PUBLIC VERSION

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

CIRRUS LOGIC, INC.; AND
OMNIVISION TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INCORPORATED,
Petitioners,

v.

GREENTHREAD LLC
Patent Owner

Case: IPR2024-00001[1]
U.S. Patent No. 10,734,481

PATENT OWNER'S OPPOSITION TO PETITIONERS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXHIBIT 2072 (RAO DECLARATION)

[1] Texas Instruments Incorporated, which filed a petition in IPR2024-00772, has been joined as a party to this proceeding.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND FACTS 3

III. THE BOARD SHOULD DENY PETITIONERS' MOTION 4

A. Rules 602 and 802 do not apply to testimony from corporate representatives. 4

B. Petitioners' Motion is unsupported by the record. 5

1. Petitioners' personal knowledge arguments are baseless. 6

2. Greenthread's licenses are not hearsay. 11

3. Petitioners' other hearsay arguments are baseless. 12

C. Petitioners' arguments go to the weight of evidence, not it's admissibility. 13

IV. CONCLUSION 14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

City of Chicago v. Reliable Truck Parts Co., Inc.,
822 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Ill. 1993) 7

Dan Ryan Builders W. Va., LLC v. Main St. Am. Assurance Co.,
452 F. Supp. 3d 411 (D.S.C. 2020) 7

DataMill, Inc. v. U.S.,
91 Fed. Cl. 722 (Fed. Cl. 2010) 6

Humphreys v. Bank of Am.,
557 Fed. Appx. 416 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2014) 5

Incyte Corp. v. Concert Pharm., Inc.,
IPR2017-01256, Paper 119 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 8, 2019) 13

Izett v. Crown Asset Mgmt., LLC,
2019 WL 4845575 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2019) 11

Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 540 (5th Cir. 1994) 11

Machinex Indus., Inc. v. JJG IP Holdings, LLC,
IPR2020-00899, Paper 45, 2021 WL 4876262 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 4, 2021) 13

Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Eight kHz, LLC,
IPR2023-01003, Paper 61, 2025 WL 43710 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 7, 2025) 4

Microsoft Corp. v. Parallel Networks Licensing, LLC,
IPR2015-00485, Paper 81 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 11, 2016) 13

Parker v. Freedom Mortg. Corp.,
2020 WL 13605540 (E.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2020) 5

Persian Gulf Inc. v. BP W. Coast Prods. LLC,
632 F. Supp. 3d 1108 (S.D. Cal. 2022) 5

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. New Horizont, Inc.,
2008 WL 1977522 (E.D. Pa. May 7, 2008).....5

U.S. v. Skeddle,
981 F. Supp. 1069 (N.D. Ohio 1997) 12

Univ. Healthsystem Consortium v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc.,
68 F. Supp. 3d 917 (N.D. Ill. 2014).....5

Other Authorities

37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c).....4, 14

Fed. R. Ev. 602.....1, 6, 13

Fed. R. Ev. 801(c)(2) 11

Fed. R. Ev. 802(c)(2) 12

EXHIBIT LIST

Exhibit No.	Description	Submitted Previously?
Ex. 2001	*Greenthread, LLC v. Intel Corp.*, No. 6:22-cv-00105-ADA, Dkt. 1 (Complaint) (W.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2022)	X
Ex. 2002	Definition of "privity" in Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) available from Westlaw at westlaw.com	X
Ex. 2003	*Greenthread, LLC v. Intel Corp.*, 6:22-cv-00105-ADA, Dkt. 38 (First Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement) (W.D. Tex., filed Apr. 29, 2022)	X
Ex. 2004	*Greenthread, LLC v. Intel Corp.*, No. 6:22-cv-00105-ADA, Dkt. 113 (Redacted Memorandum Opinion and Order) (W.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2022)	X
Ex. 2005	*Greenthread, LLC v. Intel Corp.*, 6:22-cv-00105-ADA, Dkt. 38-8 (Greenthread's Amended Preliminary Infringement Contentions) (W.D. Tex., filed Apr. 29, 2022)	X
Ex. 2006	*Greenthread, LLC v. Intel Corp.*, 6:22-cv-00105-ADA, Dkt. 38-12 (Exs. D-1, D-2, D-3, D-6 to Greenthread's Preliminary Infringement Contentions) (W.D. Tex., filed Apr. 29, 2022)	X
Ex. 2007	*Greenthread, LLC v. Intel Corp.*, 6:22-cv-00105-ADA, Dkt. 49 (Notice of Appearance of Additional Counsel) (W.D. Tex., filed June 9, 2022)	X
Ex. 2008	Petition (Paper 1) in *Sony Group Corp. v. Greenthread, LLC*, IPR2023-00376	X

