

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

ENTEGRIS, INC.
Petitioner

v.

INPRIA CORP.
Patent Owner

Case No. IPR2025-00267
Patent 11,673,903

**PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO PATENT OWNER'S DISCRETIONARY
DENIAL BRIEF**

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PETITIONER’S EXHIBIT LIST

Ex[No.]¹	Description of Documents
1001	U.S. Patent No. 11,673,903 (“’903 Patent”)
1002	Declaration of Dr. Gerard Parkin (“Parkin Decl.”)
1003	Declaration of Dr. Drew Hood (“Hood Decl.”)
1004	Prosecution File History for the ’903 Patent (“’903 Patent File History”)
1005	“Synthesis of The First Mono-t-Butyltin Element Compounds,” by D. Hänssgen et al. (“Hänssgen”)
1006	U.S. Patent Application No. 2016/0116839, entitled “Organometallic Solution Based High Resolution Patterning Compositions and Corresponding Method,” to Meyers et al. (“Meyers”)
1007	U.S. Patent Application No. 2011/0166268, entitled “High Purity Monoalkyltin Compounds and Uses Thereof,” to Deelman et al. (“Deelman”)
1008	Declaration of Sylvia D. Hall-Ellis, Ph.D. (“Hall-Ellis Decl.”)
1009	“Amino-derivatives of Metals and Metalloids. Part I. Preparation of Aminostannanes, Stannylamines, and Stannazanes,” by K. Jones and M.F. Lappert (“Jones”)
1010	U.S. Patent No. 11,697,660
1011	Excerpt of Prosecution File History for U.S. Patent No. 11,697,660
1012	<i>Inpria Corp. v. Lam Research Corp.</i> , Case No. 1:22-cv-01359 (D. Del.), Joint Claim Construction Brief, D.I. 199

¹ Citations to issued patents are made by column and line number. Citations to patent application publications are made by paragraph number. Citations to the remaining exhibits are to the page number added by the exhibit label.

Ex[No.] ¹	Description of Documents
1013	U.S. Patent Application No. 2022/0242888.
1014	U.S. Patent No. 6,517,901.
1015	Caseri, Walter (2014). “Initial Organotin Chemistry.” Journal of Organometallic Chemistry. 751: 20–24.
1016	K. Jones and M.F.& Lappert. “Amino Derivatives of Metals and Metalloids.” Journal of Organometallic Chemistry, Vol. 3, pp. 295-307 (1965).
1017	Clark Shove Robinson, “The Elements of Fractional Distillation,” 1st Ed., McGraw-Hill (1992).
1018	U.S. Patent No. 10,642,153.
1019	Procedures for Synthesis of $i\text{PrSn}(\text{NMe}_2)_3$ developed by Dr. Parkin.
1020	Procedures for Synthesis of $t\text{BuSn}(\text{NEt}_2)_3$ developed by Dr. Parkin.
1021	M. Froneman, T. Modro and S. Vather, “Dialkylamidoderivatives of Sn(II) and Sn(IV) in Phosphorus Chemistry”
1022	U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2022/0064192 A1
1023	<i>Inpria Corp. v. Lam Rsch. Corp.</i> , No. 1:22-cv-01359, Dkt. 499 (D. Del. Apr. 24, 2025) (Inpria’s Opening Brief ISO Motion for Preliminary Injunction)
1024	<i>Inpria Corp. v. Lam Rsch. Corp.</i> , No. 1:22-cv-01359, Dkt. 172 (D. Del. Sept. 10, 2024) (Second Amended Complaint)
1025	<i>Inpria Corp. v. Lam Rsch. Corp.</i> , No. 1:22-cv-01359, Dkt. 452 (D. Del. Apr. 16, 2025) (Lam’s Motion to Dismiss)
1026	<i>Inpria Corp. v. Lam Rsch. Corp.</i> , No. 1:22-cv-01359, Dkt. 508 (D. Del. Apr. 28, 2025) (Order Amending Case Schedule)
1027	<i>Inpria Corp. v. Lam Rsch. Corp.</i> , No. 1:22-cv-01359, Dkt. 522 (D. Del. May 6, 2025) (Order re: Case Narrowing)

I. INTRODUCTION

Discretionary denial in this case is unwarranted. Patent Owner Inpria Corp.’s (“Inpria” or “Patent Owner”) arguments largely rely on anticipated activity in an ongoing litigation in which Inpria asserts the ’903 Patent against a third party, Lam Research Corp. (“Lam”). *See* No. 1:22-cv-01359 (D. Del.) (the “1359 Litigation”). Petitioner Entegris, Inc. (“Entegris” or “Petitioner”) is not a party to the 1359 Litigation, and Inpria has never sought to add Petitioner as a party. Petitioner is not related to Lam, has no control over Lam or any of the arguments or issues that will be addressed at trial in that litigation, and has no knowledge of Lam’s litigation strategy. Petitioner has not reviewed any of Lam’s invalidity contentions in the case and has had no opportunity to be heard on any of the ’903 Patent invalidity issues raised by the litigants. Failure to consider the Petition would deprive Petitioner of the ability to protect its own interests in challenging the validity of the ’903 Patent.

Moreover, judging from the public docket, the 1359 Litigation is a highly complex case focused on numerous matters and issues unrelated to the ’903 Patent or Petitioner—including *seven other patents*, accused Lam products not sold or provided by Petitioner, a pending preliminary injunction motion against Lam (unrelated to the ’903 Patent), a motion to dismiss, or alternatively transfer and stay, filed by Lam relating to disputed issues of standing, indemnification, and inventorship (not involving Petitioner), a co-pending district court matter relating to

inventorship of all of the patents (including the '903 Patent),² and a Court order to reduce asserted claims and prior art across all patents-in-suit. In this context, Inpria's conclusion that invalidity of the '903 Patent under Sections 102 and 103 will be addressed at all in the 1359 Litigation, much less by next year is, at the very least, highly speculative.

The grounds in the Petition are also compelling. The Petition demonstrates the invalidity of the Challenged Claims, which are directed to (a) a well-known composition (b) at a specific purity level³—both of which Inpria concedes were known in the prior art. The Petition presents numerous grounds different from those considered by the Examiner. And, importantly, the Petition shows that Inpria's only distinction over the prior art cited during prosecution was based on testing and factual assertions to the Examiner that were both misleading and inaccurate. *See Pet.*, 23. The Office, and not the district court, is best positioned to give a second look to these claims in view of the new, corrected information that Petitioner presents.

