

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

GOOGLE LLC and MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC
Petitioners

v.

MULTIFOLD INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED PTE. LTD.,
Patent Owner

Case IPR2025-00059
Patent No. 9,141,135

**PETITIONER'S REPLY TO
PATENT OWNER'S RESPONSE**

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Exhibit #	Description	Previously Submitted
EX1001	U.S. Patent No. 9,141,135 (“the ’135 patent”)	X
EX1002	Declaration of Sandeep Chatterjee, Ph.D.	X
EX1003	Curriculum Vitae of Sandeep Chatterjee, Ph.D.	X
EX1004	Prosecution History of U.S. Patent App. No. 13/247,708	X
EX1005	U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2010/0248788 (“Yook”)	X
EX1006	Appendix A-12 to Multifold’s Infringement Contentions served in <i>Multifold International Incorporated Pte. Ltd. v. Google LLC</i> , Case No. 1:23-cv-01323 (D. Del.)	X
EX1007	U.S. Patent No. 7,996,045 (“Bauer”)	X
EX1008	U.S. Patent No. 8,265,705 (“Lee”)	X
EX1009	U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2007/0085759A1	X
EX1010	Scheduling Order for <i>Multifold International Incorporated Pte. Ltd. v. Motorola Mobility LLC</i> , Case No. 1:23-cv-01173 (D. Del.)	X
EX1011	Scheduling Order for <i>Multifold International Incorporated Pte. Ltd. v. Google LLC</i> , Case No. 1:23-cv-01323 (D. Del.)	X
EX1012	<i>An Introduction to GUI with Java Swing</i> by P. Fischer (excerpt)	X
EX1013	Mobile Phone Museum - Nokia - 9000 Communicator	X

Exhibit #	Description	Previously Submitted
EX1014	Exhibit 1014 to the Deposition of Dr. Rajeev Surati (EX1016), Showing a Composite of Figures Illustrating the Petition's Yook-Lee Combination	
EX1015	U.S. Provisional Application No. 61/538,884	
EX1016	Transcript of October 21, 2025, Cross-Examination of Dr. Rajeev Surati in IPR2025-00059	
EX1017	<i>McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms</i> , Fifth Edition	

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioners reply to the Patent Owner Response (Paper No. 13, “POR”) concerning challenged claims 1-3, 5-9, 15, 16, 19 and 20 of U.S. Patent No. 9,141,135 (“the ’135 patent”).

II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

With one exception, PO agrees that no claim terms need construction. (POR, 9-10.) For the term “displays information selectively,” PO proposed an improperly narrow construction in the POPR that the term means “displays information in a way that involves intentionally choosing some information to display and not others.” (POPR, 7.) And its IPR construction was plucked from a 2015 Cambridge Business English Dictionary, comprising language that appears nowhere in the ’135 patent. (See POPR, 8 (citing EX2001).) Regardless, Petitioners prevail under both plain meaning and PO’s construction. (*Infra*, §III.D.)

Unsurprisingly, PO’s dictionary-based construction is inconsistent with the intrinsic record. In PO’s construction, “selectively” requires choosing some information to display and not others, whereas the intrinsic record uses “selectively” much more broadly including, for example, to refer to displaying or not displaying a single item, with no choosing between multiple items. (See *infra*, §§II.A, B.) Similarly, the Board found that the dependent claims “indicate that ‘displays

information selectively’ has a meaning broader than Patent Owner’s proposal.”
(Paper 8 (Inst. Dec.), 10.)

PO proposed that same too-narrow construction in the POR. (POR, 10.) The Board’s reasoning in the Institution Decision was correct. And for the below additional reasons, PO’s construction is wrong because it is inconsistent with the language of the independent claims, the specification, and a more appropriate technical dictionary definition. While the Board need not define the precise contours of “displays information selectively” to resolve the Parties’ dispute, the surrounding claim language shows that term must encompass at least displaying updates to one or more of the “device status, connectivity status, and/or messaging status.” (EX1001, 29:56-61; *infra*, §§II.A, III.D.)

