

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

GOOGLE LLC,
Petitioner,

v.

GEOSCOPE TECHNOLOGIES PTE. LTD.
Patent Owner

Case No. IPR2023-01212
U.S. Patent No. 8,406,753

PATENT OWNER'S REQUEST FOR REHEARING BY THE DIRECTOR

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	2
II.	BACKGROUND OF THE CASE.....	3
	A. The Related Court Proceedings.....	3
	B. The Board’s <i>Fintiv</i> Analysis	4
III.	ARGUMENT.....	6
IV.	CONCLUSION.....	14

I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) and the Revised Interim Director Review Process¹, Patent Owner Geoscope Technologies Pte. Ltd. (“Patent Owner”) respectfully requests Director Review of the Board’s February 20, 2024 Decision Granting Institution of *Inter Partes* Review (Paper 14, “Decision”) of U.S. Patent No. 8,406,753 (“’753 Patent”).

In granting institution, the Board abused its discretion by misapplying the *Fintiv* factors that govern discretionary denial in view of a parallel district court proceeding under 35 U.S.C § 314(a). The relevant circumstances here are extraordinarily similar to those in the recent *AviaGames* proceeding, in which the Board exercised discretion to deny institution after analyzing the *Fintiv* factors. *AviaGames, Inc. v. Skillz Platform, Inc.*, IPR2022-00530, Paper 12 at 11-15 (PTAB Aug. 9, 2022). The Director granted review of that decision, vacating and remanding it **only** so that the Board could make a “compelling merits determination.” *AviaGames*, IPR2022-00530, Paper 14 at 3. In other words, the Director found no fault in the Board’s analysis of the *Fintiv* factors themselves in *AviaGames*—the remand was only for a separate merits-based determination. *Id.* The Board’s

¹ <https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/decisions/revised-interim-director-review-process> at § 3.A.

approach here was inconsistent with the remaining *AviaGames* analysis that the Director left intact.

Moreover, this Request presents an important issue of policy as to when discretionary denial is appropriate in the increasingly common scenario in which the claims of a challenged patent are invalidated by a district court before the Board rules on a petition for *inter partes* review (“IPR”). Guidance from the Director on this issue will promote uniformity and prevent inconsistent application of the *Fintiv* factors in proceedings involving these particular circumstances.

II. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

A. The Related Court Proceedings

On September 18, 2023, a district court ruled that the asserted claims of the ’753 Patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in two proceedings, one involving Petitioner Google LLC (“Petitioner”) and another involving Apple Inc.² Preliminary Response (Paper 10, “POPR”) at 17. The district court issued final judgments shortly thereafter in October of 2023, closing the district court

² These proceedings are *Geoscope Technologies Pte. Ltd. v. Google LLC.*, Civ. Action No. 1:22-cv-01331-MSN (E.D. Va.) (“Google Action”) and *Geoscope Technologies Pte. Ltd. v. Apple Inc.*, Civ. Action No. 1:22-cv-01373-MSN (E.D. Va.) (“Apple Action”).

proceedings pending Patent Owner's appeal. *Id.* at 17. Briefing was completed in Patent Owner's appeal on February 16, 2024.

By the time the district court issued its § 101 decision, the district court had issued *Markman* orders and the parties had completed both fact and expert discovery in the Google Action and the Apple Action. POPR at 21-23. This included extensive written discovery, many depositions of fact and expert witnesses, and expert reports (including those addressing the validity of the '753 Patent under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 based on the same prior art raised in the Petition). *Id.* at 21-22.

B. The Board's *Fintiv* Analysis

The Board considered the *Fintiv* factors, set forth below, to determine whether to exercise discretionary denial:

1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted;
2. proximity of the court's trial date to the Board's projected statutory deadline for a final written decision;
3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties;
4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding;
5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and

6. other circumstances that impact the Board's exercise of discretion,
including the merits.

Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential).

