

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

EVENFLO COMPANY, INC.

Petitioner

v.

BABY JOGGER II, LLC,

Patent Owner.

IPR2025-01122

Patent 11,731,682

PATENT OWNER RESPONSE¹

¹ The Board's March 25, 2026 Order acknowledged the assignment of the challenged patent to Baby Jogger II, LLC and updated the case caption accordingly. Paper 19, 1. Patent Owner will adopt this caption going forward on that basis.

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PATENT OWNER'S EXHIBIT LIST

Exhibit No.	Description
2001	<i>RESERVED</i>
2002	Excerpt of File History of Application No. 12/631,375, Applicant's Response to Office Action, Remarks and Attachments (Nov. 4, 2013)
2003	United States District Courts—National Judicial Caseload Profile for 12-month period ending December 31, 2024; <i>available at</i> https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2025-02/fcms_na_distprofile1231.2024.pdf
2004	U.S. Patent No. 10,449,987, Information Disclosure Statement dated February 28, 2018
2005	<i>RESERVED</i>
2006	<i>RESERVED</i>
2007	Docket Sheet (as of Sept. 1, 2025) for <i>Baby Jogger, LLC v. Evenflo Company, Inc.</i> , No. 1:24-cv-00723 (D. Del. filed June 18, 2024)
2008	<i>RESERVED</i>
2009	<i>RESERVED</i>
2010	<i>RESERVED</i>
2011	Declaration of Dr. Kimberly Cameron (Mar. 26, 2026)
2012	CV of Dr. Kimberly Cameron
2013	Annotated Fig. 16 of EX1051
2014–2099	<i>RESERVED</i>
2100	Transcript of the Cross-Examination of Douglas Prairie (Mar. 13, 2026)
2101	Declaration of Douglas Prairie, Exhibit 1002 from <i>Precision Planting, LLC and AGCO Corporation v. Deere & Company</i> , IPR2019-01044 (May 29, 2019)
2102	Declaration of Douglas Prairie, Exhibit 2004 from <i>Bazooka-Farmstar, LLC v. Nuhn Industries Ltd.</i> , IPR2023-01161 (Oct. 10, 2023)

Exhibit No.	Description
2103	<i>RESERVED</i>
2104	Declaration of Douglas Prairie, Exhibit 1001 from <i>Baby Generation, Inc., Evenflo Company Inc., and Monahan Products, LLC v. Baby Jogger, LLC</i> , IPR2025-01095 (June 5, 2025)
2105	<i>RESERVED</i>
2106	Declaration of Douglas Prairie, Exhibit 1001 from <i>Evenflo Company Inc., Baby Generation, Inc., and Monahan Products, LLC v. Baby Jogger, LLC</i> , IPR2025-01100 (June 6, 2025)

I. INTRODUCTION

Patent Owner Baby Jogger II, LLC (“Baby Jogger”) submits this Response in opposition to the Petition filed by Evenflo Company, Inc. (“Evenflo” or “Petitioner”) regarding claims 1-16 (the “Challenged Claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 11,731,682 (the “’682 Patent”). Paper 1 (“Petition” or “Pet.”). The Board should deny the Petition in its entirety.

The origins of the Baby Jogger patent family, including the ’682 Patent, trace back to around 2008, when Baby Jogger—a leading innovator of baby strollers since 1984—developed a modular stroller system that transforms a standard single stroller into a true double stroller while maintaining a compact, maneuverable footprint. Before this invention, parents faced a choice between unwieldy, oversized strollers that were difficult to maneuver and designs that failed to provide adequate space for the child, reduced the under-seat storage capacity, or relied on affixed components that did not permit reversibility or interchangeability. EX1010, 1:42-67. Baby Jogger’s innovation overcame these shortcomings, revolutionizing the single-to-double stroller category with a sleek, compact modular design in which an optional second (front) seat could be added, preserved under-seat storage capacity, and—through the use of adapters—was both reversible and interchangeable with other seat types.

The '682 Patent is generally directed to a stroller with a modular seating system in which first and second seats, when connected to the frame, are arranged in an inline descending configuration along the stroller frame. EX1010, claim 1. The patent's disclosure is organized around the structural interface between the seats, seat attachment adapters, and seat attachment housings—components that collectively define how and where each seat is positioned on the frame.

Petitioner advances four grounds of unpatentability. Each one fails.

Ground 1 rests on a priority challenge. Petitioner asserts that the '682 Patent is only entitled to priority to the "2016 Provisional" application within the priority chain (EX1006). But Petitioner's priority challenge is an improper word-matching exercise, not a substantive written-description analysis. Petitioner points to the absence of specific labels—"seat attachment adapter," "seat attachment housing," "handle portion"—while ignoring that the pre-2016 disclosures disclose the identical structures using identical figures, differing only in nomenclature. The written-description standard asks whether a POSA would recognize the disclosures as conveying possession of the claimed subject matter, not whether the drafter used identical terminology. Ground 1 is further undermined by the irreconcilable double standard applied by Petitioner's expert, Mr. Prairie, who demands express terminology to recognize elements in the pre-2016 disclosures while freely

extracting those same elements from the wordless drawings of a design patent (Liao) in Ground 2.

Ground 2 asserts that Liao (EX1048)—a design patent with fewer than 150 words of description and no structural disclosure—renders obvious claims 1-9 and 13-16. But Petitioner's claim mapping is internally inconsistent: it assigns the same physical structure in Liao to different claim elements depending on which limitation is under discussion, and those assignments cannot be reconciled without collapsing multiple claim elements into one. Petitioner also mischaracterizes the prosecution history of related applications, selectively quoting Patent Owner's arguments while omitting critical qualifiers. And Petitioner's expert manufactures an "inline descending configuration" by drawing a line through the estimated locations of two infants' buttocks—a reference point found nowhere in either the '682 Patent or Liao—rather than identifying any structural feature of Liao's stroller frame. Ground 3 simply combines Liao with Cheng (EX1049) for claims 10-12 and fails for the same reasons as Ground 2.

Ground 4 asserts that Offord '341 (EX1051) modified by Offord '797 (EX1054) renders obvious claims 1-16. The proposed modification—reversing the "interface portion components 100" of Offord '341—would destabilize the stroller, create physical interference between the curved lug 108 and the frame connection, and fail because the asymmetric detent of the connecting leg would not align with

the receptor cup after reversal. Petitioner's articulated motivation to combine is also conclusory, borrowing the mechanism of reversal from Offord '797 while discarding the only reason Offord '797 gives for performing it. Under *Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC*, 805 F.3d 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2015), this is insufficient.

For these reasons, the Board should find all challenged claims not unpatentable.

II. THE '682 PATENT'S SPECIFICATION, CLAIMS, AND PROSECUTION HISTORY

The '682 Patent is directed to a stroller system with a modular seating arrangement. *See* EX1010, claim 1. The patent claims priority through a series of applications, including a continuation-in-part application, ultimately tracing its priority to a non-provisional application filed December 4, 2009 (the "2009 Non-Provisional," EX1003) and a provisional application filed December 4, 2008 (the "2008 Provisional," EX1002). *See* EX1010, certificate of correction, cover.

The '682 Patent's specification describes a stroller frame comprising a handle portion and a front end portion, with seat attachment adapters that couple to seat attachment housings disposed along the frame. EX1010, 8:59-12:32. The specification discloses that each seat attachment adapter has a first end and a distal second end, with the first end comprising a connector portion that releasably couples to the respective seat attachment housing. EX1010, 10:26-36. A first seat

and a second seat, when connected to the frame, are arranged in an inline descending configuration along the stroller frame. EX1010, Fig. 8A.

The seat attachment adapters serve as structural intermediaries that define how and where each seat is positioned on the frame. *See, e.g.*, EX1010, 9:64–12:21; *id.*, Figs. 3, 8A. The seat attachment adapters are coupled to the seat attachment housings, and the seat attachment adapters connect to the first and second seats. EX1010, 10:26-31.

Claim 1 of the '682 Patent recites, among other things, a stroller frame comprising a handle portion and a front end portion, first and second seat attachment adapters spaced from and coupled to respective seat attachment housings by respective attachment frame members, and first and second seats that, when connected to the frame, are arranged in an inline descending configuration along the stroller frame. EX1010, claim 1. Claims 2-16 depend from claim 1 and add further limitations directed to the structural relationships between the seats, adapters, housings, and frame members. EX1010, claims 2-16.

III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

A. “Handle Portion” (claim 1)

Claim 1 recites, in relevant part, “A stroller, comprising: a stroller frame comprising *a handle portion* and a front end portion”² The term “handle portion” has no special meaning in the art, is unambiguous on its face, and requires no construction. *See* EX2011 ¶¶ 34-35.

Petitioner proposes that “handle portion” means the “portion of frame coupled to the left and right upper tube support frame.” Pet. 17. This position is driven by Petitioner’s priority challenge. *See* Pet. 15-16 (referring to wording changes in a later specification), 21-24 (arguing priority of “handle portion”). As shown below, the 2008 Provisional application provides written description support for the term even under Petitioner’s proposed construction. *See infra* Section IV.A.1. Accordingly, though construction is unnecessary, Baby Jogger does not oppose Petitioner’s proposed construction.

B. First and second seats “arranged in an inline descending configuration along the stroller frame” (claim 1)

Petitioner offers no construction for the term “inline descending configuration” and instead applies it in an arbitrary manner that is untethered from the claim language, the specification, and the dependent claims. Rather than

² All emphasis is added unless otherwise indicated.

ground this term in the structural relationship between the seats and the frame—as the intrinsic record requires—Petitioner's analysis determines the “inline descending configuration” with reference to a hypothetical occupant's body position. *E.g.*, Pet. 40-41 (referring to “where an infant's buttocks would rest” as one possibility), 68 (referring *only* to “general seating areas where an infant's lower body would rest”); EX1001 ¶ 395. Because Petitioner's approach lacks any basis in the intrinsic evidence,³ it is necessary to clarify the plain and ordinary meaning of this term as it would be understood by a POSA.