A. The Claims Confirm PO’s Construction Is Incorrect

Claim 1 (like the other independent claims) recites that an annunciator window displays “information therein showing at least one of a device status, a connectivity status, and a messaging status.” (EX1001, 29:46-49.) The annunciator window is modified “in response to a changed state of at least one of the device status, connectivity status, and messaging status.” (*Id.*, 29:56-59.) That “modified display of the annunciator window”—again, modified in response to a change in a state of one or more of the three statuses that could be shown in the annunciator—“displays information selectively across the annunciator window.” (*Id.*, 29:59-61.)

Thus, the claim language itself plainly suggests that “display[ing] information selectively” encompasses at least displaying information reflecting the changed state for one or more of the previously displayed statuses, as this is the clear purpose for modifying the annunciator window’s displayed information. This understanding also gives meaning to “selectively,” as the annunciator window is modified to display the changed status or statuses but its display for the remaining (unchanged) statuses, if any, is not modified. Accordingly, the annunciator “selectively” displays that new status information.

Simply put, the annunciator can show one or more of the device status, connectivity status, and messaging status. It is modified to “selectively” display information in response to a change in one or more of those statuses (e.g., modified to convey the status change). It would be illogical to construe the claim in a way that does not encompass displaying information reflecting changes to the very status information whose change triggered the modification to the annunciator window display in the first instance. PO, nonetheless, contends its construction excludes such updates (POR, 11); but that construction cannot be squared with the claim language. *See Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc.*, 256 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (declining to adopt “illogical” claim construction).

PO addresses the claim language for just three short sentences, arguing that updating the status icon for device, connectivity, or messaging status “displays the

same information” and thus “there has been no selection of information for display.” (POR, 14-15 (emphasis added).) But that is wrong. When a status icon is updated to show a new status, “the information that is displayed” is *not* “the *same*”—the updated icon shows new (different) status information. Accordingly, PO’s proposed construction fails at the outset because it is inconsistent with the plain claim language. The Board need not go any further to reject it.

B. The Specification Confirms PO’s Construction Is Incorrect

The term “selectively” appears exactly once in the specification, in the summary of the invention. (EX1001, 2:39.) There, the language tracks the independent claims nearly verbatim and does not suggest any different or narrower meaning was intended. (*Compare id.*, 2:18-40, with *e.g., id.*, 29:27-61 (claim 1); *see* EX1016, 58:18-59:19.) There is no lexicography or disclaimer as required to narrow the claim scope. *See Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent. Am. LLC*, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

Instead, the specification supports Petitioners’ position. In discussing Figure 7, it describes “annunciations displayed in the annunciation window 1100” that “include, for example, an icon 1108 representing the type of wireless data being exchanged at the time, (such as 3G, 4G, etc.), [and] icon 1110 representing the battery power level.” (Ex. 1001, 26:30-34.) The annunciator window can display such “statuses” (*id.*, 26:9-15), and it is evident that icons 1108 and 1110 would be

updated to show changes to those statuses (e.g., “the type of wireless data being exchanged at the time” and “battery power level”) (*id.*, 26:30-34). PO quotes this language (POR, 12-14) but overlooks its import. Instead, PO focuses on portions regarding displaying “notifications,” “alert[s]” and “messages.” (POR, 14-15.) While those types of information may also be within the scope of the claims, adopting PO’s construction requires ignoring the specification’s disclosure of displaying current/updated statuses in the annunciator.

Provisional application No. 61/539,884, incorporated by reference (EX1001, 1:14-17), further confirms that “selectively” is broader than PO proposes. For example, one of its claims recites “selectively moving ... at least one of the displayed first and second desktops or applications to another selected position.” (EX1015, 158 (claim 1).) Despite reciting “selectively moving,” the claim encompasses moving *both* the first and second desktops or applications, not choosing to move one desktop or application and choosing not to move the other.

The ’884 provisional also uses “selectively presenting a virtual keyboard” to describe determining whether to present the keyboard or not. (*Id.*, 342 (Abstract).) In that context, “selectively” means displaying the virtual keyboard or not displaying the keyboard. (*See id.*) There is only one item to display, so “selectively” cannot mean choosing some items and not choosing others.