The Board found that (i) *Fintiv* factors 1, 2, and 4 weigh against discretionary denial; (ii) *Fintiv* factor 3 slightly favors discretionary denial; (iii) *Fintiv* factor 5 weighs in favor of discretionary denial; and (iv) *Fintiv* factor 6 is neutral. Decision at 9-16. The Board then concluded that “factors 1, 2, and 4 outweigh the remaining factors” and declined to exercise discretion to deny institution. *Id.* at 16.

In analyzing the *Fintiv* factors, the Board focused heavily on a determination that the § 101 issues addressed by the district court do not overlap with the §§ 102 and 103 issues to be addressed by the Board. For example, the Board stated that it “did not discern that the § 101 issues addressed in the Federal Circuit appeal would duplicate the anticipation and obviousness issues addressed here.” *Id.* at 11. Similarly, the Board found that the district court's § 101 ruling is categorically not “relevant to the issue of discretionary denial” because “there is no overlap of issues between this proceeding and the district court's judgment.” *Id.* at 16.

The Board also referred to the *AviaGames* decision cited by Patent Owner but gave it little weight, finding that it did “not have the benefit of the guidance provided by the Director's decisions in *Volvo* and *AviaGames*.” Decision at 12 n.6 (citing

Volvo Penta of the Americas, LLC v. Brunswick Corp., IPR2022-01366, Paper 15 (PTAB May 2, 2023) and *AviaGames*, IPR2022-00530, Paper 14). The Board found the same for *Snap Inc. v. Blackberry Ltd.*, IPR2020-00391, Paper 8 (PTAB Jul. 13, 2020)—another decision cited by Patent Owner in which the Board exercised discretion to deny institution in view of a district court’s prior invalidity determination under § 101 (*see* POPR at 18). Decision at 12 n.6.

III. ARGUMENT

The Board abused its discretion in analyzing the *Fintiv* factors by drawing a bright line that no “overlap” exists between § 101 issues and §§ 102/103 issues, and thus finding the district court’s prior § 101 invalidity determination to be irrelevant to the issue of discretionary denial. The Board relied heavily on the basic principle that § 101 issues are different from §§ 102/103 issues. Decision at 11, 16. But this is true for all petitions—these are different statutes addressing different bases for invalidating claims. This is not dependent on the facts at issue in the proceeding despite the *Fintiv* analysis requiring “a holistic look at the facts surrounding the parallel proceeding in each case.” *Fintiv*, IPR2020-00019, Paper 15 at 6 (designated informative); *see also* *Fintiv*, IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 6 (explaining that the Board “takes a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review” based on the “facts” pertaining to each *Fintiv* factor). If prior § 101 determinations were relevant for *AviaGames* and *Snap*,

there is no principled reason why they should not be relevant here as well. The legal interplay between § 101 issues and §§ 102/103 issues, as they relate to the *Fintiv* analysis, should be consistent across petitions and Board panels.

Here, the Board went so far as to state that “because there is no overlap of issues between this proceeding and the district court’s judgment, ***we do not find the court’s invalidity finding to be relevant to the issue of discretionary denial.***” Decision at 16 (emphasis added). By finding the district court’s § 101 ruling to be ***irrelevant*** to the issue of discretionary denial, the Board effectively adopted a bright-line rule that a prior invalidity determination under § 101 cannot be a basis for discretionary denial in view of the *Fintiv* factors, as patent claims cannot be challenged under § 101 in an IPR. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (“A petitioner in an *inter partes* review may request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent only on a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.”). As a result, under this approach, there effectively would be no basis for the Board to ever exercise discretion to deny institution in view of a district court’s prior invalidation of claims under § 101.

That approach is inconsistent with prior Board decisions—including the recent *AviaGames* decision which the Director reviewed and found no fault in the Board’s analysis of the *Fintiv* factors, including its reliance on a prior § 101 ruling

by a district court. As explained in the POPR, the facts in *AviaGames* and *Snap* that led the Board to discretionarily deny institution are remarkably similar to those here. POPR at 17-18. And, under those facts, the Board in *AviaGames* and *Snap* found that nearly every *Fintiv* factor favored discretionary denial specifically ***because*** of a prior invalidation under § 101. The Board’s approach here is inconsistent with those decisions and their reasoning, and threatens confusion over the proper approach.

