encrypted values of P and Q would precede the encrypted file. This solution assumes that electronic messages can be intercepted.

In the above example, a 168-bit key was used for illustration purposes. In general, however, the values of P and Q on the one hand and R on the other are independently variable and could be tailored for each country.

In its preferred form, the present invention offers much flexibility. For example, the invention is adaptable and amenable to each country's laws and regulations. There is built-in flexibility for the lengths of shared (P, Q) and non-shared (R) key portions. For communications between two countries, the key recovery rules could default to the lower limit on the length of R, resulting in the lower work factor. The key management can be done in a variety of ways that are consistent with today's standard industry practices.

Law enforcement agencies can always be sure that the key recovery agent gives them the correct information. They merely need to encrypt the information and compare it for equality with the intercepted encrypted block. This enables government to identify a potentially "bad" key recovery agent.

Keys are "made available" at the session level. This provides compartmentalization and appropriate access to encrypted data via an authorized court order. Sharing the private keys of a public key algorithm with a key recovery agent is a bad idea, since it gives access to encrypted messages received from others instead of messages sent to others. It also forces these keys to roll-over frequently in order to enforce appropriate compartmentalization. See Y. Frankel and M. Yung, "Escrow Encryption Systems Visited: Attacks, Analysis and Designs". *Crypto '95 Conference Proceedings*, August 1995, for more information on this topic.

The present invention provides a commercially acceptable solution to governments' needs for authorized access to encrypted data. It can also be used for commercial key recovery.

In this specification, the term "recovery" is used loosely to mean "made available." A secret value can be made available in different ways. It may be encrypted and made available to a third party or it may be encrypted and transmitted with the encrypted data, in which case it must be accessed via electronic means. The examples in this specification describe the latter approach.

The present invention contemplates sending a session context which contains enough information to: (1) allow the recipient to derive the key; (2) allow the recipient to verify the associated key recovery information; and (3) allow authorized entities the ability to recover components of the key.

The "differential work factor" may be set as part of a government or organization policy decision. That is, a government or organization may allow a user to retain a portion of the key which is unknown to any key recovery agent. This feature should help satisfy users who may otherwise feel reluctant about using a key recovery system.

The present invention addresses the communication needs of users and authorized key recovery agents located in different countries. It is applicable to a wide variety of

cryptographic algorithms and key lengths. However, for the purpose of this specification, we will use an example of triple DES with a total key length of 168 bits.

The present invention assumes the use of public key cryptography in operating with the key recovery agents. The invention does not assume the use of public key cryptography for key distribution between users. Although the examples of key distribution in this specification use only public key cryptography, one could just a well use a symmetric key system such as the Kerberos system, albeit with some modification of the software.

The present invention assumes that the public keys of users and key recovery agents are certified. The procedures and mechanisms to achieve this are well known in the art and are not part of the present invention.

It is assumed that each country may employ multiple key recovery agents. Each key recovery agent creates its own public and private key pair (e.g., RSA keys of 1024 bits). The cryptographic equipment used should be capable of handling variable key sizes. Each key recovery agent keeps the private key secret and publishes the public key.

Preferably, the key recovery agents' public keys, their certifiers' public keys, or secure means for obtaining these public keys are provided in the client hardware or software. This allows an encryption product to ship with a capability to operate as a turn-key solution "out of the box." A system conforming to the key recovery system of the present invention is preferably pre-configured with a country ID indicating the country in which the system is located and will operate. A user might also be able to configure the system with other information required by the key recovery protocol.

In a cryptographic product that has only a key recovery capability, the present invention prevents application programs from circumventing the key recovery system by directly invoking the encryption algorithm. Once invoked, the key recovery system ensures that the key recovery protocol steps are followed. That is, a key used for data privacy encryption will not be made available to the application program or user until after the protocol steps have been successfully completed.

Due care should be taken in replacing public keys due to roll-over.

The present invention does not attempt to address the ability of two patched implementations to interoperate. Two users are always able to "do their own thing" outside of the present invention. Nor does the present invention address the problem of lost or forgotten keys. That problem, if real, must be addressed by other mechanisms.

The present invention may be implemented as special-purpose hardware, as software executing on a general-purpose digital computer, or some combination of the two. By "software" is meant a program storage device—such as a direct access storage device (DASD) or read-only memory (ROM)—readable by a machine and tangibly embodying a program of instructions executable by the machine to perform method steps as described herein.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. **1** is a schematic block diagram showing the basic procedure of the present invention for generating an encryption key from P, Q and R values.

FIG. **1**A is a schematic block diagram of the basic communications system contemplated by the present invention.

FIG. **2**A is a schematic block diagram of a modification of the procedure of FIG. **1** in which the length of the R value may be varied on a per country basis.

FIG. **2**B is a schematic block diagram of one possible partitioning of the left and right halves of the SPQR value shown in FIG. **2**A.

FIG. **2**C is a schematic block diagram of another possible partitioning of the left and right halves of the SPQR value shown in FIG. **2**A.

