

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

YEALINK (USA) NETWORK TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD., AND YEALINK
NETWORK TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.,

Petitioners,

v.

BARCO N.V.

Patent Owner.

CASE: IPR2024-01439

U.S. PATENT NO. 11,422,951

PATENT OWNER'S SUR-REPLY

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Exhibits

Exhibit Number	Description
Ex. 2001	Excerpt from File History of Ex Parte Reexamination 90/014,087
Ex. 2002	WIPO Publication WO 2010105335 (“Banerjee”)
Ex. 2003	U.S. Publication US 20100302454 (“Epstein”)
Ex. 2004	Declaration of Dr. Michael Brogioli
Ex. 2005	Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Michael Brogioli
Ex. 2006	June 30, 2025 Deposition Transcript of Kevin C. Almeroth in IPR2024-01436
Ex. 2007	July 1, 2025 Deposition Transcript of Kevin C. Almeroth in IPR2024-01439
Ex. 2008	July 2, 2025 Deposition Transcript of Kevin C. Almeroth in IPR2024-01437
Ex. 2009	July 2, 2025 Deposition Transcript of Kevin C. Almeroth IPR2024-01438
Ex. 2010	Barco Sales Data (<i>Confidential and Redacted Versions Filed</i>)
Ex. 2011	Crestron License Agreement (<i>Confidential and Redacted Versions Filed</i>)
Ex. 2012	<i>Barco and Crestron announce patent license agreement regarding a set of essential ClickShare patents</i> , BARCO (Sept. 12, 2023) https://web.archive.org/web/20240810204702/https://www.barco.com/en/about/press-releases/barco-and-crestron-announce-patent-license-agreement-regarding-a
Ex. 2013	<i>ClickShare conferencing & collaboration</i> , BARCO (April 1, 2025), https://web.archive.org/web/20250401012647/https://www.barco.com/en/products/clickshare-conferencing-collaboration#expand

Exhibit Number	Description
Ex. 2014	<i>ClickShare Button</i> , BARCO (February 12, 2025) https://web.archive.org/web/20250212164931/https://www.barco.com/en/product/clickshare-conferencing-button
Ex. 2015	ECF 65, Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement, <i>Barco, Inc. et al v. Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co., Ltd. et al</i> , 2:2023-cv-521 (E.D. Tex. 11/14/2023)
Ex. 2016	ECF 89, Claim Construction Order, <i>Barco, Inc. et al v. Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co., Ltd. et al</i> , 2:2023-cv-521 (E.D. Tex. 11/14/2023)
Ex. 2017	List of Products Covered by Barco Patents accessible at: https://www.barco.com/en/about/terms-conditions/patents
Ex. 2018	<i>Patent</i> , CRESTRON (June 12, 2025) https://www.crestron.com/legal/patents?page=1
Ex. 2019	Crestron Electronics Private Company Profile, PITCHBOOK
Ex. 2020	ECF 55, Consent Judgment and Permanent Injunction, <i>Barco, Inc. et al v. Vivitek Corporation et al</i> , Case No. 4:19-cv-3250 (N.D. Cal. 4/27/2020)
Ex. 2021	<i>Barco Successfully enforces ClickShare IP against competitors in the U.S.</i> , BARCO (May 26, 2020) https://web.archive.org/web/20240424230846/https://www.barco.com/en/about/press-releases/2020-05-26-barco-successfully-enforces-cs-ip-against-competitors-in-the-us
Ex. 2022	Paul Krzyzanowski, <i>Devices</i> , PK.ORG (updated March 24, 2011).
Ex. 2023	Excerpts from April 18, 2025 Deposition Transcript of Andrew Ludke (<i>Confidential and Redacted Versions Filed</i>)
Ex. 2024	<i>USB device class drivers included in Windows</i> , Microsoft (Apr. 9, 2025) https://web.archive.org/web/20250409210411/https://learn.micros