As one example³, the Board in *AviaGames* found that factor 2 “weighs ***heavily*** in favor of denying institution” because, with its § 101 ruling, “the District Court has completed its consideration of the [challenged] patent.” *AviaGames*, IPR2022-00530, Paper 12 at 12-13 (emphasis added). By contrast, the Board here found the same factor to ***weigh against*** the exercise of discretionary denial, reasoning that, despite the termination of the proceedings, there is “no district court trial date scheduled” and “the date of any potential trial related to anticipation or obviousness challenges is uncertain ... but it is likely ... after the completion of this proceeding.”

³ Additional examples, supported by citations to *AviaGames* and *Snap*, are set forth in the POPR as Patent Owner pointed to the Board’s analysis of the *Fintiv* factors in those decisions as part of explaining why the factors support discretionary denial here. POPR at 19 (factor 1), 19-20 (factor 2), 20-21 (factor 3), 24 (factor 4), 25 (factor 5), 26-27 (factor 6).

Decision at 12. The same could have been said in *AviaGames*. *AviaGames*, IPR2022-00530, Paper 12 at 12 (“There is no trial date for consideration of the [challenged] patent in the district court because a non-final determination that the [challenged] patent is invalid was made on March 14, 2022.”). Yet, the Board treated this factor oppositely in these two proceedings under the same circumstances.

The Board here analyzed the *Fintiv* factors inconsistently with how the Board addressed the factors under virtually identical circumstances in *AviaGames* and *Snap*. The Board in *AviaGames* and *Snap* relied heavily on a district court’s prior invalidation of claims under § 101 to deny institution. Indeed, in *AviaGames*, the Board explained that “the District Court’s invalidity determination is ***the most important relevant circumstance***” impacting the issue of discretionary denial. *AviaGames*, IPR2022-00530, Paper 12 at 14-15 (emphasis added); *see also* POPR at 26-27 (quoting same). But the Board here found the ***exact opposite***—that the district court’s prior invalidation under § 101 is not even “relevant to the issue of discretionary denial.” Decision at 16. This discrepancy prevents consistent application of the *Fintiv* factors under identical facts. Thus, granting Director Review would serve an important policy objective—providing certainty and uniformity in how the *Fintiv* factors are analyzed in view of a prior § 101 invalidity determination.

The Board recognized Patent Owner’s reliance on the *AviaGames Fintiv* Analysis.⁴ *See, e.g.*, Decision at 10-12. But the Board gave little weight to the *AviaGames Fintiv* Analysis, finding that it “did not have the benefit of the guidance provided by the Director’s decisions in *Volvo* and *AviaGames*.” Decision at 12 n.6; *see also id.* at 11 (stating that “[t]he Director has additionally distinguished” the *AviaGames Fintiv* Analysis, citing the *AviaGames* Director Decision).

The Board misapprehended how the *AviaGames* Director Decision and *Volvo* Director Decision relate to the *AviaGames Fintiv* Analysis. Neither set aside or found error in the *AviaGames Fintiv* Analysis. In the *AviaGames* Director Decision, the Director stated that “the Board shall not deny institution of an IPR in view of a district court judgment of invalidity ***if the record prior to institution meets the compelling merits standard.***” *AviaGames*, IPR2022-00530, Paper 14 at 4 (emphasis

⁴ This paragraph and the subsequent ones describe different decisions by the Board and Director in the *AviaGames* proceeding. For clarity, (i) the decision analyzing the *Fintiv* factors (Paper 12) is referred to as the “*AviaGames Fintiv* Analysis” and (ii) the Decision on Director Review (Paper 14) is referred to as the “*AviaGames* Director Decision.” Additionally, the Decision on Director Review in *Volvo* (Paper 15) is referred to as the “*Volvo* Director Decision.”

added). The *AviaGames* Director Decision is entirely about the “compelling merits test”—none of it finds fault in the Board’s analysis of the *Fintiv* factors. *See id.* at 5.