FIG. **3**A is a schematic block diagram of the session context block transmitted to the intended receiver.

FIG. **3**B is a schematic block diagram of the session header transmitted to the intended receiver.

FIG. **3**C is a schematic block diagram of the message packet transmitted to the intended receiver.

FIG. **4** is a schematic block diagram of the recovery information transmitted to the intended receiver in the session context block.

FIG. **5** is a flowchart of the steps performed by the sender to prepare a message packet for transmission to the intended receiver.

FIG. **5**A shows the formatting of the SPQR block prior to encryption.

FIG. **5**B shows the formatting of the P and Q blocks prior to encryption.

FIG. **6** is a flowchart of the steps performed by the intended receiver to process message packet received from the sender.

FIG. **7** shows the global communications table containing country-specific data used by the communicating parties.

FIG. **8** shows a generalization of the procedure shown in FIG. **2**A.

DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

FIG. **1** shows a simplified version **100** of the procedure of the present invention for generating an encryption key for a pair of users who are located in different countries and wish to communicate privately. In accordance with the usual convention, these parties are referred to herein as Alice and Bob. Referring to FIG. **1**A, it is assumed that Alice is located in country X and Bob is located in country Y, and that the two systems are coupled via a communications channel. (References herein to "Alice" and "Bob" are to their systems unless the context clearly dictates otherwise.)

Although the example has only two users (Alice and Bob), the communication could be among more than two users. Also, although countries X and Y are shown in the example, the invention could also be used entirely within one country (and one set of key recovery agents).

To communicate with each other, Alice and Bob first agree upon a randomly generated secret value **102** referred to herein (for reasons that will become evident) as the PQR value. PQR value **102** comprises an m-bit P value **104**, an m-bit Q value **106** and an n-bit R value **108**. In the example shown in FIG. **1**, m is **112** and n is **56**, although other values of m and n could be used instead.

The P value **104** is shared with a first key recovery agent in each country, while the Q value **106** is shared with a second key recovery agent in each country, in a manner to be described. The R value **108** is kept as a shared secret between users Alice and Bob and not revealed to any other entity. The R value **108** constitutes that portion of the PQR value **102** which authorized parties (such as intelligence

agencies and law enforcement agencies) must ascertain using available cryptanalytic means, even after obtaining the P and Q values **104** and **106** from the key recovery agents. The length of the R value **108** thus determines the strength of the encryption procedure against the key recovery agents of a particular country acting in concert. In the example, the sizes of P, Q, and R are identical for countries X and Y.

To generate an encryption key, the P and Q values **104** and **106** are exclusive-ORed (XORed) with each other—i.e., combined by bitwise modulo **2** addition (**110**)—to produce a 112-bit resultant value **112**:

$$P \text{ XOR } Q$$

Although the XOR operation is used in the example, other combining operations could be used instead.

The resultant value **112** is then concatenated with the R value **108** to produce a 168-bit intermediate value **114**:

$$(P \text{ XOR } Q) \| R.$$

(Unless the context clearly dictates otherwise, "concatenation" as used herein includes interleaving of bits.)

The intermediate value **114** is then hashed (**116**) one or more times (altering inputs slightly in a predictable way) and the resultant key value **118** extracted from the generated hash values. For example, a 56-bit key value **118** could be extracted for single-DES encryption, or three 56-bit key values could be extracted for triple-DES encryption.

In the example shown in FIG. **1**, the PQR value **102** is identically partitioned into P, Q and R values **104–108** for each of the countries X and Y. In general, however, the partitioning may vary by country, as shown in FIG. **2**.

Referring to FIG. **2**, in this latter example Alice generates a secret starting PQR (SPQR) value **202**. SPQR value contains (2m+2n) bits, or 336 bits if (as assumed for this example) m is **112** and n is **56**. SPQR value **202** consists of two parts of equal length: a 168-bit left half **204** and a 168-bit right half **206**. (In general, the partitioning of SPQR into halves may be performed in an arbitrarily manner, such as selecting even bits for one half and odd bits for the other.) The left half **204** is subdivided to produce a P part **208** and r**1** part **210**, while the right half **206** is subdivided to produce a Q part **212** and r**2** part **214**. (In a similar manner, the partitioning of the parts **204** and **206** into subparts may be done on an arbitrary basis.) An R value **218** is obtained by generating (**216**) the exclusive-OR (XOR) product of r**1** and r**2**:

$$R = r1 \text{ XOR } r2$$

The P and Q parts **208** and **212** are made available to authorized key recovery agents; the r**1** and r**2** parts **210** and **214** and the derived R value **218** are retained by the users.

The manner in which the R value **218** is generated in this example allows the lengths of P, Q and R to vary from one country to another. Thus, the lengths of r**1**, r**2** and R may be zero, in which case P consists of the entire 168-bit left half **204** of SPQR **202** and Q consists of the entire 168-bit right half **206**. On the other hand, the lengths of P and Q may be zero, in which case r**1** consists of the entire 168-bit left half **204** of SPQR and r**2** consists of the entire 168-bit rightmost part **206**. More generally, R may vary in length between **0** and the length of halves **204** and **206** (168 bits in this example), depending on the country requirements.