PO addresses only two portions of the specification that provide it no help. (POR, 14 (citing EX1001, 26:18-20, 26:39-50).) The first states: “For annunciator notifications, these may include icons that indicate an event has taken place with respect to a particular function of the device.” (EX1001, 26:18-20.) That is entirely consistent with Petitioners’ reading which encompasses updating the displayed status—including the status icons—to reflect the changed status of at least the device, connectivity, and/or messaging. Even if there was a narrower reading of that embodiment as PO urges (POR, 14), an embodiment (even if the only embodiment) cannot be read into the claims. *See Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.*, 358 F.3d 898, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

PO also discusses the specification’s comparing Figure 7 and Figure 8 of the ’135 patent, which explains that in Figure 8 a longer alert or message can temporarily mask or cover some of the icons. (EX1001, 26:39-50.) But this describes masking (e.g., as required by claim 3), not displaying information selectively.

PO argues those two sections “state[] that[] some icons may or may not be displayed in the annunciator window.” (POR, 14). They do not. And the only icons not displayed in either section are those “temporarily mask[ed] or cover[ed].” (EX1001, 26:39-50.) Perhaps that could inform the meaning of “mask,” but it is irrelevant to whether “displays information selectively” encompasses modifying icons already displayed.

PO's construction is inconsistent with the specification, confirming it cannot be correct.

C. PO's Uncited Extrinsic Evidence Does Not Trump the Intrinsic Record

PO filed a declaration from Dr. Surati that opines on the term "selectively," and an excerpt from the Cambridge Business English Dictionary, but does not rely on either in the POR. To the extent the Board considers them, they do not help PO because, as PO agrees, "[e]xtrinsic evidence may not be relied upon to alter the meaning of a term that, as here, is clear from the intrinsic evidence." (POR, 21.)

Dr. Surati was "not ... asked to opine on whether [PO's] construction is correct" (EX2002, ¶58) and opines that PO's construction is merely "plausible" (EX2002, ¶62). He did not consider the '884 provisional incorporated into the '135 patent, nor did he form an opinion on if the prosecution history or extrinsic evidence supports PO's construction. (*Id.*, ¶58.) Dr. Surati's legally deficient claim construction analysis should be disregarded.

PO did not re-raise its plain meaning arguments from the POPR based on the Business English Dictionary. Accordingly, those arguments are waived. (Paper 9 (Scheduling Order), 10 ("any arguments not raised in the response may be deemed waived").) And while PO is still proposing a construction using language plucked from that dictionary, it is improper to import a dictionary definition into a claim,

particularly where, as here, it is inconsistent with the intrinsic record. *See Phillips v. AWH Corp.*, 415 F.3d 1303, 1321-22 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

PO's general-purpose dictionary is also at odds with technical dictionaries reflecting a plain meaning aligned with the claim language. *See id.* (preferring technical dictionaries over general dictionaries). The McGraw Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms provides a computer science definition that "select"¹ means "[t]o take one alternative if the report on a condition is of one state, and another alternative if the report on the condition is of another state." (EX1017, 1784.) That aligns with reading the claim such that if the state for one of the three statuses changes (e.g., the report on its condition shows a change), then the annunciator window is modified to show the changed status, and for any status that does not change (e.g., the report on its condition shows no change), then the annunciator window is not modified as to that information (e.g., no icon is displayed for the unchanged status or the previously displayed icon is not modified).

For all these reasons, PO's construction is wrong.

III. PETITIONERS SHOWED THAT ALL CHALLENGED CLAIMS ARE UNPATENTABLE

It is unclear which claims PO contends are not unpatentable. (*Compare* POR, 1, 2, 38 (identifying claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 9, 15, and 20), *with* POR, §V (heading listing

¹ "Selectively" is an adverbial form of "select."

all challenged claims), *and* POR headings §§V.A (Claim 9), V.B (Claim 3), V.C (Claim 15), V.D (Claim 1).) PO did not identify any argument within Section V of the POR as applying to independent claim 6 or its dependent claims 7 and 8. Below, Petitioners address the claims PO identifies for each argument in Section V.

A. Claim 9: Displaying the Annunciator Window Across First and Second Displays on Two Screens was Obvious


1. Ground 3: Implementing Yook’s Two Displays on Two Side-By-Side Screens was Obvious

In the Yook-Lee combination, each of Yook’s side-by-side displays is shown on one of Lee’s side-by-side screens. (Pet. 62-69; *see* EX1014.) Yook discloses the annunciator window extending across the top of its two displays, and it would continue to do so when those displays are on different screens. Accordingly, the Yook-Lee combination renders obvious claim 9’s “display the annunciator window across adjacent upper or lower edges of the first and second displays, wherein the first display is on a first screen of the multi-display device, and wherein the second display is on a different second screen of the multi-display device.” (Pet. 67-68, 70.)

