

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., and
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS, AMERICA, INC.,
Petitioners,

v.

CERENCE OPERATING COMPANY,
Patent Owner.

Case No. IPR2024-01267
U.S. Patent No. 9,026,428

PATENT OWNER'S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

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PATENT OWNER'S EXHIBIT LIST

<i>Exhibit No</i>	<i>Description</i>
2001	Federal Court Management Statistics, Eastern District of Texas, 2019-2024
2002	Excerpt of Defendant's Amended Invalidity Contentions, (<i>Cerence Operating Company v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.</i> , Case No. 2:23-cv-00482-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex.))

I. INTRODUCTION

Each of the claims of the '428 patent requires that steps be performed “in the absence of receiving user input . . . representing a space character” or “without the user inputting a space or selecting a word.” But the *Fenwick* reference relied upon to modify the *Arai* reference only provides examples where the user does input a space. For at least this reason, institution should be denied.

In addition, the Board should exercise its discretion to deny institution under *Fintiv*. Trial in the district court case between Patent Owner and the Samsung Petitioners is scheduled to begin seven months before a final written decision would be due in this case. Given the Petition's weak position on the merits, the lack of a *Sotera* stipulation, and the likely wasteful duplication of effort that would result from instituting this IPR, institution should be denied.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Background to the '428 Patent

The '428 patent teaches and claims techniques relating to the recognition of handwritten user input. For example, the patent teaches that “the use of linguistic tools with an intermediary buffer allows the system to use a ‘history’ of characters input by a user to increase the speed and accuracy of handwritten characters input to the system.” Ex. 1001 at 2:66–3:2. Such a handwriting

recognition system may be useful in devices including cellular telephones, smart phones, netbooks or laptop computers. *Id.* at 3:64–66.

III. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART

Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the priority date would have had “at least a Bachelor’s of Science Degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering, computer science, or computer engineering, or a related technical field and two years of experience working with handwriting recognition, user interfaces incorporating on-line recognition technologies, or related technical fields.” Petition at 10–11. Petitioner also notes that “A greater amount of education could compensate for fewer years of work experience, and vice versa.” *Id.* at 11.

Patent Owner reserves the right to offer a different level of ordinary skill in this or in other proceedings concerning the ’428 patent. However, Patent Owner does not believe that the issues presented in this Preliminary Response turn on the precise level of ordinary skill in the art and believes that the Board could assume Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill for the purposes of deciding whether to institute.

IV. LEGAL STANDARDS

The petitioner has the burden to clearly set forth the basis for its challenges in the petition. *Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc.*, 815 F.3d 1356, 1363

(Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) as “requiring IPR petitions to identify ‘with particularity ... the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim’”). A petitioner may not rely on the Board to substitute its own reasoning to remedy the deficiencies in a petition. *SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu*, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355 (2018) (“Congress chose to structure a process in which it’s the petitioner, not the Director, who gets to define the contours of the proceeding.”); *In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd.*, 829 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (rejecting the Board’s reliance on obviousness arguments that “could have been included” in the petition but were not, and holding that the Board may not “raise, address, and decide unpatentability theories never presented by the petitioner and not supported by the record evidence”); *Ariosa Diagnostics v. Verinata Health, Inc.*, 805 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that “a challenge can fail even if different evidence and arguments might have led to success”); *Wasica Finance GMBH v. Continental Auto. Systems*, 853 F.3d 1272, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that new arguments in a reply brief are “foreclosed by statute, our precedent, and Board guidelines”).

The Board “may reject even uncontroverted expert testimony when it is intrinsically unpersuasive.” *Granite Constr. Co. v. United States*, 962 F.2d 998, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving

obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” *Magnum*, 829 F.3d at 1380.