In the example shown in FIG. **2**A, two (m+n)-bit quantities are generated to provide respective shared key portions (P and Q) to two key recovery agents in each country. However, the procedure could readily be adapted to provide more that two shared key values if there are more than two key recovery agents in each country. Referring to FIG. **8**, if there are m bits in the shared key portions, n bits in the nonshared key portions, and N key recovery agents in each country, one could generate N (m+n)-bit values H1–HN, provide m bits (Pi) of each (m+n)-bit value Hi as a shared key portion to a different key recovery agent, and XOR (**802**) the remaining n bits (ri) of each (m+n)-bit value Hi to generate the nonshared key value R. The key (K) could be generated by XORing (**804**) the m-bit shared key portions Pi with one another and concatenating the result (P) with R to generate a value (**806**) which is hashed (**808**) one or more times to generate the key K.

FIGS. **2**B and **2**C show an example of the partitioning of the SQPR value **202** on a per country basis. In this example Alice, located in country X, uses an R value **218** (=r**1** XOR x**2**) of 56 bits (FIG. **2**B). Alice accomplishes this by partitioning the left half **204** of SPQR **202** into a 112-bit Px part **220** and a 56-bit r**1**x part **220** and, similarly, partitioning the right SPQR half **206** into a 112-bit Qx part **220** and a 56-bit r**2**x part **220**.

On the other hand Bob, located in country Y, uses an R value of 0 bits (FIG. **2**C). Bob accomplishes this by partitioning (in a trivial sense) the left half **204** of SPQR **202** into a 168-bit Py part **228** and a zero-length r**1**y part (not shown) and, similarly, "partitioning" the right half **206** into a 168-bit Qy part **230** and a zero-length r**2**y part (not shown).

Alice's P and Q values Px (**220**) and Qx (**224**) are encrypted with the public keys of key recovery agents authorized by country X, while Bob's P and Q values Py (**228**) and Qy (**230**) are encrypted with the public keys of key recovery agents authorized by country Y. The encrypted P and Q values are "made available" to the key recovery agents by transmitting them with the encrypted data, as described below. In the example shown in FIGS. **2**B–**2**C, Alice has a 56-bit R value (Rx) computed from r**1**x (**222**) and r**2**x (**226**), which she does not divulge to any third party. Bob has no comparable Ry value, since his values r**1**y and r**2**y are of zero length (i.e., null).

FIGS. **3**A–**3**C and **4**–**6** illustrate the procedure for establishing a PQR value between Alice and Bob. In this example, Alice (the sender) in country X wishes to send an encrypted message to Bob (the recipient) in country Y, where country X and country Y require different sizes for R (the undivulged part of SPQR).

In brief, Alice's system creates a session header **312** (FIG. **3**B–**3**C) containing protocol information, generates a cryptographic key K (**118**) from information stored in the session header, and encrypts a first message (message **1**) with the key K to generate an encrypted message **1** (FIG. **3**C). The session header **312** and the encrypted message **1** (**314**) are sent to Bob. Bob's system first performs consistency checking on the protocol information in the header **312**. If the checking succeeds, Bob's system uses information in the session header **312** to regenerate the cryptographic key K. The key K is then used to decrypt the message **1** (**314**) received from Alice.

In the disclosed example, a session header **312** is appended to only the first message **314** of one or more messages making up a session. Alternatively, each message could have its own header **312** (in which case it would be a message header rather than a session header).

The procedure will be described in more detail. Referring to FIG. **5**, Alice's system begins by generating a 336-bit secret starting PQR (SPQR) value **202** (FIG. **2**A) (step **502**). The SPQR value **202** is used by both Alice and Bob to

generate a secret key K (**118**) using the procedure shown in FIG. **1**; the key K is used to encrypt and decrypt messages. This is accomplished by exclusive-ORing the 168-bit left and 168-bit right halves of SPQR to form the intermediate value (P XOR Q) || R shown in FIG. **1**. Thereafter, the key derivation process continues as described in FIG. **1**.

Next, Alice encrypts the SPQR value **202** with a public key of Bob's that is specifically intended for key distribution to generate an encrypted SPQR value SPQR' (step **504**). (It is assumed that each user employs one public and private key pair for key distribution and a different public and private key pair for signing.) The encrypted value SPQR', which is the logical equivalent of an encrypted key, is evaluated as:

$$SPQR'=ePUb(\mathrm{HASH}(T1);SPQR;\ \mathrm{SALT0})$$

where PUb is the public key of the receiver (Bob); SPQR is the SPQR value **202** (FIG. **2**A) generated in step **502**; SALT**0** is a 160-bit secret random value; HASH(T**1**) is a non-secret hash value (preferably, 128 or 160 bits); and T**1** is non-secret recovery information to be described below.