Exhibit No.	Description	Submitted Previously?
Ex. 2009	*Greenthread, LLC v. Dell Inc.*, No. 6:22-cv-105-ADA, Dkt. 120 (Second Amended Complaint)	X
Ex. 2010	*Greenthread, LLC v. Intel Corp.*, 6:22-cv-00105-ADA, Dkt. 135 (Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice of L. Popovski on Behalf of Sony) (W.D. Tex., filed January 30, 2023)	X
Ex. 2011	Email communication from Patent Owner's counsel to Petitioner's counsel dated October 20, 2023	X
Ex. 2012	Email Attachment – Cirrus Logic Technical Support Article Number 000207340	X
Ex. 2013	Email Attachment - Cirrus Logic Investor Presentation as of April 28, 2015	X
Ex. 2014	Email Attachment - GlobalFoundries 2022 Capital Markets Day, available at https://investors.gf.com/static-files/65f5f1b9-2aea-47a3-8455-10413c6560f4	X
Ex. 2015	Email Attachment - Intel RealSense Product Family D400 Series, dated 2019	X
Ex. 2016	Email communication from Petitioner's counsel to Patent Owner's counsel dated October 24, 2023	X
Ex. 2017	Email communication from Patent Owner's counsel to Board, copying Petitioner's counsel dated November 1, 2023	X
Ex. 2018	*Greenthread, LLC v. Cirrus Logic, Inc.*, No. 1:23-cv-00369 (Supplemental Preliminary Infringement Contentions) (W.D. Tex., served Oct. 13, 2023)	X
Ex. 2019	*Greenthread, LLC v. Cirrus Logic, Inc.*, No. 1:23-cv-00369, Dkt. 29 (Scheduling Order) (W.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2023)	X

Exhibit No.	Description	Submitted Previously?
Ex. 2020	Article entitled "Cirrus Logic Helps Ease PC Industry Transition to New MIPI SoundWire® Interface" available at https://investor.cirrus.com/news-and-events/investor-news/news-details/2023/Cirrus-Logic-Helps-Ease-PC-Industry-Transition-to-New-MIPI-SoundWire-Interface/default.aspx	X
Ex. 2021	*Greenthread, LLC v. Intel Corp.*, 6:22-cv-00105-ADA, Dkt. 120-8, Greenthread's Amended Preliminary Infringement Contentions (W.D. Tex., filed Jan. 23, 2023)	X
Ex. 2022	Confidential agreement	X
Ex. 2023	CS42L42, Low Power Audio Codec with SoundWire and Audio Processing, available at https://www.cirrus.com/pubs/proBulletin/cs42l43-cs36l56-bulletin.pdf	X
Ex. 2024	Cirrus Logic Immersive PC Audio Solution, available at https://www.cirrus.com/pubs/proBulletin/cs42l43-cs36l56-bulletin.pdf	X
Ex. 2025	Cirrus Logic – What Drives Our Success, available at https://investor.cirrus.com/company-overview/what-drives-our-success/default.aspx	X
Ex. 2026	Cirrus Logic, Inc. Terms and Conditions of Sale, available at https://www.cirrus.com/legal/productterms/	X
Ex. 2027	*Greenthread, LLC v. OmniVision Technologies Inc.*; 2:23-cv-212, Dkt. 1 (Complaint) (E.D. Tex May 10, 2023)	X
Ex. 2028	Confidential declaration	X