On these facts, neither the *Fintiv* factors nor the *Advanced Bionic* factors favor discretionary denial. The relevant factors and the public interest in allowing the Office to review and correct its own determinations of patentability based on Inpria's

² See Paper 7 at 8-9; *The Rsch. Found. for the State Univ. of New York v. Inpria Corp.*, CA No. 1:24-cv-120-BKS (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2024).

³ In the 1359 Litigation, Inpria argued the ordinary and customary meaning should apply for all relevant terms of the '903 Patent. For purposes of the Petition, Petitioner interprets all claim terms in accordance with Inpria's claim construction position.

incorrect factual assertions made during *ex parte* prosecution heavily weigh in favor of institution.

II. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL UNDER *FINTIV* IS NOT WARRANTED

A. The *Fintiv* Factors Support Institution

1. Factor 5 – “Whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party”

Because *Fintiv* factor 5 impacts factors 1-4, Petitioner addresses factor 5 first.

This factor weighs heavily against discretionary denial. In *Fintiv*, the Office confirmed that, “[i]f a petitioner is unrelated to a defendant in an earlier court proceeding, the Board has weighed this fact against exercising discretion to deny institution under NHK.” *Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.*, IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 13-14 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (footnote omitted). Here, Petitioner is not a party to the 1359 Litigation, and Inpria has never sought to add Petitioner as a party to the case. Petitioner also is not related to Lam, the defendant in the 1359 Litigation, and Lam is not a real party-in-interest in these proceedings. Petitioner has nothing more than an arms-length business relationship with Lam, acting as just one of multiple suppliers of precursors that *may* be used in metal-oxide-resist (MOR) deposition equipment separately sold by Lam and accused in the 1359 Litigation. Petitioner has no control over Lam (in the 1359 Litigation or otherwise), has no insight into Lam’s litigation or business strategy, has never reviewed Lam’s invalidity contentions, is represented by separate counsel, and had no involvement

in any decisions by Lam regarding whether to file petitions for *inter partes* review of any of the other seven patents asserted by Inpria in the 1359 Litigation.

Dolby Laboratories, Inc. v. Intertrust Technologies Corp., IPR2020-00665, Paper 11 at 17 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 16, 2021) is highly instructive under these facts. In *Dolby*, the Board confirmed that an arms-length business relationship between a petitioner and defendants (identified as real parties-in-interest) in a related litigation is not sufficient to justify discretionary denial under *Fintiv*. *First*, the Board distinguished the *Fintiv* analysis from that in *Valve Corp. v. Electronic Scripting Products, Inc.*, IPR2019-00062, Paper 11 at 2 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 2019) (precedential), which found that a preexisting “significant relationship” was relevant to “the question of exercising discretion under the *General Plastic* factors when parties who have a ‘significant relationship’ file multiple, staggered petitions directed to the same patent.” *Dolby*, Paper 11 at 15-17. In *Dolby*, where there were not multiple petitions on the same patent, the Board found that petitioner’s argument regarding *Valve* was “not persuasive” and did not apply. *Id.* at 17.

Second, applying *Fintiv*, the Board in *Dolby* specifically found that (1) the only relationship between the petitioner and the defendants was that the defendants purchased equipment from the petitioner, (2) there was “nothing in the record to indicate that [petitioner] exerts any control over” the defendants or the underlying action, and (3) the patent owner had distinguished the petitioner from the underlying

action because the petitioner was “only one of several suppliers” and “many of [defendants’] systems do not use” petitioner’s equipment. *Id.* at 16. Under these facts, the relationship between petitioner and the defendants was not relevant to the *Fintiv* analysis and did not weigh against institution. *Id.* at 17.

This case is on all fours with *Dolby*, and the same result should be reached here. As in *Dolby*, there are not multiple petitions on the ’903 Patent, so *Valve*’s “significant relationship” test does not apply. All three factors in the Board’s *Fintiv* analysis also apply here. *First*, Petitioner has an arms-length business relationship with Lam and is one of multiple suppliers of chemical precursors that may be used in Lam’s MOR equipment. *See Dolby*, Paper 11 at 16. Notably, none of Lam’s customers for that equipment are parties to the 1359 Litigation, and Petitioner does not control whether Lam’s customers purchase Petitioner’s precursors or those of other entities. *Second*, Petitioner has no control over Lam in the 1359 Litigation; indeed, Petitioner has never seen Lam’s invalidity contentions, has no control over Lam’s invalidity positions, and has no opportunity to be heard (via Lam or otherwise) on the issue of invalidity of the ’903 Patent. *See, e.g., id.* (“Additionally, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Dolby exerts any control over the Texas Actions or the Texas Defendants.”). *Third*, as was the case in *Dolby*, Inpria itself has distinguished Petitioner from Lam. *Id.* For example, Inpria contends that Petitioner does not participate in the MOR market at issue in the 1359 Litigation, EX1023,

1:22-cv-01359, Dkt. 499 at 19-22 (D. Del. Apr. 24, 2025) (identifying Inpria and Lam as the only two competitors in the market), that Petitioner is not the only supplier of precursors, and that other precursors from other suppliers can be used in Lam’s MOR equipment. *See* EX1024, Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 45 (listing Entegris as one of multiple companies that Lam allegedly “collaborates with”).

Thus, under *Fintiv* and *Dolby*, Petitioner is not sufficiently related to Lam such that Lam’s involvement in the 1359 Litigation should be imputed to Petitioner. *See also Google LLC v. Mullen Indus. LLC*, IPR2025-00021, Paper 14 at 11 (P.T.A.B. May 14, 2025) (finding that even where the petitioners were admitted real parties-in-interest, and some of the petitioners were defendants in the underlying litigation, the involvement of a single non-defendant in the petition was sufficient to render this factor neutral).

Inpria’s arguments that Petitioner is somehow “involved” in the 1359 Litigation are irrelevant and unsupported. *See* Paper 7 at 3-4. As an initial matter, while Inpria does not rely specifically on the “significant relationship” test from *Valve*, it implies that Petitioner’s “preexisting, established relationship” with Lam is relevant. *See id.* at 19. But as the Board held in *Dolby*, where, as here, there are not multiple petitions on the same patent, that test does not apply.

