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**SECOND
EDITION**

APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY



**Protocols, Algorithms,
and Source Code in C**

BRUCE SCHNEIER

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3.6 SECRET SPLITTING

Imagine that you've invented a new, extra gooey, extra sweet, cream filling or a burger sauce that is even more tasteless than your competitors'. This is important; you have to keep it secret. You could tell only your most trusted employees the exact mixture of ingredients, but what if one of them defects to the competition? There goes the secret, and before long every grease palace on the block will be making burgers with sauce as tasteless as yours.

This calls for **secret splitting**. There are ways to take a message and divide it up into pieces [551]. Each piece by itself means nothing, but put them together and the message appears. If the message is the recipe and each employee has a piece, then only together can they make the sauce. If any employee resigns with his single piece of the recipe, his information is useless by itself.

The simplest sharing scheme splits a message between two people. Here's a protocol in which Trent can split a message between Alice and Bob:

- (1) Trent generates a random-bit string, R , the same length as the message, M .
- (2) Trent XORs M with R to generate S .

$$M \oplus R = S$$

- (3) Trent gives R to Alice and S to Bob.

To reconstruct the message, Alice and Bob have only one step to do:

- (4) Alice and Bob XOR their pieces together to reconstruct the message:

$$R \oplus S = M$$

This technique, if done properly, is absolutely secure. Each piece, by itself, is absolutely worthless. Essentially, Trent is encrypting the message with a one-time pad and giving the ciphertext to one person and the pad to the other person. Section 1.5 discusses one-time pads; they have perfect security. No amount of computing power can determine the message from one of the pieces.

It is easy to extend this scheme to more people. To split a message among more than two people, XOR more random-bit strings into the mixture. In this example, Trent divides up a message into four pieces:

- (1) Trent generates three random-bit strings, R , S , and T , the same length as the message, M .
- (2) Trent XORs M with the three strings to generate U :

$$M \oplus R \oplus S \oplus T = U$$

- (3) Trent gives R to Alice, S to Bob, T to Carol, and U to Dave.

Alice, Bob, Carol, and Dave, working together, can reconstruct the message:

- (4) Alice, Bob, Carol, and Dave get together and compute:

$$R \oplus S \oplus T \oplus U = M$$

This is an adjudicated protocol. Trent has absolute power and can do whatever he wants. He can hand out gibberish and claim that it is a valid piece of the secret; no one will know it until they try to reconstruct the secret. He can hand out a piece to Alice, Bob, Carol, and Dave, and later tell everyone that only Alice, Carol, and Dave are needed to reconstruct the secret, and then fire Bob. But since this is Trent's secret to divide up, this isn't a problem.

However, this protocol has a problem: If any of the pieces gets lost and Trent isn't around, so does the message. If Carol, who has a piece of the sauce recipe, goes to work for the competition and takes her piece with her, the rest of them are out of luck. She can't reproduce the recipe, but neither can Alice, Bob, and Dave working together. Her piece is as critical to the message as every other piece combined. All Alice, Bob, or Dave know is the length of the message—nothing more. This is true because R , S , T , U , and M all have the same length; seeing anyone of them gives the length of M . Remember, M isn't being split in the normal sense of the word; it is being XORed with random values.

3.7 SECRET SHARING

You're setting up a launch program for a nuclear missile. You want to make sure that no single raving lunatic can initiate a launch. You want to make sure that no two raving lunatics can initiate a launch. You want at least three out of five officers to be raving lunatics before you allow a launch.

This is easy to solve. Make a mechanical launch controller. Give each of the five officers a key and require that at least three officers stick their keys in the proper slots before you'll allow them to blow up whomever we're blowing up this week. (If you're really worried, make the slots far apart and require the officers to insert the keys simultaneously—you wouldn't want an officer who steals two keys to be able to vaporize Toledo.)

We can get even more complicated. Maybe the general and two colonels are authorized to launch the missile, but if the general is busy playing golf then five colonels are required to initiate a launch. Make the launch controller so that it requires five keys. Give the general three keys and the colonels one each. The general together with any two colonels can launch the missile; so can the five colonels. However, a general and one colonel cannot; neither can four colonels.

A more complicated sharing scheme, called a **threshold scheme**, can do all of this and more—mathematically. At its simplest level, you can take any message (a secret recipe, launch codes, your laundry list, etc.) and divide it into n pieces, called **shadows** or **shares**, such that any m of them can be used to reconstruct the message. More precisely, this is called an **(m,n) -threshold scheme**.

With a $(3,4)$ -threshold scheme, Trent can divide his secret sauce recipe among Alice, Bob, Carol, and Dave, such that any three of them can put their shadows together and reconstruct the message. If Carol is on vacation, Alice, Bob, and Dave can do it. If Bob gets run over by a bus, Alice, Carol, and Dave can do it. However, if Bob gets run over by a bus while Carol is on vacation, Alice and Dave can't reconstruct the message by themselves.