Exhibit No.	Description	Submitted Previously?
Ex. 2029	*Greenthread, LLC v. OmniVision Technologies Inc.*, 2:23-00212, Preliminary Infringement Contentions for OmniVision Technologies Inc.	X
Ex. 2030	Deep Dive Teardown of the PlayStation VR2 CFIZVR1 VR Headset, available at https://www.techinsights.com/blog/deep-dive-teardown-playstation-vr2-cfi-zvr1-vr-headset	X
Ex. 2031	Intel RealSense Product Family D400 Series, dated September 2023	X
Ex. 2032	Confidential declaration	X
Ex. 2033	GlobalFoundries Annual Report on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2022, available at https://investors.gf.com/static-files/cc73efd0-09c1-442a-b4dd-0bcb74610e31	X
Ex. 2034	Confidential agreement	X
Ex. 2035	TechInsights Report on Sony Xperia 5111	X
Ex. 2036	TechInsights Report Ad	X
Ex. 2037	Email communication from Petitioner's counsel to Patent Owner's counsel dated between January 9, 2024 through January 10, 2024	X
Ex. 2038	Email communication from Petitioner's counsel to Patent Owner's counsel dated between October 20, 2023 through October 31, 2023	X

Exhibit No.	Description	Submitted Previously?
Ex. 2039	*Greenthread, LLC v. Intel Corp.*, No. 6:22-cv-00105-ADA, Dkt. 7 (summons returned executed) (W.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2022)	X
Ex. 2040	Petition (Paper 2) in *Sony Group Corp. v. Greenthread, LLC*, IPR2023-00324	X
Ex. 2041	Petition (Paper 3) in *Sony Group Corp. v. Greenthread, LLC*, IPR2023-00325	X
Ex. 2042	Petition (Paper 1) in *Sony Group Corp. v. Greenthread, LLC*, IPR2023-00375	X
Ex. 2043	*Greenthread, LLC v. OmniVision Technologies Inc.*; 2:23-cv-212 (OmniVision's Responses and Objections to Greenthread's Fourth Set of Common Interrogatories)	X
Ex. 2044	Email communication from Petitioner's counsel to Patent Owner's counsel dated between November 28, 2023 through December 6, 2023	X
Ex. 2045	Samsung Supplier List, dated June 8, 2022, available at https://image-us.samsung.com/SamsungUS/home/pdf/062822/2022_Supplier_List_220608_F.pdf	X
Ex. 2046	Email communication to Petitioner's counsel attaching production dated October 5, 2023	X
Ex. 2047	Email communication to Petitioner's counsel attaching production dated June 30, 2023	X
Ex. 2048	*Greenthread, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al*, EDTX-2-19-cv-00147, Dkt. 1 (Complaint) (E.D.Tex., April 30, 2019)	X

Exhibit No.	Description	Submitted Previously?
Ex. 2049	*Greenthread, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al*, EDTX-2-19-cv-00147, Dkt. 6 (Order granting Motion for Extension of Time, and Waiver of Foreign Service Requirement) (E.D.Tex., May 31, 2019)	X
Ex. 2050	Correspondence from Patent Owner's counsel to Petitioner's counsel dated May 4, 2023	X
Ex. 2051	Webpage from DigiKey for Cirrus Logic CS35L41 (https://www.digikey.com/en/products/detail/cirrus-logic-inc/CS35L41-CWZR/16377919)	X
Ex. 2052	Webpage from DigiKey for Cirrus Logic CS40L25 (https://www.mouser.com/ProductDetail/Cirrus-Logic/CS40L25-CWZR?qs=xZ%2FP%252Ba9zWqYWfeisEtcaTA%3D%3D)	X
Ex. 2053	Webpage from Mouser for Cirrus Logic CS40L25 (https://www.mouser.com/ProductDetail/Cirrus-Logic/CS40L25-CWZR?qs=xZ%2FP%252Ba9zWqYWfeisEtcaTA%3D%3D)	X
Ex. 2054	Webpage from ArduCam for OmniVision OV9282 (https://www.arducam.com/product/ov9282-monochrome-globalshutter-camera-module-depthai-oak/)	X
Ex. 2055	Webpage from Uctronics for OmniVision OV9282 (https://www.uctronics.com/ov9282-monochrome-global-shutter-camera-module-depthai-oak.html)	X
Ex. 2056	Excerpts of the Deposition Transcript of Scott Warrick taken on June 7, 2024 along with marked Exhibits 3-5 in *Greenthread, LLC v. Cirrus Logic, Inc.*, 1:23-cv-00369-DC (W.D. Tex.)	X

