

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

GOOGLE LLC,
Petitioner,

v.

ERICSSON AB,
Patent Owner.

Case IPR2025-00004
Patent No. 11,122,313

PATENT OWNER'S REPLY
IN SUPPORT OF ITS REVISED CONTINGENT MOTION TO AMEND

PO’S REPLY RE: REVISED CONTINGENT MOTION TO AMEND

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EXHIBIT LIST

Exhibit No.	Description
Ex. 2001	Declaration of Kayvan B. Noroozi in Support of Motion for Admission <i>Pro Hac Vice</i>
Ex. 2002	Confidential Arbitration Agreement
Ex. 2003	Confidential Settlement Agreement
Ex. 2004	U.S. Patent Application Publ. No. US2020/0068241 (publication of U.S. Patent Application Ser. No 16/672,463, filed November 3, 2019)
Ex. 2005	U.S. provisional application Ser. No. 61/500,316, filed Jun. 23, 2011
Ex. 2006	U.S. Patent Application Publ. No. 2018/0192102 (publication of U.S. Application No. 15/910,911, filed Mar. 2, 2018 that issued as U.S. Pat. No. 10,477,257 on Nov. 12, 2019)
Ex. 2007	U.S. Patent Application Publ. No. 2016/019820 (publication of U.S. Application No. 15/067,129, filed Mar. 11, 2016 that issued as U.S. Pat. No. 9,912,975 on Mar. 6, 2018)
Ex. 2008	U.S. Patent Application Publ. No 2014/0237243 (publication of U.S. Application No. 14/266,368, filed Apr. 30, 2014 that issued as U.S. Pat. No. 9,313,178 on Apr. 12, 2016)
Ex. 2009	U.S. Patent Application Publ. No. 20120331293 (publication of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/530,997, filed Jun. 22, 2012 that issued as U.S. Pat. No. 8,751,807 on Jun. 10, 2014)
Ex. 2010	Declaration of John Villasenor, Ph.D. in Support of Patent Owner's Response for IPR2025-00004
Ex. 2011	Deposition Transcript of Mr. Anthony J. Wechselberger (Taken 5/29/25)
Ex. 2012	Declaration of John Villasenor, Ph.D. in Support of Patent Owner's Response for IPR2025-00003

I. The revised amended claims do not broaden claim scope

Petitioner's opposition contends that the revised amended claims improperly expand the scope of the original claims to "cover implementations that the original claims did not." Opp. 1. Petitioner argues that while the original claims require obtaining a second content encryption key *before* reaching the recited "boundary" and applying that second key *after* that same boundary, the revised amended claims do not contain the same requirement. Opp. 2-5.

Petitioner's assertion that the revised amended claims broaden the scope of the original claims is incorrect. The original claims recite, in relevant part:

[1E] prior to reaching the first key rotation *boundary*, obtaining a second content encryption key, the second content encryption key to be used after the first content encryption key rotation *boundary* is reached; and

[1F] applying the second content encryption key for content decryption after the key rotation *boundary* is reached.

In claim 1, the "first key rotation *boundary*" provides the point before which the second CEK must be obtained, and "after" which it must be applied.

The revised amended claims contain the same before / after requirement of the original claims with respect to obtaining and applying the second CEK, but the relevant "boundary" of the revised amended claims is now the "notification-based content encryption key boundary." It is this boundary that corresponds to the "first


key rotation boundary” of the original claims, as this is the boundary point around which key rotation will occur in the revised amended claims. The revised amended claims thus recite, in relevant part:

[21.5] prior to reaching the first time-based content encryption key rotation boundary, and *in response to* receiving a notification to expire said first content encryption key *after* a notification-based content encryption key *boundary* and before said first time-based content encryption key rotation boundary, *requesting and obtaining a second content encryption key*, the second content encryption key to be used *after* the notification-based content encryption key *boundary* and before the first time-based content encryption key rotation boundary is reached; and

[21.6] *applying* the second content encryption key for content decryption *after* the notification-based content encryption key *boundary* for the first key and before the first time-based content encryption key rotation boundary is reached.