An obviousness determination requires finding that a POSITA would have been motivated to modify or combine teachings in the prior art. *In re Stepan Co.*, 868 F.3d 1342, 1345–46 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Obviousness concerns “whether a skilled artisan not only *could have made* but *would have been motivated to make* the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.” *Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC*, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The “mere fact that these possible arrangements existed in the prior art” does not provide a motivation to substitute the arrangement in one prior art embodiment with the arrangement in another.” *Virtek Vision International ULC v. Assembly Guidance Systems, Inc.*, 97 F.4th 882, 887 (Fed. Cir. 2024). Because a motivation to modify or combine is part of the *prima facie* case for obviousness that must be set forth in the petition, a petitioner should not be permitted to present “an entirely new rationale to explain why one of skill in the art would have been motivated to combine” in its reply. *Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd.*, 821 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

V. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

Petitioners state that “no express constructions of the claims are necessary” and state that “the claims should be given their plain and ordinary meaning.” Petition at 10–11. Patent Owner agrees that no construction of the terms is required to decide whether to institute this IPR. As Patent Owner explains further below, institution should be denied applying the plain and ordinary meaning to the relevant claim terms.

VI. ARGUMENT

A. Ground 1: *Arai* in combination with *Fenwick*

1. **Element 1[g]: “removing the first sequence portion from the memory storage buffer, wherein the removing is performed in the absence of receiving user input editing the first candidate sequence, representing a space character, or selecting a word; and”**

The Petition fails to show that *Arai* in combination with *Fenwick* discloses or renders obvious the claimed “wherein the removing is performed in the absence of receiving user input editing the first candidate sequence, *representing a space character*, or selecting a word” of limitation 1[g] (emphasis added).

The Petition concedes that *Arai* alone fails to satisfy this limitation, arguing that: “While *Arai* requires hitting the Enter Key to send a word (or

words) to the application (*Arai ¶[0091]*), *Fenwick* performs this function automatically absent any user input” Petition at 31.

The Petition also concedes that at least some of the time *Fenwick* removes words from the buffer as a result of the user inputting a space: “To be sure *Fenwick* also discloses removing words from the buffers with a user input comprising a ‘hard space,’ which arguably may represent a space character.” Petition at 32. While the Petition attempts to caveat this concession with the language “arguably may,” the Petition never argues or presents evidence that the “hard space” of *Fenwick* is not “user input . . . representing a space character” or that removal of words based upon such a “hard space” would satisfy limitation 1[g]. Accordingly, the Petitioners have waived any argument that a combination of *Arai* with *Fenwick* would satisfy this element based upon the “hard space” teaching of *Fenwick. Harmonic*, 815 F.3d at 1363.

What the Petition instead relies upon to satisfy the “in the absence of receiving user input . . . representing a space character” requirement is a different teaching in *Fenwick*, exemplified in its Figure 5a:

100		102	104	106	108
PASS	BUFFER 1	BUFFER 2	BUFFER 3	BUFFER 4	
1	t				
2	th				
3	the_	the			
4	the_n	then_	then		
5	the_ne	then_e	there		
6	the_new_	the ew	the_new		
7	new_t	newt	newt_		
8	new_to_	newto	newt_o	new_to	

Fenwick, FIG. 5a (annotated)

Ex. 1006, Fig. 5a; annotations from Petition at 30.

Here, with pass 7 of the process, the word “the” and its following space are removed from buffers 1 and 3. In this example, the user is intending to enter the sentence: “the newton<cr> is real<.>” Ex. 1006 at 6:38–39. Contrary to Petitioners’ argument, this input clearly “represent[s] a space character.” There is every indication in *Fenwick* that the space following “the” in buffers 1 and 3 of Figure 5a reflect a space in the user’s written input, not a space that *Fenwick*’s system simply created from nothing.

This is suggested by the very title of the reference: “Pattern Recognition System Having Inter-Pattern Spacing ***Correction***.” Ex. 1006 at 1 (emphasis added). *Fenwick* explains the type of errors it is seeking to correct:

In a typical pattern recognition system, various pattern groups (which may be as small as a single individual pattern) are formed from the pattern data by measuring the inter-pattern spacing distance between adjacent individual patterns. Adjacent patterns which are spaced apart from each other by less than a threshold inter-pattern distance are typically combined together to form one pattern group. Adjacent patterns spaced apart by more than the threshold amount are assumed to correspond to next adjacent pattern groups.