Claim 1 recites that, “when connected to the frame, [the first seat and the second seat] are arranged in an inline descending configuration along the stroller frame.” EX1010, claim 1. The claim language itself anchors the “inline descending configuration” to the structural relationship between the seats and the frame—specifically, the point at which each seat connects to the frame via its seat attachment adapter. *See* EX2011 ¶ 36. Under the *Phillips* standard, claim terms are given “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention,” and that meaning is determined primarily

³ Mr. Prairie testified on cross-examination that he could not “recall [his] exact logic” at all for why he referenced that location—as opposed to any other—besides the need to meet the claim limitation. *See* EX2100, 149:13-21, 152:2-10.

from the intrinsic record. *Phillips v. AWH Corp.*, 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005)

This reading follows naturally from the specification and the claim structure as a whole. The '682 Patent's disclosure is organized around the interface between the seats, the seat attachment adapters, and the seat attachment housings. Nothing in the intrinsic record describes the inline descending configuration with reference to an occupant's body. Rather, the specification describes the seat attachment adapters as the structural intermediaries that define how and where each seat is positioned on the frame. *See, e.g.*, EX1010, Figs. 3, 8A; *id.* 10:24–33, 11:38–12:2, 12:9–10, 13:53–55. The seat attachment adapters are coupled to the seat attachment housings, and the seat attachment adapters in turn connect to the seats. *Id.* The position of each seat is determined by where the seat attaches to its seat attachment adapter—not by where an occupant's body happens to rest within the seat, which is not a static position. *See* EX2011 ¶ 37.

The dependent claims confirm this focus. Claims 2 through 5 of the '682 Patent are likewise directed to the structural relationship between the seats, the seat attachment adapters, and the seat attachment housings. *See* EX1010, claims 2-5. A POSA reading claim 1's "inline descending configuration along the stroller frame" in the context of these dependent claims would understand that the relevant configuration is defined by the structural mounting points—the locations where the

seats connect to the seat attachment adapters—not by occupant positioning. *See* EX2011 ¶ 38.

This construction is also consistent with the plain meanings of “when connected to the frame” and “along the stroller frame.” *See* EX2011 ¶ 39. The phrase “when connected to the frame” directs the reader to where the seat attaches to the frame via its seat attachment adapter. Any other reading would divorce the phrase “along the stroller frame” from the claim entirely.

IV. THE PETITION FAILS TO SHOW THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS ARE UNPATENTABLE

A. Ground 1: Rolicki is not prior art to the challenged claims

Rolicki was filed March 14, 2013, and claims priority to a provisional application dated January 7, 2013. EX1047, cover. As explained below, the '682 Patent is entitled to the December 4, 2008 filing date of the 2008 Provisional. Accordingly, Rolicki is not prior art.



Petitioner's priority challenge elevates form over substance. Rather than grapple with what the priority applications actually disclose, Petitioner searches for “magic words”—specific labels and terminology that did not appear in the earlier applications—and declares victory when it cannot find them. That approach has no basis in the law. The written-description inquiry asks whether the prior application reasonably conveys to a POSA that the inventor possessed the claimed subject matter—it is not a word-matching exercise. *Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.*,

598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[T]he level of detail required ...varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the relevant technology.”); *PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.*, 522 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (test satisfied if “written description actually or inherently disclose[s] the claim element”). When the actual disclosures are examined, Petitioner’s challenge fails on every contested limitation.

1. The 2008 Provisional discloses a “handle portion”

Start with the most telling detail in the entire Petition: Petitioner relies on an annotated version of Fig. 8A of the ’682 Patent to argue that “[c]laim 1 includes limitations only disclosed by the 2016 Provisional.” Pet. 12, 15-17, 21-24. But Fig. 8A of the ’682 Patent is, other than its labeling, the *same figure* as Fig. 8 of the 2008 Provisional, which predates the 2016 Provisional by more than six years.⁴ Compare EX1010 (the “’682 Patent”), Fig. 8A, with EX1002, Fig. 8; see also EX1003, Fig. 8.; EX2011 ¶¶ 48-49.

⁴ For ease of reference, Baby Jogger reproduces the 2009 Non-Provisional figures and description in this Patent Owner Response; however, the 2008 Provisional discloses the same features. See EX2011 ¶¶ 47-49; see also EX1001 ¶¶ 102-103 (agreeing the “figures and Description[s]” are “very similar”).

Pet. 12 (showing Petitioner's annotated Fig. 8A of the '682 Patent).	EX1003, Fig. 8.
 FIGURE 8A	 Fig. 8

Petitioner's entire argument depends on the implausible proposition that a POSA can look at Fig. 8A of the '682 Patent and identify certain limitations, such as a "handle portion," then look at the same figure in the 2008 Provisional—same stroller, same structure, just a different label—and suddenly be unable to find them. In reality, a person of ordinary skill *in the art of stroller design* would have no difficulty identifying the stroller components Petitioner contests within the 2008 Provisional. *See, e.g.*, EX2011 ¶¶ 50-66.

a. A "handle portion" is plainly disclosed in the 2008 Provisional

Petitioner's "handle portion" argument reduces to this: the filings before 2016 did not use the exact same "handle portion 81d" label as the '682 Patent. *See* Pet. 21-24. But that proves nothing. A handle is a common and readily recognizable component of any stroller. EX2011 ¶ 50. It sits at the rear of a stroller frame, at a height suitable for pushing. EX2011 ¶¶ 50-51. A POSA would look at Figs. 1, 3, 5, 8, and/or 9A-9F of the 2008 Provisional and recognize the upper rear

portion of the stroller frame as the “handle portion.” *See, e.g.*, EX1002, Fig. 3, 8; *see also* EX1003, Figs. 3, 8; EX2011 ¶¶ 50-57. This common-sense recognition is all that the written-description standard requires. *PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.*, 522 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (the relevant question for determining priority is whether the earlier filings “convey with reasonable clarity” to a POSA that the inventor was “in possession” of the challenged limitations as of their filing dates).


b. Petitioner's reliance on re-labeled figures in the 2016 disclosures does not save its argument

Petitioner attempts to sidestep this straightforward analysis by construing “handle portion” based on the more specific re-labeling in the 2016 Provisional (EX1006): arguing that “handle portion” means the “portion of frame coupled to the left and right upper tube support frame.” Pet. 17. Petitioner and its expert's theory is that because the label “upper tube support frame” did not appear until 2016, a POSA could not have identified the “handle portion” in the filings before 2016. Pet. 21-24; EX1001 ¶ 209. This argument tries to obscure the plainly obvious: the 2008 Provisional describes and shows a handle. *See, e.g.*, EX1002, Fig. 3; *id.* ¶ [0033]; *see also* EX1003, Figs. 3, 8; *id.* ¶¶ [0012], [0043] (describing the embodiment shown in Fig. 8 and identifying reference 81c as a “handle portion”).

Petitioner and its expert confuse a labeling change with a structural change. When the 2016 Provisional relabeled 81c as the “upper tube support frame” and introduced 81d as the “handle portion,” the underlying stroller frame structure depicted in the figures did not change. *Compare* EX1002, Fig. 8, *and* EX1003, Fig. 8, *with* EX1010, Fig. 8A; *see also* EX1001 ¶¶ 209-212 (showing the same figure other than reference labels and Mr. Prairie’s annotations). The same tubular members connecting the left and right upper portions of the frame are visible in both figures. EX2011 ¶¶ 51-53 (stating “the underlying stroller structure depicted is identical”). All that changed was the granularity of the labeling, not the physical structure.

In any case, the 2008 Provisional discloses a “handle portion.” *See* EX2011 ¶¶ 50-51, 53-57. For example, Fig. 3 of the 2008 Provisional depicts a stroller 10 having an upper rear structure. *See* EX1002, Fig. 3; *see also* EX1003, Fig. 3; EX2011 ¶ 54. A POSA would recognize that structure as coupled to the left and right upper portions of “frame 12”—satisfying Petitioner’s “redefined definition.” *See* EX1002 ¶ [0021]; *see also* EX1003 ¶ [0043]; EX2011 ¶¶ 54-55. A POSA would recognize the same structure in Fig. 8. *See* EX1002, Fig. 8; *see also* EX1003, Fig. 8; EX2011 ¶¶ 56-57. Indeed, as shown below in the cropped excerpts of Figures 3 and 8, the upper rear structure depicted is nearly the same in each. *See also* EX2011 ¶¶ 56-57 (agreeing POSA would recognize *handle portion* as

construed by Petitioner in both priority documents). Accordingly, the term handle portion is supported by the 2008 Provisional.




2. The 2008 Provisional discloses “seat attachment adapters” and “seat attachment housings”

a. A POSA would understand the 2008 Provisional discloses “seat attachment adapters” and “seat attachment housings”

Petitioner also argues that the terms “housing” and “adapter” were not disclosed until the 2016 Provisional. Pet. 21. This argument fails for the same

reasons as the “handle portion” argument: it is word matching, not substantive analysis.

In the '682 Patent, the “seat attachment adapter” is identified as element 84, shown below. The 2008 Provisional includes the same element bearing the same reference number 84 but refers to it as a “seat attachment portion,” “seat support portion” or “seat support element,” as shown below. *See, e.g.*, EX1002, Fig. 8, ¶ [0034]; *see also* EX1003 ¶ [0044].



The label differs; the structure does not. *See, e.g.*, EX2011 ¶¶ 58-64. A POSA would also understand these disclosures as the same component because the 2008 Provisional and the '682 Patent describe element 84 in nearly identical terms. It is: capable of supporting a second stroller seat in front of the first (*compare* EX1002 ¶ [0034], *with* EX1010 10:31-33; *see also* EX1003 ¶ [0046]); connected to the front wheel support frame (*compare* EX1002 ¶ [0036], *with* EX1010 11:67-

12:2; *see also* EX1003 ¶ [0046]); and comprises a seat connector 88 (*compare* EX1002 ¶ [0036], *with* EX1010 12:9-10; *see also* EX1003 ¶ [0046]). *See also* EX2011 ¶ 60. It is the same element, the same structure, the same function, and the same location—just a different name. *Id.*

Similarly, the 2008 Provisional discloses the claimed “seat attachment housings.” *See, e.g.*, EX2011 ¶¶ 61-64. Consistent with its plain meaning, the ’682 Patent describes a “seat attachment housing” as a component that is coupled to a seat attachment adapter. *See, e.g.*, EX1010, 10:2-5 (“[S]eat attachment adapters can be coupled to the frame by coupling the adapter 84 into a seat attachment housing disposed along the frame 81.”); *id.* 10:26-29 (“[S]eat attachment adapter 84 is configured to have a first end that is removably coupled to the frame 81 and/or seat attachment housing.”); EX1020, 33 (claim 1 as originally filed reciting “wherein a first seat attachment adapter is configured to be removably coupled to the first seat attachment housing”); EX2011 ¶ 61.

