

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

DURATION MEDIA LLC,
Petitioner,

v.

RICH MEDIA CLUB LLC,
Patent Owner.

IPR2024-00937
Patent 11,741,482 B2

Before KARL D. EASTHOM, MICHAEL J. FITZPATRICK, and
NEIL T. POWELL, *Administrative Patent Judges*.

FITZPATRICK, *Administrative Patent Judge*.

DECISION
Denying Institution of *Inter Partes* Review
37 C.F.R. § 42.108

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, Duration Media LLC, filed a Petition to institute an *inter partes* review of all claims, namely claims 1–14, of U.S. Patent No. 11,741,482 B2 (“the ’482 patent,” Ex. 1001) pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 311(a). Paper 2 (“Pet.”). Patent Owner, Rich Media Club LLC, filed a Preliminary Response pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 313. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”).

We have authority to determine whether to institute an *inter partes* review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, and for the reasons explained below, we determine that the information presented does not show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to any claim. *See* 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we deny the Petition.

A. *Real Parties In Interest*

Each party identifies itself as the sole real party in interest. Pet. 10; Paper 4, 1.¹

B. *Related Matters*

Petitioner and/or Patent Owner identify the following as related matters:

- *Rich Media Club LLC v. Duration Media LLC*, No. 2:23-cv-01967 (D. Ariz.);

¹ Patent Owner “established a related company, RealVu, Inc. (‘RealVu’) [to which it] licensed its patents.” Prelim. Resp. 14–15. According to Patent Owner, “RealVu was the industry-facing entity used to sell the viewable ad space to advertisers and publishers.” *Id.* at 15.

- *Rich Media Club LLC v. DMG Media, Ltd. d/b/a Dailymail.com*, No. 2-23-cv-00388 (E.D. Tex.);
- *Rich Media Club LLC v. Duration Media LLC*, No. 2:22-cv-02086 (D. Ariz.);
- *Rich Media Club LLC v. ResearchGate GmbH*, No. 2:23-cv-00362 (E.D. Tex.); and
- *Duration Media LLC v. Rich Media Club LLC*, No. IPR2023-00953 (PTAB).

Pet. 10–11; Paper 4, 1–2. In addition, Patent Owner points out there are U.S. patent applications that are related to the '482 patent, although Patent Owner does not identify whether such applications are pending. Paper 4, 1.

In IPR2023-00953, the Board issued a final written decision determining that Petitioner failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that any of the challenged claims of related U.S. Patent No. 11,443,329 B2 (“the '329 patent”) were unpatentable. Ex. 2001.

C. The '482 Patent

The '482 patent is titled “System And Method For Creation, Distribution And Tracking Of Advertising Via Electronic Networks.” Ex. 1001, code (54). The prime exemplary electronic network identified is the Internet. *Id.* at 2:7. The '482 patent explains:

From the advertiser’s perspective, there are two main tasks to accomplish: 1) creation of an effective ad; and 2) effective placement of the ad. From the ad publisher’s perspective there are also two main tasks to accomplish: 1) display of the highest revenue-producing ads; and 2) reducing the amount of work necessary to place, maintain, track and process payments for advertising.

Id. at 2:11–17.

The '482 patent discloses “creating electronic advertisements using licensed digital content, and distributing such advertisements for display at desired network locations.” Ex. 1001, 2:56–59. “The digital content is delivered to designated advertising locations on the network and becomes part of an advertising display composed at the time requested by the network user/ad viewer.” *Id.* at 2:66–3:2. “The [described invention] provides the ability for both publishers and advertisers to optimize the benefits of creating and distributing advertisements electronically, and manage and track every aspect of the advertisement creation and distribution process.” *Id.* at 3:17–21.

The '482 patent claims priority from numerous ancestor applications, the first of which was provisional application no. 60/753,536, filed on Dec. 24, 2005. Ex. 1001, codes (60), (63). However, the parties agree that the effective filing date of the claims of the '482 patent is April 4, 2009, the date on which application no. 12/384,403 (“the '403 application”) was filed. *See* Pet. 21 (“With respect to the '482 patent, the earliest priority date that can be claimed is April 4, 2009, the filing date of the '403 appl.”); Prelim. Resp. 2–3 (“The '482 Patent issued from a continuation-in-part application that added new matter with a filing date of April 4, 2009.”).

