

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

---

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

---

PADAGIS US LLC,  
Petitioner,

v.

NEURELIS, INC.,  
Patent Owner.

---

IPR2025-00464 (Patent 8,895,546 B2)  
IPR2025-00465 (Patent 11,241,414 B2)  
IPR2025-00466 (Patent 11,793,786 B2)<sup>1</sup>

---

Before GRACE KARAFFA OBERMANN, ANNETTE R. REIMERS, and  
TIMOTHY G. MAJORS, *Administrative Patent Judges*.

MAJORS, *Administrative Patent Judge*.

DECISION

Denying Request for Rehearing of Order Denying Patent Owner's Motion  
for Leave to File Petition for Certificate of Correction on Patents  
Undergoing *Inter Partes* Review  
*37 C.F.R. § 42.71*

---

<sup>1</sup> This decision addresses issues common to the listed cases. Therefore, we exercise our discretion to issue one decision to be filed in each case. The parties are not authorized to use this style heading.

IPR2025-00464 (Patent 8,895,546 B2)  
IPR2025-00465 (Patent 11,241,414 B2)  
IPR2025-00466 (Patent 11,793,786 B2)

## I. BACKGROUND

On December 15, 2025, and pursuant to Patent Owner’s request, the Board authorized Patent Owner to file a motion for leave to petition for a certificate of correction on each of the patents challenged in the above-captioned proceedings. Paper 23; Ex. 3001 (request for authorization).<sup>2</sup> On December 23, 2026, Patent Owner filed its motion (Paper 26 (hereafter “Motion” or “Mot.”)), which Petitioner opposed on January 9, 2026 (Paper 30, hereafter “Opposition” or “Opp.”).

Patent Owner’s Motion requested the Board cede its jurisdiction over the challenged patents in the ongoing IPRs so that Patent Owner could file a petition seeking from the Director a certificate of correction that would amend each patent to include a disclosure related to a “Joint Research Agreement” (“JRA”) and the parties to that agreement. Mot. 1–2. If the patents were amended as proposed, Patent Owner planned to invoke the “safe harbor defense” under 35 U.S.C. § 103(c)(2)(C) (pre-AIA) and eliminate the asserted Gwozdz reference from consideration in the obviousness grounds raised by Petitioner against each of the challenged patents. *Id.* at 1–3. That result—removing Gwozdz from consideration—would essentially be case dispositive across all three proceedings.

The Board, in a decision and order dated February 6, 2026, denied Patent Owner’s Motion. Paper 36 (hereafter “Decision”). As explained in the Decision, we determined that the Motion had not provided a “sufficient basis” to support Patent Owner’s position that the challenged patents may be

---

<sup>2</sup> Unless otherwise noted, all citations are filings in IPR2025-00465. Similar papers and exhibits were filed in IPR2025-00464 and IPR2025-00466.

IPR2025-00464 (Patent 8,895,546 B2)  
IPR2025-00465 (Patent 11,241,414 B2)  
IPR2025-00466 (Patent 11,793,786 B2)

corrected for the alleged mistake in omitting the JRA disclosure and, additionally, “we determine[d] that substantial prejudice to Petitioner warrant[ed] denial of the Motion.” *See, e.g.*, Decision 12. Patent Owner now requests rehearing of that Decision. Paper 37 (“Request”).

## II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On a request for rehearing, the Board reviews the decision subject to the request for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be shown where a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” *PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co.*, 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Moreover, the rehearing “request must specifically identify all matters the [requesting] party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, a reply, or a sur-reply.” *Id.*

## III. ANALYSIS

Patent Owner argues that rehearing should be granted for three reasons. First, Patent Owner argues the Board abused its discretion by addressing the merits of whether a certificate of correction should be issued on the challenged patents, which Patent Owner states is “a task reserved for the Director.” Request 1, 2–4. Second, Patent Owner contends the Board misapprehended the law and overlooked facts in addressing the merits insofar as the Board questioned whether the patents’ omission of the JRA disclosure was a “minor” mistake, or a mistake that “occurred in good faith,”

IPR2025-00464 (Patent 8,895,546 B2)  
IPR2025-00465 (Patent 11,241,414 B2)  
IPR2025-00466 (Patent 11,793,786 B2)

as set forth under the relevant statutory provisions (i.e., 35 U.S.C. § 255). *Id.* at 1, 4–10. Third, Patent Owner argues the Board erred in its prejudice analysis, including by finding that Petitioner was prejudiced while allegedly ignoring any prejudice to Patent Owner. *Id.* at 1, 10–15. We address these arguments in turn below.