The 2008 Provisional discloses such a structure in multiple places, albeit using different words. For example, the 2008 Provisional describes “connector portions 17” that allow a seat attachment “to be connected to the front of the stroller.” EX1002 ¶ [0020]; *see also* EX1003 ¶ [0030]. It further describes an embodiment in which “the attachment portion 21 [of an attachment] may be inserted into a cylindrical recess of the connector portion 17.” EX1002 ¶ [0025];

see also EX1003 ¶ [0035]. And it describes a frame member whose “first end is capable of connecting to a stroller frame” and “second end is connected to the seat attachment member [that supports the seat].” EX1002 ¶ [0022]; *see also* EX1003 ¶ [0032]. Thus, the 2008 Provisional describes the same frame-mounted component that is coupled to a seat attachment as recited in claim 1 of the '682 Patent. *See also* EX2011 ¶ 61.


Petitioner's expert's reliance on Baby Jogger's citation to paragraphs [0046] and [0047] during prosecution is also unavailing. *See* EX1001 ¶ 205-207. The fact that Patent Owner pointed to specific paragraphs during prosecution does not mean that those paragraphs are the *only* support for the elements. Applicants routinely cite the most directly relevant passages when responding to Office Actions. The fact that the Patent Owner cited the later description does not concede that the earlier, foundational description in the 2008 Provisional was insufficient. Written description support can come from any portion of the specification, including figures. *See Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar*, 935 F.2d 1555, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

b. The structural relationship between “adapters” and “ housings” is also disclosed

Petitioner's expert contends that pre-2016 disclosures do not disclose the “adapter” being coupled to the “housing.” EX1001 ¶¶ 190-192. But the 2008 Provisional disproves this contention. *See, e.g.*, EX2011 ¶ 62.

The 2008 Provisional discloses various “attachments” such as a “seat attachment” which includes an “attachment portion 21” and a “seat attachment portion [84]” (the adapter), and “connector portions 17” (the housing) including embodiments having a “cylindrical recess” into which an “attachment portion 21 [of the seat attachment] may be inserted.” *See, e.g.*, EX1002 Figs. 1-8; *id.* ¶¶ [009], [0023]-[0025], [0028], [0036]; *see also* EX1003 ¶¶ [0035]-[0036], [0039], [0047].

Indeed, this same structure is depicted throughout the figures of the 2008 Provisional. *See* EX2011 ¶ 62. For example, Fig. 1 of the 2008 Provisional illustrates a single-seat embodiment of a stroller having “connector portions 17,” and Fig. 8 (which, other than the labeling, is the same as Fig. 8A of the ’682 Patent) illustrates a double-seat embodiment of the same stroller. EX1002, Figs 1, 8; *id.* ¶¶ [0020], [0025]; *see also* EX1003 ¶ [0030] (“The attachment frame members 17 allow a seat attachment such as the seat attachment for converting the single stroller 10 to a double stroller.”).



Although the connector portions 17 (which the 2009 Non-Provisional calls “attachment frame members 17”) are not explicitly labeled in Fig. 8, a POSA would recognize them. *See* EX2011 ¶ 62. They occupy the same location and share the same appearance as the labeled “connector portions 17” in Fig. 1. The 2008 Provisional separately confirms that “seat attachment portion 84” is “connected to the stroller 80 front wheel support frame 81a,” which is precisely the location where those connector portions appear. *See* EX1002 ¶ [0036]; *see also* EX1003 ¶ [0046]. A POSA would understand this disclosure as describing the same structural relationship claimed in the ’682 Patent: an adapter (seat attachment portion 84) that couples to a housing (connector portion 17). EX2011 ¶ 62.

- c. The prosecution history of the 2009 Non-Provisional confirms that “seat attachment adapters” and “seat attachment housings” are supported by the pre-2016 filings*

During prosecution of the 2009 Non-Provisional, the Applicant added Figs. 10 and 11 (shown below) to further illustrate “seat support element 84.” EX1014, 222 (Response filed June 12, 2013).

EX1014, 233.




Fig. 10




Fig. 11

EX1014, 234.

Fig. 10 shows a complete stroller frame with attachment frame members 17 and seat support element 84 in context. *See* EX1014, 221-222, 233-234. Fig. 11 zooms in to show a seat support element 84 inserting directly into attachment frame member 17 via “slot 18.” *See* EX1014, 154-155; EX1003 ¶ [0034]; EX2011 ¶¶ 63-64.


Notably, the Examiner never raised a new-matter objection to these figures and subsequently issued a Notice of Allowance, thereby implicitly finding that Figs. 10 and 11 were supported by the original specification. *See* EX1014, 182-185; 333-343. Petitioner's expert claims that the Examiner objected to Figures 10 and 11 and that “it does not appear this objection was addressed as the Patent Owner ultimately elected to abandon” the application. EX1001 ¶ 111-112 (citing Examiner's August 2013 objections and applicant's June 2014 Petition to Withdraw from Issue, EX1014, 276-277, 519-521). But the Examiner had resolved those objections for himself by February 2014, when he issued the Notice of Allowance. EX1014, 333-343.⁵ The 2016 Provisional did not introduce adapters being coupled to housings—it simply renamed them.

⁵ And as noted above, those objections were not new matter objections in any case.

3. *The 2008 Provisional discloses the first, second, and third “vertical position[s]”*

Petitioner alleges that the “vertical position” limitations of claim 1 were first disclosed in the 2016 Provisional. Pet. 21; EX1001 ¶¶ 188-189. This argument suffers from the same fundamental defect: it ignores what the 2008 Provisional actually discloses.

Each of the three claimed “vertical position[s]” is shown in Figs. 8 and 9A-9F of the 2008 Provisional. *See* EX2011 ¶¶ 65-66. In Fig. 8, the stroller seat 86 is positioned at the upper rear of the frame at the “first vertical position.” EX1002 ¶¶ [0035]-[0036]; *see also* EX1003 ¶ [0045]. Below that position, the seat attachment portion 84 is shown connected to the front wheel support frame 81a—at a lower vertical position. EX1002 ¶ [0036]; *see also* EX1003 ¶ [0046]. And the connector portions 17 (the housings) are shown at positions along the frame that are below the first seat and closer to the front end of the stroller. *See* EX1002 ¶ [0020], Figs. 1, 8; *see also* EX1003 ¶ [0030], Figs. 1, 8.



The 2008 Provisional further describes the relative arrangement: “The seat attachment portion is capable of supporting a second stroller seat in front of the stroller seat 86” and “[t]he front seat may be positioned substantially over the front wheels so the stroller remains stable.” EX1002 ¶ [0036]; *see also* EX1003 ¶ [0046]. Paragraph [0037] adds: “Preferably, the front seat is located substantially over the front wheels and the back seat is located substantially over the rear wheels.” EX1002 ¶ [0037]; *see also* EX1003 ¶ [0048].

Petitioner’s contention that a POSA would not have recognized the pre-2016 disclosures as possessing the “reasoning and details regarding the vertical positioning” is also a red herring. EX1001 ¶ 188. The 2016 Provisional’s description of the rationale for the vertical arrangement—that it “provides improved access”—is explanatory commentary, not a new structural disclosure.

EX1006, 10-11. The physical arrangement of seats at different vertical heights was already disclosed in the 2008 Provisional. *See* EX1002, Figs. 8, 9A–9F; *id.*

¶¶ [0036]–[0037]; EX2011 ¶¶ 65-66. The written description requirement demands possession, not explanation of every advantage. *Cf. Nuvo Pharms. (Ireland) Designated Activity Co. v. Dr. Reddy's Lab'ys Inc.*, 923 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (the written description requirement “does not require theory or explanation of how or why a claimed composition will be effective”).

4. *The opinions of Petitioner's expert are methodologically flawed.*

The opinions of Petitioner's expert suffer from four methodological flaws that undermine his conclusions. First, word matching. *See, e.g.*, EX2011 ¶¶ 75-76. Mr. Prairie repeatedly points to the absence of specific terms—“seat attachment adapter,” “seat attachment housing,” “vertical position”—as proof that the underlying concepts were not disclosed. *See, e.g.*, EX1001 ¶¶ 202 (alleging “Patent Owner deliberately chose to identify Figures 10-11 as disclosing a ‘seat support element 84’ and **not** a ‘seat attachment adapter 84’” (emphasis in original)), 204 (alleging “Patent Owner purposely did not use the terminology ‘seat attachment adapters 84’/‘seat attachment housings 1105’”). But the written-description standard asks whether a POSA would understand the prior disclosure as conveying possession of the claimed subject matter—not whether the drafter used identical terminology. *PowerOasis*, 522 F.3d at 1306 (“The disclosure does not have to

provide *in hac verba* support in order to satisfy the written description requirement.” (cleaned up)); *Maquet Cardiovascular LLC v. Abiomed Inc.*, 131 F.4th 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (stating “a patentee is free to take a different approach to claiming an invention in subsequent patents, either by adding limitations or by altering the claims’ format”).

Mr. Prairie’s own opinions confirm the unreliability of this approach: when addressing priority, he claims that a POSA would understand the use of “seat attachment adapters” was “intended to convey how these elements are different” from “[seat] attachment portion[s].” EX1001 ¶ 203. But when mapping Liao to the claims, he equates the two terms, stating that a POSA would have understood “seat attachment portions” as being “first/second ‘adapters.’” EX1001 ¶ 383. Mr. Prairie cannot have it both ways. If “seat attachment portions” and “seat attachment adapters” are different concepts, his prior art mapping fails. If they are the same concept—as he asserts at paragraph 383—then the 2009 Non-Provisional, which repeatedly references “seat attachment portions” (*see, e.g.*, EX1014, 164 (“The seat attachment portion may comprise a protrusion having a complementary shape to the sleeve for inserting into the sleeve.”))), necessarily discloses “adapters,” and the priority challenge fails. Thus, Mr. Prairie’s contradictory views discredit his opinions on the priority issues.