A significant problem with this prior technique is that a relatively large inter-pattern distance between adjacent patterns can sometimes be mistakenly identified as a space between pattern groups, resulting in a single pattern group being split into separate, and generally incomprehensible, parts. For example, in a word recognition system where certain combinations of characters or the manner in which those characters are input (i.e., *nonuniform or sloppy handwriting* may result in all kinds of recognition problems) *can create irregular inter-character spacing, this technique may result in the letters within a word being incorrectly recognized as belonging to separate words*. Inter-character spacing problems are of particular significance in handwriting recognition systems where writing styles and writing clarity can vary substantially.

Ex. 1006 at 1:23–48. Accordingly, *Fenwick* explains that “the preferred embodiment of the present invention is described in terms of detecting words and

correcting or preventing spacing errors between characters.” Ex. 1006 at 3:63–65. *Fenwick* is not trying to address a situation where the user simply does not put space between consecutive words. Rather, *Fenwick* is trying to correct or prevent errors in the recognition system, by addressing the problem of irregular spacing between letters leading to gaps between words that cause the recognition system to *mistakenly identify spaces where the user did not intend them*. The “correction” being performed is correction of erroneous identification of spaces that might otherwise occur using purported prior art techniques. But the handwriting that the system is operating on is normal—though perhaps “sloppy”—English-language handwriting, with intended spaces left between the words “the” and “newton.”

The Petition identifies no example in *Fenwick* where a word is removed from a buffer without the user providing input containing a space, either the normal space between written English words or a “hard space.” Accordingly, the Petition fails to show this claimed scenario is taught or rendered obvious by *Arai* in combination with *Fenwick*. The Petition thus fails to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing as to claim 1.

2. Claims 2, 3, 7, and 8

Each of claims 2, 3, 7, and 8 depends from claim 1 and accordingly incorporates limitation 1[g]. The Petition relies upon the same arguments for

limitation 1[g] in these claims as it does for claim 1. Petition at 35–39. Accordingly, the Petition fails to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing as to claims 2, 3, 7, and 8, for the same reasons as for claim 1.

3. Claim 9, 12, and 13

Limitation 9[e] of claim 9 requires:

automatically determining that at least a portion of the sequence matches a word or phrase in a database of acceptable words and/or phrases without the user inputting a space or selecting a word; and

Ex. 1001 at 21:14–16.

Limitation 9[f] further requires:

sending the first sequence to an application or service running on, or accessible by, the wireless device,
wherein the sending comprises removing the first sequence from the memory storage buffer, and
wherein the sending is performed in the absence of user editing of the first sequence.

Ex. 1001 at 21:18–23.

For limitation 9[e], the Petition appears to rely upon unmodified teachings of *Arai*. Petition at 42–45. But for limitation 9[f], the Petition expressly relies upon a combination of *Arai* and *Fenwick*. Petition at 46. The Petition makes no argument that *Arai* alone satisfies limitation 9[f], thereby conceding

that *Arai* alone does not teach claim 9. For the motivation to combine and the identification of relevant teachings in *Fenwick*, the Petition simply refers to Section VIII.A.1.h, the discussion of limitation 1[g]. Petition at 46.

It is this ***combination*** of *Arai* and *Fenwick* that must satisfy claim 9, and in particular that must satisfy both the “without the user inputting a space or selecting a word” of limitation 9[e] and the “in the absence of user editing of the first sequence” of limitation 9[f]. But as explained in connection with claim 1 above, the teachings of *Fenwick* relied upon to modify *Arai* all involve detecting words which are followed by a user-inputted space, either a conventional space between written words or a “hard space.” See Section VI.A.1 above. Accordingly, the Petition fails to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing as to claim 9 under Ground 1, for the same reasons as for claim 1.