A. Alleged Abuse of Discretion

According to Patent Owner, “[t]he Panel exceeded its authority when denying leave to seek the Certificate of Correction, based on its view that [Patent Owner] had not demonstrated that the omission was ‘minor’ or that the ‘mistake occurred in good faith.’” Request at 2–3 (citing Decision 7–9) (additional quotation marks omitted). Patent Owner points out that, consistent with the Federal Circuit’s holding in *Honeywell*, a decision on the merits of a patentee’s request under § 255, including whether the mistake for which correction is sought is “minor” or is shown to have “occurred in good faith,” belongs to the Director. *Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Arkema Inc.*, 939 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (explaining, *inter alia*, that the Director “has not delegated its Section 255 authority to the Board”). Patent Owner argues the Board did not heed the limitations on its authority and instead decided those merits issues for itself. Request 3. And, Patent Owner contends, other Board decisions have granted patentees leave to petition for a certificate of correction without requiring any explanation of how the merits are met. *Id.* at 3–4 (citing *Sandoz Inc. v. Acerta Pharma B.V.*, IPR2023-00478, Paper 17 at 22 (PTAB Aug. 7, 2023)).

We agree with Patent Owner that *Honeywell* is controlling precedent and that it confirms the limits on the Board’s authority to decide the ultimate

IPR2025-00464 (Patent 8,895,546 B2)  
IPR2025-00465 (Patent 11,241,414 B2)  
IPR2025-00466 (Patent 11,793,786 B2)

merits issues under § 255. Indeed, we repeatedly recognized this in our Decision. *See, e.g.*, Decision 5 (citing *Honeywell* and stating, “[a]s the Federal Circuit has explained, the Director—not the Board—is responsible for deciding whether a certificate of correction is appropriate under § 255”).

We nonetheless disagree with Patent Owner’s characterization of our Decision as actually deciding the § 255 merits issues and overstepping the limits on the Board’s authority. Citing the standard set forth in *Honeywell*, which addresses motions for leave to request a certificate of correction on patents undergoing *inter partes* review that are under the Board’s exclusive jurisdiction, we explained that the Board is tasked with “determining whether there is a *sufficient basis* supporting [a patentee’s] position that the mistake *may* be correctable” under § 255. Decision 5 (quoting *Honeywell*, 939 F.3d at 1349–50). That “sufficient basis” standard is what we applied in the Decision. *Id.* at 5–8, 12.

Accepting Patent Owner’s criticisms of the Decision, however, would carry significant consequences. It would treat the “sufficient basis” inquiry as a threshold so low and permissive that the Board cannot comment on the manifest holes in a patentee’s claim for relief—like we did here, where we noted that Patent Owner did not even assert that the alleged mistake occurred in good faith, much less try to substantiate such an assertion in any way. *See* Decision 7–8. We see material differences in weighing the merits of the argument and evidence and then deciding whether the § 255 statutory elements are satisfied such that the certificate of correction should issue, which is the Director’s purview, versus simply asking whether a patentee has raised even a plausible allegation that the elements are met such that the

IPR2025-00464 (Patent 8,895,546 B2)  
IPR2025-00465 (Patent 11,241,414 B2)  
IPR2025-00466 (Patent 11,793,786 B2)

mistake may be corrected. If the Board cannot consider the latter, in deciding whether leave should be granted, the “sufficient basis” inquiry is no threshold at all. Patent Owner, in practical effect, requests the Board to read out the “sufficient basis” inquiry, contrary to controlling authority.