Thus, as Patent Owner stated in the POPR, the Director necessarily reviewed the *AviaGames Fintiv* Analysis, but did not disagree with or take issue with that analysis. POPR at 18. If anything, the *AviaGames* Director Decision is an endorsement of the treatment of the *Fintiv* factors in the *AviaGames Fintiv* Analysis—including the critical importance the district court’s § 101 ruling played in that analysis—as the Director stated that “[i]f the Board finds the record does not rise to [the compelling merits] standard, the Board *will* exercise discretion to deny institution.” *AviaGames*, IPR2022-00530, Paper 14 at 4 (emphasis added). On remand, the Board found the petition did not present a compelling challenge on the merits and maintained its discretionary denial. *AviaGames*, IPR2022-00530, Paper 15 at 2-3.

Thus, contrary to the Board’s characterization here, the *AviaGames* Director Decision did not “distinguish[.]” the *AviaGames Fintiv* analysis. Decision at 11. Nor did it provide any contrary “guidance” as to how each *Fintiv* factor should be analyzed. *Id.* at 12 n.6. The *AviaGames* Director Decision merely explains that institution is required if a petition presents “compelling merits” even if the *Fintiv* factors support discretionary denial. *AviaGames*, IPR2022-00530, Paper 14 at 4. The *AviaGames* Director Decision did not fault or alter any of the Board’s underlying

Fintiv analysis, including the relevance of the prior § 101 ruling. The Board’s analysis here—that the district court’s § 101 ruling is categorically irrelevant to the *Fintiv* analysis—is inconsistent with the analysis of the *Fintiv* factors in *AviaGames* that the Director did not alter or criticize.

The *Volvo* Director Decision also does not contradict the *AviaGames* *Fintiv* Analysis. In that decision, the Director vacated the Board’s finding that it lacked statutory authority to institute on claims that were invalidated under § 101 by a district court but pending appeal. *Volvo*, IPR2022-01366, Paper 15 at 5-7. Additionally, the Director remanded for the Board to perform a *Fintiv* analysis, stating that “*AviaGames* recognizes that a *Fintiv* analysis should be conducted in scenarios like this, where a district court has rendered a non-final invalidity determination that some or all of the claims challenged in an IPR petition are invalid, even on grounds that cannot be raised in that IPR.” *Id.* at 8. Thus, the *Volvo* Director Decision stands for the proposition that the Board should conduct a *Fintiv* analysis under the circumstances present here. That is not disputed here—both parties addressed the *Fintiv* factors in their papers.

Contrary to the Board’s determination, the *Volvo* Director Decision does not provide new “guidance” on the application of the *Fintiv* factors nor does it demonstrate any error in the *AviaGames* *Fintiv* Analysis. Decision at 12 n.6. If anything, the *Volvo* Director Decision supports Patent Owner’s position. The

Director’s reliance on the *AviaGames* Director Decision and instruction to the Board to “evaluate *Fintiv* factors 1-5” in view of a district court’s prior § 101 invalidity determination further confirm that such determination is relevant to the issue of discretionary denial. *Volvo*, IPR2022-01366, Paper 15 at 8 (citing *AviaGames*, IPR2022-00530, Paper 14 at 3). If the district court’s § 101 invalidity determination was categorically irrelevant to the issue of discretionary denial—as the Board found here (Decision at 20)—the Director’s remand for evaluation of the *Fintiv* factors in view of that determination would be unnecessary.

Additionally, the Board gave little credit to the *AviaGames* *Fintiv* Analysis because “[o]ther panels decisions are not binding.” *Id.* Although the *AviaGames* *Fintiv* Analysis is not precedential, the Director reviewed that decision and found no error in its treatment of the *Fintiv* factors. Despite this—and despite the similarity of circumstances—the Board here analyzed the *Fintiv* factors significantly differently from how they were analyzed in the *AviaGames* *Fintiv* Analysis.