PO does not dispute that Yook discloses an annunciator window (light blue below) extending across the adjacent upper edges of its two displays (blue box and red box below) as shown in the Petition. (Pet. 35-36, 39-40; POR 22.)


Yook

'135 Patent



(Pet., 36 (citing EX1005, FIG. 3 (left); EX1001, FIG. 7 (right)).) And PO does not dispute that it would have been obvious in view of Lee to have each of Yook’s displays on a separate screen. (See Pet., 62 (“[W]here, for example, the ‘first display’ is shown on one screen and the ‘second display’ is shown on the other screen, it would have been obvious to configure Yook in view of Lee to include such features.”).)

PO instead complains that the Petition does not adequately explain how, in the Yook-Lee combination, the annunciator is “displayed ‘across adjacent upper or lower edges’ of the displays on two different screens.” (POR, 22 (citing Pet., 70).) But there is nothing more to explain because nothing changes in the Yook-Lee combination other than that Yook’s single two display areas are shown on two screens as disclosed by Lee, such as in Lee’s Figure 4A (below). (See Pet., 62-64.)



(EX1014 (Yook's displays annotated in blue and red boxes; far right showing each of Yook's displays on one of Lee's screens (*see* Pet., 62)); *see also* EX1016, 27:22-29:18, 31:12-32:20 (Dr. Surati testifying about EX1014).)

The annunciator window remains in the same place in the Yook-Lee combination: across the top of Yook's two displays, as Yook undisputedly discloses. Those displays are just on different screens in the Yook-Lee combination, as described in the Petition. (Pet., 62-64.) Changing the hardware on which the displays are shown does not otherwise change what is on the displays, how they are oriented with respect to one another, or where the annunciator is located on the displays. Petitioners have met their burden.

**a) PO's Alternate Ways of Combining
Yook and Lee Fail**

Instead of addressing the above Yook-Lee combination in the Petition, PO conjures up and argues about different ways that one could modify Yook in view of Lee. Fatal to PO's arguments, in "address[ing] [these] alternate ways Yook may be combined with Lee," PO neglects to address the Yook-Lee combination presented in the Petition. (POR, 23.) Because "combinations of prior art that sometimes meet the claim elements are sufficient to show obviousness," *Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc.*, 841 F.3d 995, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted), PO's alternative ways of combining Yook and Lee are wholly irrelevant.

Each of PO's alternatives requires some form of rotating the device into the orientation shown in Yook's Figure 4e (that the Petition does not rely on) or Lee's Figure 6 so that the device's screens are stacked instead of side-by-side as Lee discloses in Figure 4A (having side-by-side screens) or as Yook discloses in its Figure 3 (having side-by-side displays). (POR, 23-25.) PO draws two different "displays" on Lee's Figure 6—one dividing the screens and application in half (*id.*, 24) and a second again dividing the application in half (*id.*, 25). But neither of those is the combination in the Petition. (See Pet., 65 ("each display is on a different screen"), 67 ("Yook-Lee combination ... displays a 'first application' on a 'first display' on one of the screens and displays a 'second application' on a 'second


display’ on the other screen”); EX1014.) Even if PO’s “alternatives” are ways one could combine Yook and Lee, they are not the only options. *See Unwired Planet*, 841 at 1002.

PO also admits that “the placement of the status bar depends on how one might hold phones and how they may be used.” (POR, 25.) Yook discloses how in its Figures 1, 3, and 10: the phone may be held and used with the displays side-by-side so that the status bar extends across the top of the displays. (Pet., 20 (citing EX1005, FIGS. 1, 3, 10).) Modifying Yook’s single screen with two displays in view of Lee to have two screens (one display on each screen), is a straightforward hardware swap that does not otherwise change what is shown on the displays or their orientation.

b) PO’s Argument That the Annunciator Window Is Not Part of Any Screen Area Is Erroneous

PO does not contest that Yook discloses “the annunciator window [] extend[s] across a first portion of the first display and a second portion of the second display” (Pet., 36-37) or the “annunciator window is located across adjacent upper or lower edges of [the] first and second displays” (Pet. 39-40). Nevertheless, PO argues that in the Yook-Lee combination—and only in the Yook-Lee combination—that very same annunciator window “is not part of any screen area and would not be displayed if each of Yook’s screen areas are displayed on one of Lee’s screens.” (POR, 26.) This argument makes no sense.