SALT**0** protects the encrypted SPQR value SPQR'. Even if a portion of the original SPQR value **202** becomes known, the remainder cannot be discovered via an exhaustive attack on the encrypted value SPQR'. SALT**0** is also used as an input to a public one-way function ("one-way" being used here in the usual cryptographic sense) to generate four additional salt values (SALT**1**, SALT**2**, SALT**3** and SALT**4**) used to encrypt the P and Q values in the manner described below. The one-way function ensures that it is easy to calculate SALT**1**-SALT**4** from SALT**0** but computationally infeasible to generate SALT**0** from any of these derived salt values.

HASH(T**1**) is a hash value calculated on the recovery information Ti using a public one-way hash function. HASH (T**1**) provides a form of "reverse signature" for the information in T**1**. A reverse signature strongly couples information to a secret; while anyone can calculate a reverse signature, only users that know all the secrets inside the encrypted block (and can thereby recreate the encrypted block using the public key) or know the private key (and can thereby directly recover the secrets) can verify a reverse signature. Further information on reverse signatures may be found in D. B. Johnson and S. M. Matyas, "Enhanced Optimal Asymmetric Encryption: Reverse Signatures and ANSI X9.44", *Proceedings of the* 1996 *RSA Data Security Conference*, San Francisco, Calif., 1996, incorporated herein by reference.

The values SPQR, SALT**0** and HASH(T**1**) are formatted into a block (FIG. **5**A), processed, and encrypted with Bob's public key. Preferably, this is done using the enhanced optimal asymmetric encryption procedure described in the above reference, although other procedures could be used as well.

Using the SPQR value **202** generated in step **502**, Alice next derives the appropriate Px, Qx, Py, and Qy values **220**, **224**, **228** and **230** (FIGS. **2**B–**2**C) for countries X and Y and encrypts these values with the public keys of authorized key recovery agents for countries X and Y, respectively, to generate encrypted P and Q values Px', Qx', Py' and Qy' (step **506**).

The encrypted P and Q values are those parts of the secret SPQR value **202** that are "made available" to the key recovery agents. That is, they can be obtained from a key recovery agent with an authorized court order or other provided-for mechanism. The encrypted P and Q values are defined as follows:

$$Px'=ePUx1(\mathrm{HASH}(T1);Px;\ \mathrm{SALT1})$$

$$Qx'=ePUx2(\mathrm{HASH}(T1);Qx;\ \mathrm{SALT2})$$

$$Py'=ePUy1(\mathrm{HASH}(T1);Py;\ \mathrm{SALT3})$$

$$Qy'=ePUy2(\mathrm{HASH}(T1);Qy;\ \mathrm{SALT4};)$$

where:

PUx**1** is the public key of key recovery agent **1** for country X;

PUx**2** is the public key of key recovery agent **2** for country X;

PUy**1** is the public key of key recovery agent **1** for country Y;

PUy**2** is the public key of key recovery agent **2** for country Y;

Px and Qx are the P and Q values **220** and **224** (FIG. **2**B) "made available" to authorized key recovery agents for country X;

Px and Qx are the P and Q values **220** and **224** (FIG. **2**C) "made available" to authorized key recovery agents for country Y;

SALT**1**, SALT**2**, SALT**3**, SALT**4** are 160-bit secret derived values generated as described for step **504**;

HASH(T**1**) is a 128-bit or 160-bit non-secret hash value generated as described for step **504**; and

T**1** is non-secret recovery information as described for step **504**.

The salts SALT**1**-SALT**4** protect the encrypted P and Q values. Even if a portion of P or Q should become known, the remainder could not be discovered via an exhaustive attack on the encrypted P or encrypted Q value. For example, consider the situation where Px and Qx are proper subsets of Py and Qy, respectively. Even if Px and Qx are obtained from key recovery agents via an authorized court order, the task of recovering R is not made simpler by first attacking Py and Qy (to recover a portion of R) and then attacking the remainder of R. The salt values SALT**1**-SALT**4** are specifically constructed to be different to avoid the situation where two blocks of equal value are encrypted with different public keys.

The HASH(T**1**) present in the encrypted SPQR value is also included in the encrypted P and Q values. This provides a strong coupling of the recovery information T**1** to the encrypted P or Q value, thereby providing the key recovery agents with a means for determining whether an encrypted P or Q value satisfies the stated conditions in a presented court order.

The P or Q value, the salt, and the HASH(T**1**) are formatted into a block (FIG. **5**B), processed, and encrypted with the public key of the key recovery agent. Preferably, this is done using the enhanced optimal asymmetric encryption procedure described in the paper of D. B. Johnson et al. cited above, although other procedures could alternatively be used.

Following the encryption steps **504** and **506**, Alice generates a session context block **302** (FIG. **3**A) containing the encrypted value SPQR' (**304**), the encrypted P and Q values (**306**), and the recovery information T**1** (**308**) (Step **508**).