D. The Challenged Claims

Review is sought for all of the claims of the '482 patent, namely claims 1–14. Claims 1 and 8 are independent, with claim 1 being a method

claim and claim 8 being a system claim. Claim 1 is illustrative and reproduced below:

1. A method for rendering advertisement content in an ad content display page, wherein the ad content display page includes (i) a predefined area configured to display advertisement content, the predefined area being a portion of the ad content display page, and (ii) page content displayed in other portions of the ad content display page, the page content being separate from the advertisement content, the ad content display page being scrollable to allow a portion of the ad content display page to appear in a visible area of a browser window of a browser that is configured to be operated by a remote computing device, the method comprising:

(a) determining whether a predefined portion of the predefined area of the ad content display page is in the visible area of the browser window; and

(b) in response to a determination that the predefined portion of the predefined area of the ad content display page is in the visible area of the browser window, causing a communication to be sent from the remote computing device to one or more dispatcher servers, wherein the one or more dispatcher servers are configured to:

(i) receive the communication, and

(ii) cause advertisement content to be served to the remote computing device,

wherein the browser is configured to render the advertisement content in the predefined area of the ad content display page, and

wherein the advertisement content first appears in the predefined area of the ad content display page only after the one or more dispatcher servers serve the advertisement content to the remote computing device and the browser renders the advertisement content in the predefined area of the ad content display page.

Ex. 1001, 59:56–60:24.

C. *The Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability*

Petitioner asserts the following grounds of unpatentability:

Claim(s) Challenged	35 U.S.C. § ²	Reference(s)/Basis
1–14	103(a)	Koeppel, ³ Seo, ⁴ Krassner ⁵
6, 13	103(a)	Koeppel, Seo, Badros, ⁶ Krassner

Pet. 25–26.

II. ANALYSIS

A. *Claim Construction*

The challenged claims should be read in light of the specification, as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. *In re Suitco Surface, Inc.*, 603 F.3d 1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Thus, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning. *See In re Translogic Tech., Inc.*, 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The ordinary and customary meaning is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); *see also*

² The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, which was enacted September 16, 2011, made amendments to 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103. AIA § 3(b)–(c). Those amendments became effective eighteen months later on March 16, 2013. *Id.* at § 3(n). Because the application from which the ’482 patent issued claims priority to an application filed before March 16, 2013, any citations herein to 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 are to their pre-AIA versions. *Id.* at § 3(n)(1).

³ US 2005/0177401 A1, published Aug. 11, 2005 (“Koeppel,” Ex. 1006).

⁴ WO 2007/089082 A1, published Aug. 9, 2007 (“Seo,” Ex. 1018).

⁵ US 2007/0265923 A1, published Nov. 15, 2007 (“Krassner,” Ex. 1003).

⁶ WO 2006/138400 A1, published Dec. 28, 2006 (“Badros,” Ex. 1005).

37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (stating that claims are construed in IPRs according to the same standard as used in federal court).

Neither party proffers an express construction of any claim term. *See* Pet. 15; *see generally* Prelim. Resp.

Petitioner does argue, however, that certain claim language appearing in claim 1 is not limiting. Pet. 29–30. That claim language, which we refer shorthand to as the “in response to” limitation, recites the following:

(b) *in response to* a determination that the predefined portion of the predefined area of the ad content display page is in the visible area of the browser window, causing a communication to be sent from the remote computing device to one or more dispatcher servers, wherein the one or more dispatcher servers are configured to:

(i) receive the communication, and

(ii) cause advertisement content to be served to the remote computing device

Ex. 1001, 60:4–14 (emphasis added). Petitioner argues that “this ‘*in response to*’ limitation is non-limiting because it requires a condition precedent that need not ever occur.” Pet. 29–30 (citing MPEP § 2111.04 (II); *Ex parte Schulhauser*, Appeal 2013-007847, 2016 WL 6277792 (Apr. 28, 2016) (precedential); *Ex Parte Botman*, Appeal 2021-004052, 2022 WL 4093710 (Sept. 2, 2022); *Ex Parte Gopalan*, Appeal 2017-007009, 2018 WL 2386111 (May 21, 2018); *Ex Parte Erhart*, Appeal 2019-004505, 2021 WL 195811 (Jan. 8, 2021)).