Turning to Inpria’s alleged evidence of Petitioner’s “involve[ment],” Inpria largely relies on publicly available citations in its own complaint in the 1359

Litigation. But Inpria’s complaint does not prove Petitioner’s involvement in the litigation, and in fact demonstrates that Petitioner is just one of multiple suppliers of precursors for use in Lam’s products. *See, e.g.*, EX1024, ¶ 45 (listing Entegris as one of multiple companies that Lam allegedly “collaborates with”). To be clear, Petitioner and Lam are independent entities. Petitioner and Lam have separate counsel; Petitioner has not reviewed Lam’s invalidity contentions; and Petitioner had no involvement in the preparation of those contentions or Lam’s invalidity positions. Other than responding to third-party subpoenas from both Inpria and Lam in the 1359 Litigation, Petitioner has not filed any motions or otherwise appeared in the case.

Inpria attempts to muddy the waters by arguing that Petitioner has “been collaborating, and shares a common interest, with” Lam. Paper 7 at 1, 19 (citing *RPX Corp. v. Applications in Internet Time, LLC*, IPR2015-01750, Paper 128 at 2 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 2, 2020) (precedential)). But Inpria does not cite any time where Petitioner invoked common interest privilege to withhold communications with Lam (Petitioner has not)⁴ and, in any event, Inpria cites no case law support for its assertion that a claim of common interest privilege is relevant to the *Fintiv* analysis. A common interest between two parties can exist regardless of their relationship or

⁴ Inpria’s EX2039 is not evidence of Petitioner’s invocation of the common interest privilege. In EX2039, Petitioner’s counsel merely confirmed that Petitioner has complied with 37 C.F.R. § 42.11.

control over one another. *See In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp.*, 493 F.3d 345, 364-65 (3d Cir. 2007) (common interest can exist for distinct legal entities). The only case cited by Inpria, *RPX Corp.*, relates to determining whether a third party should be added as a real party-in-interest and says nothing about common-interest privilege claims or the *Fintiv* analysis.

Inpria also argues in a footnote that Lam should be a real party-in-interest to this proceeding. Paper 7 at 19 n.4. But, as made clear in *Dolby*, that issue is irrelevant to the present *Fintiv* analysis. Moreover, for all the reasons discussed herein, Inpria has no factual basis for its allegation, which appears to be based on Inpria confusing the determination of whether entities are in privity with whether they share a common interest. *See, e.g., Petroleum Geo-Servs. Inc. v. WesternGeco LLC*, IPR2014-00688, Paper 33 at 18 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 15, 2014) (“The nature of shared interests in invalidating the ’607 patent, undertaking a joint defense, and assertion of a common interest privilege does not, without more, indicate privity . . .”). Indeed, even if Petitioner were in a joint defense group with Lam, that would not be enough to make Lam a real party-in-interest. *See P.T.A.B. Consolidated Trial Practice Guide* (Nov. 2019) at 17 (“[I]f Party A is part of a Joint Defense Group with Party B in a patent infringement suit, and Party B files a PGR petition, Party A is not a ‘real party-in-interest’ or a ‘privy’ for the purposes of the PGR petition based solely on its participation in that Group.”).

Inpria also argues that the timing of Entegris's filing of the present Petition, within a year of Inpria's assertion of the '903 Patent against Lam, indicates that Lam and Petitioner are coordinating. Paper 7 at 20. But filing the Petition before Lam's bar date for *inter partes* review proceedings is irrelevant and does not indicate coordination or privity. *See, e.g., K.J. Pretech Co. v. Innovative Display Techs. LLC*, IPR2015-01866, Paper 15 at 19 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 17, 2016) (finding that the "timing of the petition filing in relation to [the] pending district court action" against the alleged real party-in-interest, along with the "fact that Petitioner is a supplier" to the alleged real party-in-interest "of certain components used in products accused of infringement," to be insufficient proof of control or privity). Rather, although Lam is not a real party-in-interest, anticipating that Inpria would advance such an argument, Petitioner determined Lam's bar date based upon publicly available information to avoid putting an unnecessary dispute before the Board. The fact that Petitioner chose the filing date of its Petition to avoid a meritless, collateral dispute is neither evidence of coordination nor a reason for the Petition to be denied.

Given that Petitioner is not a party to the 1359 Litigation, and is not in privity with the defendant either, fairness and public policy considerations weigh heavily in favor of institution here. Petitioner has no control over the arguments made by Lam in the 1359 Litigation, and denying the Petition over that litigation would cause significant prejudice to Petitioner. Petitioner is entitled to challenge the validity of

the '903 Patent in this forum rather than filing its own declaratory judgment action in district court. Moreover, as described in detail below in Section II.A.6, the public policy interests in (1) invalidating patents that cover old and known technology, (2) allowing the Board, rather than a district court, to assess the veracity of the statements made to the Office during prosecution, and (3) having the technical expertise of the Board members, who are best suited to assess the statements during prosecution as well as Petitioner's experiments, each weigh heavily against exercising discretionary denial in this case.

Petitioner is separate from Lam, and Petitioner has the right to protect its independent interests in the invalidity of the '903 Patent.

2. Factor 1 – “Whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted”

This factor either weighs against denial or is neutral. Inpria speculates that a stay is unlikely to issue in the 1359 Litigation. In view of the complexity of the matter—which reaches far beyond the '903 Patent and involves seven additional asserted patents, a preliminary injunction proceeding (not involving the '903 Patent), a pending motion to dismiss or in the alternative to sever, transfer and stay disputed issues of standing, indemnification, and inventorship (EX1025, Dkt. 452), and a related district court case litigating inventorship and ownership of all eight asserted patents (including the '903 Patent)—whether the Court will delay the trial, or even dismiss the case, is highly speculative. Indeed, the Court's recent actions confirm

this. The Court recently moved the trial date by four months, confirming that the Court is not opposed to adjusting the trial date where necessary. EX1026, Dkt. 508. The Court has also ordered Inpria to reduce the number of asserted claims among the eight pending patents, and Lam to reduce its asserted prior art, in just a matter of weeks—meaning there may be no resulting overlap between this proceeding and the 1359 Litigation and no resulting likelihood that the '903 Patent invalidity issues will proceed to trial at all. EX1027, 1:22-cv-01359, D.I. 522 (D. Del. May 6, 2025). In view of these facts, Inpria's assertion that there will be no further delay of trial for the '903 Patent should not be credited. *See, e.g., Mullen Indus.*, Paper 14 at 8-9 (“[W]e decline to speculate whether the district court will grant a stay. Thus, we find that factor 1 is neutral.”).

