

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

Tianma Microelectronics Co., Ltd.

Petitioner

v.

LG Display Co., Ltd.

Patent Owner

Patent No. 11,251,394 B2
Filing Date: June 22, 2020
Issue Date: February 15, 2022

Title: ORGANIC LIGHT EMITTING DISPLAY AND METHOD OF
FABRICATING THE SAME

Inter Partes Review No. IPR2025-01579

**PETITIONER'S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER'S REQUEST FOR
DISCRETIONARY DENIAL OF INSTITUTION**

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Exhibit	Description
Ex-1011	USPTO’s Global Dossier for U.S. Pat. Pub. No. 2012/0062481 A1 to Kim et al. (“Kim481”)
Ex-1012	Department of Defense’s Notice of Availability of Designation of Chinese Military Companies, dated January 7, 2025
Ex-1013	Declaration of Minfu Zhang
Ex-1014	Declaration of Gaojun Huang
Ex-1015	Department of Defense’s Notice of Availability of Designation of Chinese Military Companies, dated April 2, 2024

***NOTE: All citations herein to page numbers identify the stamped page numbers of the cited exhibit, not the page numbers of the original reference.**

I. INTRODUCTION

The Director should reject LG’s request for discretionary denial (Paper 7, “DD Req.”), consider the Petition on the merits, and institute this IPR. First, the Examiner erred when issuing the ’394 Patent. During prosecution, the Examiner indicated that original claims 10 and 19, which were originally written in dependent form, would be allowable if rewritten in independent form. But Kang651—the reference applied during prosecution against the other claims—did disclose the limitation of original claim 10. And the Examiner failed to locate Kim481, a primary reference in the Petition that discloses original claim 19 limitation; even though the Examiner did identify Kim481’s foreign counterpart, he failed to properly analyze that foreign counterpart during prosecution. Had the Examiner conducted a proper analysis of Kang651 and Kim481’s foreign counterpart, he would have rejected the claims.

Second, the ’394 Patent issued less than four years ago, and the Director routinely declines to deny institution for such young patents. Moreover, since its issuance, the parties have been engaged in cross-licensing discussions. Petitioner had an expectation of non-enforcement based on those ongoing communications.

Third, the *Fintiv* factors weigh against denial. The Final Written Decision is scheduled to issue six months before the scheduled pre-trial conference. Petitioner filed a stipulation broader than *Sotera* to eliminate overlap between the

proceedings. LG failed to raise a single argument against the merits of the Petition. The Director regularly declines to deny institution in such instances.

Fourth, none of the six entities LG identifies are RPIs because none controlled, funded, or directed this IPR. Contrary to LG's position, *Yangtze* does not apply because Petitioner has never been on an entity list.

The '394 Patent is young and subject to ongoing licensing discussions, and the Board is best suited to address the earlier error by the Examiner. This Petition should be considered on the merits and instituted.

II. INSTITUTION IS REQUIRED TO CORRECT MATERIAL ERRORS AND IS AN APPROPRIATE USE OF THE OFFICE'S RESOURCES

The Examiner materially erred when it allowed the '394 Patent to issue. The Examiner effectively issued a first-action allowance when he rejected all other claims as anticipated by Kang651 (Ex-1010) but indicated that original dependent claims 10 and 19 would be "allowable if rewritten in independent form." Ex. 1002, 256. That was an error. Kang651 does teach the features of original claim 10; and the Examiner failed to apply Kim481's foreign counterpart against original claim 19. *See* Pet., 117-126, 143-145.


First, the Examiner materially erred in finding that Kang651 did not disclose original claim 10's requirement that the first or second bridges overlap the bank. But Kang651 does. As the Examiner found, Kang651's second bridge

143b discloses the claimed second bridge and Kang651's pixel defining layer

125 discloses the claimed bank. *See* Petition (“Pet.”) at 6-9.

Kang651's second bridge 143b overlaps layer 125. Figure 3 illustrates that second bridge 143b is between pixels. The figure shows a display panel 110 with touch sensor layer 150 stacked on top. Kang651, Fig. 3, ¶33. The display panel includes **pixels PX (yellow)** with **second bridge 143b (cyan)** between the two middle pixels. *Id.*, Fig. 3, ¶49.

FIG. 3




Id., Fig. 3 (annotated).