Exhibit Number	Description
	oft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/usbcon/supported-usb-classes
Ex. 2025	Reserved
Ex. 2026	Dr. Kevin Almeroth's Declaration in IPR2024-01437
Ex. 2027	Dr. Kevin Almeroth's Declaration in IPR2024-01438
Ex. 2028	Reserved
Ex. 2029	Reserved
Ex. 2030	Dr. Kevin Almeroth's Declaration in IPR2025-00597
Ex. 2031	Reserved
Ex. 2032	Modified Protective Order
Ex. 2033	December 1, 2025 Deposition Transcript of Kevin C. Almeroth in IPR2024-01436, IPR2024-01437, IPR2024-01438 and IPR2024-01439

I. INTRODUCTION

The Reply asserts “[t]his is not a close case.” Reply, 26. This admission, in the proper context, could not be more accurate. Petitioner failed to meet its burden that any challenged claim is obvious. The ’951 Patent has been successfully licensed to a significant and sophisticated market competitor. The ’951 Patent is embodied by products which have experienced significant commercial success. The weakness of the multi-reference obviousness challenge that the Petition presents, coupled with the strong, and un rebutted, secondary considerations, overwhelmingly confirms that the Challenged Claims are not obvious.

The Petition presents three Grounds which fail to teach “an input device configured to allow the user to carry out a user action on the input device that triggers transfer of user selected arbitrary media content...” Ex. 1001, Cl. 1. Moreover, the Petition fails to provide sufficient motivation to combine the cited references. For example, with respect to Ground 1, the Reply argues a POSITA would be motivated to modify *Ono*’s peripheral device to include an input device used to trigger the transfer of content, despite *Ono* clearly stating such modification is unnecessary, and that such an embodiment would reduce the speed between presenters. Ex. 1005, ¶161 (“for example, where there are a plurality of presenters who are to present in a given order, *it is unnecessary for each presenter to carry out output on/off operations at each information terminal apparatus* in accordance with the order,

and therefore, the gap in time until the next presentation is eliminated, and presentations can be conducted speedily”).¹ Inexplicably, the Reply points to *Ono*’s discouragement from such an input device as ***motivating*** the alleged combination. Reply, 8-9 (citing Ex. 1005, ¶161).

With respect to Ground 2, the Petition points to a nonexistent problem in *Uchida*. Petition, 46 (“Uchida does not specifically address a scenario where multiple users are vying for control over the display to project images from their individual computers.”) *Uchida* already addresses how multiple users switch between their presented content with the use of the remote control device. Ex. 1009, ¶13 (“the present invention provides... a remote control device that remotely controls the operation of the image projection device,”) ¶45 (“the remote control device 2 may be provided with a start-up control button for issuing a start-up instruction and a stop control button for issuing a stop instruction.”). Meanwhile, the Reply alleges that a POSITA would ***remove*** *Uchida*’s remote control device and implement an input device onto *Uchida*’s transmitters to address a problem when users are “vying for control” of the presentation system. However, this problem that does not exist in *Uchida*, *Uchida*’s remote control device manages which participant is in control of the presentation system.

¹ All emphasis added unless otherwise noted.

Lastly, with respect to Ground 3, the Reply proposes a combination between two of *Ichieda*'s embodiments to free up a PC network card. In doing so, Petitioner proposes modifications that are entirely distinct from this alleged improvement. In other words, the combination proposed by Petitioner is not supported by the proffered motivation and is at odds with each of *Ichieda*'s embodiments, confirming the hindsight driven analysis of the Petition.

In addition to failing to prove that the '951 Patent is obvious, the Reply misstates the laws and facts regarding Patent Owner's secondary indicia, which unquestionably support a finding of non-obviousness.

II. THE CRESTRON LICENSE STRONGLY SUPPORTS NON-OBVIOUSNESS

Industry-leader Crestron has licensed the '951 Patent from Patent Owner. The Reply fails to address this undeniable fact and under controlling Federal Circuit case law, the proceeding, which rests entirely on obviousness grounds, can stop here.