Inpria's other arguments should also carry little weight. For example, Inpria points to its recent motion for preliminary injunction as supposedly “making a stay even less likely.” Paper 7 at 9 (citing EX2001 at 50, 67). But the '903 Patent was not at issue in the preliminary injunction proceedings, so those proceedings are irrelevant here. *See* EX1023, 1:22-cv-01359, Dkt. 499 at 7-11 (no allegations of infringement of the '903 Patent).

As another example, Inpria argues that the Petition should be denied because Lam has not moved for a stay of the 1359 Litigation after filing its own petitions for *inter partes* review on other patents. But that just highlights the overarching issue

with Inpria’s discretionary denial request. Petitioner does not know why Lam has not moved for a stay relating to IPRs on other patents because Petitioner has no control over Lam or Lam’s litigation strategy in the complex 1359 Litigation. Nor does Petitioner have any knowledge of whether Lam will seek a stay of the 1359 Litigation if this Petition is instituted—a distinct possibility in view of the Delaware court’s demonstrated willingness to stay co-pending district court cases after institution of IPR on an asserted patent, even where not every asserted patent has been challenged in an IPR. *See NEC Corp. v. Peloton Interactive, Inc.*, No. 22-987-CJB, 2024 WL 1533952 (D. Del. Apr. 9, 2024) (granting motion to stay pending IPR where at least one asserted patent was not at issue in the IPR); *Speyside Med., LLC v. Medtronic CoreValve LLC*, No. 1-20-cv-00361, Dkt. 155 (D. Del. Sept. 30, 2021) (staying entire case where the Board only instituted on 3 of 5 asserted patents).

For all these reasons, Inpria’s assertion that there will be no further delay by the Court in resolving the ’903 Patent’s invalidity is mere speculation. This factor weighs against denial or is neutral.

3. Factor 2 – “Proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision”

This factor also weighs against denial or is neutral. Inpria notes that the trial date in the 1359 Litigation is currently set for April 2026, about four months before the final written decision would issue in the present IPR. But as explained for factor 1, that date is entirely speculative in view of, at least, the pending issues in the

1359 Litigation and the Court's recent order to narrow the asserted claims and prior art within the next month. EX1027, Dkt. 522. There may be no trial on the invalidity of the '903 Patent at all, much less one that occurs before a final written decision in this proceeding.

Moreover, even if the April 2026 trial date holds, the short four-month period between the district court case and the final written decision in this matter is not determinative. For example, in *Google v. Mullen Industries*, the Board instituted the petition despite a trial setting six months before the institution decision would issue because the other factors were either neutral or weighed against denial. IPR2025-00021, Paper 14 at 7-12. Likewise, the weight of the scheduled trial date should be especially discounted here where the merits of invalidity are so strong (*see* factor 6) and where Entegris, who is not a party to the 1359 Litigation, has no opportunity to challenge the validity of the patent in that case.

Indeed, each of the cases cited by Inpria with respect to the trial date are easily distinguished because, in each, the petitioner and defendant in the parallel litigation were one and the same, so the defendant had another opportunity to challenge the patent in the parallel litigation. *See Fintiv*, IPR2020-00019, Paper 15 at 15 (P.T.A.B. May 13, 2020) ("The parties agree that the Petitioner here, and the defendant in District Court, are the same party."); *NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc.*, IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 at 20 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 12, 2018) ("The district court

proceeding, in which *Petitioner asserts the same prior art and arguments*, is nearing its final stages, with expert discovery ending on November 1, 2018, and a 5-day jury trial set to begin on March 25, 2019.” (emphasis added)); *Motorola Sols., Inc. v. Stellar, LLC*, IPR2024-01205, Paper 11 at 10 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 13, 2025) (“Patent Owner notes that Petitioner and its real party-in-interest (WatchGuard Video, Inc., acquired by Petitioner in 2019) are the only defendants in the parallel litigation.”); *Motorola*, Paper 19 at 2-4 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 28, 2025) (vacating prior order with respect to weight of factors 3 and 4, but not 5); *Nokia of Am. Corp. v. Godo Kaisha IP Bridge*, IPR2022-00755, Paper 9 at 13 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 2, 2022) (“Here, however, Petitioner is the defendant in the parallel proceeding.”).

Entegris should not be denied its right to challenge the validity of the ’903 Patent independent of the 1359 Litigation because of a trial date in a case that it is not a party to and has no control over.

4. Factor 3 – “Investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties”

Factor 3 also weighs against denial. Petitioner is not a party to the 1359 Litigation, so this factor does not apply to Petitioner. Notably, Inpria waited nearly seven months into fact discovery before even serving its third-party subpoena on Petitioner, indicating that even Inpria did not view obtaining discovery from Petitioner as particularly important to its case. And for all the reasons discussed in factors 1 and 5, Inpria’s vague statements that Petitioner has been “investing

resources behind the scenes” of the 1359 Litigation are not supported by evidence. *See* Paper 7 at 14.

Even with regard to the actual parties in the 1359 Litigation, the public docket indicates that significant work remains to be done in the district court. Fact discovery is on-going, expert discovery has not started, and dispositive and *Daubert* motions and pre-trial exchanges are months away. *See* EX2001 at 68 (Dkt. 508). Moreover, the Court ordered a significant reduction in patents and/or claims and prior art ahead of trial, making it highly speculative that the trial will resolve any issues relevant to this proceeding. *See* EX1027, Dkt. 522. Inpria attempts to rebut these facts by pointing to work done on its preliminary injunction proceedings (Paper 7 at 13), but those proceedings did not involve the '903 Patent and are irrelevant. *See* EX1023, 1:22-cv-01359, Dkt. 499 at 7-11 (no allegations of infringement of the '903 Patent).