Second, rather than analyzing whether the pre-2016 disclosures actually show possession of the claims of the '682 Patent, Mr. Prairie focuses almost entirely on the *post*-2016 filings. *See, e.g.*, EX1001 ¶ 191 (comparing text of the 2016 Second Provisional to the '305 CIP), 193 (comparing “claim 1” of the 2016 Second Provisional to claim 1 of the '682 Patent), and 196 (comparing the dependent claims of the '682 Patent to the “dependent claims” of the 2016 Second Provisional). When he *does* reference the pre-2016 disclosures, his analysis collapses back into word matching. *See, e.g.*, EX1001 ¶ 198 (alleging opinions are “further supported” because there is “no disclosure” in “the pre-'305 CIP specification” of quote “seat attachment adapters” and “seat attachment housings”). This methodology inverts the legal standard: the question is whether the 2008 Provisional or 2009 Non-Provisional conveyed possession of the *claimed* subject matter, not whether the specifications in the 2016 Provisional and the '682 Patent use the same labels.

Third, Mr. Prairie draws unsupported inferences from the “revisions” in the '305 CIP. *See* EX1001. ¶¶ 174-187. A CIP may elaborate upon, add embodiments to, or refine language from a prior application without conceding that the prior application lacked written description support. *See* MPEP § 201.08 (noting that a CIP “that has joint inventors may derive from [(i.e., claim priority to)] an earlier application that has a sole inventor”). The '305 CIP's “revisions” are equally

consistent with normal patent prosecution practice—clarifying and enriching a disclosure. Petitioner's expert's suggestion to the contrary is speculation, not evidence.

Further, Mr. Prairie's "objective inquiry" into labeling changes across the '682 Patent family is anything but objective. Mr. Prairie treats every labeling change—such as renaming "seat support element 84" to "seat attachment adapter 84"—as a deliberate, substantive act by a single authorial mind. *See* EX1001 ¶¶ 202 ("Patent Owner *deliberately* chose ..."), 204 ("[A] POSITA would understand the distinction ... is *intentional*"), 204 ("Patent Owner *purposely* did not use ..."). This theory requires an assumption that a single, consistent drafter controlled the terminology across the entire patent family over the full course of its prosecution. The record shows the opposite. Over the fourteen years leading up to the '682 Patent, at least five different prosecuting attorneys handled the family. *See* EX1002, 6 (identifying a first practitioner); EX1016, 168 (identifying a second practitioner); EX1018, 742 (identifying a third practitioner); EX1020, 477 (identifying a fourth practitioner); EX1020, 825 (identifying a fifth practitioner). This attorney turnover alone provides a far more straightforward explanation for variations in terminology than Mr. Prairie's theory: different attorneys used different labels for what they saw in the figures. Mr. Prairie does not acknowledge, much less rule out, this obvious explanation—or any other benign one, such as

drafters simply adopting terminology that had become customary by the time of each filing. Instead, he imputes to a succession of unrelated drafters a prescient, coordinated awareness of how their word choices would later be characterized in litigation. This is not an “objective inquiry.” It is a litigation-driven inference dressed up as expert analysis.

Finally, Petitioner's expert imposes his own claim construction on “seat attachment adapter” without acknowledging that he is doing so. Rather than explicitly construing the term—where it could be tested against established claim-construction principles—Mr. Prairie imports a narrowing limitation within his priority analysis, requiring “seat attachment adapter” to be removably coupled to “the stroller frame 11 **and/or** seat attachment housing.” EX1001 ¶¶ 191-192 (emphasis in original). He derives this requirement from a *single sentence* describing “one example.” EX1001 ¶ 191. The effect is de facto claim construction that layers additional limitations onto the claim language. But because Mr. Prairie never identifies it as such, it escapes the scrutiny that *Phillips* demands. The Board should not permit an expert to narrow claim scope through the back door of a priority analysis.

5. *Petitioner's expert applies an irreconcilable double standard*

The methodological deficiencies identified above are thrown into sharpest relief by Petitioner's own Ground 2 analysis. *See* EX2011 ¶¶ 73-77. To sustain

Ground 2, Petitioner's expert conducts an extraordinarily detailed inferential analysis of Liao—a design patent with less than 150 words of “description”—extracting from its CAD figures the existence and function of seat attachment housings, seat attachment adapters, connector portions, latches, latch pins, attachment frame members, bearing surfaces, locking tabs, vertical positions, and an inline descending configuration. EX1001 ¶¶ 353-424. Yet to sustain the priority challenge, Mr. Prairie insists that a POSA reading the pre-2016 disclosures—which include specifications describing these very structures with reference numbers and functional language—would not recognize those same elements because different labels were used. *See* EX1001 ¶¶ [0188]-[0217]; EX2011 ¶¶ 73-77 (expert explaining “if a POSA were to apply a structural-inference approach when analyzing Liao, as Mr. Prairie does, then the POSA would also apply a structural-inference approach when reviewing the pre-2016 disclosures”). Petitioner cannot have it both ways. An expert who applies fundamentally different analytical standards to different references in the same proceeding, depending on the outcome that favors his client, has not provided a reliable opinion. *See* Fed. R. Evid. 702(b)-(c). The Board should weigh this selective approach accordingly when evaluating both the priority challenge and the merits of Ground 2.

6. *Inventorship does not defeat priority*

Petitioner also alleges that the addition of three new inventors on the 2016 Provisional establishes that the challenged claims contain new matter. Pet. 17-20; EX1001 ¶¶ 178-181. This is a non sequitur. The addition of inventors to a continuation-in-part application does not establish that every claim of a subsequent patent depends on the newly added subject matter. *Cf Waldemar Link v. Osteonics Corp.*, 32 F.3d 556, 558 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“A CIP application can be entitled to different priority dates for different claims.”). The relevant inquiry is whether the substance of the challenged claims finds written description support in the earlier application. *PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.*, 522 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008). As demonstrated above, it does.

7. *Petitioner's “transition statement” argument is irrelevant*

Petitioner's reliance on the “transition statement” under 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(a)(6) is equally unavailing. *See* Pet. 18-19 (citing EX1020, 49). This procedural mechanism assists the USPTO in determining whether to apply AIA or pre-AIA law—it is not a substantive condition of patentability. *See* 78 Fed. Reg. 11024, 11032 (Feb. 14, 2013). As the Federal Circuit has stated, absent inequitable conduct, irregularities in complying with the PTO's internal examination procedures “become[] irrelevant after the patent has issued.” *Magnivision, Inc. v. Bonneau Co.*, 115 F.3d 956, 960 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

B. Ground 2: Liao

Petitioner's Ground 2 asserts that Liao (EX1048) renders obvious claims 1-9 and 13-16 of the '682 Patent. This ground falls for multiple, independent reasons.

At the threshold, Petitioner's entire Ground 2 analysis must be understood in context: Liao (EX1048) is a design patent. It claims "[t]he ornamental design for a combination pushchair frame." EX1048, claim. It contains no written description of structural components, no part numbers, no functional disclosure, and no claim language identifying discrete elements like "adapters," " housings," or "attachment frame members." Even Petitioner's own expert concedes that Liao "does not expressly describe the various elements." EX1001 ¶ 353. Every component identification in Petitioner's Ground 2 analysis is therefore an inference drawn by Petitioner's expert from ornamental drawings—not a teaching of the reference itself. The Board should evaluate Petitioner's claim mapping with this limitation firmly in mind.


Against that backdrop, Ground 2 fails for four independent reasons. First, Liao does not disclose an "inline descending configuration" as required by claim 1. *See* EX2011 ¶¶ 85-89. Liao's seats are mounted at the same vertical height on the frame, and Petitioner's expert manufactured the appearance of a descending arrangement by drawing an arbitrary line through hypothetical infant seating positions—a methodology he could not explain at deposition.

Second, Petitioner's Ground 2 analysis does not stand on its own. Instead of independently mapping Liao to the '682 Patent's claims, Petitioner's expert improperly bootstraps his analysis to findings from the prosecution of two unrelated applications—the '417 Application and the '568 Patent—without ever establishing that those claims are coextensive with the '682 Patent's claims. Petitioner also applies a transparent double standard, treating labeling differences as dispositive when challenging priority but treating them as irrelevant when asserting obviousness.

Third, Petitioner mischaracterizes the '417 Application's prosecution history—misidentifying the Examiner's "seat attachment portions," selectively quoting Baby Jogger while omitting critical qualifiers, and conflating attachment positioning with seat positioning. Finally, Petitioner's own claim mapping is internally inconsistent; it assigns the same physical structure to multiple claim elements depending on which limitation is under discussion, and those assignments cannot be reconciled. Each of these deficiencies independently warrants denial of Ground 2.

1. Liao does not disclose "an inline descending configuration"

Liao does not disclose the claimed "inline descending configuration." In Liao, both seats connect at the same vertical height. Liao's figures demonstrate this plainly. Figures 5 and 11 are particularly instructive. *See* EX1048, Figs. 5, 11.



These figures show that the first and seats, when connected to the frame's connection points, are arranged at the *same* vertical level. There is no structural offset between the first seat's mounting location and the second seat's mounting location. The seats are arranged in a level, parallel configuration along the frame, not a descending one. EX2011 ¶ 86-89; *see also* EX2100, 145:17-21 (Prairie agreeing Fig. 11 shows a “horizontal type configuration”).

Liao's remaining figures confirm the same geometry. *See* EX1048, Figs. 8-13. Throughout Liao's figures, the two seats are mounted at structurally equivalent positions on the frame. No figure in Liao depicts the kind of staggered, vertically offset mounting arrangement that the '682 Patent discloses and claims. A POSA reviewing Liao without the benefit of the '682 Patent would have no reason to perceive the claimed “inline descending configuration” in any of these figures—because none exists.