Petitioner misstates the law for secondary considerations. "Unlike products, which may incorporate numerous features beyond those claimed or described in a patent and therefore may require careful parsing to establish a nexus, *actual licenses to the subject patent do not demand the same*, as they are, by their nature, directly tied to the patented technology." *Ancora Technologies, Inc. v. Roku, Inc.*, 140 F.4th 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2025). So, "[l]icenses to the challenged patent, then, unlike

products or other forms of objective evidence of nonobviousness, do not require a nexus with respect to the specific claim at issue, nor does [] nexus law require that a particular patent be the only patent being licensed or the sole motivation for entering into a license.” *Id.*

The Reply fails to provide any explanation for why *Anacora* does not apply. Instead, Petitioner misinterprets caselaw in attempt to impose a stricter nexus requirement for licensed patents. *Id.* For example, *Sibia Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp.*, a case two-decades before *Anacora*, does not require that licensed patents be practiced by the licensee’s product. Instead, it provides a single instance where a court found the “existence of these licenses is insufficient to ***overcome the conclusion of obviousness***[.]” 225 F.3d 1349, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“SIBIA points to three licenses or sub-licenses of the ’629 patent, all of which were part of larger licensing packages.”). *Sibia* fails, however, to undermine *Anacora*, which confirms that when a challenged patent is licensed, a nexus is presumed, even if the license includes more than the challenged patent. So too here—Patent Owner’s license covers three patent families that all claim similar technology—and this is not the case of a broad portfolio-wide license. The Crestron license here is targeted to specific patents necessary to practice the claimed technology.

Likewise, in *Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A.*, a licensee identified another patent in the licenses as being the more desirable from a licensing perspective. 808 F.3d

829, 838 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“A Pamlab executive explained that Pamlab desired this stable form ‘[b]ecause of its uniqueness and its novel properties’”). It was this desire for another licensed patent which resulted in the difficulty in determining “the extent to which the licensing agreement was a result of the novel features in the [challenged patent], as opposed to the other patents involved.” *Id.* Here, no such evidence exists, and *Anacora*’s clear direction is not overcome by the unique factual circumstances of *Merck*. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Ex. 2023, 58:14-19. Conversely, Barco has many other unrelated, unlicensed patents in its portfolio. Ex. 2017.

Last, the Reply cites to *Teva Pharmaceuticals Int’l GmbH v. Eli Lilly & Co.*, in attempt to require a mapping between the licensed patents and the licensee’s products. Reply, 30 (citing 8 F.4th 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2021)). However, here, just like in *Teva*, Petitioner’s “argument loses sight of the true purpose of the nexus requirement, which is to consider whether the fact-finder can infer that the licensing arose out of recognition and acceptance of the subject matter claimed in the patents.” *Teva*, 8 F.4th at 1364. The Crestron license is a license involving three patent families (or 20 patents total) involving related technology. Ex. 2011. This is not comparable to *Teva*, where the license involved 188 patents, so “the nexus between the license and the validity of any particular claim is rather tenuous to say the least.” *Teva*, 8, F.4th at 1363. Moreover, the Reply provides no argument that somehow

[REDACTED]

Teva, should govern over the more recent *Anacora*, which is crystal clear: “Licenses to the challenged patent, then, unlike products or other forms of objective evidence of nonobviousness, do not require a nexus with respect to the specific claim at issue, nor does [] nexus law require that a particular patent be the only patent being licensed or the sole motivation for entering into a license.” *Ancora v. Roku*, 140 F.4th at 1362.

Notwithstanding Petitioner’s misunderstanding of the case law, the Reply is also flawed with respect to the relevant facts. Patent Owner has demonstrated a nexus between the challenged patent and the Crestron License. For example, Crestron identifies the ’951 Patent as embodied in its AM-TX3-100 and AM-TX3-2 products. Ex. 2018.² [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Ex. 2023, 58:14-19. Indeed, as the Reply itself notes, the ’951 Patent is independently valuable. Reply, 27 (citing Ex. 1078, 141:20-143:18). Dr. Almeroth did not form any specific opinions in relation to Crestron and its license of the ’951 Patent, and Petitioner offers no evidence that Crestron does not practice the ’951 Patent. Ex. 2033, 13:20-14:4, 14:16-21. In

²<https://web.archive.org/web/20250616134131/https://www.crestron.com/legal/patents?page=1>

summary, the Reply's position (Reply, 28-30) regarding the Crestron License is unsupported by law and fact.