Patent Owner’s citation of other Board decisions does not persuade us that we abused our discretion in denying the Motion. Patent Owner cites *Sandoz* as allegedly illustrating a case where the “Board found sufficient basis that the mistake may be correctable, despite the patent owner’s motion not delineating between whether the mistaken omission was ‘clerical’ or ‘minor’ or providing any meaningful good-faith analysis.” Request 3–4 (citing *Sandoz*, IPR2023-00478, Paper 11 at 5–6). *Sandoz* does not help Patent Owner.<sup>3</sup> First, unlike Patent Owner’s Motion here, the patentee in *Sandoz* at least made an allegation that the omission of a joint research agreement was “inadvertent and made in ‘good faith.’” *Sandoz*, IPR2023-00478, Paper 11 at 6. We are unpersuaded that it was error for the Board to point out the absence of any such allegation of “good faith” in the present case. Second, in *Sandoz* the patentee moved for leave to seek a certificate of correction months before the institution due date, which motion the Board denied as “moot” because institution was denied on discretionary grounds. *Sandoz*, IPR2023-00478, Paper 17 at 22. Inasmuch as the Board discussed

---

<sup>3</sup> Many of Patent Owner’s arguments in the Request, including its *Sandoz* argument, are new and not found in the Motion. A request for rehearing is generally not a vehicle to raise for the first time new arguments, authorities, and evidence. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (requiring the requesting party to identify where any allegedly overlooked or misapprehended matters were raised previously in the relevant papers).

IPR2025-00464 (Patent 8,895,546 B2)  
IPR2025-00465 (Patent 11,241,414 B2)  
IPR2025-00466 (Patent 11,793,786 B2)

the patentee’s showing in that otherwise “moot” motion, that discussion is at best dicta. *Id.*

In any event, our denial of Patent Owner’s Motion here was based on more than simply the questions we posed about Patent Owner’s showing on the statutory elements under § 255. Indeed, we even “assum[ed] Patent Owner ha[d] done enough to put at issue for a merits decision by the Director” whether the alleged mistake qualified as “clerical” or “minor” under § 255, but then noted other problems with the Motion, including its total silence on the “good faith” issue, and substantial and unfair prejudice to Petitioner from Patent Owner’s 7-year delay in pursuing any correction of the challenged patents. *See, e.g.,* Decision 7–12 (finding that Patent Owner was (or should have been) on notice about the alleged mistake in omitting the JRA disclosure since at least 2019, when Gwozdz was successfully asserted as prior art in an IPR obviousness challenge against a directly related patent with nearly identical claims).<sup>4</sup>

B. Alleged Misapprehension of the Law and Overlooked Evidence

Patent Owner contends that the omission of the JRA disclosure is “minor” because it does not change the scope of the claims, and because the applicable statute and regulations indicate that a patent may be amended to include such a disclosure. Request 4–5 (citing, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 103(c)(2) (pre-AIA), and 37 C.F.R. § 1.71(g)(1), (g),(3)).

---

<sup>4</sup> As explained in the Decision, on January 29, 2019, a family member patent was challenged in IPR2019-00451 (“the 451 IPR”) that resulted in a Final Written Decision concluding the claims would have been obvious over the same Gwozdz-based obviousness ground asserted here, which conclusion was subsequently affirmed by the Federal Circuit on appeal. Decision 8–12.

IPR2025-00464 (Patent 8,895,546 B2)  
IPR2025-00465 (Patent 11,241,414 B2)  
IPR2025-00466 (Patent 11,793,786 B2)

We are unpersuaded that the Decision misapprehended the cited law and regulations. We cited those authorities expressly in the Decision. Decision 6–7. And, as noted above, our analysis proceeded on whether the relief sought by Patent Owner in its Motion should be granted even “assuming” Patent Owner’s citation of the applicable authorities was sufficient to put at issue for the Director whether the omission of the JRA disclosure here was “clerical,” “typographical,” or “minor.” *Id.* at 7.

Patent Owner also argues the alleged mistake was “minor” because the Director has since authorized the JRA disclosure correction in a child application/patent related to the challenged ’414 patent. Request 5–6 (noting U.S. Patent No. 12,268,664 (the ’664 patent) is a descendant of the ’414 and ’786 patents) (Ex. 2077 (the ’664 patent)). According to Patent Owner, “[t]he same day the Panel granted authorization to file” the Motion, Patent Owner “asked the Director to authorize correction” of the ’664 patent. Request 5–6. Patent Owner argues that because “the Director has *already decided* that this correction is proper, there can be no question that the Board’s lesser *Honeywell* standard is satisfied.” *Id.* at 6 (citing Ex. 2078 (request and certificate of correction)).