Unable to find a structural height differential in Liao's connection points, Mr. Prairie states that "Liao discloses an upper seat ('first seat') and a lower seat ('second seat') that are visibly arranged in an inline descending configuration along the stroller frame, as shown by the green line which I have generally drawn through the portions of the seat where the infant's buttocks would be generally located." EX1001 ¶ 385. This sentence does significant work to obscure what actually happened.

Mr. Prairie selected one figure from Liao—not because that figure shows seats arranged in an inline descending configuration along the stroller frame, but because the different seat types could position a hypothetical infant's buttocks at slightly different vertical locations. He then drew a line connecting those two points to create a visual impression of the claimed "inline descending" arrangement. But Mr. Prairie's line does not track any structural feature of Liao's stroller frame; it does not follow a mounting point, a frame rail, or any physical connection between the seats. Instead, it traces an imaginary path between estimated locations of two infants' buttocks, a reference point found nowhere in the '682 Patent or in Liao.

This mapping does not measure anything "along the stroller frame." It measures the incidental difference in where an occupant's body might rest within two different types of seats—a variable that depends on the seat's geometry and the

occupant's position, not on where the seat is arranged along the frame. An infant's buttocks sits at a different height in a bassinet than in an upright toddler seat, regardless of where either seat is mounted. That height difference reflects the seat's shape and reveals nothing about the seat's position *along the frame*.

Mr. Prairie's reference point is also arbitrary. *See* EX2011 ¶ 89. He selects the infant's buttocks, but there is no basis in the claims, the specification, or the understanding of a POSA for choosing that anatomical landmark over any other. Why not the infant's head? Or shoulders? Or feet? Each would produce a different slope and potentially a different conclusion about whether a "descending configuration" exists. A construction that depends on which body part the POSA happens to select is not a construction at all—it is an exercise in post hoc line-drawing. And the result is not fixed: as the infant shifts, reclines, or is repositioned within the seat, the "inline descending configuration" would appear, disappear, or reverse depending on the occupant's posture at any given moment. A claim limitation cannot turn on whether a child is sitting up or slouching.

The arbitrariness of this approach was laid bare during cross-examination. When asked why he drew the line "through the portions of the seat where the infant's buttocks would be generally located," Mr. Prairie could not provide a reason:

I don't recall my exact logic for the beginning and ending point of that line. It was just a general [sic] to show that in the seat there are different vertical positions.

EX2100, 149:13-22.

When pressed further to explain his choice of endpoints, his only explanation was that the “whole point” was his “intent” to show that Liao teaches the limitations of the claims. EX2100, 158:11-22. That is not an analytical methodology—it is an admission that the conclusion drove the analysis rather than the other way around.

Most damaging, Mr. Prairie effectively conceded that Liao does not actually show the claimed configuration as disclosed. He testified that “if you *want* inline des[cending] configuration” even when not shown, then you could adjust Liao “to create” it. EX2100, 145:23-146:5. He further testified that “if [an inline descending configuration] is a *desired* configuration,” then a POSA “could” adjust the length of Liao's arms to create it. EX2100, 148:13-21. These admissions are fatal. The question is not what a POSA *could* do to a reference given a pre-supposed desire to achieve the configuration; it is what the reference *discloses* and whether a POSA would have been motivated, in the absence of the claims, to reach that same configuration. See *InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGO Commc'ns, Inc.*, 751 F.3d 1327, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (concluding that a party's expert “succumbed to hindsight bias in her obviousness analysis” where such analysis “primarily consisted of

conclusory references to her belief that [a POSA] *could* combine these references, not that they *would* have been motivated to do so”). Mr. Prairie’s own testimony establishes that Liao does not disclose an “inline descending configuration”—one would have to *modify* Liao to create it.

The Supreme Court has warned that factfinders should be aware “of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon *ex post* reasoning.” *KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.*, 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007); *see also Arashi Vision v. GOPRO, INC.*, IPR2024-01434, Paper 9, 24-29 (PTAB Mar. 31, 2025) (“This selective use of discrete design characteristics suggests that the analysis is driven by a hindsight reconstruction of the invention rather than the objective teachings of the references.”). That is precisely what happened here. Mr. Prairie knew the ’682 Patent claims an “inline descending configuration.” He knew Liao’s seats are mounted at the same height. So he manufactured a height differential—not from the structure of Liao’s stroller, but from the incidental geometry of where an infant might sit within two different types of seats. He then drew an arrow and called it an “inline descending configuration.” When asked to justify this methodology, he could not.

The claims require that the seats, “when connected to the frame,” are “arranged in an inline descending configuration along the stroller frame.” EX1010, claim 1. That language anchors the configuration to the frame—to where the seats

are structurally mounted—not to what happens inside the seat after an occupant is placed in it. *See* EX2011 ¶¶ 36-39. Liao's seats are mounted at the same height. No amount of occupant-positioning analysis changes that fact. The Board should give no weight to a claim mapping built on an arbitrary reference point that the expert himself cannot explain.

2. *Petitioner's reliance on the prosecution history of other applications is erroneous*

Petitioner's expert improperly bootstraps his analysis to Examiners' "findings" from the prosecution of two different applications—the '417 Application and '568 Patent—that involved different claims with different terminology. This flawed approach undermines Ground 2 for several reasons.

First, the '417 Application prosecution history is not a substitute for an independent claim mapping. Liao was never used as the primary reference in any rejection during prosecution of the '682 Patent. *See* Pet. 7. Yet Mr. Prairie cites the '417 Application prosecution history (EX1024) for every element of claim 1 in Ground 2. *See* EX1001 ¶¶ 363-386. In virtually every instance, Mr. Prairie treats the '417 Examiner's findings as "confirming" what a POSA would understand from Liao with respect to the '682 Patent's claim limitations. *See, e.g.,* EX1001 ¶¶ 356-359; *see also* EX2100, 132:6-133:7. But in no instance does Petitioner's expert compare the '417 Application's claim language to the '682 Patent's claim language to establish that the two sets of claims are coextensive—or even

comparable—on the relevant limitation. *See generally* EX1001 ¶¶ 353-424 (Ground 2 analysis citing '417 Application prosecution history repeatedly without any claim-language comparison). He simply assumes a one-to-one correspondence that he never demonstrates. An Examiner's finding that Liao anticipates a different claim in a different application does not establish that Liao satisfies the limitations of the '682 Patent's claims—claims that use different terminology, describe different structural relationships, and in several instances address different features.

The '568 Patent prosecution history fares no better. Petitioner invokes the '568 Patent prosecution history to “confirm” its color-coded annotations of Liao. Pet. 67; *see also* Pet. 65. But the '568 Patent prosecution history provides no such granular identification. As with the '417 Application, neither the Applicant nor the Examiner in '568 Patent prosecution history ever identifies what specific portion of Liao corresponds to a “seat attachment adapter.” *See* EX1019, 559 (Examiner referring only to Figs. 1-13 in gross). Petitioner's use of the '568 Patent prosecution history to “confirm” its specific color-coded annotations is therefore not supported by the record.

These shortcuts are especially revealing because Petitioner and its expert treat terminology gaps differently depending on whether they help or hurt its case. *See* EX2011 ¶¶ 73-77. In its priority challenge (Pet. § VIII), Petitioner treats the slightest terminological variation as dispositive. For example, Petitioner appears to

argue that “seat attachment adapters” weren’t disclosed prior to 2016 because the earlier applications use the term “seat support element 84” instead—even though the ’682 Patent identifies that very same element 84 as the “seat attachment adapter.” *See* Pet. 19-21; *compare* EX1003, Fig. 8, *with* EX1010, Fig. 8A (labeling the same structure as “seat attachment adapter 84”). Yet in Ground 2, Petitioner freely equates the ’417 Application’s “seat attachment portions” with the ’682 Patent’s “seat attachment adapters” without any analysis. *See, e.g.*, Pet. 67. Petitioner cannot have it both ways. If different terminology means different structure for priority purposes, it must mean different structure for obviousness purposes as well. And if the terms are interchangeable for Ground 2, then Petitioner’s priority challenge collapses.

3. *Petitioner mischaracterizes the prosecution history of the ’417 Application*

Petitioner’s reliance on the ’417 Application prosecution history (*see* Pet. 56-68) is not only flawed, but it also mischaracterizes what the Examiner found and what Patent Owner argued. In particular, Petitioner misidentifies the structure the Examiner called a “seat attachment portion,” selectively omits qualifying language from Baby Jogger’s own arguments, and conflates where seats *attach* with where seats are *positioned*.

a. Petitioner misidentifies the Examiner's "seat attachment portions"

Petitioner alleges that the Examiner in the '417 Application found that Liao teaches "seat attachment portions" that would be understood by a POSA as being the "first/second 'adapters.'" Pet. 64. This mischaracterizes the record. The "seat attachment portions" referenced by the Examiner in the '417 Application are not the "adapters" that Petitioner now identifies with its gold-shaded annotation. Rather, it appears the Examiner was referring to "seat attachment portion 17." See EX1024, 1199 (objecting to the drawings because they allegedly "only [portray] one attachment portion 17" while the claims recite "one or more seat attachment portions"). If so, the Examiner was using "seat attachment portion" to refer to an entirely different structural element than what Petitioner now identifies as the gold-shaded "adapters." Compare EX1024, 75, with Pet. 65.

Moreover, the '417 Application's claim language—"one or more seat attachment portions"—does not map one-to-one onto the '682 Patent's "seat attachment adapters," and the Examiner never identified which specific structural components in Liao's figures correspond to these "portions." Therefore, Petitioner's assertion that the Examiner's findings "confirm" Petitioner's specific gold-shaded highlighting is, at best, a stretch.

b. Petitioner selectively quotes Baby Jogger out of context

Petitioner states that “Patent Owner later argued that Liao teaches a ‘seat attachment portion ... coupled to a separate, discrete component’ and not directly to the frame.” Pet. 64-65 (citing EX1024, 1394). This quotation omits a critical qualifier. What Baby Jogger *actually* said was that “the ***alleged*** seat attachment portion of Liao is not attached directly to the stroller frame.” EX1024, 1394. The word “alleged” appears repeatedly in the original passage. Baby Jogger was not conceding that Liao teaches a “seat attachment portion” corresponding to Petitioner’s current mapping. Baby Jogger was using the Examiner’s terminology, acknowledging that the Examiner treated something in Liao as a “seat attachment portion” while disputing that whatever it was satisfied the claims as amended.