Figure 4 depicts display panel 110 with a “detailed structure of [] **pixels** **PX**” and confirms that the pixel defining layers 125 are between the pixels and, consequently, overlapping second bridge 143b. The figure shows that each pixel is the “**light emitting element (LD)**” (yellow) and that the *pixel defining layers (PDL) 125* (light purple) are (a) between each set of pixels and

(b) form “opening[s]” for each pixel to be “expose[d]” from. Kang651, Fig. 4,

¶¶49, 58-59.



Id. at Fig. 4 (annotated). The break lines on both sides of Figure 4 indicate that the PDLs 125 extend laterally beyond the figure until the next pixel.

The teachings from Figures 3-4 show that the **second bridge 143b (cyan)** overlaps **PDL 125 (light purple)** and, thus, Kang651 discloses original claim 10’s requirement of an overlapping bridge and bank. Specifically, looking at the touch sensor layer 150 (as shown in Figure 3) stacked on top of display panel 110 (as detailed in Figure 4) shows that the second bridge and PDL are in between the middle pixels and overlapping each other.

Second, the Examiner failed to identify and apply Kim481 (Ex-1007). Even though the Office cited Kim481’s foreign counterpart, KR20120060926A (“KR’926”), it failed to apply that foreign counterpart against original claim 19

or locate Kim481. *See* Pet., 117-126, 143-145; '394 Pat., page 2, (56) (citing the foreign counterpart); Ex. 1002, 10; Ex. 1011 (USPTO's global dossier showing Kim481 and KR'926 are part of same family, also available at <https://globaldossier.uspto.gov/result/application/US/13021581/1>). As explained in the Petition, Kim481 discloses the features of original claim 19. *See* Pet., 117-126, 143-145.

The Director should institute review to correct the Examiner's errors. *See Microsoft Corp. v. ParTec Cluster Competence Ctr. GmbH*, No. IPR2025-00318, Paper 9 at 2-3 (June 12, 2025).

III. SETTLED EXPECTATIONS SUPPORT A MERITS CONSIDERATION

The "settled expectations" of the parties weigh strongly against denial because (1) the '394 patent is young, issuing only four years ago in 2022; (2) Petitioner filed the Petition expeditiously, less than four months after being served (which, as LG concedes, is when Petitioner became aware of the '394 patent); and (3) Petitioner did not expect enforcement and had no reason to challenge validity because the parties were engaged in cross licensing discussions until the litigation.

None of LG's arguments related to the parties' expectations withstand scrutiny. To the contrary, all weigh against discretionary denial.

A. The Age of the '394 Patent Weighs Against Discretionary Denial

The '394 Patent issued February 15, 2022, less than four years before the petition filing date, which strongly weighs against discretionary denial. The Director has found that patents issued less than six years ago “have not been in force for a significant period of time . . . , and, accordingly, Patent Owner has not developed strong settled expectations.” *See, e.g., Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Wilus Inst. of Standards & Tech. Inc.*, No. IPR2025-00935, Paper 12 at 2 (Deshpande, C.J., Sep. 26, 2025) (declining discretionary denial when “the challenged patents have not been in force for a significant period of time (issued in 2021 and 2023), and, accordingly, Patent Owner has not developed strong settled expectations that favor discretionary denial as to these patents”); *Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Wilus Inst. of Standards & Tech. Inc.*, No. IPR2025-00933, Paper 11 at 3 (Deshpande, C.J., Oct. 10, 2025); *Cambridge Indus. USA, Inc. v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.*, No. IPR2025-00434, Paper 11 at 2-3 (Director June 26, 2025). Therefore, the '394 patent falls within the period where a “Patent Owner has not developed strong settled expectations,” which weighs against discretionary denial.

LG raises irrelevant arguments relating to patents asserted in litigation that are from different patent families than the '394 patent. Older patents from other families do not impact settled expectations for the challenged patent. *Cambridge*

Indus., No. IPR2025-00434, Paper 11 at 2-3 (finding that older patents from another family did not undermine rejecting discretionary denial for patents issued in 2019 and 2020 due to their age); *Amgen Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.*, No. IPR2025-00601, Paper 9, at 3 (July 24, 2025). The other patents in the related litigation include United States Patent Nos. 8,416,166, 8,736,801, 10,175,803 (issued January 8, 2019); 10,444,924 (issued October 15, 2019); 10,499,493 (issued December 3, 2019); and 10,869,388 (issued December 5, 2020). Ex. 2001, 6. None of these belong to the patent family associated with the '394 patent. *See* '394 Pat., Cover, (60) (listing two non-asserted patents as parents).