Exhibit No.	Description	Submitted Previously?
Ex. 2057	Declaration of Dr. Alexander Glew	X
Ex. 2058	Transcript of Deposition of Dr. Sanjay Banerjee taken on July 19, 2024	X
Ex. 2059	Excerpts from Chen, J. Y., CMOS Devices and Technology for VLSI, Prentice-Hall (1990)	X
Ex. 2060	U.S. Patent No. 5,384,476 ("Nishizawa")	X
Ex. 2061	CV of Dr. Alexander Glew	X
Ex. 2062	U.S. Patent No. 8,421,195	X
Ex. 2063	U.S. Patent No. 9,190,502	X
Ex. 2064	U.S. Patent No. 11,121,222	X
Ex. 2065	U.S. Patent No. 10,510,842	X
Ex. 2066	U.S. Patent No. 11,316,014	X
Ex. 2067	File History of U.S. Patent No. 8,421,195	X
Ex. 2068	File History of U.S. Patent No. 9,190,502	X
Ex. 2069	File History of U.S. Patent No. 11,121,222	X

Exhibit No.	Description	Submitted Previously?
Ex. 2070	File History of U.S. Patent No. 10,510,842	X
Ex. 2071	File History of U.S. Patent No. 11,316,014	X
Ex. 2072	Declaration of Mohan Rao	X
Ex. 2073	Statista Information	X
Ex. 2074	*Greenthread, LLC v. Cirrus Logic Inc.*, No. 1:23-cv-369-DC-DTG, Dkt. 53 (Claim Construction Order and Memorandum in Support Thereof) (W.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2024)	X
Ex. 2075	*Greenthread, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Et Al.*, 2:19-cv-00147, Dkt. No. 67 (Claim Construction Memorandum Opinion and Order) (E.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2020)	X
Ex. 2076	*Intel Corp. v. Greenthread LLC*, IPR2023-00420, Ex. 1003 (Dr. Blalock Declaration), Dec. 28, 2022	X
Ex. 2077	*Greenthread, LLC v. Cirrus Logic, Inc.*, No. 1:23-cv-00369-DC, Dkt. 86 (W.D. Tex. Jul. 11, 2024)	X
Ex. 2078	Transcript of Deposition of Dr. Sanjay Banerjee, taken on December 6, 2024	X

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioners are at a loss to explain why [redacted], two large sophisticated semiconductor companies, would pay collectively $10,000,000 for licenses to the family of challenged patents—*and no other patents*—when Greenthread had never threatened litigation or even contacted either company. Either company or both could have joined or copied [redacted] then-pending IPR petitions at little cost, if they considered Greenthread's patents invalid. The simplest explanation for [redacted] decision to take a license is that they believed that Greenthread's patents were valid and valuable. Unfortunately for Petitioners, that conclusion is inconsistent with the result they want here. To avoid the facts, Petitioners seek to exclude a declaration from Dr. Rao, the patent's inventor and Greenthread's founder, by claiming that Dr. Rao has no personal knowledge of the licenses.

Petitioners' motion can be denied for at least two reasons. First, the rules of evidence Petitioners invoke, (Federal Rule of Evidence 602, requiring personal knowledge, and 802, barring hearsay) do not apply to testimony as a corporate representative. Dr. Rao's testimony is offered as an employee and representative of

Patent Owner Greenthread. Therefore, the rules that Petitioners invoke are simply inapplicable.[2]

Second, even if Rules 602 and 802 applied, Petitioners' argument has no basis in the record whatsoever. Petitioners make the blanket assertion that Dr. Rao knows nothing of Greenthread's patent licenses or business affairs and therefore his declaration should be stricken in its entirety. But Dr. Rao's deposition testimony tells a very different story. Dr. Rao testified that he was and is involved in all of Greenthread's business decisions and provided detailed answers to Petitioners' questions about Greenthread's licenses and his personal involvement with Greenthread's decision to enter them.