At a minimum, this creates an inconsistency in how the *Fintiv* factors are analyzed where a district court has invalidated claims under § 101 prior to institution. Harmonizing the analysis of the *Fintiv* factors under these circumstances would promote uniformity and predictability in the Board’s institution decisions. Patent Owner respectfully submits that the approach in *AviaGames*—which gives weight to the district court’s § 101 invalidity determination—is more effective than the

Board’s approach here—which found the district court’s § 101 invalidity determination to be irrelevant (Decision at 16)—in promoting the “efficiency and integrity of the system.” *Fintiv*, IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 6.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, Patent Owner respectfully requests that the Director grant review of the Board’s decision to institute an *inter partes* review, vacate that decision, and remand for further proceedings consistent with the Director’s guidance.

Case No. IPR2023-01212
U.S. Patent No. 8,406,753

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: March 5, 2024

/Ryan J. Singer/

Ryan J. Singer (Reg. No. 79,736)
Christopher M. Gerson (*pro hac vice*)
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP
919 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10022
Tel: (212) 756-2000
Fax: (212) 593-5955
ryan.singer@srz.com
chris.gerson@srz.com

*Counsel for Patent Owner
Geoscope Technologies Pte. Ltd.*

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the foregoing **Patent Owner's Request for Rehearing by the Director**, was served on March 5, 2024 *via* email directed to counsel of record and by filing documents through the Patent Trial and Appeal Case Tracking System (P-TACTS):

Lead Counsel: Patrick C. Keane, Esq. Registration No. 32,858 BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC 1737 King Street, Suite 500 Alexandria, Virginia 22314 Direct Telephone (703) 838-652 2 Main Facsimile (703) 836-2021 patrick.keane@bipc.com	Backup Counsel: Roger H. Lee, Esq. Registration No. 46,317 BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC 1737 King Street, Suite 500 Alexandria, Virginia 22314 Direct Telephone (703) 838-6545 Main Facsimile (703) 836-2021 roger.lee@bipc.com
Backup Counsel : Matthew L. Fedowitz, Esq. Registration No. 61,386 BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC 1700 K Street, NW, Suite 300 Washington, DC 20006 Direct Telephone (202) 452-7306 Main Facsimile (202) 452-7989 matthew.fedowitz@bipc.com	Backup Counsel: Andrew R. Cheslock, Esq. Registration No. 68,577 BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC 1737 King Street, Suite 500 Alexandria, VA 22314 Direct Telephone (703) 838-6523 Main Facsimile (703) 836-2021 andrew.cheslock@bipc.com

Backup Counsel: Mythili Markowski, Ph.D., Esq. Registration No. 67,063 BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC 1700 K Street, N.W., Suite 300 Washington, DC 20006 Direct Telephone (202) 452-7314 Main Facsimile (202) 452-7989 mythili.markowski@bipc.com	Backup Counsel: Samuel Harrod, Esq. Registration No. 79,148 BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC Union Trust Building, 501 Grant Street, Suite 200 Pittsburgh, PA 15219 Direct Telephone (412) 562-8805 Main Facsimile (412) 562-1041 samuel.harrod@bipc.com
Backup Counsel: Ralph G. Fischer, Esq. Registration No. 55,179 BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC Union Trust Building 501 Grant Street, Suite 200 Pittsburgh, PA 15219 Direct Telephone (412) 392-2121 Main Facsimile (412) 562-1041 ralph.fischer@bipc.com	

Dated: March 5, 2024

/Ryan J. Singer/

Ryan J. Singer
Registration No. 79,736
Lead Counsel for Patent Owner
SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL LLP
919 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10022
Tel: (212) 756-2000
Fax: (212) 593-5955
ryan.singer@srz.com

*Counsel for Patent Owner
Geoscope Technologies Pte. Ltd.*