The revised amended claims thus require (1) “receiving a *notification* to expire said first content encryption key *after* a notification-based content encryption key *boundary*”; (2) “*in response to* receiving [said] notification . . . , *requesting and obtaining* a second content encryption key,” and (3) “applying the second content encryption key . . . *after* the *notification-based* content encryption

key **boundary** for the first key.” (emphases added). The illustration below depicts the before / after requirement of the revised amended claims.¹



The revised amended claims thus require that the second CEK be obtained “in response to” a notification of an upcoming notification-based boundary, *i.e.*, **before** that boundary, and that the second CEK be applied **after** that boundary. The revised claims do not broaden the original claims.

In arguing otherwise, Petitioner conflates the **notification** recited in the revised amended claims with the actual **boundary** that defines the point of key rotation. In limitation 21.5, a **notification** provides an upcoming notification-based CEK boundary. This limitation further requires that the second CEK must be

¹ In the above illustration, the second CEK is applied before the first time-based key rotation boundary, and also maintained *after* the first time-based key rotation boundary. This aspect of the illustration represents one embodiment and is non-limiting.

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requested and obtained “in response to” *receiving a notification of* that upcoming boundary, and thus *before* that boundary. Per 21.6, the second CEK must then be applied *after* that same boundary. The revised amended claims thus maintain the before / after requirement of the original claims.

Petitioner's arguments based on the revised amended claims' “first *time-based* key rotation boundary” are likewise inapposite. The “first *time-based* key rotation boundary” is *not* an operative rotation boundary because it is preceded and trumped by the *notification-based* key boundary, which causes early expiration. The first *time-based* key rotation boundary thus does not correspond to the “first key rotation boundary” of the original claims for purposes of Petitioner's claim scope dispute. It is the notification-based key boundary that corresponds to the “first key rotation boundary” of the original claims in that respect.

Accordingly, contrary to Petitioner's assertion, the revised amended claims do not encompass any *additional* embodiments when they require that the second CEK be applied both after the *notification-based* key rotation boundary and before the first *time-based* key rotation boundary. That additional language creates a further limitation requiring early expiration of the first CEK, *i.e.*, the first CEK must be rotated before its original *time-based* boundary.

Petitioner's reliance on the fact that the revised claims require both obtaining

and applying the second CEK before the *time-based* CEK boundary is thus misdirected for purposes of Petitioner's claim scope broadening argument. Rather, that additional language only adds another temporal limitation, thus further limiting the scope of the original claims without broadening the claims in any way.

Petitioner's arguments as to claim scope broadening are thus without merit.

II. The revised amended claims do not introduce new matter

Petitioner additionally argues that limitations 21.6 and 29.7 introduce new matter that is not supported by the written description. Opp. 5-7. In particular, Petitioner contends that none of Patent Owner's citations provide written description support for applying a second CEK *before* "any rotation boundary." Opp. 6-7. Petitioner thus asserts that the written description does not support notification-based early key expiration, i.e., notification-based key rotation *before* the original *time-based* rotation boundary for that key. *Id.*

Petitioner is incorrect. As a threshold matter, satisfying written description does not require that the disclosure provide "*in haec verba*" support for the limitation at issue. *Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc.*, 815 F.3d 1331, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Thus, Petitioner cannot establish a lack of written description by arguing that the specific wording of the limitations at issue is not present in the underlying disclosures. *Id.* Rather, so long as the disclosures reasonably allow

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persons of ordinary skill to recognize that the inventor invented what is claimed, the written description requirement is met. *Id.* at 1344.

Here, the provisional application (Ex. 2005) teaches that in the embodiment of Fig. 3 at step 304, the client 110 “retrieves and parses the content information, including . . . content key *expiration*.” Ex. 2005 at 11 (emphasis added). Thus, in the embodiment of Figure 3, content encryption keys initially come with a content key expiration point, which is identified by the client at step 304. The provisional further teaches that *later on*, at step 308, “the client 110 checks to see if an ***unscheduled*** key change is signaled, i.e., a key change was requested ***outside*** of any fixed duration lifespan.” Ex. 2005 at 12 (emphasis added). The provisional thus necessarily discloses that a key change notification can *alter* the original point of key rotation that was initially defined for a given key. The provisional further teaches that the unscheduled key change notification “describes the expiration of the previous key.” *Id.* Thus, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the disclosure’s teachings as to explicit key change notification are ***not*** “independent of and, agnostic to, key rotation boundaries.” Opp. 7.