Alice then digitally signs the session context **302** with her private signature key to generate a signature **310** (FIG. **3**B) (step **510**). The signature **310** couples the transmitted quantities together and permits Bob to validate that the received encrypted SPQR value **304** originated with the claimed sender, Alice. The signature **310** is appended to the session context **302** to form a session header **312** (FIG. **3**B) (step

512). (Alternatively, the signature could be omitted if repudiability were desired.)

Finally, a packet **316** containing the session header **312** and the encrypted message **1 (314)** are sent to Bob (step **518**).

Referring now to FIG. **6**, upon receiving the packet **316** (FIG. **3**C) from Alice, Bob's system first validates the signature **310** on the session context **302**, using Alice's public signature key (step **602**).

Bob then decrypts the encrypted SPQR value **304** (FIG. **3**A) using his private decryption key to obtain the original SPQR value **202** (FIG. **2**A) (step **604**).

Thereafter, Bob validates the received encrypted P and Q values **308** (step **606**). This is done by reconstructing the values Px, Qx, Py, and Py from the decrypted SPQR value **202**, encrypting these values with the public keys of the authorized key recovery agents for each country (X and Y), and comparing these produced values for equality with the encrypted P and Q values received from Alice.

Bob then regenerates the key **118** (FIG. **1**) from the decrypted SPQR value **202** (FIG. **2**A), using the procedure employed by Alice previously (step **608**). This is done only after determining in step **606** that the correct encrypted P and Q values **304** have been received from Alice. Key **118** is provided to a requesting application program on Bob's system so that it can decrypt the encrypted message **1 (314)** from Alice (step **610**).

Recovery information Ti is provided (1) so that Bob can validate the encrypted SPQR value **304** and the encrypted P and Q values **306** for each key recovery agent and (2) so that the key recovery agents can validate their own respective encrypted P and Q values.

FIG. **4** shows the components of the recovery information T1. The sender ID **402** enables the receiver to obtain the public key certificate needed to validate the signature **310** generated by the sender on the session context **302**.

The receiver ID **406** enables the receiver to determine that the message **314** is indeed intended for him or her.

The country-of-origin ID **404** and country-of-destination ID **408** permit the receiver to validate the contents of the session context **302** by reproducing equivalent encrypted P and Q values and comparing then for equality with the received encrypted P and Q values **306**.

The sender's and receiver's key recovery agent IDs **410** and **412** permit the receiver to validate that bona fide key recovery agents have been used in accordance with the procedure of the present invention. They also permit the public key certificates for each of the key recovery agents to be obtained. The key recovery agent IDs **410** and **412** also enable law enforcement to know which key recovery agents are capable of decrypting a user's encrypted P and Q values **306**. The default key recovery agent IDs **410** and **412** for each user may be carried in an extension to the X.509 version **3** certificate.

The (optional) unique session ID **414** permits the sender and receiver to identify the session.

The cryptoperiod **416** is specified by a starting and ending date and time for the use of the key. The P or Q value will not be released unless the period of the court order overlaps a portion of the cryptoperiod of the key. The key recovery system will enforce relatively short cryptoperiods (e.g., less than 1 day), and may be a policy decision of a country. This helps ensure that the session context **302** needs to be set up dynamically and therefore transmitted between the sender and receiver.

Creation date/time **418** denotes the date and time (UTC encoded) when the session context **302** was created. The receiver checks the date and time as part of consistency checking. The date and time must fall within the period of the court order in order to access the P or Q value.

The crypto algorithm ID **420** enables the procedure of the present invention to be parameterized. That is, the sizes of P, Q, and R can be made to depend on the cryptographic algorithm used for data encryption.

It is envisioned that the public key certificate for each user will adhere to the X.509 version 3 Certificate Standard. A v3 extension would desirably be capable of holding certain needed information about the PQR protocol, such as user ID, country ID, first key recovery agent ID and second key recovery agent ID. It is also envisioned that the sender's as well as the receiver's public key certificates must be made available to the PQR system. Thus, when the public keys of the users are made available for the purpose of effecting key distribution, the necessary information to perform key recovery will also become available, and can be validated. The certificate seems the natural place to carry this information. By incorporating a user's key recovery information in his/her public key certificate, there is less opportunity for a user to misuse the PQR system, e.g., by claiming a different country ID with more favorable key recovery options.

In a system where key distribution is performed using symmetric key cryptography (e.g., Kerberos), the same information could be stored and provided by a key distribution center (KDC). The KDC could also prepare the encrypted PQ values. A special version of Kerberos would be required in order to perform the consistency checking on the encrypted PQ values.

The information required by the system of the present invention is stored in a table called the global communications table **700** (FIG. **7**). The global communications table **700** contains information allowing the system to calculate the sizes of the keys and P, Q and R for specific algorithms and users located in different countries. It may also contain the public keys of key recovery agents authorized for each country. The numbers in the table are examples only to demonstrate the kind of flexibility the present invention permits. The variations are virtually unlimited. In particular, each country may have many key recovery agents.

