

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.,
Petitioner

v.

LIONRA TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED,
Patent Owner.

IPR2024-00734
U.S. Patent 7,623,518 B2

AUTHORIZED RESPONSE TO DIRECTOR REVIEW REQUEST

I. Introduction

Dissatisfied with the Board's thorough analysis and its reasoned determination that "a memory circuit," as recited in claims 15, 17, 19-21, is disclosed by the prior art, Patent Owner requests Director Review ("Request," Paper 28) of the Final Written Decision ("FWD," Paper 27). Patent Owner alleges that the Board's decision "rests on an erroneous claim construction." Request, 1. According to Patent Owner, the Board's construction was "erroneous" and "constituted an abuse of discretion" because it cited "Exhibit 3001, a dictionary definition" and there was not "any opportunity for Patent Owner to address or rebut" this definition. Request, 1. But Patent Owner's arguments ignore that the Board's obviousness analysis was properly informed by the surrounding claim language, the '518 patent's specification, and its prosecution history. The citation to Ex. 3001 was ancillary to the Board's analysis. FWD, 95-97. Patent Owner's arguments also contradict the record, which demonstrates that it had an opportunity to respond and, in fact, presented its own arguments and evidence for this term. The alleged "abuse" and "errors" are merely disagreements with the Board's findings in the FWD.

II. No reviewable error is demonstrated.

Requests for Director review of a final written decision are limited to: (a) abuse of discretion; (b) important issues of law or policy; (c) erroneous findings of

material fact; or (d) erroneous conclusions of law. The Request does not credibly raise any such abuse, issue, or error. Accordingly, the Request should be denied.

III. Argument

A. **There was no abuse or error: the Board considered the surrounding claim language, specification, and prosecution history in reaching its determination.**

After a full trial, the Board found that claims 15, 17, and 19-21 were unpatentable. FWD, 2, 94-99. The Board agreed with Petitioner that the memory components in the prior art “**collectively correspond to ‘a memory circuit.’**” FWD, 94-97. In so doing, the Board “disagree[d] with Patent Owner that ‘the specification, claims, and prosecution history all show that ‘a’ memory circuit should be construed as a single memory circuit’ insofar as ‘a single memory circuit’ includes **only one component.**” FWD, 95.

The Board explained that “nothing in the claim language indicates that the word ‘circuit’ connotes only one component.” FWD, 95.

The Board also considered the specification in reaching its determination. First, the Board noted that “the ’518 patent’s specification describes a preferred embodiment where **different components** store different types of data as recited in claim 15.” FWD, 95 (citing Ex.1001, 9:31-36). Second, the Board noted that the ’518 patent’s specification provides that the memory functionality “may be combined to be performed by fewer elements or divided out and performed by **more**

elements.” FWD, 96 (citing Ex.1001, 9:65–10:3). The Board further noted that “Patent Owner does not identify in the ’518 patent’s specification ‘words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction’ that limit ‘a memory circuit’ to a single component.” FWD, 96 (citing Resp. 28–33; Sur-Reply 14–19). Accordingly, “limiting ‘a memory circuit’ to a single component [as Patent Owner argues] would exclude a preferred embodiment from claim scope” which is “rarely, if ever correct.” FWD, 95 (citing *PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC*, 815 F.3d 747, 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).

And the Board considered the prosecution history, noting that Patent Owner did not identify any statement of “prosecution disclaimer” or other “unambiguous evidence of disclaimer.” FWD, 96 (internal quotations omitted).

In short, the Board’s analysis was thorough and sound. The citation to the Microsoft Computer Dictionary (Ex.3001) merely reinforces that Patent Owner’s position is baseless and incongruent with plain English. FWD, 95 (“If anything...”).The Board’s decision does not hinge on Ex. 3001, and the outcome would have been the same without it. Because the dictionary definition was “not needed for a prima facie case of obviousness,” Patent Owner “has not established that it was denied its procedural rights.” *Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC*, 805 F.3d 1064, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

B. Patent Owner had an opportunity to respond.

Patent Owner alleges that it “never had an opportunity to address or respond” to an interpretation (consistent with Ex.3001) under which the claimed “memory circuit” includes a “combination of electrical components interconnected.” Request, 3, 5. This is incorrect—the obviousness of the claimed “memory circuit” over the prior art’s multiple memory components was addressed extensively throughout trial.

From the case’s inception, Petitioner argued that the claimed “memory circuit” was obvious over a combination of interconnected electrical components (NVRAM 408, dynamic memory 409, and TCAM 410). Paper 2 (“Pet.”), 65-67; Paper 13 (“Reply”), 23. Patent Owner twice responded with its own position, arguing that multiple components cannot “correspond to a **single** memory circuit as recited in claims 15 and 19.” Paper 9 (“Resp.”), 30; Paper 18 (“Sur-Reply”), 19. Patent Owner submitted evidence on the issue in the form of extrinsic expert testimony. *See* Ex.2001, ¶92.

The parties then addressed the issue at oral argument. Patent Owner identified the “memory circuit” issue as the first issue for argument. *See* Ex.2003, 5; *see also id.* at 3-4 (highlighting “memory circuit” limitations in red). Half of Patent Owner’s 24 demonstrative slides focused on the “memory circuit” issue. *See* Ex.2003, 6-17. As expected, the Board heard from both parties on the issue:

[G]oing to the single memory argument from Patent Owner, [Petitioner’s] position is that **multiple memory**

elements correspond to the memory circuit, NVRAM, dynamic memory and TCAM...They form a circuit, and they are a memory circuit.

Tr. 42:20-25; *see also id.* at 48:9-10 (“...the memory circuit can, in fact, correspond to **different components collectively creating a circuit...**”).

[Patent Owner's counsel:] I would not think of that as being a memory circuit, Your Honor. I would think of that as being multiple memories.

Tr. 51:18-19.

Patent Owner's reliance on *Dell v. Acceleron* is misplaced. *See* Request, 4-5. In *Dell*, the outcome rested on a “factual assertion introduced into the proceeding only at oral argument...” *Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC*, 818 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, the “memory circuit” issue was fully briefed, with both parties arguing their positions based on their preferred evidence. Patent Owner simply could not overcome the intrinsic record evidence or otherwise distinguish the prior art.

IV. Conclusion

The Request does not establish any abuse of discretion or erroneous findings of material fact or conclusions of law. Instead, it merely airs disagreements with the Board's decision. Patent Owner's Director Review Request should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: November 12, 2025
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies, in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 42.6, that
service was made on the Patent Owner as detailed below.

Date of service November 12, 2025

Manner of service Electronic Mail: bcooper@bc-lawgroup.com;
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Documents served **AUTHORIZED RESPONSE TO DIRECTOR REVIEW
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