The relevant “screen areas” are the areas the Petition identifies as Yook’s “first display” and “second display.” (Pet., 15-16.) The annunciator window is disclosed on Yook’s screen and within those two screen areas. (*See id.*, 15-16, 36-37; EX1005, FIG. 3). And the annunciator is rendered on Yook’s screen (and correspondingly on the Yook-Lee screens as discussed above in §III.A.1), so PO is wrong that it “is not part of any screen area.” (*See* EX1001, 4:11-14 (defining screen); Pet., 36-37).)



(EX1014; *see also* Pet., 62.)

It is equally unclear why PO and Dr. Surati believe Yook’s annunciator window “would not be displayed if each of Yook’s screen areas are displayed on one of Lee’s screens.” (POR, 26 (citing EX2002 ¶89).) PO seems to contend that

when transitioning from Yook’s single screen with two displays to the Yook-Lee dual-screen (having one screen for each of those displays), the dual-screen device would omit Yook’s annunciator window. (POR, 26; EX2002 ¶89.) But PO and Dr. Surati provide no practical, functional, or technical reason for removing Yook’s annunciator window from the dual-screen Yook-Lee device. (See POR, 26; EX2002, ¶89.) Removing a functional part of Yook’s user interface simply because its displays are shown on two screens instead of one exposes PO and Dr. Surati’s desperation to find any reason (including one they make up) to try and avoid invalidity. See *KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.*, 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (factfinders may use common sense).

PO’s argument hinges on conflating “map viewing area 76” and “email handling view area 73” in Yook’s Figure 7b embodiment—an embodiment the Petition never relies on or even cites—with the different screen areas Petitioners mapped to Yook’s “display[s].” (See POR, 26; EX2002 ¶89.) In Figure 7b, the status bar is located below area 73 and above area 76 as Dr. Rodriguez testified. (EX1005, FIG. 7b; POR, 26 (quoting EX2006, 46:20-47:1).) So, the argument seems to be that if each of Yook’s two displays were shown on a separate screen, the annunciator window would not be shown on any screen because it is not part of Figure 7b’s map viewing area 76 or its email handling view area 73. But those “area[s]” are not the “displays” mapped in the Petition. (See Pet., 21-22, 36-37.)

The Petition maps the first display and second display to Yook's Figures 1, 3 and 10 as shown below in blue and red boxes, where both mapped displays include a portion of the annunciator. (*Id.*)




FIG. 1




FIG. 3 <301>




FIG. 10 <1001>

(Pet., 22 (citing EX1005, FIGS. 1, 3, 10).)

PO does not dispute this mapping where the annunciator window is part of Yook's first and second displays. And Dr. Surati agrees that in the context of the '135 patent, "a display can have multiple windows on it at the same time." (EX1016, 33:5-8.) So even if Yook's annunciator window is not in the same "area" as the application windows, they still share a "display."

2. Ground 1: PO's Infringement Contentions Read "Screen" Broadly

PO contests Petitioners' understanding of its infringement contentions. (POR, 21.) But those contentions speak for themselves—the accused devices, while foldable, have just one screen. PO does not dispute that if the claim interpretation in Ground 1 based on the contentions is adopted, Claim 9 is unpatentable.

B. Claim 3: PO's Arguments Fail for the Above Reasons

PO makes the same arguments addressed above in Sections III.A, B for claim 9. (POR, 27-28.) They are unavailing for the reasons above and those discussed in the petition. (*Supra*, §§III.A, B; Pet., 70-73.)

C. Claim 15: Yook Discloses or Suggests Portrait Mode Displays

PO's argument groups together parts of claim 1 and claim 15 to incorrectly contend that "an annunciator window extending across the first and second displays while in portrait mode [] is completely missing from the [Yook-Lee] combination." (POR, 29.) This is shown in Yook's Figures 3 and 10. (*See* Pet., 46.)