5. Factor 4 – “Overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding”

This factor either weighs against denial or is neutral. Inpria argues that there is overlap because Lam incorporated the publicly available Petition in Lam’s invalidity contentions—again, contentions in which Petitioner had no involvement. Petitioner has no knowledge of the arguments with which Lam will proceed to expert discovery, or if any of the art in the Petition will be asserted in the 1359 Litigation after the Court-ordered narrowing of prior art. Moreover, even if Lam does intend to assert the same prior art combinations at trial, Petitioner’s witnesses, Professor

Parkin and Dr. Hood, who conducted certain experiments to expose Inpria's incorrect statements during prosecution, are not involved in the 1359 Litigation (to Petitioner's knowledge). Neither Inpria nor Lam have sought to add them to a witness list, depose them, or approached Petitioner to interview them.

And, again, Petitioner is not a party to the 1359 Litigation and Lam is not a party to this IPR proceeding, so Inpria's argument that "*the parties* will undoubtedly be required to argue overlapping validity issues in two forums" (Paper 7 at 14 (emphasis added)) is incorrect. Petitioner has no control over Lam; has never seen Lam's invalidity contentions; and does not know what other bases of invalidity that Lam has asserted for the '903 Patent. In fact, Inpria admits that Lam has advanced additional arguments related to the invalidity of the '903 Patent and that the Petition challenges different claims than Lam has challenged in the 1359 Litigation. Paper 7 at 17-18. Thus, while there may be some overlap, that overlap is not complete and, in any event, is not attributable to Petitioner.

6. Factor 6 – "Other circumstances that impact the Board's exercise of discretion, including the merits."

Factor 6 strongly supports institution. Petitioner has demonstrated strong evidence against the patentability of the Challenged Claims (which Inpria does not address), and the Petition should be instituted for this reason alone. Moreover, the Petition explains that it was Inpria's incorrect statements to the Office that led to allowance. See Pet., 14-17, 26-27. Inpria's argument that Hänssgen, Deelman,

Meyers, and Jones were each “put in front of the examiner” during prosecution of the ’903 Patent fails to address any of its own misleading arguments about those references.⁵ See Paper 7 at 5.

Inpria’s only other arguments are unsupported nitpicking of Petitioner’s testing. Those hyper-technical criticisms do not address the core issue of the invalidity of the Challenged Claims. Moreover, contrary to Inpria’s arguments, the Board, rather than a district court, has the necessary technical expertise to assess these experiments and is also best suited to review and assess the impact of Inpria’s incorrect statements to the Office during prosecution.

(i) The Petition Demonstrates a Reasonable Likelihood of Finding the Challenged Claims Invalid, Regardless of Petitioner’s Experiments

The Petition demonstrates a strong basis for invalidity of the Challenged Claims. Those claims monopolize categories of well-known compounds—certain monoalkyl tin triamide compounds—at a certain level of purity irrespective of how the compounds are made.⁶ See, e.g., EX1001, cl. 1. Even the ’903 Patent admits monoalkyl tin triamide compounds were well-known in the prior art, citing the 1985

⁵ Inpria also fails to consider that Jones was never substantively considered by the Office.

⁶ As stated above, in the 1359 Litigation, Inpria argued the ordinary and customary meaning should apply for all relevant terms of the ’903 Patent. For purposes of the Petition, Petitioner interprets all claim terms in accordance with Inpria’s claim construction position.

Hänssgen publication. EX1001, 3:29-36. The '903 Patent further admits that highly pure versions of those compounds are desirable and achievable through fractional distillation, which “results in even lower dialkyl or polyalkyl contamination.” EX1001, 3:44-52; *see also* EX1001, Example 8 (describing purification to achieve the claimed purity level using only a conventional fractional distillation process); EX1002 ¶ 179. The '903 Patent neither identifies any monoalkyl tin triamide that cannot be further purified, nor identifies any impediment to purification, other than pointing out that “the separation or purification process generally raises the cost of manufacturing.” EX1001, 3:44-52. Because the claimed compositions are directed to well-known compounds, and the claimed purity can be achieved through routine purification methods, there is a reasonable likelihood of finding the Challenged Claims invalid on that basis alone.

During prosecution, the only purported difference between the prior art and the Challenged Claims raised by Inpria was that the art failed to *expressly* report a purity value for the known monoalkyl tin triamide compounds. The Petition showed that such a purity level was either anticipated or, at the least obvious, in view of the prior art. For example, Hänssgen itself discloses a reaction pathway that selectively forms a claimed monoalkyl triamide compound with “no indications of secondary reactions” and an “analytically pure” product “can be obtained by fractiona[l] distillation.” EX1005, 2; EX1002 ¶¶ 87-91. As another example, Deelman teaches a

method to form monoalkyltin compounds of “formula RSn(T)_3 in which R is linear, branched or cyclic $\text{C}_1\text{-C}_{20}$ alkyl, preferably $\text{C}_1\text{-C}_{10}$ alkyl, and T is a ligand”—a genus of the claimed monoalkyltin, and its composition can have a purity up to “99.999 wt%.” EX1007, [0013]. These express disclosures of high purity levels are further supported by Dr. Parkin’s testing based on prior art synthesis methods. The Petition therefore repeatedly demonstrated that the Challenged Claims lack novelty and non-obviousness, and factor 6 strongly supports institution.

(ii) Petitioner’s Experiments Show That Inpria Misled the Office

The Petition should also be instituted because it clearly showed that the Office did not have full and accurate information regarding the cited references.

Specifically, during prosecution, Inpria submitted three declarations to the Examiner, repeatedly and incorrectly arguing that, based on Inpria’s in-house experiments, that the claimed purity could not be achieved in the prior art, despite the disclosures and motivations in the references themselves. The Office relied on those experiments, lacking its own resources to repeat them. As summarized below, Petitioner’s expert in this proceeding, Professor Parkin, has now repeated the prior art experiments and has conclusively demonstrated that each of Inpria’s submissions was incorrect.