Moreover, the provisional teaches that the workflow manager may initiate content encryption key rotation at any time, outside of the fixed duration lifespan of the existing key.” Ex. 2005 at 5. The phrase “at ***any*** time” necessarily discloses

a time *before* the original “fixed duration lifespan of the existing key,” thus providing written description for limitations 21.6 and 29.7.

The provisional further provides that the workflow manager may initiate key rotation “as necessitated by security policies (e.g., the current content encryption key was compromised or the current encryption was found to be not sufficiently random).” Ex. 2005 at 10; *id.* at 8 (reiterating same). Since the provisional discloses the ability to rotate a key through explicit notification to address a key security compromise, it necessarily discloses setting a notification-based key rotation point *before* the original time-based key rotation point, since this is the logical time when a compromised key would be rotated for security reasons.

Finally, the provisional explicitly provides that a content encryption key may be expired *before* its fixed duration lifespan. Ex. 2005 at 9 (teaching that a key may be expired, for example, with “10 minutes left in its lifespan[.]”).

The '313 patent and all applications along the chain of priority include the above disclosures explicitly, and also incorporate the teachings of the provisional by reference. Ex. 2004, ¶¶ 1, 6, 10, 35-36; Ex. 2006, ¶¶ 1, 6, 10, 35-36; Ex. 2007, ¶¶ 1, 6, 10, 35-36; Ex. 1001, 1:4-19; Ex. 2008, ¶¶ 6, 10, 35-36. The revised amended claims thus do not introduce new matter.

III. The Substitute Claims Are Not Unpatentable Under §§ 101, 103, or 112

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Petitioner does not dispute, and thus concedes, that the revised amended claims satisfy Section 101 and the indefiniteness provisions of Section 112. *See* Revised MTA at 16-17. Petitioner's obviousness contentions likewise fail.

Limitation [21.2] requires content encryption key identifiers to uniquely identify each content encryption key from every other content encryption key for the entire duration of a media playback. And each unique content encryption key identifier must be "assigned" to the corresponding content encryption key itself. Petitioner primarily relies on Peterka to meet those requirements, Opp. 13, but Peterka's sequence numbers or timestamps are only assigned to its ECM/EMM messages, and not the content key included in those messages. Ex. 1005 ¶ 121; Ex. 2010 ¶ 88; Pet. 24 (stating "the sequence number/timestamp is unique to each ECM/EMM[.]"). Peterka thus does not teach "content encryption key identifiers"; it only provides message identifiers, which do not suffice. Ex. 2010 ¶ 88.

The designations used in Peterka's Figure 7B—CK0, CK1, and CK2—likewise do not meet limitation [21.2]. *Cf.* Paper 27 at 15-16. Peterka uses CK0, CK1, and CK2 as descriptive labels for its patent figures and teachings; it does not disclose or suggest sending any such labels to clients as key identifiers. Ex. 2010 ¶ 93. Peterka's figure labels are not a motivation to modify Peterka's teachings. *Id.*

Moreover, Petitioner contends that Peterka's message identifiers *already*

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serve to uniquely identify keys and to avoid key confusion, Pet. 24, Ex.

2010 ¶ 93, thus belying its contrary contention that a POSA would have been motivated to directly assign identifiers to Peterka's content encryption keys. *Cf.* Opp. 13-14. A POSA would not have been motivated to solve a problem that the Petition itself concedes Peterka does not have. Ex. 2010 ¶ 94. Petitioner incorrectly contends that a POSA "would have recognized the need to differentiate between keys, especially for scenarios where a *single* comprised key held by multiple clients needed to be targeted for revocation." Opp. 14 (emphasis original). But Petitioner's theory relies on content keys that are *multicast*ed in ECM messages with only *one* content key sent per message. Pet. 21, 24. The Petition itself contends that because only one key is sent in each message, and each message has a *message* identifier, the content key in each message can be uniquely identified, thus obviating any need for a directly assigned *key identifier*. Pet. 24; Ex. 2010 ¶ 93. Since each content key is *multicast*ed, all clients holding that key could identify the key using the same single message identifier. Thus, Petitioner's rationale could not have motivated its modification.