For inter-country communications, the system of the present invention could determine Bob's country ID from his public key certificate or comparable system configuration information. Using Alice's origin country ID and Bob's destination country ID, the system will then calculate the maximum key length that Alice and Bob can use. This value is the smaller of the two key values. For example, for countries X and Y the key values for DES are 64 and 128 bits, respectively, in which case **64** is selected.

The lengths of Px, Qx, and Rx for Alice in country ID=X and Py, Qy, and Ry for Bob in country ID=Y are calculated. In this case, the PQR system will allow recovery of only as many bits as are required by the origin and destination countries. Therefore, the sizes of P, Q and R can vary depending on the country. However, the size and value of (Px XOR Qx) || Rx will always by equal the size and value of (Py XOR Qy) || Ry, thereby ensuring that the same key value will be calculated by Alice and Bob.

The present invention provides for interoperability between systems incorporating the invention and systems omitting the invention PQR, subject to export/import regulations of the relevant countries. A non-PQR system could not act as a sender and communicate with a PQR system unless both countries had no requirement for key recovery. This is so because the receiving PQR system would expect

to see encrypted P and Q values in the session context which it would be required to validate. A PQR system could not act as a sender and communicate with a non-PQR system unless there was a way for the sender to determine a set of default key recovery information for the receiver. If the sender could determine the country ID for the receiver and if the PQR scheme provides the IDs of two default key recovery agents for each country, then a PQR systems might be able to act as a sender and communicate with a non-PQR system acting as the receiver. But the receiver would still need to use the same key derivation algorithm using a received PQR value in the session context.

The random-appearing salts SALT**1**-SALT**4** used in the encrypted SPQR and the encrypted Px, Qx, Py, and Qy values must be generated in a way which allows Bob to verify that they are correct. As Bob does not know the private keys belonging to the key recovery agents, the only way to do this is to encrypt the plaintext values with the public keys of the key recovery agents and compare them for equality with the received values.

This means that the salts in the encrypted Px, Qx, Py, and Qy values must be derivable from the salt in the encrypted SPQR. One way to do this is to prefix a count field to SALT**0** and hash the result with a one-way hash function to produce a pseudorandom salts (SALT**1**, SALT**2**, SALT**3**, and SALT**4**) for the encrypted Px, Qx, Py, and Qy values, respectively. The count would contain a numerical value representing the order of the encrypted P or Q value in the session context. Doing it this way ensures that all derived salt values in the encrypted Px, Qx, Py, and Qy values appear independent; a corrupt key recovery agent cannot use a derived salt value to reduce the security of another encrypted P or Q value. In addition to supplying an authorized requester with a P or Q value, the key recovery agent can also supply the derived salt used so that the authorized requester can use the key recovery public key to verify that the correct decryption was done by the key recovery agent.

An authorized requester accesses the session context. The means to do this are not specified in the PQR framework. Both the authorized requester and the key recovery agent can have some level of confidence that the session context conforms to the PQR framework, by verifying the digital signature on the session context. Note that this verification may be done at any time by anyone and as often as desired, as only non-secret values are input to the signature process.

Both the authorized requester and the key recovery agent can verify that the user ID(s) and date/time values are valid, that is, are specified in the authorization to process the key recovery request. The other public information can also be validated as appropriate.

To get legitimate access to information encrypted under the present invention, it is contemplated that a law enforcement agency first obtain a warrant or court order to conduct wire-tapping against a specified target for a specified period of time. Next, the law enforcement agency must intercept the communications to collect the encrypted data. The law enforcement agency next brings the encrypted P and Q values to the key recovery agents, together with the court order. The key recovery agents privately decrypt the P and Q values and check the IDs and dates against the court order. If all requirements of the court order have been met, the agents then release the decrypted P and Q values to the law enforcement agency. The law enforcement agency then XORs the P and Q values together, performs an exhaustive search on R to derive the full key, and decrypts the information using the derived key. The requirement for an exhaustive search on R deals with the potential problem that the key recovery agents could be colluding with the law enforcement agency to conduct widespread key recovery. The exhaustive search requirement is designed to make such widespread abuse too expensive to carry out.

Several types of attacks may be considered when evaluating the present invention. One type of attack is based on corrupt key recovery agents. If one of the key recovery agents was corrupt and revealed its P value, it would not pose a problem, since the Q value is still unknown to the attacker. Not knowing the value of Q or the value of R, the attacker would still be required to break a 168-bit intermediate value (P XOR Q concatenated with R). Users should find this solution more palatable than a scheme where the entire key is recovered by the key recovery agents. As long as the key recovery agents do not collude, no attack is possible.

A corrupt key recovery agent is prevented from using the salt value associated with his encrypted P or Q to attempt to analyze another encrypted P or Q. Each salt appears independent since it was derived by passing the PQR salt through a one-way function.

Another type of attack is based on corrupt users. A basic assumption of the present invention is that if both users are corrupt, they can use their own encryption methods or bypass any software system checks. Therefore, the present invention does not seek to thwart an attack where both users are corrupt. This is a fundamental simplifying assumption.