This is new argument relying on new evidence, which was not presented in Patent Owner’s Motion. Patent Owner contends that good cause exists to consider these materials, which allegedly “could not have been submitted” with the Motion. That is partly true because the February 10, 2026, grant of the certificate of correction on the related patent did not exist until just a few weeks ago. Ex. 2078, 1–2. Notably, however, Patent Owner did not timely inform that Board (e.g., in the Motion or

IPR2025-00464 (Patent 8,895,546 B2)  
IPR2025-00465 (Patent 11,241,414 B2)  
IPR2025-00466 (Patent 11,793,786 B2)

Updated Mandatory Disclosures) that it was pursuing a certificate of correction on any related patents or applications, which Patent Owner could have done; as Patent Owner concedes, its request for a certificate on the '664 patent was made several days *before* the Motion was filed. Request 5–6.

In any event, that wholly *ex parte* request and grant on a related patent that is not part of these IPR proceedings is divorced from important context raised here in the Motion and Opposition, including Patent Owner's many years of delay in pursuing correction of the challenged patents and the substantial prejudice to Petitioner in these proceedings arising from that delay. Decision 10 (explaining that, as a result of Patent Owner's delay, "Petitioner is [now] statutorily time-barred from filing another IPR petition against the challenged patents" that does not rely on Gwozdz). That is why, as confirmed in *Honeywell* and pursuant to regulation, a motion and the Board's permission is required before a patentee may seek correction of patents undergoing *inter partes* review. 37 C.F.R. § 1.323.

Patent Owner further argues that other Board panels have found that corrections of a patent to disclose a joint research agreement are "minor." Request 7–8 (citing *Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Res. Org. v. BASF Plant Science GmbH*, PGR2020-00033, Paper 26 at 4–5 (PTAB Mar. 18, 2021) (hereafter "*CSIRO*")).<sup>5</sup> As already pointed out, whether the correction sought by Patent Owner might appropriately be characterized as "minor" was ultimately not decisive for us in denying Patent Owner's Motion. Decision 7. And *CSIRO* is distinguishable on at least the prejudice inquiry.

---

<sup>5</sup> Patent Owner also cites the motion submitted by patent owner in *CSIRO* (*CSIRO*, Paper 19).

IPR2025-00464 (Patent 8,895,546 B2)  
IPR2025-00465 (Patent 11,241,414 B2)  
IPR2025-00466 (Patent 11,793,786 B2)

The only prejudice argument in *CSIRO* concerned a potential scheduling delay if relief was granted, and petitioner further noted that just one of the twenty-five grounds would be impacted if the patent-at-issue was corrected to include the disclosure related to a joint research agreement. *CSIRO*, Paper 21 at 6–7. Unsurprisingly, the issue of prejudice did not factor into the Board’s grant of the motion (*CSIRO*, Paper 26) and, even with the issuance of the certificate in that case, petitioner prevailed at trial on other grounds raised in the PGR without the Board reaching the one impacted art ground. *CSIRO*, Paper 40 at 31. Conversely, none of Petitioner’s grounds here across the three proceedings survives if Gwozdz is eliminated from consideration under § 103(c)(2)(C) (pre-AIA) and, importantly, for reasons explained in the Decision and herein, Patent Owner’s 7-year delay in pursuing correction of the challenged patents in these proceedings introduces a strong element of prejudice against the Petitioner.

Continuing, Patent Owner argues the Board erred in evaluating whether good faith was shown. Request 8–10. According to Patent Owner, the Board overlooked the prosecution history of the ’414 patent, where Patent Owner allegedly took “corrective action” during prosecution of that patent “to narrow its claims” after the conclusion of the 451 IPR. *Id.* That claim amendment, Patent Owner argues, convinced the Examiner to find that there was adequate descriptive support in the application’s putative priority documents, thus effectively antedating Gwozdz and removing it as an available prior art reference. *Id.* (citing Ex. 1002, 27–28). Thus, Patent Owner contends, it had no need at that time to correct the challenged patents to reference the JRA. *Id.*

IPR2025-00464 (Patent 8,895,546 B2)  
IPR2025-00465 (Patent 11,241,414 B2)  
IPR2025-00466 (Patent 11,793,786 B2)

This argument is unpersuasive in establishing that the Board erred. To begin, the argument is new and nowhere in the Motion is there any reference to the '414 patent's prosecution history or any "corrective action" taken by Patent Owner as indicative that the omission of the JRA disclosure was simply a good-faith mistake. *See generally* Mot.