Even if the age of the other patents is considered, LG's arguments substantively fail because "most of the [] patents have not been in force for a significant period of time" and, thus, do not support discretionary denial. *Cambridge Indus.*, No. IPR2025-00434, Paper 11 at 2-3. Four of the seven patents were issued within six years of the petition date, and another within seven years.

B. LG's Concession that Petitioner Lacked Knowledge Until the Complaint Weights Against Discretionary Denial

LG concedes that "specific notice of the '394 Patent" was not provided until filing of the complaint in June 2025. DD Req., 13. Petitioner filed this Petition only four months after. Given that the '394 patent recently issued and Petitioner filed expeditiously, discretionary denial is not warranted.

The cases LG cites (*Ericsson* and *Nvidia*) do not show otherwise. DD Req., 12-13. In *Ericsson*, the challenged patent in IPR2024-01453 had been in force since 2006, and Petitioner has been aware of it since 2013, from prosecution of another patent. *Ericsson Inc. v. Procomm Int’l Pte. LTD*, No. IPR2024-01453, Paper 15 at 2-3 (June 25, 2025). Here, Petitioner became aware of the ’394 patent at the filing of the complaint—a mere four months before filing this Petition.

In *Nvidia*, one challenged patent “ha[d] been in force for over 11 years,” and the other “originally issued in 2015,” but “reissued in 2023.” *Nvidia Corp. v. Neural AI, LLC*, No. IPR2025-00606, Paper 18 at 2-3 (Director July 31, 2025). The Director found that the parties “had a commercial relationship and, in 2017, [the patent owner] sent Petitioner a presentation” that included both patents at issue, providing “actual notice of the challenged patents.” *Id.* Thus, the petitioner in *Nvidia* waited seven years to file petitions after receiving the specific notice and both patents were many years older than the ’394 Patent.

LG argues that Petitioner’s alleged general awareness of LG’s portfolio or of the ’394 patent’s family members is sufficient to provide notice of the challenged patent itself—but provides no legal support.² Nor would such a rule

² As one district court judge explained, “Saying you knew about [a patent] family is not too far a step from saying you knew there was this PTO in Virginia,

be practical as it would have required Petitioner to have promptly filed IPRs against all 150 patents LG identified during negotiations. *See* DD Req., 5.

LG's suggestion that Petitioner should have challenged the '394 Patent earlier also rings hollow. Again, by LG's own admission, Petitioner and LG were in continuing cross-licensing discussions since 2015, and Petitioner had every belief that negotiations were still ongoing until the service of the complaint. *See* Section III.D. And these were not typical licensing discussions; there was an expectation by Petitioner that an amicable license would result, based on LG's willingness to continue good-faith discussions for nearly ten years. *Id.* Further, LG had every reason to believe that, if the parties could not reach a licensing agreement and litigation ensued, Petitioner would challenge validity, given Petitioner's history of challenging patents asserted in litigation. *See e.g., Tianma Microelectronics Co. Ltd. v. Japan Display*, No. IPR2021-01057 (Jul. 2, 2021). Thus, even if LG had some settled expectations based on Petitioner's general knowledge of LG's large portfolio or patents related to the '394 patent, such expectations would be overcome by Petitioner's previous IPR activity.

and you should just go check everything there and see if anything there applies. It's too nebulous." *See Intell. Ventures I LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.*, Hearing Tr. 61:2-9, No. 2:17-cv-00577-JRG, Dkt. 297 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2019).

C. LG Fails to Show Extraordinary Investment in '394 Patent to Support Settled Expectations

LG last argues that it has settled expectations in the '394 patent due to “an extraordinary amount of investment, time, and resources dedicated to research, [and] development[.]” *See* DD Req., 13-16. But most of its statements present no specific connection to the '394 patent—instead providing generalities about LG’s business and achievements by certain employees—none of which are the inventors. Without any evidence, LG claims it “has sold OLED panels practicing TOE technology and covered by the '394 Patent” since 2019. *Id.*, 15. But, even if accepted as true, this hardly shows the “extraordinary” investment required to create settled expectations *in the challenged patent*.

LG has no settled expectations to support discretionary denial.

D. Petitioner’s Settled Expectations Outweigh Any Expectations of LG

Even if LG could prove it had settled expectations—it cannot—Petitioner had settled expectations of non-enforcement until LG filed its lawsuit because the parties were engaged in good-faith cross licensing negotiations for years, and LG never ended those negotiations before filing its lawsuit. *See Apple, Inc. v. Allani*, No. IPR2025-00856, Paper 11 at 3 (Director Sep. 5, 2025) (finding that a petitioner’s expectation of non-enforcement counsels against discretionary denial when the petitioner concludes that a license is not necessary, informs the patent

owner, and the patent owner waits a significant period before initiating litigation).