If the sender is corrupt and does not send the key recovery values, the receiver will not be able to validate them. By detecting a corrupt transmission, the decryption process will not be enabled.

If the receiver is corrupt and does not verify the key recovery values, the sender has still transmitted them, allowing them to be accessed by key recovery agents as needed.

If a very long cryptoperiod is allowed, a pair of users can send the session context over a secure channel (for example, by meeting face to face) and then use this session context for a long time. This might pose a problem for accessing the session context. One solution is to require dynamic session contexts be used by specifying a limited cryptoperiod.

It is assumed that a public key infrastructure exists which is capable of providing certificates of public keys and for certificate management at the client devices. It is also assumed that each party can determine the country it is located in. This is important for the mobile users.

The present invention gives an individual a degree of data privacy that is very resistant to a key exhaustion attack by a non-authorized entity. Even for an authorized recovery, the remaining workfactor is nontrivial. Thus, a law enforcement agency can monitor (via key recovery) selected individuals, but mass monitoring is much more impractical. At the same time, the present invention addresses a law enforcement agency's need to monitor criminal activities, since a suspected criminal may be targeted and his or her encrypted messages recovered to help determine information.

Providing key recovery at the session level has several advantages. First, it is compartmentalized. There is a natural limitation of the key in time which hopefully corresponds closely with the time period of an authorized key recovery. Second, it is appropriate. Opening a private decryption key of a receiver to get messages from a suspected bad sender is inappropriate. Anyone can send a message to high-ranking officials. This does not mean that these officials should have their keys opened.

What is claimed is:

1. A method of generating a cryptographic key for use by a pair of communicating parties while providing for the

recovery of said key using a plurality of cooperating key recovery agents, said method comprising the steps of:

generating a plurality of shared key parts that are shared with respective key recovery agents;

generating a nonshared key part that is not shared with any key recovery agent;

generating said key as a function of said shared key parts and said nonshared key part; and

making respective ones of said shared key parts available to said key recovery agents to facilitate said recovery of said key using said key recovery agents.

2. The method of claim **1** in which said step of generating said key comprises the step of:

combining said shared key parts to generate a composite key part; and

generating said key as a function of said composite key part and said nonshared key part.

3. The method of claim **2** in which said shared key parts and said composite key part have a common length.

4. The method of claim **2** in which said shared key parts are combined by modulo 2 addition.

5. The method of claim **1** in which each of said key recovery agents has a public encryption key and a corresponding private decryption key, said step of making respective ones of said shared key parts available to said key recovery agents comprising the steps of:

encrypting said shared key parts using the public encryption keys of said key recovery agents to generate a plurality of encrypted shared key parts; and

transmitting said encrypted shared key parts over a communications channel from which said encrypted shared key parts may be provided to said key recovery agents.

6. The method of claim **1** in which said step of generating said key comprises the step of:

combining said shared key parts to generate a composite key part;

concatenating said composite key part with said nonshared key part to generate a resultant value; and

generating said key as a function of said resultant value.

7. Apparatus for generating a cryptographic key for use by a pair of communicating parties while providing for the recovery of said key using a plurality of cooperating key recovery agents, said apparatus comprising:

means for generating a plurality of shared key parts that are shared with respective key recovery agents;

means for generating a nonshared key part that is not shared with any key recovery agent;

means for generating said key as a function of said shared key parts and said nonshared key part; and

means for making respective ones of said shared key parts available to said key recovery agents to facilitate said recovery of said key using said key recovery agents.

8. The apparatus of claim **7** in which means for generating said key comprises:

means for combining said shared key parts to generate a composite key part; and

means for generating said key as a function of said composite key part and said nonshared key part.

9. The apparatus of claim **8** in which said shared key parts and said composite key part have a common length.

10. The apparatus of claim **8** in which said shared key parts are combined by modulo 2 addition.

11. The apparatus of claim **7** in which each of said key recovery agents has a public encryption key and a corresponding private decryption key, said step of making respective ones of said shared key parts available to said key recovery agents comprising the steps of:

encrypting said shared key parts using the public encryption keys of said key recovery agents to generate a plurality of encrypted shared key parts; and

transmitting said encrypted shared key parts over a communications channel from which said encrypted shared key parts may be provided to said key recovery agents.

12. The apparatus of claim **7** in which said means for generating said key comprises:

means for combining said shared key parts to generate a composite key part;

means for concatenating said composite key part with said nonshared key part to generate a resultant value; and

means for generating said key as a function of said resultant value.

13. A program storage device readable by a machine, tangibly embodying a program of instructions executable by the machine to perform method steps for generating a cryptographic key for use by a pair of communicating parties while providing for the recovery of said key using a plurality of cooperating key recovery agents, said method steps comprising:

generating a plurality of shared key parts that are shared with respective key recovery agents;

generating a nonshared key part that is not shared with any key recovery agent;

generating said key as a function of said shared key parts and said nonshared key part; and

making respective ones of said shared key parts available to said key recovery agents to facilitate said recovery of said key using said key recovery agents.