Even considering this new argument, it is flawed. That Patent Owner may have tried to narrow the claims in the '414 and '786 patents<sup>6</sup> to avoid Gwozdz as prior art says nothing about the challenged '546 patent, which is the direct parent of the patent in which the claims were held unpatentable over Gwozdz in the 451 IPR.<sup>7</sup> In addition, insofar as the Examiner apparently credited Patent Owner's amendment of some claims and entitlement of those claims to an earlier priority date, the then-Acting Director found the Examiner's "conclusion directly contradicts" the holding in the 451 IPR, raising concerns of "material error" and referring the cases to the Board for decisions on institution. *Padagis US LLC v. Neurelis, Inc.*, IPR2025-00465, Paper 12 at 3 (Acting Director Stewart, July 16, 2025) (informative). Upon referral, we determined that the allegedly narrowed claims of the '414 and '786 patents did not find adequate written description support in the relevant priority applications or avoid Gwozdz as prior art.

---

<sup>6</sup> As noted in the Decision, the applications that issued as the '414 and '786 patents were filed after the Board's Final Written Decision in the 451 IPR and while the appeal to the Federal Circuit was pending. Decision 8–9.

<sup>7</sup> In the Request for Rehearing in IPR2025-00464, Patent Owner contends that we "overlooked the import of the Statutory Disclaimer" (Ex. 2075) filed on the '546 patent. IPR2025-00464, Paper at 8. We cannot have overlooked evidence that is not cited in the Motion and, indeed, did not exist at the time the Motion was filed. Ex. 2075 (disclaimer filed January 2, 2026).

IPR2025-00464 (Patent 8,895,546 B2)  
IPR2025-00465 (Patent 11,241,414 B2)  
IPR2025-00466 (Patent 11,793,786 B2)

*See* Decision 8 n.6 (citing Paper 13, 14–30). And finally, Patent Owner could have sought to amend the claims *and* correct the specifications to reference the JRA to address the concerns with Gwozdz being asserted against its portfolio of related patents, before those patents became the subject of new infringement allegations by Patent Owner and the present obviousness challenges raised by Petitioner. Those options for Patent Owner were not mutually exclusive. Patent Owner pursued claim amendment (for some claims) yet for years neglected to seek a correction to add disclosure of the JRA—only pursuing that option for the first time after these proceedings were well underway.

Patent Owner contends the facts here are similar to those in *CSIRO*, where petitioner argued in 2020 that patent owner should have amended the specification in 2006 when art that patent owner later sought to exclude was first cited during prosecution. Request 10 (citing *CSIRO*, Paper 21 at 1–2). But, unlike here, in *CSIRO* there was no argument that patentee’s delay in pursuing a correction of the specification substantially prejudiced petitioner. *See* Opp. 1. As discussed above, the requested certificate in *CSIRO* was only marginally relevant to the grounds raised by petitioner, and the prejudice issues in *CSIRO* versus here have little in common.

C. Alleged Errors in the Prejudice Inquiry

Patent Owner contends that the Board’s prejudice analysis was improper, not determinative, and that the Board overlooked the prejudice to Patent Owner. Request 10–13. We disagree on all points.

According to Patent Owner, the applicable statute and regulations make no reference to consideration of prejudice in evaluating whether a

IPR2025-00464 (Patent 8,895,546 B2)  
IPR2025-00465 (Patent 11,241,414 B2)  
IPR2025-00466 (Patent 11,793,786 B2)

motion for leave should be granted. *Id.* at 10–11. Even so, the Board has long considered prejudice to the parties in deciding such motions, and the Federal Circuit has endorsed the same. *See Kingston Tech. Co. v. CATR Co., Ltd.*, IPR2015-00559, Paper 44 at 3 (PTAB Nov. 6, 2015) (denying patent owner’s motion for leave to file a request for certificate of correction, citing a patent owner’s delay in seeking to correct certain claim language and the unfairness to petitioner if the changes were allowed); *Honeywell*, 939 F.3d at 1350 (instructing the Board to permit the filing of a motion for leave (which permission the Board earlier refused) and indicating that the Board may consider prejudice to petitioner when evaluating that motion).