Petitioner simply fails to overcome the significance of the Crestron license. Ex. 2011, 15; Ex. 2023, 28:22-29:16. Crestron, a world-wide company with a sophisticated IP portfolio of its own, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] using the claimed patented technology. Ex. 2023, 28:10-18, 58:14-19; Ex. 2019 (showing Crestron owns 460 patent families). [REDACTED] Ex. 2023, 76:1-18. Creston itself identifies that its AM-TX3-100 and AM-TX3-2 products practice the '951 Patent. Ex. 2018. This *direct and un rebutted* acquiescence and licensing by a sophisticated entity that owns over 460 patent families strongly favors a finding of non-obviousness.

III. THE EMBODIED PRODUCTS ARE A COMMERCIAL SUCCESS

The Reply does not dispute that a Barco Base unit, when used with a ClickShare Button, practices the claimed invention. Reply, 26-29. While certain Barco Base units may include features not covered by the '951 Patent, it is undisputed that the '951 Patent is practiced by a Barco Base unit used in connection with a ClickShare Button. *See* POR, 49-71. Further, as Mr. Six testified when deposed by Petitioner, when a Barco Base unit is used, 85% (or more) of users use the ClickShare Button over the ClickShare Application. Ex. 1078, 199:23-200:11.

Moreover, “the degree of correspondence between a product and a patent claim falls along a spectrum.” *Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC*, 944 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The Reply does not identify any unclaimed features or otherwise advance any evidence to counter Patent Owner’s mapping of the products to the claims. The Reply’s argument that the ClickShare System is not coextensive with the claimed subject matter is conclusory, unsupported by any evidence, and thus unpersuasive. Ex. 2033, 10:21-11:8, 11:16-12:1, 12:14-22, 13:9-12.

IV. THE ’951 PATENT CLAIMS ARE PATENTABLE OVER THE CITED REFERENCES

A. Ground 1

1. The Reply Provides No Evidence That A POSITA Would Be Motivated To Combine *Ono* And *Corbett*

As noted in the POR, *Ono* provides a system which:

seeks to provide an image display system including a plurality of information terminal apparatuses connected to a wire or wireless network and an image display apparatus, *wherein switching among the plurality of networked information terminal apparatuses and selecting a desired information terminal apparatus therefrom can be performed from the side of the image display apparatus*, and image information from the desired information terminal apparatus can be displayed on a display section of the image display apparatus.

POR, 20 (quoting Ex. 1005, ¶8). Despite the clear objective described in *Ono*, the Petition and Reply advocate that a POSITA abandons *Ono*’s system where the image

display apparatus manages the selection of the displayed content, in favor of one where the communications modules connected to the information terminal apparatuses control image display. Ex. 2033, 44:11-18 (Dr. Almeroth opining that there is no motivation to combine when “there is a particular objective of the primary reference that would be undermined by considering – by trying to combine it with a secondary reference”), 45:7-15, 59:16-60:4.

Neither the Reply, nor Dr. Almeroth, provide an explanation for how *Ono* could be modified in this way and still enable “switching among the plurality of networked information terminal apparatuses[.]” Ex. 1005, ¶8; POR, 20-24. Instead, both confusingly rely on the newly cited passage from *Ono*:

since the information terminal apparatus whose image is to be shown on the screen 5 can be switched merely by operations from the remote controller 69 of the image display apparatus 1, even in cases, for example, where there are a plurality of presenters who are to present in a given order, it is unnecessary for each presenter to carry out output on/off operations at each information terminal apparatus in accordance with the order, and therefore, the gap in time until the next presentation is eliminated, and presentations can be conducted speedily.

Reply, 8 (quoting Ex. 1005, ¶161) (emphasis in original); Ex. 1083, ¶7. This passage does not support the conclusion that *Ono*’s system could manage communications from this terminal—rather it confirms the opposite. As stated by Dr. Almeroth himself:

[t]he full quote from this passage of Ono explains that, *since the information terminal apparatus whose image is to be shown on the screen can be switched merely by operations from the remote controller* of the image display apparatus, *it is unnecessary for each presenter to carry out output on/off operations at each information terminal apparatus in accordance with the order.*

Ex. 1083, ¶7. As explained by Dr. Almeroth, a POSITA reading this passage would not interpret the Petition’s combination to be workable. A POSITA would find the combination to be unnecessary.