Claim 15 requires that "the first and second *displays* are both in a portrait mode" (EX1001, 32:28-29), whereas claim 1 from which it depends recites the annunciator window "extend[s] across a first portion of the first display and a second portion of the second display" (*id.*, 29:50-52). For claim 1, PO *does not dispute* Petitioner's analysis that Yook discloses the annunciator extending across two displays in at least its Figure 3. (*See* Pet., 36-37; *see generally* POR.) The Petition also demonstrated how Yook's same Figure 3 (and Figure 10) discloses or suggests those first and second displays are both in portrait orientation. (*See, e.g.*, Pet., 46; EX1016, 38:17-39:19 (testifying the Figure 3 displays "seem[]" to be in a portrait mode").) Thus, Yook discloses or suggests in at least Figure 3 "the first and second

displays are both in portrait mode” and the annunciator window extending across both of those portrait-mode displays. (Pet., 36-37, 46.)



FIG. 3 <301>

(Pet., 37 (annotating Ex. 1005, Fig. 3, to show first and second display (red and blue boxes) and the annunciator window (light blue shaded box)).)

PO argues (1) Yook’s Figure 4e does not disclose the annunciator window extending across a portion of both displays (POR, 29-31), (2) law does not permit Petitioners to rely on Yook’s Figure 3 and Figure 10 disclosure of two portrait-mode displays (*id.*, 31-32), and (3) having the annunciator extend across a portion of both portrait-mode displays, if not explicitly disclosed, would not have been obvious (*id.*, 32-33). As discussed below, each of these arguments fails. *First*, Figures 3 and 10 disclose the annunciator extending across two portrait-mode displays; Figure 4e is immaterial. *Second*, an obviousness analysis can rely on what a patent’s figures clearly disclose or suggest, including Yook’s portrait-mode displays. *Third*, Yook

discloses an annunciator extending across both displays and so that would have been obvious.

1. Yook’s Annunciator Extends Across Two Portrait-Mode Displays in Figures 3 and 10

The Petition relies on Yook’s Figures 3 and 10, not Yook’s Figure 4e, as disclosing first and second displays in a portrait mode. PO points to Figure 4e to confuse this mapping, but that figure discloses a single physical screen in “portrait mode.” (POR, 29-31.) While the Petition *discusses* Figure 4e as informing the understanding of a portrait mode (in the context of a portrait mode *screen*), in mapping claim 15, PO cannot dispute that the Petition illustrates how Yook’s Figures 3 and 10 both disclose first and second displays in a portrait mode. (*See* Pet., 46.) In those figures, the annunciator window extends across both the first and second portrait-mode displays as annotated in the petition. (*See* Pet., 22 (displays), 32-37 (annunciator and displays).)




FIG. 3 <301>

(*Id.*, 37 (citing EX1005).)

2. The Law Permits Reliance on Yook's Figures

Yook's Figures 3 and 10 disclose first and second displays in a portrait mode (e.g., where each display has a width less than its height). (Pet., 46.) Dr. Surati agrees the mapped displays in Yook's Figure 3 are in portrait mode. (EX1016, 38:17-39:19.) But PO incorrectly contends the law prohibits reliance on Yook's figures, which surely would have at least suggested to a POSITA the rectangular-shaped displays that they clearly show. (See Pet., 46-48.)

For obviousness, the question is what a prior art reference "would teach or suggest to a person of ordinary skill in the art" not limited "to what [the prior art] literally says or shows." *DexCom, Inc. v. Stewart*, No. 2024-1291, 2025 WL 2399052, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2025) (affirming obviousness based on what a POSITA would have understood from the prior art's figures); see *Bradium Techs. LLC v. Iancu*, 923 F.3d 1032, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2019). In particular, "patent drawings may be useful in shedding light about the general shapes and relative sizes of elements of the claimed invention." *Regents of Univ. of California v. Satco Prods., Inc.*, No. 2023-1356, 2024 WL 4972639, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 4, 2024) (citations omitted); see also *Monterey Rsch., LLC v. STMicroelectronics, Inc.*, No. 2022-1411, 2023 WL 7037383, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 26, 2023) (finding no error in Board's reliance on patent drawings for the "general shapes of the claimed active regions"). Longstanding precedent confirms that patent figures can be relied on for all that they

disclose or suggest to a POSITA. *See In re Meng*, 492 F.2d 843, 847 (CCPA 1974) (“a drawing is available as a reference for all that it teaches a person of ordinary skill in the art”); *In re Mraz*, 455 F.2d 1069, 1072 (CCPA 1972) (“we did not mean that things patent drawings show clearly are to be *disregarded*” (citation omitted)). Thus, the Board can rely on Yook’s figures disclosing or suggesting portrait mode displays.