The only place where Petitioners address *specific* facts of which Dr. Rao purportedly lacks personal knowledge is a "*see*, *e.g.*" string cite to statements in Dr. Rao's declaration. But Petitioners do not explain why they think Dr. Rao has no personal knowledge of these facts other than his supposed general ignorance of Greenthread's business. Any explanation Petitioners might offer would be implausible because Dr. Rao's testimony and declaration make clear the basis of his

[2] Although Petitioners mention Rules 402 and 403 in passing, they make no separate argument to support striking Dr. Rao's testimony under those rules, except their irrelevant arguments under Rules 602 and 802.

knowledge for each of the statements in the string cite. Moreover, during Dr. Rao's deposition Petitioners failed to *ask* Dr. Rao about any of statements in their string cite. If they believed Dr. Rao had no personal knowledge of these statements, they could have and should have asked him about them at his deposition. Since they did not, their motion should be denied.

II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND FACTS

Dr. Rao is the inventor of each challenged patent (*see* Ex. 1001). He is also the co-founder and a corporate representative of Greenthread. Ex. 2072, ¶ 1. Dr. Rao has "been familiar with [Greenthread's] business affairs since its creation." *Id.*, ¶ 2. "[O]nly one part of" Dr. Rao's job is technical. Ex. 1066, 19:20. Dr. Rao also makes "sure that correct business decisions are made at the appropriate time," such as when to enter into a patent license. *Id.*, 20:1-6. Dr. Rao testified that he reviewed each of Greenthread's patent licensing opportunities with Greenthread's then-President Phil John. *Id.*, 27:11-19 ("Mr. John and I reviewed each case.").

In his declaration and deposition testimony, Dr. Rao explained how, through RPX, Patent Owner negotiated and secured a license with each of [redacted] and [redacted] despite Greenthread having never threatened *either* company with litigation. Ex. 2072, ¶ 4-5; *see* Ex. 1066, 34:11-16.

When Petitioners asked, Dr. Rao also provided details about specific licensing opportunities he analyzed. For example, Dr. Rao testified that he analyzed two

patents Greenthread received as part of the consideration for its license with AMS-OSRAM. Ex. 2072, ¶ 3; Ex. 1066, 30:2-6 ("I recommended to Mr. John … that my reading is the patents have some potential future value."). *Id.*, 32:6-9 ("Mr. John, who understands some of the business and market, agreed with me that there's a potential, and we both agreed with the conclusion.").

Finally, Dr. Rao testified to the circumstances giving rise to Patent Owner's license with [redacted] and the fact that Greenthread never threatened litigation against those companies. *See* Ex. 2072, ¶ 4-5; Ex. 1066, 34:10-16 ("[S]ome of the licensees, we never approached them. They took their license. We did not contact them.").

III. THE BOARD SHOULD DENY PETITIONERS' MOTION

The Board should deny Petitioners' Motion to Exclude ("Mot.") Dr. Rao's declaration in its entirety. As the moving party, Petitioners bear the burden to show that Dr. Rao's declaration (or some part thereof) should be excluded. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c); *e.g.*, *Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Eight kHz, LLC*, IPR2023-01003, Paper 61 at 80, 2025 WL 43710, at *34 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 7, 2025). Since Petitioners seek to exclude Dr. Rao's declaration *in its entirety*, they have the burden to show that each and every statement must be excluded. Petitioners come nowhere close to meeting that burden.

A. Rules 602 and 802 do not apply to testimony from corporate representatives.

Petitioners' motion should be denied, because the personal knowledge and hearsay rules do not apply to testimony offered as a corporate representative. *Humphreys v. Bank of Am.*, 557 Fed. Appx. 416, 424 n.6 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2014); *Univ. Healthsystem Consortium v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc.*, 68 F. Supp. 3d 917, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (stating there is "little principled distinction" between allowing a 30(b)(6) witness to testify at trial without personal knowledge and allowing him to testify at deposition without personal knowledge); *Persian Gulf Inc. v. BP W. Coast Prods. LLC*, 632 F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1128 (S.D. Cal. 2022) ("By definition, corporate witnesses … testify regarding the company's knowledge, not the individual's personal knowledge."); *Parker v. Freedom Mortg. Corp.*, 2020 WL 13605540, at *3 (E.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2020) (holding that "[s]o long as the testimony falls within the corporate knowledge" of the witness, the testimony was admissible); *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. New Horizont, Inc.*, 2008 WL 1977522, at *7 (E.D. Pa. May 7, 2008) ("[T]he testimony of the [corporate representative] is deemed to be the testimony of the corporation itself."). Since Dr. Rao's testimony was offered in his capacity as an employee and representative of Greenthread, the rules under which Petitioners' made their motion do not apply.