2021 Declaration: In response to the Examiner’s §§ 102 and 103 rejections based on Bernhardt (DE 3109309) against all pending claims, Inpria argued that

Bernhardt failed to show the claimed purity and submitted a declaration by inventor Joseph Edson (the “2021 Declaration”) to present “results of in-house experiments” that purportedly showed the claimed purity could not be met. The experiments purportedly followed the methods of Hänssgen (EX1004, 890-91) for obtaining a highly pure compound, even though the Examiner had not relied on Hänssgen for the rejection. The entirety of the description of the “in-house experiments” consisted of a single paragraph, alleging that Hänssgen’s methods cannot achieve high purity monoalkyl tin composition:

8. In-house experiments following the method of Hänssgen (HÄNSSGEN ET AL., "Synthesis of the First Mono-t-butyltin Element Connections", *Organometallic Chemistry*, 293:191-195 (1985)) were conducted under my direction. The experiments considered the reaction of tBuLi with Sn(NEt₂)₄ in diethyl ether. The reaction product was purified using standard fractional distillation, as described by Hänssgen, to selectively isolate the major product, tBuSn(NEt₂)₃. The post-distillation product was subjected to ¹¹⁹Sn NMR analysis. The post-distillation product had an average of approximately 2% dialkyltin triamide, tBu₂Sn(NEt₂)₂.

EX1004, 896-98. Unable to separately verify Inpria’s assertions, the Examiner withdrew his § 102 rejections based on Bernhardt.

In the Petition, to test Inpria’s conclusions, Professor Parkin followed the methods disclosed in Hänssgen to synthesize high purity monoalkyltin. Professor Parkin’s results showed that the monoalkyltin composition resulting from Hänssgen’s method easily met the purity requirements of claim 1—demonstrating

that Inpria's declaration was either misleading or incorrectly performed. EX1002 ¶¶ 113-118. These results further show that Hänssgen's express disclosures of a highly pure monoalkyltin composition are accurate and that Hänssgen invalidates the Challenged Claims. If Inpria had not submitted the 2021 Declaration, or if the Examiner had in his possession the testing results from Professor Parkin, the Challenged Claims would not have issued.

2022 and 2023 Declarations: In response to the Examiner's rejections based on Deelman in view of Meyers, Inpria submitted a second and third declaration from Joseph Edson on September 16, 2022 (the "2022 Declaration") and February 24, 2023 (the "2023 Declaration"), respectively, again presenting "results of in-house experiments" that purportedly show that the claimed purity could not be achieved. Those declarations specifically "adapted the method of Deelman to try to make a monoalkyltin triamide product," in an attempt to show "the claimed high purity liquid compositions according to claim 1 are not achievable through the method disclosed by Deelman." EX1004, 547-48 (emphasis omitted). However, Inpria's purported "adapt[ation]" of the Deelman method involved significant errors that led to incorrect results. Specifically, Mr. Edson conceded that he used "water" as a solvent during synthesis; but that is a significant error that would have impacted purity because, as a POSITA would have recognized, the monoalkyltin triamide readily "hydrolyze[s] in aqueous solution" (*i.e.*, reacts with water). EX1004, 553;

EX1002 ¶¶ 68-69, 106-109. In this regard, Mr. Edson ignored Meyers, one of the inventor's own patents, which "expressly teaches synthesis of a monoalkyltin triamide in '*anhydrous*' (i.e., water free) medium using a monoalkyltin trihalide as the starting point, consistent with synthesis approach disclosed in Deelman." EX1002 ¶ 106 (emphasis added); EX1006, [0151]. The Examiner allowed the claims in view of the inventor declarations. EX1004, 361.

By contrast, in the Petition, Professor Parkin followed the teachings of Deelman and Meyers and used *anhydrous* media for synthesis. As expected, Professor Parkin's testing successfully resulted in a monoalkyltin triamide product having a high purity that falls within the claimed range, even without needing further purification by the known fractional distillation methods. In this regard, the Petition again showed that the Challenged Claims should have been found invalid in view of a second set of known art. Had Inpria not presented faulty experiments and incorrect results, or if the Examiner had in his possession the testing results from Professor Parkin, the Challenged Claims would not have issued.

The Board is most suited to review Inpria's incorrect declarations presented to the Office and to correct those errors.

(iii) Inpria's Brief Fails to Address Petitioner's Positions

Without addressing, even at a high level, any of the fatal defects of the Challenged Claims identified in the Petition, Inpria incorrectly characterizes the

issues raised by the Petition and the Board's ability to assess those issues and also resorts to nitpicking the testing supervised by Professor Parkin. None of Inpria's arguments has merit.

First, Inpria asserts that Entegris relies exclusively on inherent anticipation of the Challenged Claims in view of Professor Parkin's testing and that "reliance on experimental testing is better suited for district court litigation." Paper 7 at 21, 24. However, inherent anticipation in view of Professor Parkin's testing is certainly not the sole basis of Petitioner's invalidity arguments. As summarized above, and as further detailed in the Petition, the invalidity of the claims would have been apparent to a POSITA, even without the experimental testing, because the claimed compounds and methods to purify such compounds were both well-known. *E.g.*, Pet., 6-9, 35-37. For example, Hänssgen discloses a reaction pathway that selectively forms a claimed monoalkyl triamide compound with "no indications of secondary reactions" and further teaches purification of the compound by fractional distillation to improve purity as needed, thereby anticipating and/or rendering obvious all of the Challenged Claims, independently of any testing data. *See, e.g.*, EX1005, 2; EX1002 ¶¶ 86-91, Pet., §§ IX (anticipation) and X (obviousness).

Regardless, Inpria lacks support for its argument that IPR proceedings are not suitable to assess Professor Parkin's experiments because deposition testimony of

Professor Parkin (or related witness Dr. Hood)⁷ or additional discovery may be needed. Paper 7 at 23. “[C]ross examination of affidavit testimony prepared for the proceeding” is part of “routine discovery” in an IPR, 37 CFR § 42.51(b)(1), and additional document discovery can also be requested under 37 CFR § 42.51(b)(2). None of this potential routine discovery outweighs the fact that P.T.A.B. judges have the right technical and legal expertise and are far better suited to assess the merits of the claims than a jury or a district court judge.

Second, Inpria has no basis for its allegations that additional discovery is needed because material was “withheld.” There has been no “withheld” discovery of “lab notebooks and NMR data for Dr. Hood’s experiments,” as Inpria alleges. Paper 7 at 23. Petitioner’s witnesses memorialized all relevant information in their declarations; if any additional notes exist, they would be intermediate drafts protected by the work-product privilege. *E.g., Twitter, Inc. v. Palo Alto Rsch. Ctr. Inc.*, IPR2021-01398, Paper 33 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 18, 2022) (finding draft declarations are protected under the work-product privilege). Nor was there any NMR data withheld by the witnesses. Inpria does not dispute that the witnesses’ declarations report detailed NMR spectra consistent with the standard NMR reporting practice in

⁷ Inpria incorrectly asserts that Petitioner relies on two experts for the Petition but admits, at the same time, Dr. Hood merely follows the instructions of Dr. Parkin to conduct the testing. Paper 7 at 32.

the field; the allegedly “withheld” NMR data is just machine specific raw data that is meaningless independent of the machine. Paper 8 at 11.