Patent Owner argues that prejudice to Petitioner should not be determinative because it was Petitioner that chose to rely on Gwozdz as its sole primary reference for its obviousness grounds. Request 11–12 (citing another panel decision that weighed prejudice differently, finding prejudice to patent owner outweighed prejudice to petitioner, and notwithstanding a potential statutory bar against any future challenge by petitioner). This argument elides important context concerning the history of the 451 IPR, the subsequent Federal Circuit appeal, and Patent Owner’s many years of delay in pursuing any certificate of correction to add the JRA disclosure, which we addressed in detail in our Decision. Decision 8–12 (agreeing with Petitioner that it reasonably relied on this history and Patent Owner’s many years of silence when it prepared its petition asserting Gwozdz). How another panel may have weighed the prejudice issues on a different record does not control our assessment of the issue.

IPR2025-00464 (Patent 8,895,546 B2)  
IPR2025-00465 (Patent 11,241,414 B2)  
IPR2025-00466 (Patent 11,793,786 B2)

Patent Owner contends that the Board's concerns about prejudice appear to be rooted in "perceived gamesmanship." Request 12. We never said that. To the contrary, the concern here is that Patent Owner's years of delay and inaction result in unfair prejudice to Petitioner now if Patent Owner is allowed to add the JRA disclosure to the challenged patents. Patent Owner was in the best position to know about the JRA (signed in 2007) and, if it believed the JRA provided a safe-harbor defense against an obviousness challenge based on Gwozdz, to have promptly corrected its patents that are, without the correction, susceptible to that challenge. But Patent Owner did not do so, even after the 451 IPR was filed or during the roughly seven years that followed. Decision 8–12.

Patent Owner argues that we overlooked that it will be prejudiced if relief is denied because Patent Owner will be deprived of the safe harbor defense under Section 103(c)(2). Request 13. We considered the prejudice to Patent Owner. But such prejudice arises first and foremost from Patent Owner's own delay and inaction as already explained. In that light, the unfair prejudice to Petitioner substantially outweighs any countervailing prejudice to Patent Owner. Decision 11–12 (explaining that an opportunity to file a reply brief would do little to remedy the prejudice to Petitioner now that it is time-barred from raising any new grounds of unpatentability or filing any new challenge that is not reliant on Gwozdz).

Patent Owner's remaining criticisms about our prejudice analysis fare no better in demonstrating reversible error. Request 14–15. Patent Owner contends that the relief it is requesting would not affect scheduled deadlines in the case. *Id.* at 14. That may be true, but it does not mitigate the

IPR2025-00464 (Patent 8,895,546 B2)  
IPR2025-00465 (Patent 11,241,414 B2)  
IPR2025-00466 (Patent 11,793,786 B2)

prejudice to Petitioner as already explained if relief is granted. And, to the extent Patent Owner is suggesting the Board is attempting to apply a form of preclusion or “estoppel-lite” by referencing the 451 IPR and the subsequent affirmance by the Federal Circuit in that case, Patent Owner is mistaken. *Id.* at 14–15. We highlighted that history to reinforce that Patent Owner has been on notice since at least 2019 that nearly identical claims were exposed to a Gwozdz-based obviousness challenge. Had Patent Owner moved promptly in 2019 to correct its patents with a disclosure of the JRA, it is possible the entire 451 IPR might have been avoided or at least summarily resolved. But Patent Owner did not do so. Instead, it delayed making any request for correction over the ensuing seven years. That long and unexplained delay weighs heavily against granting leave to pursue correction at this stage.

#### IV. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, it is:

ORDERED that Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing is *denied*.

IPR2025-00464 (Patent 8,895,546 B2)  
IPR2025-00465 (Patent 11,241,414 B2)  
IPR2025-00466 (Patent 11,793,786 B2)

FOR PETITIONER:

James Murphy  
Corey Casey  
POLSINELLI PC.  
jpmurphy@polsinelli.com  
ccasey@polsinelli.com

FOR PATENT OWNER:

Michael A Sitzman  
Timothy Best  
MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP  
msitzman@mwe.com  
tbest@mwe.com

Raymond Miller  
Nancy Stakleff  
DLA Piper LLP (US)  
raymond.miller@us.dlapiper.com  
nicole.endejann@us.dlapiper.com