General threshold schemes are even more versatile. Any sharing scenario you can imagine can be modeled. You can divide a message among the people in your building so that to reconstruct it, you need seven people from the first floor and five people from the second floor, unless there is someone from the third floor involved, in which case you only need that person and three people from the first floor and two people from the second floor, unless there is someone from the fourth floor involved, in which case you need that person and one person from the third floor, or that person and two people from the first floor and one person from the second floor, unless there is . . . well, you get the idea.

This idea was invented independently by Adi Shamir [1414] and George Blakley [182] and studied extensively by Gus Simmons [1466]. Several different algorithms are discussed in Section 23.2.

Secret Sharing with Cheaters

There are many ways to cheat with a threshold scheme. Here are just a few of them.

Scenario 1: Colonels Alice, Bob, and Carol are in a bunker deep below some isolated field. One day, they get a coded message from the president: "Launch the missiles. We're going to eradicate the last vestiges of neural network research in the country." Alice, Bob, and Carol reveal their shadows, but Carol enters a random number. She's actually a pacifist and doesn't want the missiles launched. Since Carol doesn't enter the correct shadow, the secret they recover is the wrong secret. The missiles stay in their silos. Even worse, no one knows why. Alice and Bob, even if they work together, cannot prove that Carol's shadow is invalid.

Scenario 2: Colonels Alice and Bob are sitting in the bunker with Mallory. Mallory has disguised himself as a colonel and none of the others is the wiser. The same message comes in from the president, and everyone reveals their shadows. "Bwa-ha-ha!" shouts Mallory. "I faked that message from the president. Now I know both of your shadows." He races up the staircase and escapes before anyone can catch him.

Scenario 3: Colonels Alice, Bob, and Carol are sitting in the bunker with Mallory, who is again disguised. (Remember, Mallory doesn't have a valid shadow.) The same message comes in from the president and everyone reveals their shadows. Mallory reveals his shadow only after he has heard the other three. Since only three shadows are needed to reconstruct the secret, he can quickly create a valid shadow and reveals that. Now, not only does he know the secret, but no one realizes that he isn't part of the scheme.

Some protocols that handle these sorts of cheaters are discussed in Section 23.2.

Secret Sharing without Trent

A bank wants its vault to open only if three out of five officers enter their keys. This sounds like a basic (3,5)-threshold scheme, but there's a catch. No one is to know the entire secret. There is no Trent to divide the secret up into five pieces. There are protocols by which the five officers can create a secret and each get a piece, such that none of the officers knows the secret until they all reconstruct it. I'm not going to discuss these protocols in this book; see [756] for details.

Sharing a Secret without Revealing the Shares

These schemes have a problem. When everyone gets together to reconstruct their secret, they reveal their shares. This need not be the case. If the shared secret is a private key (to a digital signature, for example), then n shareholders can each complete a partial signature of the document. After the n th partial signature, the document has been signed with the shared private key and none of the shareholders learns any other shares. The point is that the secret can be reused, and you don't need a trusted processor to handle it. This concept is explored further by Yvo Desmedt and Yair Frankel [483,484].

Verifiable Secret Sharing

Trent gives Alice, Bob, Carol, and Dave each a share or at least he says he does. The only way any of them know if they have a valid share is to try to reconstruct the secret. Maybe Trent sent Bob a bogus share or Bob accidentally received a bad share through communications error. Verifiable secret sharing allows each of them to individually verify that they have a valid share, without having to reconstruct the secret [558,1235].

Secret-Sharing Schemes with Prevention

A secret is divided up among 50 people so that any 10 can get together and reconstruct the secret. That's easy. But, can we implement the same secret-sharing scheme with the added constraint that 20 people can get together and *prevent* the others from reconstructing the secret, no matter how many of them there are? As it turns out, we can [153].

The math is complicated, but the basic idea is that everyone gets two shares: a "yes" share and a "no" share. When it comes time to reconstruct the secret, people submit one of their shares. The actual share they submit depends on whether they wish the secret reconstructed. If there are m or more "yes" shares and fewer than n "no" shares, the secret can be reconstructed. Otherwise, it cannot.

Of course, nothing prevents a sufficient number of "yes" people from going off in a corner without the "no" people (assuming they know who they are) and reconstructing the secret. But in a situation where everyone submits their shares into a central computer, this scheme will work.

Secret Sharing with Disenrollment

You've set up your secret-sharing system and now you want to fire one of your shareholders. You could set up a new scheme without that person, but that's time-consuming. There are methods for coping with this system. They allow a new sharing scheme to be activated instantly once one of the participants becomes untrustworthy [1004].

3.8 CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION OF DATABASES

The membership database of an organization is a valuable commodity. On the one hand, you want to distribute the database to all members. You want them to com-

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