Each of claims 12 and 13 depends from claim 9 and accordingly incorporates limitations 9[e] and 9[f]. The Petition relies upon the same arguments for these limitations in these claims as it does for claim 9. Petition at 47. Accordingly, the Petition fails to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing as to claims 12 and 13 under Ground 1, for the same reasons as for claim 9.

B. Ground 2: *Arai* in combination with *Fenwick* and *Baker*

Ground 2 challenges claims 9, 12, and 13 under largely the same theory as Ground 1, adding the third reference *Baker* to purportedly satisfy the “database” requirement of limitation 9[e]. Petition at 48–51. The Petition does not argue that the teachings of *Baker* are relevant to the “without the user inputting a space or selecting a word” of limitation 9[e] or to limitation 9[f], and it relies upon the same purported teachings of *Arai* and *Fenwick* to satisfy these in claims 9, 12, and 13 as Ground 1 does. Petition 48–51. Accordingly, the Petition fails to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing as to claims 9, 12, and 13 under Ground 2, for the same reasons as for Ground 1.

C. The Board Should Exercise Its Discretion to Deny Institution on *Fintiv* Grounds

35 U.S.C. § 314(a) gives the Board discretion to deny institution of IPR due to the advanced state of parallel district court litigation regarding the same issues. *See NHK Spring Co. v. Intrix-Plex Techs., Inc.*, IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 at 19-21 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential) (“*NHK*”). The Board has set forth six factors for determining whether discretionary denial in light of such parallel litigation is appropriate, and in analyzing them, “takes a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” *Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.*, IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5-6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“*Fintiv I*”); *see also Apple Inc. v.*

Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 15 at 7-17 (PTAB May 13, 2020) (informative) (“*Fintiv IP*”); Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (dated June 21, 2022) (“Interim Discretionary Denial Memo”).

Each of these six *Fintiv* factors weigh in favor of the Board exercising its discretion to deny institution here. For Factor 1, no stay of the parallel district court litigation has been granted, and a stay is unlikely given the advanced stage of the case. For Factor 2, the district court trials will occur approximately seven months before the deadline for a final written decision in this proceeding. For Factor 3, there will be much investment by the parties and the district court—by the time the Board issues its institution decision, the district court will have held a claim construction hearing, fact discovery will be near completion, and opening expert reports will be days away. For Factor 4, there is substantial overlap in both the claims and art at issue in this proceeding and in the district court; Petitioners have not made a *Sotera* stipulation to address the concerns of inefficiency and inconsistent rulings. For Factor 5, Petitioners are defendants in the parallel litigation. And for Factor 6, the Petition fails to present a compelling challenge on the merits. Each of these factors is addressed in more detail below.

1. *Fintiv* Factor 1: The district court has not granted a stay, nor is there any evidence that a stay will be granted.

In the parallel district court proceeding (*Cerence Operating Company v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.*, Case No. 2:23-cv-00482-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex.)) involving the '428 Patent and the Petitioners, the district court has not granted a stay pending IPR. Further, there is no evidence that a stay will be granted.

Moreover, the facts here indicate that it is unlikely that the district court would grant a stay pending IPR even if this IPR were instituted, given the late stage of litigation. The parties have already exchanged infringement and invalidity contentions (Ex. 1019 at 4), and the fact discovery period is more than half completed (Ex. 1019 at 3–4). By the time the Board's institution decision is due in this proceeding (March 6, 2025), the claim construction hearing will have been held and the due date for opening expert reports on infringement and invalidity will be a mere 11 days away. (Ex. 1019 at 3.) Trial is currently set for August 4, 2025—more than seven months before the earliest deadline for a final written decision in this IPR. (Ex. 1019 at 1.)

Where the district court litigation has not been stayed, and any stay is speculative and unlikely, allowing this IPR to proceed in parallel would be wasteful and inefficient. Factor 1 weighs against institution.