Petitioner, however, does not identify a purported condition precedent that need not ever occur. Pet. 29. Presumably, the only possible candidate would be the language that follows “in response to,” i.e., “a determination that the predefined portion of the predefined area of the ad content display

page is in the visible area of the browser window.” Ex. 1001, 60:4–6. But nothing in the claim suggests that the determination is optional or that it need not ever occur. For example, the “in response to” limitation of claim 1 does not use the conjunction “if,” as was the case in *Schulhauser*. See 2016 WL 6277792, *3 (interpreting “triggering an alarm state if the electrocardiac signal data is not within the threshold electrocardiac criteria” such that “triggering an alarm state” only needs to be performed “if the electrocardiac signal data is not within the threshold electrocardiac criteria.”).⁷ In fact, the prior step (a) of claim 1 explicitly requires the determination, reciting: “(a) determining whether a predefined portion of the predefined area of the ad content display page is in the visible area of the browser window.” Ex. 1001, 60:1–3.

As properly construed, the “in response to” language modifies the recited step of “causing a communication to be sent from the remote computing device to one or more dispatcher servers” such that the step must be “in response to a determination that the predefined portion of the predefined area of the ad content display page is in the visible area of the browser window.” Ex. 1001, 60:4–8. In other words, “causing a communication” is a required step of the method of claim 1.

⁷ Although the Petition cites several additional cases and a provision of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure as supporting its proposed construction (*see* Pet. 29–30), the Petition does not explain how those citations allegedly support reading the “in response to” language out of claim 1. We determine they do not.

B. Obviousness Generally

A claim is unpatentable “if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). “Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying facts.” *MobileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple Inc.*, 780 F.3d 1159, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The underlying facts include (i) the scope and content of the prior art, (ii) the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention, (iii) the level of ordinary skill in the field of the invention, and (iv) any relevant objective considerations of nonobviousness. *Id.* (citing *Graham v. John Deere of Kan. City*, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966)). An additional underlying fact is whether there was a reason to combine prior art teachings when so asserted. *Id.*

C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art

In determining whether an invention would have been obvious at the time it was made, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. *Graham*, 383 U.S. at 17. “The importance of resolving the level of ordinary skill in the art lies in the necessity of maintaining objectivity in the obviousness inquiry.” *Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc.*, 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The “person having ordinary skill in the art” is a hypothetical construct, from whose vantage point obviousness is assessed. *In re Rouffet*, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

Factors that may be considered in determining level of ordinary skill in the art include: (1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.

Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

Petitioner argues a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering or electrical (or similar) engineering with about three years of experience in computer science, computer engineering and/or electrical engineering.” Pet. 14.

Patent Owner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art also would have had “experience in the internet advertising industry” and urges us to adopt the same formulation as we adopted in the final written decision in IPR2023-00953. Prelim. Resp. 4. We agree with Patent Owner that the person of ordinary skill in the art would have had such experience. Indeed, it is unclear how Petitioner’s proposal accounts for the types of problems encountered in the art or prior art solutions to those problems. *See Daiichi Sankyo*, 501 F.3d at 1256 (identifying these factors, among others, as “a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art”).

The difference between the parties’ proposals as to the person of ordinary skill in the art, however, is immaterial here. Thus, for purposes of deciding the Petition, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal.

D. The Prior Art

1. Koeppel

Koeppel is titled “System and Method for Performing Web Based In-View Monitoring.” Ex. 1006, code (54). String citing one hundred and one consecutive paragraphs of Koeppel, Petitioner argues that it “teaches a client-side script to determine the coordinates of various components of a webpage on a display and whether they are in view.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶85–185; Ex. 1011 ¶41).⁸ Paragraph 18 of Koeppel (cited at Pet. 17) states:

[A]lthough conventional on-line target advertising and content provision techniques allow adjustments to be made on downloaded documents in order to target selected users, they lack the ability to monitor and collect detailed user response data associated with content that is actually visible to the users when browsing the downloaded documents. Furthermore, although conventional on-line advertising techniques enable providers to advertise their products and services on third party Web sites, they lack the ability to efficiently perform detailed billing based on whether an advertisement was actually in-view when a Web site including the advertisement is rendered.

Ex. 1006 ¶18. Petitioner argues that “Koeppel uses information about whether an advertisement is ‘in-view or partially in-view’ to generate billing records.” Pet. 19 (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶177).

2. Seo

Seo is titled “Method for Offering Advertisement in Association with Contents in View and System for Executing the Method.” Ex. 1018, code

⁸ Exhibit 1011 is a declaration by Trevor Smedley, Ph.D.