Inpria also makes the irrelevant complaint that the Petition does not characterize the *starting* materials for the synthesis. Paper 7 at 24. The relevant issue is not the starting materials, but the *resulting* monoalkyl tin triamide product, which was thoroughly characterized using multiple NMR analyses, and shown to invalidate the Challenged Claims. See EX1003. Notably, Inpria does not assert that any of the starting materials were novel or unavailable at the relevant timeframe. Each ingredient was well-known and disclosed in the prior art and correctly following the prior art methods to synthesize monoalkyl tin triamide product, as Professor Parkin did, shows that the Challenged Claims should never have issued.

Third, Inpria’s criticisms of Professor Parkin’s procedures ignore the evidence and are irrelevant. For example, Inpria takes issue with Professor Parkin’s use of “tin foil” to wrap the reaction vessels “to avoid light exposure,” and argues that there is “no rationale for this addition.” Paper 7 at 24. But Inpria’s argument quotes the very *rationale* it alleges is missing—“to avoid light exposure”—a step that a POSITA would naturally have undertaken given the known light sensitivity of monoalkyltin triamides. Inpria’s argument ignores that a POSITA can (and did) exercise reasonable care to avoid exposing a light-sensitive compound to light, just as they would clean the reaction vessel to avoid unwanted impurities.

Inpria also argues that one of Professor Parkin's experiments (based on Meyers) "impermissibly rel[ied] on a modification inspired by hindsight after Entegris's first test failed." Paper 7 at 24. Not so. He relied on the teachings of the prior art to make adjustments as a POSITA would to optimize the process. Specifically, Professor Parkin recognized that the reaction led to a small quantity of dialkyltin diamide impurity "due to secondary reactions," and decided to use "a known good solvent for monoalkyl tin trihalide" to "first dilute i-PrSnCl₃" in order to "minimize[] secondary reactions." EX1002 ¶¶ 120-121. Other than switching from a poor solvent to a good solvent, the other parameters including reactant concentrations were maintained the same as those disclosed in Meyers. *Compare* EX1003 ¶¶ 39-43, *with* EX1006, Example 7. Such adjustment of solvent involves no more than routine optimization of experimental conditions, about which Inpria is free to cross-examine Professor Parkin. Inpria's allegation fails to even identify a plausible source of hindsight.

For all the above reasons, factor 6 weighs strongly in favor of institution.

III. THE *ADVANCED BIONICS/BECTON*, *DICKINSON* FACTORS DO NOT FAVOR DISCRETIONARY DENIAL

Inpria argues that the Petition should be denied because "every piece of prior art used in the Petition previously was presented to the Office during prosecution and Entegris fails to show that the Examiner erred in considering the references." Paper 7 at 25. However, as the Petition explains, two of the references, Hänssgen

and Jones, were not substantively considered in an office action. For the other combinations, Petitioner advances different arguments regarding the references and explains that Inpria's incorrect statements regarding these references caused the Office to err in its evaluation of the validity of the '903 Patent. As such, the *Advanced Bionics/Becton, Dickinson* factors do not weigh in favor of discretionary denial. Rather, the public interest favors having the Office review the statements made by Inpria during prosecution and allowing the Office to correct the errors with respect to these references.

A. Hänssgen and Jones Were Not Substantively Considered In an Office Action

Inpria argues that Hänssgen and Jones were both considered by the Office during prosecution. However, while these references were listed on Information Disclosure Statements, neither Hänssgen nor Jones was relied upon by the Examiner for any rejections during prosecution. *See* EX1004; Pet., 24. Thus, the *Advanced Bionics/Becton, Dickinson* factors do not favor denial of the Petition for those references.

B. Petition Presents New Arguments Regarding Hänssgen, Meyers and Deelman

Inpria's brief also ignores that the Petition presents different positions regarding Deelman and Meyers than those considered during prosecution. *See generally* Paper 7 at 29-35 (failing to address the new combinations and cited

portions of the references). The Petition presented several new combinations of those references:

- Meyers in view of Deelman
- Meyers/Deelman in view of Hänssgen
- Deelman in view of Jones
- Deelman/Jones in view of Hänssgen.

None of these combinations were considered during prosecution. Because the Petition advanced numerous different arguments to show the invalidity of '903 Patent, reconsideration is necessary.

C. The Office Erred In Its Consideration of the References

The Office first erred in its overall assessment of the claimed subject matter. Specifically, as explained in Section II.A.6, the Office did not address that the '903 Patent itself admits: (1) the claimed compositions are directed to well-known compounds, and (2) the claimed purity can be achieved through known and routine purification methods. During prosecution, Inpria distracted from these core issues, filing 8 office responses, 2 Request for Continued Examinations, 3 declarations, and 1 Notice of Appeal; conducting 2 Examiner Interviews; and repeatedly raising incorrect questions of whether a specific reference inherently disclosed the claimed purity level. But Inpria never identified a single compound within the broad scope of the claimed genus that could not be further purified to achieve the claimed purity,

and never identified any possible impediment to purification. Reconsideration is necessary for this reason alone.

The Examiner also erred in his analysis of specific references, and in failing to consider other references at all, in part due to Inpria's incorrect statements during prosecution, as further explained below:

(i) Hänssgen

The Examiner did not consider Hänssgen in a rejection, but should have, despite its German-language text. As explained in detail in the Petition, Hänssgen discloses a method to selectively synthesize the specifically claimed monoalkyltin compound in a way that is analytically pure. That disclosure alone anticipates the Challenged Claims. *See* Pet., Ground 1A; EX1002, Ground 1A.