B. Petitioners' Motion is unsupported by the record.

Petitioners' motion should also be denied because it has no basis in the record. Since Petitioners seek to strike Dr. Rao's declaration in its entirety, they bear the

burden to show that he has no personal knowledge of *any* statement it contains. The motion fails, because Petitioners' generalized assertion that Dr. Rao lacks any knowledge of Greenthread's business affairs is totally baseless. His declaration and deposition testimony say the exact opposite. The only *specific* statements Petitioners claim Dr. Rao has no personal knowledge of are listed in a "*see*, *e.g.*" string cite in Petitioners' brief. *See* Mot., 5-6. Petitioners offer no explanation for why they think Dr. Rao lacks knowledge of these statements other than their generalized claim that he knows nothing of Greenthread's business affairs. At Dr. Rao's deposition, Petitioners failed to ask Dr. Rao about any of these statements and his other testimony makes clear that his testimony is based on personal knowledge.

1. Petitioners' personal knowledge arguments are baseless.

"[T]he threshold for admitting testimony under Rule 602 is 'low,'" and Dr. Rao easily clears it. *DataMill, Inc. v. U.S.*, 91 Fed. Cl. 722, 734-35 (Fed. Cl. 2010). First, Petitioners argue that Dr. Rao must lack personal knowledge of *any* of the facts in his declaration, because he is "primarily a technical person." Mot., 2. It should go without saying that being "a technical person" does not preclude a witness from also having personal knowledge of business affairs. Dr. Rao said he is "*primarily*" a technical person, not exclusively a technical person. Ex. 1066, 12:16-17 (emphasis added). As Dr. Rao went on to explain, he was and is involved in all of Greenthread's business decisions. *See* Ex. 1066, 20:1-2.

Likewise, Petitioners' assertion that Dr. Rao "simply" interacted with Mr. John on business matters is incorrect and inconsistent with Dr. Rao's testimony. *Petitioners*, not Dr. Rao, inserted the word "simply" as their self-serving characterization of Dr. Rao's activities. Mot., 4, 6. Dr. Rao did not say that he "simply" interacted with Mr. John or that those interactions would not have been a basis for personal knowledge. To the contrary, Dr. Rao said he personally analyzes every patent licensing opportunity Greenthread has and makes "sure that correct business decisions are made at the appropriate time." Ex. 1066, 20:1-2. Moreover, even if Dr. Rao had no substantive input and "simply" shadowed Mr. John as he made all the decisions, Dr. Rao would still have personal knowledge based on his observations of Mr. John. Petitioners' blanket claim that Dr. Rao is ignorant of Greenthread's business affairs is not supported by anything in the record.

Petitioners also assert that Dr. Rao does not have personal knowledge of Greenthread's patent licenses, because he did not sign them. But personal knowledge of contracts is not limited to the signatories. A "witness does not need to have witnessed the execution of a contract in order to possess personal knowledge about that contract." *Dan Ryan Builders W. Va., LLC v. Main St. Am. Assurance Co.*, 452 F. Supp. 3d 411, 422 (D.S.C. 2020); *see also City of Chicago v. Reliable Truck Parts Co., Inc.*, 822 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding that "[s]uch a

requirement would be ludicrous"). Petitioners cite no authority that only a signatory has personal knowledge of a license.

Furthermore, *Petitioners never asked* Dr. Rao whether or how he had personal knowledge for the licenses. Petitioners never asked, because it was obvious from his other testimony that he was very personally familiar with the licenses. Dr. Rao testified that he analyzed the licensing opportunities, including license terms and discussed the licenses with Mr. John. *E.g.*, Ex. 1066, 27:11-19, 29:19-30:6, 30:17-31:1, 32: 5-9, 34:10-16, 41:14-42:1. That is personal knowledge of the licenses.