Moreover, it is unclear from the prosecution history alone what the Examiner or Applicant were referring to when they referenced the “alleged seat attachment portion.” In particular, the Examiner never identifies what specific structural component in Liao’s figures the Examiner considers to be the “seat attachment portion.” See EX1024, 1203 (mapping “one or more seat attachment portions” to “Fig. 1-13” of Liao without identifying any specific structure). For example, the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of Claims 2-16 over Liao in the Final Office Action cites “(See, e.g., Fig. 1-13)” for every single claim element—fifteen times for claim 2 alone—without once identifying which specific structure

in which specific figure corresponds to which specific claim element. *See* EX1024, 1203-1205. This is the quintessential “in gross” rejection: a blanket citation to all thirteen figures for every limitation.

Because the Examiner never provided any component-level identification, there was nothing for the Applicant to agree or disagree with at that level of generality. Petitioner now seeks to retroactively supply—through its expert’s color-coded annotations—the specific identifications the Examiner never provided, and then to characterize Patent Owner’s response as though it confirmed those specific identifications. It did not.

c. Petitioner conflates attachment positioning with seat positioning

Petitioner’s argument that, in the ’417 Application, the Examiner “determined that Liao teaches a first seat at a first vertical position and a second seat at a lower, second vertical position” (Pet. 68) mischaracterizes the prosecution history. The Examiner’s actual language refers to where seats *attach*—not where they are positioned. The claim the Examiner was referencing concerned the vertical positions of “seat attachment portions,” not the vertical positions of the seats themselves. *See* EX1024, 1205 (“Liao discloses: wherein the first seat *is configured for being removably attached to the stroller frame at a first vertical position* (See, e.g., Fig. 1-13), and the second seat *is configured for being removably attached to the one or more seat attachment portions at a second*

vertical position that is below the first vertical position (See, e.g., Fig. 1-13).”).

There is a meaningful distinction between the vertical position at which a seat attaches to a frame or attachment portion versus the vertical position at which the seat itself sits. Petitioner ignores this distinction.

In sum, Petitioner and Mr. Prairie mischaracterize and place undue reliance on the file history of the related '417 Application. Their discussion ignores the entire context of the claims at issue in that application and the differences from the claims at issue here. And while the claims in each *are* different, the Examiner ultimately concluded *both* the '682 Patent and the '417 Application's claims were patentable despite earlier rejecting them over Liao. Pet. 27 (conceding Liao was used in a rejection during prosecution of the '682 Patent (citing EX1020, 341)); EX1024, 1608-15.

4. *Petitioner's mapping of the '682 Patent claims to Liao is internally inconsistent*

Claim 1 of the '682 Patent requires three distinct structural elements working together: a “seat attachment adapter,” “seat attachment housing,” and an “attachment frame member” that couples the adapter to the housing while keeping them spaced apart. EX1010, claim 1, limitations [1.6]-[1.7]. It is Petitioner's burden to identify, consistently and with specificity, where each of these elements is found in Liao. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). As shown below, Petitioner has not done so. Its mapping of these elements is internally contradictory—and the

contradictions are not mere labeling disputes. They reveal that Liao does not actually teach the claimed three-component relationship of adapter, housing, and attachment frame member. No matter how Petitioner draws the boundaries between these elements in Liao's figures, at least one claim limitation cannot be satisfied.

Petitioner shades an element gold and identifies it as the "1st/2nd adapters." Pet. 65-66; EX1001 ¶¶ 379-381. Reading the Petition as a whole, Petitioner's primary position is that the entire gold-shaded element constitutes the "adapter." *See, e.g.*, Pet. 65-66 (characterizing the "adapter" as the element shaded gold). But Petitioner's annotated Fig. 1 places an arrow pointing to only an upper end portion of that gold-shaded element. Pet. 65. Whether the "adapter" is the entire gold-shaded element or only the end portion, Petitioner's mapping fails—and the nature of that failure demonstrates that Liao does not disclose the claimed structural relationship.

- a. If the entire gold-shaded element is the "adapter," then Liao does not teach an adapter "spaced from and coupled to" a housing "by" an attachment frame member*

Claim 1 requires that the "seat attachment adapter [be] spaced from and coupled to the [] seat attachment housing by a [] attachment frame member." EX1010, claim 1, limitations [1.6]-[1.7]. Under this reading, the portion that the Petitioner elsewhere identifies as the "attachment frame member" is part of the "adapter" itself—meaning the adapter would be spaced from and coupled to the

housing by a portion of itself. That reduces Claim 1's requirement to a tautology: "the adapter is spaced from and coupled to the first seat attachment housing by [a portion of the adapter]." That is not what the claim recites. The claim requires a seat attachment adapter, a seat attachment housing, and an attachment frame member that couples them while keeping them spaced apart. Petitioner's mapping collapses two of those three elements into one, which does not demonstrate that Liao teaches the claimed structure.


This reading also creates a cascading problem for dependent claims. Claim 8 recites "third" and "fourth" seat attachment adapters. Petitioner identifies certain purple-shaded portions of the Liao stroller as these adapters. Pet. 75-76; EX1001 ¶¶ 409-411. But the purple-shaded structures look different than the gold-shaded structure that Petitioner identifies as the "seat attachment adapter" in claim 1. Petitioner thus maps two visually distinct components—one shaded gold, one shaded purple—to the same type of claim element ("adapter"). A POSA reviewing Liao would have no reason to categorize these dissimilar structures under a single label; the only reason Petitioner does so is to "find" that every claim element has a corresponding feature in Liao.

b. If only the end portion is the "adapter," then Liao does not satisfy claims 4 and 5

Alternatively, the arrow in Petitioner's annotated Fig. 1 (Pet. 65) could be read as identifying only an *end portion* of the gold-shaded element as the "1st/2nd

adapters.” Pet. 65. Under this interpretation, the “seat attachment adapter” is only one part of the gold-shaded structure—its upper end—while a different sub-region of the same structure is identified as the “attachment frame member.” But this interpretation fares no better.

Petitioner also maps the “first end” to one end of the gold-shaded element and the “distal second end” to the portion identified as the “adapter” under this interpretation. Pet. 71-72; EX1001 ¶ 399. Claim 4 recites: “wherein each of the first seat attachment adapter and the second seat attachment adapter has a first end and a distal second end.” EX1010, claim 4. Under a plain reading of the claim, the “first end” and the “distal second end” are ends of the “seat attachment adapter.” Under this interpretation, those ends would be shown as below.



But this mapping does not read on claim 5. Claim 5 requires that “the first end comprises the respective [] connector ... and the first end is releasably coupled to the respective [] seat attachment housing.” EX1010, claim 5. If one end of the gold-shaded element is the “adapter,” then Petitioner’s identification of the “connector portion[s]” does not satisfy the requirement that “the first end comprises the respective [] connector.” *See* Pet. 70 (labeling a lower end of the entire gold-shaded element as a “connector portion”). Furthermore, the “first end” cannot be “releasably coupled to the respective [] seat attachment housing” because it is separated from the “seat attachment housing” by what Petitioner identifies as an “attachment frame member.” *See* Pet. 66. In short, the structural arrangement shown in Liao does not match the structural arrangement recited in claims 4 and 5, no matter where Petitioner draws the line between “adapter” and “frame member.”

c. The contradictions are irreconcilable because Liao does not teach the claimed structure

Under either reading, contradictions arise that cannot be resolved without redefining at least one claim element. That is the hallmark of a reference that does not actually disclose what the Petitioner needs it to disclose. A POSA examining Liao’s figures without the ’682 Patent’s claims in hand would see a stroller frame with various structural members—but would have no reason to parse that frame into “seat attachment adapters,” “seat attachment housings,” “attachment frame

members,” and “connector portions.” Those labels come from the ’682 Patent’s claims, not from anything Liao teaches. Liao is a design patent containing no written description of components, no part numbers, and no functional disclosure. Petitioner’s exercise of reverse-engineering component boundaries onto ornamental drawings is precisely the kind of hindsight-driven analysis that the law prohibits. *See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc.*, 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating it is “necessary ... to occupy the mind of one skilled in the art *who is presented only with the references*” and guided by the “then-accepted wisdom in the art”), *abrogated on other grounds by Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.*, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995); *see also In re Kotzab*, 217 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that in order to prevent hindsight bias, “[c]lose adherence to this methodology is especially important in cases [in which the invention is easily understood]”).

The Board’s rules require that a petition “specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). That requirement demands a single, consistent identification—not a moving target that shifts depending on which limitation is under discussion. Petitioner has not met this standard. Its mapping of claims 1, 4, and 5 to Liao is internally contradictory, and those contradictions exist because Liao does not teach the structural relationship the claims require. Because this faulty mapping forms the foundation on which the

challenges to all dependent claims rest, the failure cascades through Petitioner's Ground 2 analysis.

C. Ground 3: Liao and Cheng

Ground 3 combines Liao with Cheng (EX1049) to address claims 10-12. Ground 3 fails for the same reasons as Ground 2. *See, e.g.*, EX2011 ¶¶ 85-89.

D. Ground 4: Offord '341 and Offord '797

Petitioner contends that claims 1-16 of the '682 Patent are obvious over Offord '341 (EX1051) and Offord '797 (EX1054). *See* Pet. 91-123, 125-126. The crux of Petitioner's theory is that a POSA would have been motivated to reverse and swap each "interface portion component 100" of Offord '341 because Offord '797 discloses a rotatable rectangular sub-frame. *Id.* at 97-101; EX1001 ¶¶ 484, 486. This theory fails for multiple reasons, each of which is separately dispositive.


1. *The "interface portion component 100" of Offord '341 is not functionally interchangeable with the "interface portion 10" of Offord '797*

Petitioner's motivation theory rests on its expert's assertion that the "interface portion component 100" of Offord '341 and the "interface portion 10" of Offord '797 are "not only analogous, but are functionally interchangeable." EX1001 ¶ 581. From this premise, Petitioner's expert concludes that a POSA would have been motivated to reverse Offord '341's interface components 100 "in the reverse orientation as disclosed in Offord '797." EX1001 ¶¶ 581-582. The premise is wrong, and the conclusion does not follow.