2. *Fintiv* Factor 2: The district court trials will occur more than seven months before the deadline for a final written decision in this proceeding.

“If the court’s trial date is earlier than the projected statutory deadline, the Board generally has weighed this fact in favor of exercising authority to deny institution under *NHK*.” *Fintiv I* at 9.

Here, the deadline for a final written decision in this IPR is March 6, 2026, which may be extended to September 6, 2026, for good cause or in the case of joinder. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c). Meanwhile, the district court litigation is set for trial on August 4, 2025. (Ex. 1017 at 1.) The timeframe set by the district court is consistent with the Federal Court Management Statistics for the Eastern District of Texas. *See* Interim Discretionary Denial Memo at 3 & n.4 (encouraging use of these statistics in evaluating this factor). Those statistics indicate that, over the past six years, a civil case in the district was brought to trial 19.8 months after filing. Ex. 2001 (indicating median times to trial for civil cases for the twelve-month period ending in September for 2019-2024 as 16.8, 18.0, 22.1, 21.0, 19.0, and 21.9). Here, the trial is set approximately 22 months after October 13, 2023, the date the case was filed. (Ex. 1019 at 1; *Cerence Operating Company v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.*, Case No. 2:23-cv-00482-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex.), Dkt. 1.)

Thus, the district court trial is set to occur **seven months** before the deadline for a final written decision, and possibly more than a year before the deadline if extended. This weighs heavily against institution. Indeed, the Board has denied institution on account of even smaller gaps between the final written decision and trial. *See, e.g., EClinicalWorks, LLC v. Decapolis LLC*, IPR2022-00229, Paper 10 at 9 (PTAB Apr. 13, 2022) (finding this factor weighed in favor of discretionary denial and denying institution where “the beginning of the jury trial in the WDTX Cases is roughly **one or two months** before any final decision would have been due had *inter partes* review been instituted”); *Fintiv II* at 13 (finding this factor weighed in favor of discretionary denial and denying institution where the district court trial was scheduled to occur **two months** before the deadline for the Board to reach a final written decision); *NXP USA, Inc. v. Impinj, Inc.*, PGR2022-00005, Paper 17 at 9 (PTAB May 2, 2022) (“NXP”) (same), *reh’g denied*, Paper 20 (PTAB Aug. 25, 2022).

Petitioners imply that the Board should ignore these set trial dates because it is “speculative.” Petition at 52. But the Petition presents no evidence that the trials will not proceed on the set date, which, as noted above, is consistent with the most current time-to-trial statistics for the Eastern District of Texas. *See* Interim Discretionary Denial Memo at 3 & n.4. “[B]ased on the evidence of record, there is no evidence to suggest that trial will be delayed.”

Nine Energy at 9; *see also NXP* at 9 (“We generally take courts’ trial schedules at face value absent some strong evidence to the contrary.”) (quoting *Fintiv II* at 13).

Because the district court trial is currently set to occur seven months before the earliest deadline for a final written decision in this IPR, the set date is consistent with current time-to-trial statistics, and there is no evidence that the date may change, this factor weighs heavily against institution. *Fintiv II* at 13.

3. *Fintiv* Factor 3: By the time an institution decision is reached, both fact discovery and claim construction proceedings will be well underway.

Factor 3 relates to the “amount and type of work already completed in the parallel litigation by the court and the parties *at the time of the institution decision.*” *Fintiv I* at 9 (emphasis added). Here, the claim construction hearing will be complete when the institution decision is due. (Ex. 1017 at 3.) Fact discovery is likewise already well underway. The parties have collectively served and responded to dozens of interrogatories, as well as served 11 third-party subpoenas. Extensive document production has also already occurred. And by the time the institution decision is due, document production is to be substantially complete and the deadline to complete discovery and serve opening expert reports will be 11 days away. (Ex. 1017 at 3.) Those investments weigh strongly against institution because they ensure that this IPR cannot be