(54). Petitioner argues that it “discloses identifying a user event, such as scrolling, corresponding to a content area becoming visible, and downloading an advertisement in response to the event.” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1018, 5:1–14; Ex. 1011 ¶¶42–43). Petitioner further argues that “Seo determines whether a user is ‘currently viewing’ by detecting whether an event, such as scrolling, occurs (S202), and displays an advertisement only when the content area is visible.” *Id.* at 20 (citing Ex. 1018, 10:16–18, Fig. 2). The excerpt of Seo cited by Petitioner states: “Also, according to the present invention, it is possible to provide advertising associated with a content that a user is currently viewing, and thereby fit an advertiser’s intention to provide advertising associated with the content that the user is interested in.” Ex. 1018, 10:16–18. Thus, although the cited excerpt of Seo includes the words “currently viewing” as quoted by Petitioner, it does not disclose “determining whether a predefined portion of the predefined area of the ad content display page is in the visible area of the browser window,” as recited in claim 1. As Patent Owner puts it, “Seo teaches . . . to take an action ‘in response to’ a user-initiated event [such as scrolling], not a determination that a ‘predefined portion of the predefined area of the ad content display page is in the visible area of the browser window.’” Prelim. Resp. 8 (quoting claim 1).

3. Badros and Krassner

Neither Badros nor Krassner is relevant to our decision to deny the Petition. Thus, they are not discussed further.

E. Ground 1 (Koeppel, Seo, Krassner)

The Petition asserts that claims 1–14 would have been obvious over Koeppel, Seo, and “[o]ptionally Krassner.” Pet. 26–38.

1. Claim 1

Petitioner does not have a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to claim 1, because, as explained below, the Petition fails to show how the prior art teaches, or renders obvious, the “in response to” limitation, which we reproduce again as follows:

(b) in response to *a determination that the predefined portion of the predefined area of the ad content display page is in the visible area of the browser window*, causing a communication to be sent from the remote computing device to one or more dispatcher servers, wherein the one or more dispatcher servers are configured to:

(i) receive the communication, and

(ii) cause advertisement content to be served to the remote computing device.

Ex. 1001, 60:4–14 (emphasis added). For brevity, we refer shorthand to the *italicized claim language* above as the “determination” limitation and the underlined claim language above as the “causing a communication” limitation. Thus, the “in response to” limitation includes both the “determination” limitation and the “causing a communication” limitation.

Initially, the Petition relies on Koeppel as disclosing the “determination” limitation of claim 1. *See, e.g.*, Pet. 30 (“Koeppel . . . teaches ‘determining the proportion of a component in view.’” (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶125)); *see also id.* at 17–19 (discussing Figure 9B of Koeppel). The Petition asserts that Koeppel further teaches “performing an action” in

response to the determination. *Id.* at 30 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶177). A responsive action is possible in Koeppel, the Petition explains, because “the client notifies the server when ‘user events’ occur, including ‘whether content is actually in-view.’” *Id.* at 30 (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶82). The responsive action in Koeppel, however, does not satisfy the “causing a communication” limitation of claim 1. Nor does the Petition argue that it does, and, in fact, the Petition concedes that it does not. *Id.* at 31.

Accordingly, the Petition turns to Seo. Pet. 31–32. In turning to Seo, the Petition asserts that (1) Seo, like Koeppel, teaches the “determination” limitation and (2) Seo additionally teaches the “causing a communication” limitation. In particular, the Petition asserts:

Koeppel, however, does not disclose “*in response to a determination that the predefined portion of the predefined area of the ad content display page is in the visible area of the browser window ... cause advertisement content to be served to the remote computing device.*” Seo discloses this limitation.

Pet. 31 (Petitioner’s ellipsis). Relatedly, the Petition also asserts:

Seo teaches waiting [sic] “*the predefined portion of the predefined area of the ad content display page is in the visible area of the browser window*” until it causes “*a communication to be sent from the remote computing device to one or more dispatcher servers.*”

Pet. 32 (quoting claim 1).

Despite asserting that Seo teaches the “determination” limitation, the Petition does not show where Seo does so or explain how its teachings might be interpreted to do so. The closest thing the Petition points to is the detection in Seo’s system of the act of scrolling. *See* Pet. 20 (“Seo determines whether a user is ‘currently viewing’ by detecting whether an event, such as scrolling, occurs (S202), and displays an advertisement only

when the content area is visible.” (citing Ex. 1018, 10:16–18)); *see also* Ex. 1018, 5:11–14 (“In operation S202, the system identifies whether the event occurs. When the event occurs, the system performs operation S203, otherwise, the system waits for the event to occur. In this instance, the event may include a user enter event or a scrolling event.”). Whether a scrolling event occurs, however, does not satisfy the specific language of the claim reciting “a determination that the predefined portion of the predefined area of the ad content display page is in the visible area of the browser window.” Nor does the Petition explain how it might.