Moreover, the Reply fails to provide any additional explanation for why such modification would be desirable, *i.e.*, why a POSITA would be motivated to combine *Ono* with *Corbett*. The Petition cites to *Grimshaw* and *Uchida* to “illustrate the desirability in the art and thus provide a specific design incentive.” Reply, 11 (citing Ex. 1008, ¶19; Ex. 1012, 5:8-24; Ex. 1009, ¶¶70-72). These passages amount to nothing more than a disclosure that buttons and switches in presentation systems exist, which, with nothing more (as is the case in the Petition), cannot be the basis for unpatentability. Ex. 1008, ¶19; Ex. 1012, 5:8-24; Ex. 1009, ¶¶70-72; *Virtek Vision Int’l ULC v. Assembly Guidance Sys., Inc.*, 97 F.4th 882, 887 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“The mere fact that these possible arrangements existed in the prior art does not provide a reason that a skilled artisan would have substituted” one for the other). Rather, the petition should have (and did not) argue “why a skilled artisan *would*

make this substitution.” *Id.* There is no basis (articulated or otherwise) to modify *Ono* based on these disclosures when *Ono* itself renders it “unnecessary for each presenter to carry out output on/off operations at each information terminal apparatus in accordance with the order.” Ex. 1005, ¶161.

Not only is the Reply’s argument unpersuasive as to the facts, but it also misapplies the law. References must be considered in their entirety. *W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc.*, 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Preferences for an alternative solution may result in a lack of motivation to combine. *Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.*, 839 F.3d 1034, (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding no motivation to combine when prior art taught a preference for an alternative). Moreover, *Ono* **does** “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage investigation into” the combination between *Ono* and *Corbett*. *Meiresonne v. Google, Inc.*, 849 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting *Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc.*, 737 F.3d 731, 738 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). By avoiding the need for “each presenter...to perform an output on/off operation at each information terminal apparatus...the gap in time until the next presentation is eliminated, and the presentation can be conducted speedily.” Ex. 1005, ¶144. To modify *Ono* as the Reply suggests is a change based on hindsight, not the teachings of the identified prior art.

2. Ground 1 Does Not Disclose “an input device... that triggers transfer of said user selected arbitrary media content”

In the Institution Decision, the Board recognized that PO’s argument with respect to this limitation had merit:

As Patent Owner notes, Ono describes remote controller 69 as capable of receiving user inputs that will cause a “connection request signal” to be transmitted. Ex. 1005 ¶ 45. Ono also makes clear, however, that the connection request signal does not necessarily result in the transfer of image information because that request may either be accepted or *denied*. See *id.* ¶¶ 82–97. As such in the proposed combination, if the connection request is accepted, then image information is communicated from the transmitter to the wireless communications network and to the base node for display (*id.* ¶¶ 87–88); conversely, if the connection request is not accepted, then image information is not communicated (*id.* at ¶¶ 65–96).

Institution Decision (Paper 12) at 20. The Reply’s arguments regarding this limitation are unpersuasive.

The Reply improperly interprets PO’s argument as meaning that a connection may never fail. Reply, 12. This is a strawman argument which fails to appreciate the claim limitation. *Ono* fails to render this limitation obvious because its input device does not trigger the transfer of content—not because its transmissions may fail. *Ono* is clear. The control section generates a connection request signal that requires subsequent action to occur to before content can be transferred. Ex. 1005,

¶¶45, 83; Ex. 2004, ¶91. It does not trigger the transfer of content. It merely requests a process that has multiple subsequent steps that ultimately could lead to the transfer of content. *Id.*

Similarly, the Reply erroneously cites functionality of the ClickShare CSE-800 user guide and seeks to conflate instances in which a product may fail to function with the interpretation of this claim limitation. Reply, 11 (citing Ex. 1067). The cited passage relates to use of a *fifth* or *ninth* sharing device, which may also include a device sharing via a software application or HDMI input source. Ex. 1067, 43. This product feature has little, if any relevance, on interpreting the claim limitation, let alone explaining whether unrelated prior art teaches this limitation. Accordingly, Ground 1 fails.