- a. The “interface portion 10” of Offord ’797 was designed to be reversed while “interface portion component 100” of Offord ’341 was not*

The “interface portion 10” of Offord ’797 is a symmetric, unitary rectangular structure specifically designed for 180-degree rotation. *See* EX1054, Figs. 5-7; *id.*, 3:12-30, 4:24-5:2; *see also* EX2011 ¶ 147. It incorporates at least three features that enable reversal. *See* EX2011 ¶¶ 147-150.


First, Offord ’797’s interface portion 10 includes a “channel 21” at its front corners “in order to closely receive and rest on top of forward portions of the basket frame 18.” EX1054, 4:18-23; *see* EX1054, Figs. 5-6. This channel ensures that the interface portion remains supported regardless of which end faces forward after rotation. *See* EX2011 ¶ 148.



Second, the interface portion 10 includes a “crossbar member 10e, located at substantially the same level and being of substantially the same length as the end crossbar member 10a.” EX1054, 3:20-22. The structural symmetry between the front and rear crossbars (10a and 10e) is what permits the interface portion 10 to function identically in either orientation. *See* EX2011 ¶ 147.

Third, Offord '797 was designed with multiple support points to maintain stability during rotation. *See* EX2011 ¶¶ 149-151. Specifically, the interface portion 10 is supported by (i) two connectors 14 that mount into the frame, (ii) two channels 21 that rest on the basket frame, and (iii) a clip 16—five support points total. EX1054, 3:3-14, 3:34-4:4, 4:10-23. As Offord '797 itself explains, these additional support points are necessary because “to achieve suitable stability, [interface portion 10] is also supported at other locations other than through the connectors 14.” EX1054, 4:10-23.

The “interface portion component 100” of Offord '341, shown below, is designed differently.



It is not a single rectangular unit but rather two separate, asymmetric components—each having a “connecting leg 102,” a “downwardly curved bar 104,” and two “connector sockets 106.” EX1051, 9:16-22; *id.*, Fig. 14. Each

component is supported by only two points—the connecting leg 102 and a “lug 108”—and lacks the symmetry that enables rotation in Offord ’797. The absence of these design features confirms that the “interface portion components 100” of Offord ’341 were not designed for reversal and are not “functionally interchangeable” with the “interface portion 10” of Offord ’797. *See* EX2011 ¶¶ 152-154.

Mr. Prairie confirmed this structural distinction on cross-examination. When asked why a POSA would not expect Offord ’341 to behave the same way as Offord ’797 when reversed, Mr. Prairie acknowledged the critical difference: “[I]n the older structures, ... it is a little bit more of a convoluted structure, it is more of a full assembly whereas the newer Offord is two individual brackets.” EX2100, 241:18-21. Mr. Prairie thus concedes that the sub-frames are structurally different—yet his declaration treats them as interchangeable. This internal inconsistency undermines the reliability of his opinions.

2. *The structural differences between the “interface portion component 100” of Offord ’341 and “interface portion 10” of Offord ’797 would have discouraged a POSA from making the proposed modification*

Even if the “interface portion component 100” of Offord ’341 and the “interface portion 10” of Offord ’797 were analogous (they aren’t), the differences between them would have discouraged a POSA from reversing the interface

portion component 100 of Offord '341. Three specific problems would have been apparent.

a. The proposed modification would destabilize the stroller

Offord '341 warns that the vertical and horizontal positions of the connector sockets 106 must be carefully calibrated “such that the child-carrying units remain as close to the centre of gravity of the vehicle 2 as possible to prevent any possibility of dangerous tilting or toppling over.” EX1051, 9:45-52. The existing configuration of Figure 15—with the rear seat lower and front seat higher—was designed to work with the stroller's center of gravity as disclosed. *See* EX2011 ¶¶ 155-163. In contrast to Offord '797's lateral bars, leg 102 of Offord '341 is not close to horizontally equidistant from the two connector sockets 106, resulting in the lower connector socket 106 problematically moving forward from the center of mass of the stroller when the interface portion component 100 is reversed. EX2011 ¶ 158. This could lead to precisely the kind of “dangerous tilting or toppling over” that Offord '341 cautions against. EX2011 ¶¶ 156-158; EX1051, 9:45-52. A POSA reading Offord '341's stability warnings would have been led away from the proposed reversal, not toward it.


b. The curved lug 108 would physically interfere with the frame connection


In the as-disclosed configuration of Fig. 15, each “downwardly curved lug 108” rests on top of the “basket frame 44,” providing an additional support point

“such that the weight of two infants is fully supported by the frame assembly.”


EX1051, 9:32-36; EX1001 ¶ 485. Petitioner itself relies on this feature, asserting that the lug resting on the basket frame “further inform[s] a POSITA that orientation of the ‘interface portion component 100’ could be reversed.” Pet. 100; EX1001 ¶ 485. But Petitioner ignores what happens to lug 108 after reversal.

Pet. 100 (Petitioner's modified Offord '341 Figs. 15, 13A).





Petitioner's modified Fig. 15 of EX1051 further modified to show the point of interference (left); Petitioner's modified Fig. 13A of EX1051 further modified to show the point of interference (right)




As shown above, the location where the curved lug 108 would rest after rotation is already occupied by the physical connection between the basket frame 44 and the stroller frame assembly 4. See EX1051, Figs. 1, 13B. This creates a

direct physical interference that would prevent curved lug 108 from providing additional support. EX2011 ¶¶ 139-140. A POSA would have recognized this interference and understood that the interface portion component 100 was not designed to be reversed. *See* EX2011 ¶¶ 139-140.

c. The asymmetric detent of connecting leg 102 would not align with the receptor cup 34 after reversal

Petitioner's proposed modification requires that, after rotation, each connecting leg 102 on the interface portion component 100 must mate with the receptor cup 34 on the opposite side of the stroller. *See* Pet. 99; EX1001 ¶¶ 484, 490, 493-494. This requires that the detent (shown in blue below) on connecting leg 102 and the corresponding opening in receptor cup 34 (also shown in blue) be symmetrically positioned so that the detent aligns with its receiving opening after a 180-degree rotation. *See* EX2011 ¶¶ 134-138.



But they are not symmetrical. See EX2011 ¶¶ 135-137. The detent that interfaces between element 102 (and, relatedly, detent 76 on the mounting device 14, which interfaces with the same receptor cup 34) is not centrally located on the component. Inspection of Figure 16 of Offord '341 shows that detent 76 is closer to the left side of connecting leg 48 than the right side. EX2013. This asymmetric offset means that the detents are located closer to one side than the other.

EX2013.




FIG. 16

This asymmetry is fatal to the proposed modification. If the interface portion component 100 is rotated 180 degrees and mounted on the opposite side of the stroller, the detent on element 102 would not align with the receiving opening in

receptor cup 34. Likewise, if one were to attempt to swap and insert the mounting device 14 after reversal (as shown in Petitioner's modified Fig. 15 of EX1051 at Pet. 105), detent 76 would not align with its receiving opening in the receptor cup 34. A POSA would have recognized that the asymmetric design of these mating components precludes the proposed reversal. *See* EX2011 ¶¶ 135-137, 139-140.

3. *Petitioner's articulated motivation to combine is conclusory*

Even setting aside the structural obstacles, Petitioner's stated motivation to modify Offord '341 does not withstand scrutiny. Petitioner asserts that "a POSITA would have been motivated to review the teachings of Offord '797 to determine if they could be applied to the teachings of Offord '341." Pet. 125; EX1001 ¶ 580. But this states only that a POSA would have reviewed Offord '797—it does not explain *why* a POSA would have been motivated to apply the specific modification of reversing the interface portion components 100. Reviewing a cited reference is not the same as being motivated to implement specific features disclosed therein.

Petitioner further asserts that "a POSITA would have also understood that the reason for the citation to Offord '797 was to inform a POSITA that the 'interface components 100' of Offord '341 could be reversible like the sub-frame 10." Pet. 125; EX1001 ¶¶ 490, 580-581. This is *ipse dixit*. If the inventor of Offord '341 had intended to convey that the interface portion components 100 were reversible, he would have said so—as he did *expressly* in Offord '797. *Cf.* EX1054,

4:24-30 (explicitly disclosing that “the interface portion 10 is dimensioned so as to be ... turned through 180° about its central vertical axis”). The cross-reference to Offord '797 identifies “[a] similar sub-frame arrangement”—not a reversible one. EX1051, 9:35-36. Petitioner reads into this cross-reference a teaching that the inventor chose not to include.

Petitioner's rationale-to-combine section (Pet. 125-126) adds little substance. Petitioner states that “[r]eversing the ‘interface components 100’ so that the rear seat is higher than the front seat is nothing more than the obvious use of known technique to improve similar devices in the same way.” Pet. 125. This is a recitation of a *KSR* rubric, not an explanation of why a POSA would have had reason to make the specific modification proposed. *See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC*, 805 F.3d 1064, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting that *KSR* “does not establish that it suffices for obviousness that a variation of the prior art would predictably work, but requires consideration of whether ... [a POSA] would recognize the potential benefits and pursue the variation”).

Critically, Petitioner's own framing reveals the gap in its theory: Petitioner identifies making “the rear seat ... higher than the front seat” as the *outcome* of the proposed reversal, yet nowhere in the Petition or in Mr. Prairie's declaration does Petitioner establish that a POSA would have viewed a higher rear seat as a beneficial outcome worth pursuing. Petitioner simply assumes the desirability of

this result without ever articulating why a POSA would want a higher rear seat in the first place. Under *Belden*, that assumption is insufficient; petitioners must show not merely that a modification *could* produce a particular result, but that a POSA would have recognized the result as a benefit and pursued it. 805 F.3d at 1075.