PO cites *Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int’l*, 222 F.3d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2000) for a misplaced argument that patent drawings “may not be relied on to show *particular sizes* if the specification is completely silent on the issue.” (POR, 31 (emphasis added).) But Petitioners are relying on relative dimensions, not “particular sizes.” (*See Pet.*, 46.) And the Board has repeatedly determined *Hocker-Halberstadt* does not prohibit relying on such clearly disclosed *relative* dimensions. *See, e.g., Innoscience (Zhuhai) Tech. Co., Ltd. v. Efficient Power Conversion Corp.*, No. IPR2023-01384, Paper 31 at 35-44 (Mar. 25, 2025) (analyzing “substantially equal widths”); *Unified Patents, LLC v. Oceana Innovations LLC*, IPR2020-01463, Paper 27 at 42-49 (Feb. 14, 2022) (analyzing “relative horizontal and vertical dimensions”); *In re Bjorn*, Appeal 2018-001567 (Application No. 13/270,691), 2019 WL 6173305, at *10 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 16, 2019) (affirming rejection based on relative dimensions); *In re Sato*, Appeal 2012-001276 (Application No. 11/896,682), 2014 WL 1154010, at *4-5 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2014) (affirming rejection based on

“relative size of the depicted structures”); *Hahle Behr Charleston Inc. v. Catalano*, IPR2023-00861, Paper 15 (Apr. 5, 2024). PO is wrong to suggest the case law requires a different standard, particularly one that is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of obviousness.

Hockerson-Halberstadt is also limited to circumstances where “the specification is completely silent on the issue.” 222 F.3d at 956. Yook is not completely silent. In the Figure 4e depiction of device 100, Yook shows the screen oriented taller than it is wide and calls that a “portrait mode” screen. (EX1005, FIG. 4e, ¶[0055].) Thus, Yook confirms that the screen’s relative dimensions are intentionally depicted. That at least suggests the relative dimensions of the displays on the screen are also intentionally depicted such that they disclose or suggest the portrait-mode displays they clearly show.

3. Using Portrait-Mode Displays Would Have Been Obvious

The Board need not reach PO’s third argument to find claim 15 obvious. But if it does, PO’s contention that the obviousness argument in the Petition at 47 “does not address whether it would have been obvious to configure the annunciator window to extend across both the first and second displays while the displays are in portrait mode” is erroneous. (POR, 32.) The annunciator window extending across both the first and second displays is an element of claim 1. (Pet., 36.) And it is undisputed that Yook discloses that element in at least its Figure 3. (*Id.*, 36-37.) To

the extent the Board finds Yook's Figure 3 or 10 does not disclose or suggest those displays are in portrait mode (e.g., that they are taller than they are wide), Petitioners' argument was simply that it would have been obvious to give those displays such relative dimensions. (Pet., 47-48.)

The record here shows only two known options: portrait and landscape. (Pet. 47-48.) Both were predictable. (*Id.*) The difference between portrait and landscape is only which dimension of the display (the width or height) is smaller. As Petitioners and Dr. Chatterjee explained, there are reasons to use both orientations. (Pet., 47-48; EX1002, ¶¶75-76.) As such, using portrait-mode displays would have been obvious. *See Google LLC v. Koninklijke Philips N.V.*, 795 F. App'x 840, 846 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (holding claim limitation obvious to try where there were only two predictable choices).

PO's response is a straw man. It incorrectly suggests Petitioners' position is that the displays would be stacked vertically as shown in Yook's Figure 4e, apparently based on Figure 4e disclosing a *screen* in portrait orientation. (POR, 30, 32.) But the Petition points to Yook's Figures 3 and 10 for the claim 15 analysis, because those figures depict portrait-mode *displays* (as claimed). (Pet., 46.) The annunciator in Yook's Figure 3 and 10 embodiments already extends across both portrait-mode displays and there is no reason to depart from that configuration. (*Id.*, 37, 46; EX1016, 22:13-16.)

D. Claim 1 is Unpatentable (Grounds 1 and 3)

PO's claim 1 argument hinges on its incorrect construction for "displays information selectively."² But under both that term's plain meaning and PO's proposed construction the prior art discloses or suggests that limitation.