As for limitation [21.5], Petitioner still does not identify any *teaching* in Peterka or Traw of a client requesting a new key *in response to* a key change notification. Try as it might, Petitioner cannot rewrite Peterka's express teaching

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that the client always *already has* the new key to which it has been notified to change. Ex. 2012 ¶¶ 120-129; Ex. 1005 ¶ 116 (Peterka stating that “when a new key is implemented, the implementation will be signaled to the clients so that the clients can begin utilizing the new content key *with which they have been provided.*”) (emphasis added). Peterka further reiterates that the new content key “has recently been distributed to the client.” *Id.* ¶117. Peterka thus does not teach a client first receiving a key change notification and then, in response to that notification, issuing a request for a second key, as limitation [21.5] requires.

Traw likewise fails to meet the “*in response to*” requirement of limitation [21.5]. Like Peterka, Traw expressly teaches that a notification instructs the client to change to a key that the client has already been provided. Ex. 1041 at Abstract (“a device manufacturer embeds the keys in content protection implementations for the devices, and to renew the content protection implementations in devices after the devices are distributed, in response to at least a security compromise”); 5:7-65 (“[T]he device manufacturer embeds the keys in manufactured devices ... [and] cause[s] the periodic renewal of the devices’ content protection implementations, which may include new keys in the new content protection implementation installed in the devices.”). Traw never teaches having a client request a new key in response to a notification to rotate the keys. Petitioner’s reliance on Traw at 2:43-

64 does not show otherwise. Opp. 19. In the cited passage, Traw teaches that the “[c]ontent protection implementations” taught therein must be renewed (replaced) “on a periodic basis, independent of whether revocation has occurred.” Ex. 1042 at 2:56-60. Traw further states: “In one embodiment, the renewal is achieved by an on-line download of at least a portion of a *new content protection implementation*[.]” (emphasis added). Traw’s teaching is thus in reference to its content protection implementation, and is “independent of whether revocation has occurred.” *Id.* That teaching in no way discloses a client requesting and obtaining a new *key* in response to a notification of an upcoming early key rotation boundary, as [21.5] requires. Petitioner’s obviousness theory thus fails for all revised claims.

Petitioner’s Ground 6 combinations based on the Petition’s Grounds 2-5 fail for the same reasons above. The Petition concedes that Peterka-Suzuki only requests new keys when the remaining lifetime/validity time of a current key reaches a “setting value” and not in response to a notification. Pet. 47, 49-51. Moreover, Ground 6 provides no viable motivation to meet limitation 21.2 because the Petition itself demonstrates that Peterka has no need for directly assigned, unique key identifiers. Pet. 24; Ex. 2010 ¶ 93.

With respect to **Claim 23**, Petitioner relies on an obvious-to-try theory, but never contends that it was one of a set of finite and obvious options to set the

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expiration time of a second key as equal to the original time of the first key plus the remaining life of the first key at expiration, as claim 23 requires. Rather, Petitioner broadly contends that setting the expiration time of the second key to *any* time after the expiration of the first key was simply *one* obvious option. By that logic, existence could be reduced to “hot dog” or “not hot dog,” and everything that is “not hot dog”—from space shuttles to semiconductors to 5G communication standards—would be one finite and obvious option. Petitioner simply has no prior art disclosing claim 23, and cannot provide an evidence-backed obviousness showing with particularity, as it must. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3).

Petitioner also cannot demonstrate obviousness for **Claim 27**. Claim 27 requires assigning a second key to the same *segment* as the first key. Petitioner's expert has testified that in Peterka, each key is for one segment, and there is only one segment per key. Ex. 1003 ¶ 76 (“Peterka describes . . . applying a different content encryption key to each segment.”). Peterka thus cannot meet claim 27. And Traw merely teaches applying a second key for decryption of the overall media playback—“*content* originally slated to be decrypted by the first key.” Opp. at 23. That does not equate to using the second key to decrypt the same content *segment*.

Accordingly, the revised amended claims are patentable.

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Kayvan Noroozi

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing **PATENT OWNER'S
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