Apple's reasoning directly applies here to support rejecting LG's request for discretionary denial, as Petitioner had settled expectations that enforcement would not occur based on LG's decade-long delay in initiating legal action and Petitioner's statements to LG denying infringement of LG's patents, as detailed below.

LG greatly mischaracterizes the negotiations. Unsurprisingly, for most of the allegations, LG fails to provide any evidence or a declaration from an LG representative—instead relying on attorney arguments and misrepresentations that should be disregarded or given little weight. In reality, Petitioner was committed to finding an acceptable business solution through negotiations and acted diligently in responding to and requesting information from LG towards this end. Ex. 1013, Declaration of Minfu Zhang ("Zhang Decl."), ¶3. Contrary to LG's implication, Petitioner conducted extensive investigations into LG's allegations and materials, maintained that it does not infringe LG's patents, and continued to have discussions in good faith to find a fair resolution, including providing counteroffers. *Id.* LG's contention that the Petitioner acted unreasonably lacks merit, particularly in light of negotiations persisting for over a decade and LG's sustained interest in continuing negotiations.

For example, in December 2021, as part of the parties' ongoing communications, Petitioner provided detailed technical analysis, including information supporting Petitioner's continued belief that it does not infringe LG's patents, and requests for information to allow it to make a reasonable counteroffer. *Id.*, ¶¶3-4. The parties continued negotiations and, in February 2023, Petitioner presented a preliminary counteroffer and identified additional information needed from LG to help the parties reach a deal. *Id.*, ¶6. LG refused to provide the requested information. *Id.* The parties held additional meetings in 2023 without reaching a resolution. *Id.* In February 2024, the parties again met, including to discuss Petitioner's counteroffer. *Id.*, ¶7. LG demanded Petitioner provide a *new* counteroffer and refused to provide a rebuttal to Petitioner's last offer. *Id.* In August 2024, Petitioner identified nearly 100 of its CN patents that LG continued to infringe and provided an initial licensing offer for those patents. *Id.*, ¶8. LG responded, confirming that the parties' cross-licensing negotiations are continuing and requested additional information. Tianma provided additional material in September 2024. *Id.* However, LG never responded and abruptly pivoted from its previous negotiating behavior to initiate a lawsuit without ever informing Petitioner that it ceased negotiations. *Id.*

LG's claims of Petitioner's "purposeful delay" are unfounded. The changes to Petitioner's representative through the *ten years* of negotiations were due to

routine business operations and were not a mechanism to cause any delay in negotiations with LG. *Id.*, ¶9. The need for Petitioner’s newly appointed representative to become familiar with prior discussions and the current status of negotiations was also reasonable and necessary for fruitful discussions and not to cause intentional delay. *Id.*

Petitioner’s expectations weigh against discretionary denial.

IV. THE *FINTIV* FACTORS WEIGH AGAINST DISCRETIONARY DENIAL

The Director should not deny the Petition under *Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.*, No. IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“*Fintiv*”), because Factors 2, 3, 4, and 6 weigh strongly against discretionary denial, and Factors 1 and 5 are neutral or only slightly favor denial.

A. Factor 1: No Evidence of Stay Motion

Factor 1 is neutral because no motion for a stay has been filed and there is no evidence regarding the outcome of such a motion. *See Sand Revolution II, LLC v. Cont’l Intermodal Grp. – Trucking LLC*, No. IPR2019-01393, Paper 24 at 7 (June 16, 2020) (informative).

B. Factor 2: Trial is Scheduled to Occur Six Months After Final Written Decision Issues

Factor 2 weighs strongly against discretionary denial. As LG noted, the Final Written Decision is expected to occur *six months* before the pre-trial conference

date, assuming no litigation delays. DD Req., 17. This favors denying LG's discretionary denial request because it reduces the "concern of inconsistent outcomes or significant duplication of efforts." *See Apple Inc. v. Apex Beam Techs. LLC*, No. IPR2025-00896, Paper 10 at 2 (Sept. 3, 2025) (finding that a Final Written Decision issuing three weeks before the scheduled trial to weigh against discretionary denial); *Freightcar Am., Inc. v. Nat'l Steel Car Ltd.*, No. IPR2025-01046, Paper 20 at 2 (Oct. 10, 2025) (same).