This deficiency is compounded by the fact that Offord '797 itself does not teach that a higher rear seat is the purpose—or even *a* purpose—of reversing the “interface portion 10.” In Offord '797, the *stated purpose* of flipping the “interface portion 10” is “so that the seats 12 can, instead of being arranged in the rearward-facing configuration ... be arranged in a forward-facing configuration.” EX1054, 4:24-30. Offord '797 reverses the interface portion 10 to change the *direction* of the seats, not to change their *height*. See EX2011 ¶ 142. But in Offord '341, the seats are already in a “forward-facing configuration.” See EX1051, Figs. 1, 15. *None* of Petitioner's modified depictions of Offord '341 show the seats flipped into a “rearward-facing configuration.” See, e.g., Pet. 105; EX1001 ¶ 495. Petitioner thus borrows the *mechanism* of reversal from Offord '797 while discarding the *only reason* Offord '797 gives for performing it. Having discarded that reason, Petitioner substitutes a different alleged outcome—a higher rear seat—but never explains why a POSA would have pursued that outcome as beneficial, betraying Petitioner's hindsight.

The result is a motivation theory with no anchor. Petitioner discards the one justification Offord '797 actually provides for its reversal—reorienting the seat direction. *Compare* Pet. 101 (illustrating unmodified Fig. 15 of Offord '341 having forward-facing seats), *with id.* (illustrating modified Fig. 15 of Offord '341 also having forward-facing seats). And the alternative outcome that Petitioner identifies—a higher rear seat—is nowhere disclosed in Offord '797 as a benefit of the reversal; nor does Petitioner independently establish it as one. Petitioner thus asks the Board to find motivation based on a benefit that neither reference identifies and that Petitioner itself has never substantiated.

Belden requires more than a showing that a proposed modification would “predictably work”—it requires evidence that a POSA “would recognize the potential benefits and pursue the variation.” 805 F.3d at 1075. Petitioner has never identified what “potential benefit” a POSA would recognize from reversing the interface portion components 100 of Offord '341. The seat reorientation benefit disclosed in Offord '797 does not apply because Petitioner *doesn't* reorient the seats. The higher-rear-seat outcome is never established as beneficial. And no alternative benefit is articulated anywhere in the Petition or in Mr. Prairie's declaration. Where a petitioner cannot even articulate the benefit a POSA would have pursued, it has not carried its burden of establishing that a POSA “would recognize the potential benefits and pursue the variation.” *Belden*, 805 F.3d at

1075; *see also In re Kahn*, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”).

4. *Petitioner uses the patent's claims as a roadmap*

Petitioner's proposed modification of Offord '341 is results-oriented. Petitioner's modified version of Figure 15 not only reverses the interface portion component 100 but also reverses each individual seat on the “interface portion component 100.” *See* Pet. 100. The Petition depicts both seats facing forward in the modified configuration—the same orientation as the '682 Patent's Fig. 3, which Petitioner uses as a comparison. *See* Pet. 28.

But Petitioner never establishes a separate motivation for this additional modification. The reason for this gap is straightforward: there is no such teaching. The only teaching about reversal in either Offord reference is Offord '797's disclosure of rotating the entire interface portion 10 by 180°—which reverses both seats simultaneously. *See* EX1054, 4:24-30. If one starts with Offord '797 seats facing forward and the interface portion 10 is turned 180°, *both* seats will face backward. *Compare* EX1054, Fig. 2, *with* Fig. 1. Yet when Petitioner and Mr. Prairie reverse Offord '341's interface portion components 100—supposedly

according to teachings of Offord '797—both seats *still* face forward. See Pet. 101; EX1001 ¶ 495.

To arrive at the proposed forward-facing arrangement, Petitioner must take the *additional*, unmotivated step of also reversing one or both individual seats. Petitioner has identified no teaching, disclosure, or rationale for this separate modification. This demonstrates that Petitioner worked backward from the patent to construct a combination that looks similar to the patent. This is the hallmark of impermissible hindsight reconstruction. *See Interconnect Plan. Corp. v. Feil*, 774 F.2d 1132, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting an invention “must be viewed not with the blueprint drawn by the inventor” but instead via “the state of the art that existed at the time”).

5. *Petitioner relies on undesignated references to teach claim 16*

Petitioner's own expert concedes that Offord '341 “does not disclose ‘at least one central wheel.’” EX1001 ¶ 576. To fill this gap, Petitioner asserts that a POSA would “[replace] Offord's front wheels to include multiple front wheels” because doing so “was a design choice commonly used in the field of stroller design.” Pet. 123; EX1001 ¶¶ 576-579. In support, Petitioner cites EX1033 and EX1036. *Id.*

But Petitioner does not designate either EX1033 or EX1036 in its Ground 4 combination. Ground 4 is limited to Offord '341 in view of Offord '797. *See* Pet.

91 (identifying “Offord ’341 and Offord ’797” as the sole prior art basis for Ground 4). Petitioner cannot rely on additional, undesignated prior art references to supply missing claim limitations. *See* 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring the petition to identify “with particularity” each claim challenged and “the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (requiring the petition to identify “the patents or printed publications relied upon for each ground”).

Moreover, Petitioner never articulates a motivation to replace Offord ’341’s front wheels as suggested. Petitioner’s expert asserts only that such a modification “constitutes the simple substitution of one known element for another.” EX1001 ¶ 579. But the mere fact that a POSA *could* replace Offord’s front wheels does not establish that *it would have been obvious to do so*. *See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.*, 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (stating “a patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art”). The absence of any articulated rationale for this modification is independently fatal to Ground 4 as to claim 16.

6. *Petitioner’s mapping of the claims to Offord ’341 is internally inconsistent*

In its Ground 4 analysis, Petitioner maps the entire “mounting device 14” of Offord ’341 to the claimed “adapter.” Pet. 105; EX1001 ¶¶ 504-506. The Petition illustrates this mapping by shading the entire mounting device 14 in gold,

including the body of the mounting device and its “connecting legs 48.” *Id.*

Separately, and on the very next page, Petitioner maps the “legs 48” to the claimed “attachment frame members.” Pet. 106; EX1001 ¶¶ 507-508. As Petitioner explains: “A POSITA would understand a portion of the ‘adapters’ is disclosed as being a ‘connecting leg 48’ (outlined in red dash above).” Pet. 106. Petitioner’s expert likewise confirms that the legs 48 are “located on the first/second ‘adapters’ (gold)” and “function as” the “attachment frame members.” EX1001 ¶¶ 507-508.

Petitioner’s mapping is irreconcilably self-contradictory. The Petition identifies the entire “mounting device 14”—including the “legs 48”—as the “adapter.” Pet. 105. It then identifies a subset of that same structure—the “legs 48”—as the “attachment frame member.” Pet. 106. Under this mapping, the “attachment frame member” is a component within the “adapter,” not a separate structural element coupling the adapter to the housing.

This creates an inescapable logical problem. Claim 1 requires that the “adapter” be “spaced from and coupled to” the “housing” by the “attachment frame member.” The word “by” denotes that the attachment frame member is the means through which the adapter-to-housing coupling occurs. If the attachment frame member is already part of the adapter, then the claim limitation collapses into tautology: the adapter is “spaced from and coupled to” the housing by a part of

itself. That reading is structurally meaningless—the adapter is simultaneously the thing being spaced and the means of spacing.

7. *Offord '341 modified by Offord '797 does not disclose claim 15*

Claim 15 depends from claim 1 and specifies that “the first front wheel *extends from* the first seat attachment housing” and “the second front wheel *extends from* the second seat attachment housing.” EX1010, claim 15. The phrase “extends from” denotes a direct structural connection: the front wheel must originate from, project from, or be directly structurally connected to the seat attachment housing. Mere spatial proximity—being “adjacent to” or “near”—does not satisfy this limitation. In its claim 1 mapping for Ground 4, Petitioner identifies the lower “connector sockets 106” on Offord '341's “interface portion components 100” as the “first/second seat attachment housings.” Pet. 102; EX1001 ¶ 499. This mapping is carried through the Petition's analysis of claims 1 through 16, including claim 15. *See* Pet. 122.

Separately, the Petition acknowledges that the front wheels 6 of Offord '341 extend from the “common mouldings 19,” which are the wheel housings at the front end of the stroller frame. *See* Pet. 104; EX1051, 6:9-12; EX1001 ¶ 502. These “common mouldings 19” are structurally distinct components from the “connector sockets 106.” The mouldings 19 are integral parts of the original “frame assembly

4,” while the connector sockets 106 are part of the separately attachable “interface portion components 100.” EX1051, 6:9-12, 9:16-29.

For claim 15, the Petition states: “The ‘ housings ’ (green) are positioned adjacent to the front-wheel ‘ moldings 19. ’ ... As shown, the first/second front wheels extend from the first/second ‘ housings. ’ ” Pet. 122 (citing EX1001 ¶ 575). But the Petition’s own language reveals the defect: the housings are merely “positioned adjacent to” the front-wheel mouldings. Being “adjacent to” a structure from which the wheels actually extend is not the same as having the wheels “extend from” that structure.

Examination of Offord ’341’s modified Figure 15—the very figure on which Petitioner relies—confirms this distinction. The front wheels 6 are mounted on and project from the “common mouldings 19” at the bottom of the stroller frame. *See* EX1051, 5:45-48, 6:9-12. The lower “connector sockets 106” (mapped to the “seat attachment housings”) are separate structures located near the front-wheel mouldings, but the wheels do not mount into, project from, or originate from the sockets 106 in any configuration. The mere fact that the lower sockets 106 are in the general vicinity of the front-wheel mouldings 19 does not create the “extends from” relationship required by claim 15.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed, Petitioner fails to meet its burden of persuasion in this proceeding. The Board should reject the Petition and find all challenged claims not unpatentable.

Respectfully submitted,

/Warren Thomas/

Warren J. Thomas (Reg. No. 70,581)

CERTIFICATION OF WORD COUNT, 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(d)

Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(d), Patent Owner certifies that the foregoing Patent Owner's Response contains 13,792 words, excluding the portions as permitted by § 42.24(a).

/Warren Thomas/

Warren J. Thomas (Reg. No. 70,581)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.6(e) and agreement of the parties, I certify that:

- On March 13, 2026, copies of Patent Owner's Exhibits marked 2101, 2102, 2104, and 2106 were served on counsel for the Petitioner via electronic delivery during the cross-examination of Mr. Prairie and by email immediately following the deposition;
- On March 26, 2026, copies of this paper and all other accompanying exhibits were served on counsel for the Petitioner by email to:

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