Similarly, Petitioners assert, without any support, that Dr. Rao lacks knowledge of Greenthread's licensing, because communications with licensees were channeled through attorneys. Mot., 5. Communicating through its attorneys is normal industry practice and does not mean that Dr. Rao has no personal knowledge of Greenthread's "licensing activities" generally. Petitioners' leap in logic is contradicted by the record. Dr. Rao testified that he was responsible for ensuring that Greenthread makes good business decisions *See* Ex. 1066, 20:1-2. Greenthread's attorneys were, by definition, Greenthread's agents taking direction from Dr. Rao. Dr. Rao obviously knows how he instructed them and whether they followed his instructions. If they had failed to follow Dr. Rao's instructions, the licenses never would have been signed.

Finally, Petitioners provide a laundry list of statements in Dr. Rao's declaration of which they claim Dr. Rao could not have knowledge. *See* Mot., 5. But, Petitioners *did not ask* Dr. Rao the basis of his knowledge for *any* of these statements. Petitioners cannot allege that Dr. Rao does not have personal knowledge of these facts, when they never bothered to inquire whether he did. Furthermore, the basis of Dr. Rao's knowledge of these facts is clear from his declaration and deposition testimony.

In their "*see*, *e.g.*" string cite, Petitioners claim that Dr. Rao lacks personal knowledge of his statement that "[e]ach licensee has performed as agreed"—*i.e.*, that they paid the license fees. Mot., 5 (citing Ex. 2072, ¶ 2). Petitioners did not ask Dr. Rao about this statement, but if they had, he could have told them that the licensees' payments are reflected in Greenthread's banking records, and Dr. Rao's personal banking records, because he is a member of Greenthread. Ex. 2072, ¶ 2. Furthermore, Dr. Rao testified that he is generally responsible for Greenthread's business decisions. *See* Ex. 1066, 19:13-20:10. Ensuring that Greenthread was paid $10,000,000 from [redacted] as agreed is presumably high on the list of its business priorities that would concern Dr. Rao.

Petitioners' string cite also claims that Dr. Rao cannot know if certain terms are "standard" in RPX licenses. Mot., 5 (citing Ex. 2072, ¶ 3). But again Petitioners never asked Dr. Rao the basis for this statement. If Petitioners had asked Dr. Rao,

he could have pointed out that he had analyzed multiple RPX agreements for Greenthread and that many of the terms were the same. *See* Ex. 1066, 27:18-19, 30:2-6; Ex. 2072, Appx. A, B.

Petitioners claim that Dr. Rao could not know if Greenthread "threatened litigation" against [redacted] or whether they approached Greenthread. Mot., 5 (citing Ex. 2072, ¶ 4). But these are facts that would obviously be known to Dr. Rao. If Greenthread had threatened litigation, Dr. Rao would have been involved in the decision to make the threat. Ex. 1066, 21:12-14, 23:11-13. If the companies approached Greenthread—as they did—he would have analyzed (and did analyze) the licensing opportunity. *Id.*, 27:11-19, 29:19-30:6, 30:17-31:1, 32: 5-9, 34:10-16, 41:14-42:1. Again, however, Petitioners never asked Dr. Rao how he knew that Greenthread never threatened [redacted].

Finally, Petitioners claim that Dr. Rao has no personal knowledge of the reasons for the [redacted] payment schedules under the license. Mot., 5 (citing Ex. 2072, ¶ 6). But again, Petitioners never asked about the schedules. If they had, Dr. Rao could have pointed out that the schedules (and the reason for them) are described in the licenses he analyzed for Greenthread. Ex. 2072, ¶6, Appx. A § 1.1; *see also* Ex. 1066, 27:18-19, 34:10-35:2, 37:19-22, 38:12-39:4.

2. Greenthread's licenses are not hearsay.

Petitioners attempt to exclude Greenthread's licenses as hearsay fails. Hearsay is a statement offered to "prove the truth of the matter asserted." Fed. R. Ev. 801(c)(2). Contracts, like Greenthread's licenses, are verbal acts, and are not offered to "prove the truth of the matter asserted." Thus, Rule 802 against hearsay does not apply and Petitioners' argument fails. *See generally*, *Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. Leadership Software, Inc.*, 12 F.3d 527, 540 (5th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that "[s]igned instruments such as … contracts … are writings that have independent legal significance, and are nonhearsay. A contract is a verbal act. It has legal reality independent of the trust of any statement contained in it.") (internal citation omitted); *Id.* ("The admission of a contract to prove the operative fact of that contract's existence thus cannot be subject of a valid hearsay objection.").