3. Ground 1 Also Does Not Disclose A Base Node Integrated Into A Display

The '951 Patent indicates that in an unclaimed embodiment, “a display 44 may be a projector *and* screen.” Ex. 1001, 14:37-38. This embodiment is not claimed in Claims 2, 8, 10, 17, and 21, which require the integration of a base node into the display. In Claims 2, 8, 10, 17, and 21, the base node is integrated into the display, not a portion of the display. In other words, Claims 2, 8, 10, 17, and 21 are directed towards displays such as TVs or other similar devices with integrated base nodes. A base node integrated into a projector does not render obvious this

limitation. Therefore, Ground 1 fails at least with respect to Claims 2, 8, 10, 17, and 21.

B. Ground 3

1. The Reply Fails To Respond To The POR

In the relied upon “Third Embodiment” of *Ichieda*, the control section 91 of the PC 90 runs and manages the connection establishing program PN. Ex. 1006, ¶¶134-135, 139. The POR notes that “the Petition provides no motivation for altering the connection process to originate at the information terminal instead of the PC as taught by the Third Embodiment” of *Ichieda*. POR, 31 (citing Ex. 2004, ¶¶104, 106); *see* Ex. 1006, ¶141. Likewise, in its Institution Decision, the Board noted:

At most, Petitioner has demonstrated why a skilled artisan would have known to use information terminal 80 as a wireless means for communicating the image data (e.g., to free the laptop network card from use) from PC 90, but that does not explain why a skilled artisan would have modified the third embodiment to use information terminal 80 to trigger the communication of the image data that is associated with PC 90. On this record, Petitioner has not demonstrated sufficiently any connection between alleviating PC 90 from having to use a network card and why a skilled artisan would have chosen to use operation section 83 of information terminal 80 as an alternative to what *Ichieda* teaches, which is to use operation section 93 and control section 91 of PC 90 to trigger the communication of that image data that is associated

with PC 90.

Institution Decision (Paper 12), 24.

The Reply provides no explanation for why a POSITA would use the operation section 83 of the information terminal 80 instead of the operation section 93 of the PC 90. Instead, the Reply merely states that “In the modified arrangement of *Ichieda* described above and in the Petition, pressing a button on the operation section 83 ‘triggers transfer of... media content.’” Reply, 23 (emphasis in original). Dr. Almeroth provides almost identical language with no further evidence as to why a POSITA would be motivated to make the modification. Ex. 1083, ¶30; *Bell Semiconductor LLC v. NXP B.V.*, No. 2023-1260, 2024 WL 4984053, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 5, 2024) (confirming the Board properly rejecting an “expert’s declaration that parrots the language of the petition.”).

Even if the information terminal was used “to free the laptop network card from use” there is no motivation for using the information terminal to **trigger** the transfer of content. The connection process begins with a connection establishing program PN run on the laptop. Ex. 1006, ¶139. As part of this program, a POSITA would continue to launch, and run, this program on the computer because of the comparably greater computer power. *Id.*; Ex. 2004, ¶109. There is simply no explanation provided by Petitioner to use the operation section 83 of the information

terminal 80 to trigger the transfer of content. Accordingly, Ground 3 fails for at least this reason alone.

2. *Ichieda* Does Not Disclose “an input device... that triggers transfer of said user selected arbitrary media content.”

The Reply conflates PO’s arguments with respect to this limitation. The Reply argues that “the fact that a connection might fail in some circumstances is irrelevant.” Reply, 24. However, the POR explained, a user action is used to configure the wireless connection, but the transfer of content is performed automatically without a user action on an input device when a connection occurs between the PC and the projector. POR, 34.