**1. Yook Renders Obvious "displays information selectively"
Under its Plain and Ordinary Meaning**

PO's argument is entirely based on its proposed claim construction. (*See* POR, 33-38; EX1016, 60:2-8.) It is undisputed that if the Board rejects PO's construction, then "displays information selectively" is obvious in view of Yook (alone or in combination with Lee).

Petitioners demonstrated that Yook discloses or suggests and renders obvious "wherein the modified display of the annunciator window displays information selectively." (Pet. 38-39.) For instance, a POSITA would have found it obvious to configure Yook's status bar (annunciator window) to dynamically reflect updates or changes to the battery level (a device status) and signal strength status (a connectivity status). (*Id.*, 38 (citing *id.*, 32-36).) Such status changes may be reflected in the annunciator as, for example, a change in fullness of a battery graphic or change in

² PO only identifies its Section V.D argument as applying to claim 1, but the analysis in this section is equally applicable to all independent claims.

bars of an antenna graphic. (*Id.*, 35.) PO takes no issue with the conclusion that such dynamic updates to device and connectivity status are obvious in view of Yook.

As discussed at length above, “display[ing] information selectively” encompasses at least displaying information reflecting the changed state for one or more of the previously displayed status information (“at least one of a device status, a connectivity status, and a messaging status”). (*Supra*, §II.) And that is exactly what the Petition maps to this claim limitation.

2. Yook Renders Obvious “displays information selectively” Under PO’s Construction

PO argues that, under its construction, “information can be displayed selectively by choosing not to display certain information.” (POR, 33-34.) But PO does not dispute that “it would have been obvious to always display and dynamically update the same status bar icons to show device status (e.g., battery status) and connectivity status (e.g., signal strength status).” (POR, 34-35 (citing Pet. 38).) In other words, it would have been obvious for Yook’s status bar to selectively display updated icons for changed statuses (and conversely, not display updated icons for unchanged statuses). (*See* Pet., 34-35, 38-39.)

PO completely ignores Petitioners’ obviousness analysis and focuses its argument on Yook purportedly failing to meet PO’s construction because Yook allegedly discloses “a status bar without any additional context on how information in the status bar is selected for display.” (POR, 36.) Regardless of what Yook

expressly discloses and shows in its Figures regarding known icons for smartphones periodically updating statuses, the question for obviousness is whether a POSITA would have found this limitation obvious in view of Yook—an analysis that considers a POSITA’s “knowledge, creativity, and common sense.” *See Fleming v. Cirrus Design Corp.*, 28 F.4th 1214, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 2022).

The Petition explained that it would have been obvious to update the status bar icon for a given status when that status changes, and that such behavior would be implemented through a program or applet executed by a processor. (*See* Pet., 34-35, 38-39.) Dr. Chatterjee’s evidence-backed analysis also demonstrated that a POSITA would have been motivated to implement a processor controlling Yook’s status bar to display and dynamically reflect changed device status and connectivity status to selectively display updated status information to the user. (*See* EX1002, ¶¶62-63 (citing EX1007), ¶¶66-67.)

Based on that unrebutted analysis, when Yook’s battery status changes but the connectivity status does not change, Yook modifies the status bar to “selectively” display information showing a new battery status but chooses not to display information showing a new connectivity status. The same is true when Yook’s connectivity status changes but not its battery status. That is intentional selection.

More broadly, in the context of Claim 1 where a processor displays information on a screen, it is unclear how a processor displaying information could

ever fail to meet the plain language of PO's construction. For instance, if a processor displays an apple, then it has chosen to display an apple and chosen not to display an orange (or anything else). Likewise, when Yook's processor modifies the annunciator window to display information showing a changed status, it has chosen some information to display (the changed status) and chosen not to display other information (everything not shown in the annunciator). (*See Pet.*, 38.)

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the challenged claims are unpatentable and should be cancelled.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: November 7, 2025

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(d), the undersigned certifies that the foregoing Petitioner's Reply to Patent Owner's Response contains, as measured by the word-processing system used to prepare this paper, 5600 words. This word count does not include the items excluded by 37 C.F.R. § 42.24 as not counting towards the word limit.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: November 7, 2025

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on November 7, 2025, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petitioner's Reply to Patent Owner's Response and supporting exhibits to be served electronically on counsel for Patent Owner at the following addresses:

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