an efficient alternative to district court litigation. This favors discretionary denial, and panels have found this factor to favor denial when the parallel litigation was at a similarly advanced stage as here. *See, e.g., BOE Tech. Grp. Co. v. Element Capital Commercial Co.*, IPR2023-00808, Paper 9 at 23-24 (PTAB Nov. 15, 2023) (denying institution in part because “[s]ignificant discovery has been completed, including the exchange of infringement and invalidity contentions, document requests and interrogatories, and proposed claim terms for construction, and ... close of fact discovery is near”).

Because there has been substantial investment in the parallel proceedings, Factor 3 weighs heavily against institution.

4. *Fintiv* Factor 4: There is substantial overlap between this IPR and the district court proceeding.

This factor looks at “whether all or some of the claims challenged in the petition are also at issue in district court” and whether the “petition includes the same or substantially the same claims, grounds, arguments, and evidence” as the parallel district court case. *Fintiv I* at 12-13. Here, there is overlap between the challenged and asserted claims, and the same prior art applied in the Petition is also relied upon at the district court.

First, claim 1 challenged in the Petition is asserted in the litigation. (Ex. 1018 at 2). Second, there is substantial overlap between the prior art argu-

ments presented in the Petition and arguments advanced by Petitioners in litigation. The first obviousness argument presented in Petitioners' district court invalidity contentions is "Arai alone or in view of Fenwick." (Ex. 2002 at 57.) These are the same Arai and Fenwick references relied upon in this Petition. (Ex. 2002 at 13.)

Ground 1 of this IPR rests solely on this same combination of Arai and Fenwick. Ground 2 adds a third reference, Baker. But this ground only relies upon Baker as purportedly disclosing the "database" limitation of element 9[e]. Petition at 48–51. A mere two pages of the Petition address the Baker reference in connection with the challenged claims. Petition at 49–50. Indeed, the Petition itself refers to Arai and Fenwick as "the primary prior art." Petition at 5.

In short, the Petition challenges a claim asserted in the parallel litigation, and the Samsung Petitioners rely on each of its primary IPR references at the district court. A determination at trial in the district court that the combination of Arai and Fenwick fail to render claim 1 obvious would not rest upon the claim 9 requirement of a "database" and thus would not be a result of omitting Baker from an obviousness combination. Accordingly, such a determination of non-obviousness would imply that all of the grounds presented in this IPR

should fail. Thus, the overlap between IPR grounds and district court invalidity theories raises substantial “concerns of inefficiency and the possibility of conflicting decisions,” weighing against institution. *See Fintiv I* at 12.

5. *Fintiv* Factor 5: Samsung Petitioners are defendants in the district court litigation.

The Petitioners are defendants in the parallel litigation. “Because the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party, this factor weighs in favor of discretionary denial.” *Fintiv II* at 15.

6. *Fintiv* Factor 6: Other circumstances weigh strongly against institution, including the weakness of the Petition and Petitioner’s delay.

This factor looks at “other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits.” *Fintiv I* at 9. This factor weighs heavily against institution for two reasons. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the Petition fails to present a “compelling” merits (*see* Interim Discretionary Denial Memo at 2-5). As explained above, Petitioner has failed to present prior art or combinations of prior art that satisfy the “the absence of receiving user input . . . representing a space character” of claim 1 and related limitations of claim 9.

* * *

Each of the six *Fintiv* factors weigh in favor of the Board exercising its discretion to deny institution.

VII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petition fails to establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would succeed in showing that the prior art discloses or renders obvious any of the challenged claims, and the Board should deny institution on that basis. Alternatively, the Board should exercise its discretion to deny institution of this IPR on *Fintiv* grounds.

Dated: December 6, 2024

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CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT

I certify that there are 4,412 words in this paper, excluding the portions exempted under 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(a)(1), according to the word count tool in Microsoft Word.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that “Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response” was served on
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