Inpria's brief fails to address this error and instead attempts to defend the 2021 Declaration relating to Hänssgen, *see supra* § II.A.6 (describing declaration), arguing that it is not possible for the inventor to have “fail[ed] to properly follow the experiment procedures” and at the same time fail to provide “sufficient information [for another] to assess the appropriateness of the experiment.” Paper 7 at 31. But both can and did occur—the single paragraph description of the Inpria's experiment in the 2021 Declaration is indisputably insufficient for another to assess the experiment, *see supra* §II.A.6; and Professor Parkin's experiment that successfully achieves the claimed compound at the claimed high purity by following the teaching

of Hänssgen confirms the inventor's failure to properly follow the experiment procedures.

Finally, Inpria attempts to discredit Professor Parkin's experiment for: (1) wrapping the flask in aluminum foil to prevent light exposure, and (2) using an excess amount of t-BuLi in one of the two experiments. Neither argument has any merit. On the first point, as explained above, a POSITA could apply common sense in an experiment to avoid exposing light-sensitive compounds to light. *See supra* § II.A.6 On the second point, Hänssgen expressly discloses the use of an excess amount of t-BuLi, as it teaches "reactions of (Et₂N)₄Sn with lithium-t-butyl in excess under moderate conditions always yield only the mono-substitution product I." EX1005, 3. Neither of the steps deviates from the teachings of Hänssgen.

(ii) Deelman

The Examiner erred for failure to recognize the invalidating disclosures of Deelman. Deelman specifically discloses another method to selectively form monoalkyltin compounds of formula RSn(T)₃—a genus of the claimed monoalkyltin triamide. EX1007, [0027]; EX1002 ¶ 218. Deelman teaches "high purity monoalkyltin-based compounds of RSn(T)₃" "are advantageously prepared from the corresponding monoalkyltin trihalides of formula RSn(Hal)₃, in which R is as defined above and Hal is chosen from chlorine, bromine and iodine." EX1007, [0027]; EX1002 ¶ 218. Although Deelman does not provide an example of using

this method to synthesize monoalkyltin triamide, Meyers does. The Examiner, however, did not consider this obvious combination because, as explained above, Inpria submitted two declarations regarding Deelman based on faulty experiments. *See supra* § II.A.6. The Examiner also erred for failing to recognize the flaws in Inpria's experiment design.

Inpria does not address the Examiner's errors and instead wrongly asserts that Petitioner argues that "Deelman is 'simply irrelevant' because it relates to 'an entirely different category of compound.'" Paper 7 at 33 (citing Pet., 16). That assertion improperly alters and combines different sentences in the Petition to significantly change their meaning. The Petition actually states that (1) Inpria's experiments, *not* Deelman, are "simply irrelevant," and (2) that an irrelevant example in Deelman, *not* the example relied on by the Petition, is "an entirely different category of compound." *See* Pet., 16 ("*PO's in-house experiment results* did not follow these teachings and are *simply irrelevant* to the question PO purported to answer." (emphases added)); *id.* ("However, a POSITA would not have followed *Example 2* of Deelman to synthesize $\text{nBuSn}(\text{NEt}_2)_3$ because it does not relate to synthesis of moisture sensitive monoalkyltin triamide compounds, and instead *describes an entirely different category of compound*—mono-octyltintris((2-ethylhexyl) mercaptoacetate), which is stable in aqueous medium." (emphases

added)). To be clear, Deelman is *highly* relevant to and in fact invalidates the Challenged Claims, as clearly laid out in the Petition. Pet., Grounds 2A, 2B, 3A, 3B.

(iii) Meyers

The Examiner erred by failing to recognize the teaching of Meyers. Meyers discloses reacting a monoalkyltin trihalide compound with a lithium amide compound to arrive at a high purity monoalkyltin triamide composition, consistent with the teachings of Deelman. EX1002 ¶ 234; EX1006, Example 7. Although an Office Action cited Meyers, the Examiner failed to recognize that Example 7 of Meyers explicitly discloses a synthesis method of the claimed compound and that the disclosed method is capable of achieving a purity as high as 99.999 wt% according to Deelman. EX1007, [0013]. As Inpria admits, “Inpria’s declarations during prosecution were about Hänssgen and Deelman—not Meyers,” even though Meyers was cited in the Examiner’s rejection and was issued to the same inventor. Paper 7 at 34. Had the Examiner correctly and fully considered Meyers, the invalidity of the Challenged Claims would have been apparent.

Inpria does not address the Examiner’s omission of Example 7 of Meyers but instead argues that Professor Parkin’s modification of Example 7 was based on hindsight bias. *Id.* at 35. But, as explained above, Professor Parkin’s modification was no different from a routine optimization that would have been carried out by a

POSITA to achieve higher purity as expressly taught by Deelman. *See supra* § II.A.6. Inpria fails to identify any hindsight bias in Professor Parkin's approach.

(iv) Jones

The Examiner erred in failing to consider Jones, which discloses a "major advance in SnN chemistry" and teaches a means to convert tin halides and alkyltin halides into alkyltin amides. EX1009, 4; EX1002 ¶ 314. This approach was adopted in Example 7 of Meyers. EX1006, Example 7. Had the Examiner been aware of this "major advance in SnN chemistry," he would not have been misled by Inpria's declarations and the '903 Patent would not have issued.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Board decline to exercise its discretion to deny institution of the Petition.

Respectfully submitted,
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.

June 12, 2025

Date

/ Eliot D. Williams /

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

1. Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §42.24(d), the undersigned certifies that the foregoing Petitioner's Response to Patent Owner's Discretionary Denial Brief contains 7,728 words which is no more than 14,000 words and therefore complies with the type-volume limitations of 37 C.F.R. §42.24(a). The word count was calculated by starting with Microsoft Word's total document word count and subtracting the words for the Table of Contents, the Table of Authorities, the Exhibit List, the Certificate of Compliance, and the Certificate of Service.

2. This Petition complies with the general format requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a) and has been prepared using Microsoft® Word in 14-point Times New Roman.

Respectfully submitted,
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.

June 12, 2025

Date

/ Eliot D. Williams /

Eliot D. Williams (Reg. No. 50,822)
LEAD COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

In accordance with 37 C.F.R. §§42.6(e) and 42.105, the undersigned certifies that on the 12th day June 2025, a complete and entire copy of the foregoing Petitioner's Response to Patent Owner's Discretionary Denial Brief was served via email to Patent Owner at the following addresses:

PH-Entegris-Inpria-IPR@paulhastings.com

Respectfully submitted,
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.

June 12, 2025

Date

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