More specifically, during the operation of *Ichieda*’s Third Embodiment, the control section of the PC (e.g., the CPU) determines whether the process startup instruction has been received from the operation section (e.g., a keyboard or pointing device). Ex. 1006, ¶¶133, 141; Ex. 2004, ¶111. If so, the PC prompts the user to take an image of the information code displayed on the projector with an information terminal. Ex. 1006, ¶143; Ex. 2004, ¶111. The information code is then communicated from the information terminal to the PC. Ex. 1006, ¶144; Ex. 2004, ¶111. Once the PC receives the information, *Ichieda* performs a subroutine to analyze the information code. Ex. 1006, ¶145; Ex. 2004, ¶112. If the information is recognized, the PC begins setting up the wireless LAN connection on the laptop

PC. Ex. 1006, ¶¶146-147; Ex. 2004, ¶112. If the information code is not recognized an error message is displayed on the screen and the information code photograph must be retaken. Ex. 1006, ¶146; Ex. 2004, ¶112. Upon setting up connection, the PC sends a connection request over the LAN to the projector. Ex. 1006, ¶149; Ex. 2004, ¶113. If the PC determines the project has received the request, the transmission of image data occurs. Ex. 1006, ¶149; Ex. 2004, ¶114.

As with Ground 1, the Reply irrelevantly cites functionality of the ClickShare CSE-800 user guide and conflates instances in which a product fails to function with the interpretation of this claim limitation. Reply, 11 (citing Ex. 1067). The cited passage relates to use of a *fifth* or *ninth* sharing device, which may also include a device sharing via a software application or HDMI input source. Ex. 1067, 43. This product has little, if any relevance, on interpreting the claim limitation, let alone explaining whether or not a completely unrelated piece of prior art teaches this limitation. Accordingly, Ground 3 fails with respect to at least this limitation as well.

1. Ground 3 Does Not Disclose a Base Node Integrated Into A Display

For the same reasons regarding Ground 1, so too does Ground 3 fail. *See Supra* Section IV.A.3.

C. Ground 2

1. There Is No Motivation To Combine *Uchida* and *Grimshaw*

The Reply improperly argues that features of the cited references not relied on in the as-petitioned Ground should not be considered by the Board. Reply, 15 (“Barco’s arguments address a modification of *Uchida* and *Grimshaw* not presented in the Petition”), 16 (“Dr. Almeroth’s indication that ‘I have not specifically looked [into the origin of wireless setting information]’ is consistent with the grounds that are presented in the Petition.”), (“how wireless setting information is updated is irrelevant...”). Such analysis is contrary to the established law of obviousness, as references must be considered in their entirety. *W.L. Gore*, 721 F.2d at 1553.

The Reply misses the point of Patent Owner’s argument as to why a POSITA would not combine *Uchida* and *Grimshaw*. Reply, 14 (“the POR focuses on features related to updating wireless setting information using a remote control from *Uchida* being removed via a combination of *Uchida* and *Grimshaw* that was not presented in the Petition”). While the Petition alleges a POSITA would be motivated to combine *Uchida* with *Grimshaw* to address when multiple users are vying for control, such scenario does not exist in *Uchida* due to its pairing procedure. POR, 39-42. In *Uchida*, the remote control device 2 includes a start-up control button 231 which is used to start and stop the image projection system. Ex. 1009, ¶¶ 13, 45. The remote control device 2 controls which device shares content and when. It is

not that *Uchida* has a “general preference for an alternative” (as alleged in the Reply, 15-16) but that the problem allegedly solved by the combination does not even exist in *Uchida*.

Moreover, the Reply unnecessarily implements with redundant functions into its combination. The Reply argues that “[r]ather than addressing the grounds presented in the Petition, the POR focuses on features related to updating wireless setting information using a remote control from *Uchida* being removed via a combination of *Uchida* and *Grimshaw* that was not presented in the Petition.” Reply, 14. Instead, the Reply seemingly argues for a combination in which the wireless communication module of *Uchida* performs control functions already performed by the remote control device. It is unclear what, if any benefits, could be accomplished through such modification, and whether such system could even navigate conflicting or redundant control signals from competing devices. As Petitioner has not even established a clear combination with a motivation to combine, the arguments with respect to Ground 2 fail.

2. *Uchida-Grimshaw* Does Not Disclose “an input device... that triggers transfer of user selected arbitrary media content.”