14. The program storage device of claim **13** in which said step of generating said key comprises the step of:

combining said shared key parts to generate a composite key part; and

generating said key as a function of said composite key part and said nonshared key part.

15. The program storage device of claim **14** in which said shared key parts and said composite key part have a common length.

16. The program storage device of claim **14** in which said shared key parts are combined by modulo 2 addition.

17. The program storage device of claim **13** in which each of said key recovery agents has a public encryption key and a corresponding private decryption key, said step of making respective ones of said shared key parts available to said key recovery agents comprising the steps of:

encrypting said shared key parts using the public encryption keys of said key recovery agents to generate a plurality of encrypted shared key parts; and

transmitting said encrypted shared key parts over a communications channel from which said encrypted shared key parts may be provided to said key recovery agents.

18. The program storage device of claim **13** in which said step of generating said key comprises the step of:

combining said shared key parts to generate a composite key part;

concatenating said composite key part with said nonshared key part to generate a resultant value; and

generating said key as a function of said resultant value.

19. The method of claim **1** in which a plurality of sets of key recovery agents are provided, each key recovery agent

in a particular one of said sets cooperating with the other key recovery agents in said set to recover said key.

20. The method of claim **19** in which said step of generating said shared key parts is performed for each of said sets of key recovery agents.

21. The method of claim **20** in which said step of generating said shared key parts comprises the steps of:

generating a plurality of key parts that may be combined with one another to generate said key, said key parts corresponding in number to the number of key recovery agents in one of said sets; and

extracting from each of said key parts, for each of said sets of key recovery agents, a shared key part that is shared with one of the key recovery agents in said set.

22. The method of claim **21** in which said extracting step comprises, for at least one of said sets of key recovery agents, the step of:

partitioning each of said key parts into a shared key part that is shared with one of the key recovery agents in said set and a nonshared key part that is not shared with any key recovery agent in said set.

23. A method of providing for the recovery of a cryptographic key using a set of key recovery agents selected from a plurality of sets of key recovery agents, each key recovery agent in a particular one of said sets cooperating with the other key recovery agents in said set to recover said key, said method comprising the steps of:

generating a plurality of sets of key recovery values, each of said sets of key recovery values corresponding to one of said sets of key recovery agents, each key recovery value in one of said sets corresponding to a key recovery agent in that set, each of said sets of key recovery values having the property that said cryptographic key is recoverable from the key recovery values in said set without requiring the key recovery values in any other of said sets; and

making the respective key recovery values of each of said sets of key recovery values available to the corresponding key recovery agents in that set to facilitate the recovery of said key using a selected one of said sets of key recovery agents and without requiring the cooperation the key recovery agents of any other of said sets.

24. The method of claim **23** in which each of said key recovery agents has a public encryption key and a corresponding private decryption key, said step of making of said key recovery values available to said key recovery agents comprising the steps of:

encrypting said key recovery values using the public encryption keys of said key recovery agents to generate a plurality of encrypted key recovery values; and

transmitting said encrypted key recovery values over a communications channel from which said encrypted key recovery values may be provided to said key recovery agents.

25. The method of claim **24** in which said encrypted key recovery values are transmitted over said communications channel along with a message encrypted under said key.

26. Apparatus for providing for the recovery of a cryptographic key using a set of key recovery agents selected from a plurality of sets of key recovery agents, each key recovery agent in a particular one of said sets cooperating with the other key recovery agents in said set to recover said key, said apparatus comprising:

means for generating a plurality of sets of key recovery values, each of said sets of key recovery values corresponding to one of said sets of key recovery agents, each key recovery value in one of said sets corresponding to a key recovery agent in that set, each of said sets of key recovery values having the property that said cryptographic key is recoverable from the key recovery values in said set without requiring the key recovery values in any other of said sets; and

means for making the respective key recovery values of each of said sets of key recovery values available to the corresponding key recovery agents in that set to facilitate the recovery of said key using a selected one of said sets of key recovery agents and without requiring the cooperation the key recovery agents of any other of said sets.

27. A program storage device readable by a machine, tangibly embodying a program of instructions executable by the machine to perform method steps for providing for the recovery of a cryptographic key using a set of key recovery agents selected from a plurality of sets of key recovery agents, each key recovery agent in a particular one of said sets cooperating with the other key recovery agents in said set to recover said key, said method steps comprising:

generating a plurality of sets of key recovery values, each of said sets of key recovery values corresponding to one of said sets of key recovery agents, each key recovery value in one of said sets corresponding to a key recovery agent in that set, each of said sets of key recovery values having the property that said cryptographic key is recoverable from the key recovery values in said set without requiring the key recovery values in any other of said sets; and

making the respective key recovery values of each of said sets of key recovery values available to the corresponding key recovery agents in that set to facilitate the recovery of said key using a selected one of said sets of key recovery agents and without requiring the cooperation the key recovery agents of any other of said sets.

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