As for the “causing a communication” limitation, the Petition does not explain how Seo teaches all of its components. Instead, the Petition implies, by virtue of an ellipsis, that the “causing a communication” limitation merely requires “advertisement content to be served to the remote computing device” and nothing further. In Petitioner’s words:

Koeppel, however, does not disclose “*in response to a determination that the predefined portion of the predefined area of the ad content display page is in the visible area of the browser window ... cause advertisement content to be served to the remote computing device.*” Seo discloses this limitation.

Pet. 31 (Petitioner’s ellipsis). Where Petitioner uses an ellipsis, claim 1 recites: “causing a communication to be sent from the remote computing device to one or more dispatcher servers, wherein the one or more dispatcher servers are configured to: (i) receive the communication.” The Petition does not show where in the prior art these features allegedly are taught or that they would have been obvious.

We are cognizant of the Petition’s statement that, in view of Koeppel, it was a “well-known fact that advertisements are delivered to browsers

because a server ‘*receive[d] a communication*’ from the browser.” Pet. 32–33 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶172; Ex. 1011 ¶¶51–56). The Petition, however, does not explain what, if anything, the person of ordinary skill in the art would have done in view of the “well-known fact.” Further, to the extent that the Petition asserts that such a communication is inherent, the Petition fails to explain why that would be so. *See Scaltech Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, L.L.C.*, 178 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Inherency may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient to establish inherency.”).

Even assuming Koeppel teaches the “determination” limitation and Seo teaches the “causing a communication” limitation, the Petition does not explain how the prior art teaches, or renders obvious, the latter “in response to” the former, as recited in claim 1. As Patent Owner explains it:

Given that Seo does not teach that it makes a “determination that the predefined portion of the predefined area of the ad content display page is in the visible are of the browser window,” *by definition it cannot teach to take an action “in response” to a determination Seo never makes.*

Prelim. Resp. 10 (emphasis added). We agree with Patent Owner.

The Petition does not demonstrate how the combination of Koeppel and Seo would result in the “in response to” limitation. The Petition argues that *some combination* of Koeppel and Seo would have been obvious, stating:

Koeppel and Seo are both directed to a system of determining whether an online advertisement is in view. Ex-1006, abstract; Ex-1018, abstract; Ex-1011, ¶51. Seo further teaches that it would be beneficial to only download advertisements “associated with a content that the user is currently viewing.” Ex- 1018, 2:9-11. The combination of

known elements of Koeppel and Seo would achieve the predictable result of downloading an advertisement in response to a predefined area, or portion thereof, appearing in the visible area of a display. This would be an obvious solution to try given the fact that both Koeppel and Seo teach downloading advertisements. Ex-1006, abstract; Ex-1018, 5:1-14, 10:16-18.

Pet. 26. But, the Petition does not articulate any combination of Koeppel and Seo that includes the “in response to” limitation, wherein the “causing a communication” limitation occurs *in response to* the “determination” limitation.

In sum, the Petition fails to demonstrate that the asserted prior art teaches, or renders obvious, the “causing a communication” limitation, let alone it being in response to the “determination” limitation. There is not a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing as to claim 1.

2. Claims 2–14

Independent claim 8 is a system claim that includes a limitation materially similar to that discussed above. Ex. 1001, 61:1–9. The Petition groups independent claims 1 and 8 together and relies on its claim 1 analysis for claim 8. Pet. 27–34. Thus, there is not a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing as to claim 8. Further, it necessarily follows that there is not a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing on this ground as to any of the dependent claims. *See In re Fine*, 837 F.2d 1071, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Dependent claims are nonobvious under section 103 if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious.”).

F. Ground 2 (Koeppel, Seo, Badros, Krassner)

The Petition asserts that dependent claims 6 and 13 would have been obvious over Koeppel, Seo, “[o]ptionally Krassner,” and Badros. Pet. 38–40. The Petitioner does not apply the additional reference, Badros, in a manner that cures the deficiencies in the Ground 1 challenge to claims 1–14. Accordingly, there is not a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing on this ground as to either of claims 6 and 13.

III. CONCLUSION

The Petition fails to show there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition. *See* 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. Accordingly, we deny the Petition.

IV. ORDER

In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby:

ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.

IPR2024-00937
Patent 11,741,482 B2

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