The Reply describes the use of the image transfer stop switch in *Uchida* in an overly generic manner to allege it includes teachings that it does not. The image transfer stop switch, when used, “serves as an image transmission stop operation unit

for instructing the *image projection device 3* to stop transmitting the image data[.]” Ex. 1009, ¶71. In other words, image transfer stop switch does not trigger the transfer of content to the projector, rather image transfer stop switch tells the projector to stop projecting any received content and instead share a black screen. *Compare, id.* (“When the CPU 405 of the computer device 4 receives the information, it executes an image transfer application and transmits a request to the image projection device 3 via the wireless communication unit 107 to project a specific image (here, a black screen image) on the image projection device 3.”); Ex. 2033, 58:22-59:2 (“Q. So when it’s in stop mode, it’s your opinion that that ceases or prevents the image transfer from Component 1 to Component 3? A. to image projection device 3 as it’s described”). In *Uchida*, the only means to begin image projection are the start and stop instructions from the remote controller, which is not an input device of the peripheral device. Ex. 1009, ¶45.

Similarly, with respect to *Grimshaw*, the Reply ignores details which describe the operation of its proposed system in favor of its hindsight driven analysis. Reply, 17 (“The presence of other device components in the data transfer pathway does not change that Grimshaw indisputably discloses to trigger transmission with buttons”). *Grimshaw* describes a switch controller 318 which receives data signals from *all* the modules and communicates the data based on user selections. Ex. 1008, ¶19. It is clear that, regardless of which device is in control of the display module, that “each

of the connecting computers is outputting data signals through data connections 342, 352, 362, 372 for presentation on the display module.... [B]y respectively engaging buttons 344, 354, 364, 374 which causes the switch controller 318 to pass the data signals from the selected user module on the display module.” Ex. 1008, ¶19; Ex. 2004, ¶143. This is not the claimed input device that triggers, as yet again, the prior art in Ground 2 (like that in Ground 3) *always* transfers the media content and the only toggle is whether or not the already received media content is displayed.

As neither *Grimshaw* nor *Uchida* teach this limitation, Ground 2 fails.

1. Ground 2 Does Not Disclose a Base Node Integrated Into A Display

For the same reasons regarding Ground 1, so too does Ground 2 fail. *See supra* Section IV.A.3

V. DR. ALMEROOTH’S CONCLUSORY TESTIMONY SHOULD BE AFFORDED NO WEIGHT

When asked basic questions, such as the support for his conclusion that the claims are obvious “based on [his] experience and understanding of the relevant technology and law,” Dr. Almeroth was unable to provide any explanation for this “understanding of the relevant...law.” *See* Ex. 2033 at 53:7-55:12. This “trust me” approach is replete throughout his conclusions which is especially problematic given the tendency for Dr. Almeroth’s testimony to share an uncanny resemblance to the language of the Petition. *See e.g.*, Petition, 20 (“Moreover, independent of this and

yet further supporting it, there was a known desirability to provide a user of an electronic meeting tool with a local input device that would allow control over sharing the content of the user's computer screen to a shared display."); Ex. 1002, ¶87 ("Moreover, independent of this reasoning and yet further supporting it, there was a known desirability to provide a user of an electronic meeting tool with a local input device that would allow control over sharing the content of the user's computer screen to a shared display."). This becomes even more problematic when he acknowledges, and ignores express teachings of a reference he reviewed when they are inconsistent with the proposed combination. *See e.g.*, Ex. 1083, ¶¶7, 10 (admitting that *Ono* teaches the proposed modification is "unnecessary" and opining that "the combination of *Ono* and *Corbett* would have been obvious to a POSA"). Dr. Almeroth's willingness to eschew teachings of the prior art references simply because he deems them not part of the invention is further evidence of his results-oriented approach to obviousness, and calls into question his conclusions about the prior art and how a POSITA would have interpreted the references.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in the POR and above, the patentability of all claims of the '951 Patent should be upheld.

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Respectfully submitted,

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Certification of Word Count Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(d)

The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing contains 5,175 words according to the word count of the word-processing software used to prepare the foregoing.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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