Petitioners' argument that Greenthread's licenses fall outside the business records exception to hearsay in Rule 803(6) is irrelevant. Rule 801 defines hearsay. Rule 802 makes hearsay inadmissible, and Rule 803 allows certain evidence to be admitted, even though it is hearsay defined in Rule 801. But, Greenthread's licenses do not need a hearsay exception under 803, because they do not meet the definition of hearsay in 801. *See Izett v. Crown Asset Mgmt., LLC*, 2019 WL 4845575, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2019) (finding that contractual provisions were "admissible as

contracts (falling outside of the definition of hearsay), or alternatively through the business records exception").

Finally, Greenthread's licenses would also qualify for the business records exception under Rule 803(6) if they needed to. Petitioners' only argument to the contrary is that the licenses were not created pursuant to a written licensing policy. Mot., 7. But Petitioners' point to no authority that Rule 803(6) requires a written policy governing the business records. There is no such requirement. *E.g.*, *U.S. v. Skeddle*, 981 F. Supp. 1069, 1073 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that "although there was no formal policy" regarding document creation, this did not preclude admissibility under the business records exception).

3. Petitioners' other hearsay arguments are baseless.

Petitioners seek to exclude Dr. Rao's declaration on the ground that it constitutes inadmissible hearsay. Mot., 6-7. However, Petitioners argument fails because Petitioners do not explain what the "hearsay" is. Hearsay is an out of court "statement" of a non-witness that is offered "to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement." Fed. R. Ev. 802(c)(2). However, Petitioners do not point to any "statement" of a non-witness that Dr. Rao repeated in his declaration or deposition. Petitioners argue that Dr. Rao "could only have learned of the *facts* alleged in his declaration through another person's communications," but do not identify any "statement" from third parties that Dr. Rao is seeking to introduce. Mot., 6 (emphasis

added). Since Dr. Rao's declaration does not repeat any "statement" of a non-witness there is no "hearsay." Petitioners' hearsay argument is simply a reprise of its flawed "personal knowledge" argument. As explained above, Dr. Rao has personal knowledge of the matters in his declaration and Petitioners failed to make any serious attempt to inquire about the basis for Dr. Rao's knowledge. *Supra* III.B.1.

C. Petitioners' arguments go to the weight of evidence, not it's admissibility.

Petitioners' motion can also be denied, because "the Board is capable of assessing the weight to be given [Dr. Rao's] testimony without excluding it." *Machinex Indus., Inc. v. JJG IP Holdings, LLC*, IPR2020-00899, Paper 45 at 103-104, 2021 WL 4876262, at *42 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 4, 2021). "Proceedings before the Board … are not jury trials; in the absence of a jury, the risk of unfair prejudice against which Rule 403 guards is diminished, if not eliminated entirely." *Microsoft Corp. v. Parallel Networks Licensing, LLC*, IPR2015-00485, Paper 81 at 24-25 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 11, 2016). Furthermore, because there is no jury and the "Petitioner ha[s] the opportunity to address any alleged deficiencies regarding [the witness's] personal knowledge … during a deposition," challenges under Rules 602 properly "implicate the weight and sufficiency of the testimony, rather than its admissibility." *Incyte Corp. v. Concert Pharm., Inc.*, IPR2017-01256, Paper 119 at 44 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 8, 2019). Here too, Petitioners *had the opportunity* to ask Dr. Rao directly

regarding the basis of his knowledge for each of the statements in his declaration, but chose not to do so. *See* § III.B.1

IV. CONCLUSION

For at least the reasons above, the Board should deny Petitioners' Motion, as they have not carried their burden under 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c).

[redacted]

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Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATION OF PAGE LIMIT

The undersigned hereby certifies that the above-captioned **PATENT OWNER'S OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE** complies with the page limits of § 42.24(a) because it does not contain more than 15 pages. This paper also complies with the typeface requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(2)(ii) and the type style requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(2)(iii) and (iv).

Dated: January 17, 2025

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CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE

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