LG claims that Petitioner's reservation of indefiniteness arguments in related litigation could lead to inconsistent claim constructions, warranting discretionary denial. This issue is moot as Petitioner did not raise any indefiniteness positions for the '394 patent in its invalidity contentions in the litigation.

C. Factor 3: Little Investment in Related Litigation

Factor 3 weighs against discretionary denial because there has not been substantial investment in the related litigation. The litigation remains in its preliminary phase, as the parties have only recently exchanged contentions and have not yet commenced the claim construction process—showing a lack of meaningful investment in the related litigation, which weighs against discretionary denial. *Fintiv*, Paper 15 at 13-14 (finding factor 3 to weigh against discretionary denial because parties had only exchanged contentions and the Court had issued a

Markman order, but “much work remains in this case as it relates to invalidity,” including fact discovery, expert reports, and substantive motions).

D. Factor 4: Overlap is Minimal Due to Petitioner’s Broader-than-*Sotera* Stipulation and Petition Challenging Additional Claims

This Petition challenges all claims of the ’394 patent, whereas the litigation only involves claims 1-8, 17, and 19. Further, Petitioner’s stipulation (which is broader than *Sotera*) will, upon institution, eliminate even speculative overlap between proceedings by excluding any ground that uses patents or printed publications as a primary reference in any invalidity combination, any ground that uses any reference named in a ground of the Petition, any ground based on a combination of system prior art and any reference named in a ground of the Petition, and any ground where a patent or printed publication cited in the Petition is used as evidence of the operation or structure of a system art device. *See* Paper 6; *Samsung*, No. IPR2025-00933, Paper 11 at 3 (finding Petitioner’s broad stipulation favored institution because it “reduces the concern of inconsistent outcomes or significant duplication of efforts”); *Tesla, Inc. v. Intell. Ventures II LLC*, No. IPR2025-00217, Paper 9 at 2 (Director June 13, 2025). Petitioner’s stipulation is broader than the stipulations filed in the *Samsung* and *Tesla* proceedings. *Compare* Paper 6 with *Samsung*, No. IPR2025-00933, Ex. 1023 and *Tesla*, No. IPR2025-00217, Ex. 1067.

E. Factor 5: The Parties Are the Same

This is neutral or only slightly favors denial. *Innolux Corp. v. Phenix Longhorn*, No. IPR2025-00043, Paper 10 at 13 (May 15, 2025).

F. Factor 6: Strong Merits, Examiner Error, Broad Stipulation and Prompt IPR Filing Show Discretionary Denial Is Unwarranted

This factor favors institution for numerous reasons. The Examiner materially erred during prosecution, warranting review and correction. *See* Section II. Petitioner had strong, settled expectations that LG would not enforce its patents against it. *See* Section III.D. Once these expectations were broken, Petitioner acted promptly—filing within four months of receiving notice of the '394 patent and stipulating to a broader-than-*Sotera* stipulation to maximize efficiency. *See* Sections III.B, IV.D. The Petition also presents strong merits—as evidenced by LG's inability to present a single argument against the merits. *See* DD Req., 20. LG's claims of Petitioner's "significant gamesmanship" ring hollow (*see* Section III.D)—but it is LG attempting to gain an unfair advantage by deferring to its Preliminary Response to show the merits are lacking and knowing that Petitioner will be unable to respond. *Id.* For the purposes of discretionary denial, the Director should treat LG's tactics as conceding that the Petition presents strong merits.

V. NONE OF THE SIX ENTITIES LG IDENTIFIED ARE REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST

A real-party-in-interest is an entity that “controls, funds, or directs an IPR proceeding.” *See* PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019), 13. A non-party is not an RPI when it simply has a relationship with a petitioner and may generally benefit from the filing of the petition. *See Unified Patents, Inc. v. Realtime Adaptive Streaming, LLC*, No. IPR2018-00883, Paper 36 at 14–15 (Oct. 11, 2018) (“The RPI analysis ... require[s] more than simply confining the analysis to determining whether a party benefits generally from the filing of this Petition and also has a relationship with the Petitioner”); *Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals SA*, No. IPR2018-01229, Paper 13 at 12-13 (Dec. 18, 2018) (explaining that finding that a non-party is an RPI requires more than a preexisting relationship and showing general benefit from a successful petition).

None of the six entities LG identified are real parties in interest (“RPIs”). LG alleges these six entities have a relationship with Petitioner and they *may* generally benefit from a successful petition. But none of them funded, controlled, or directed this IPR, or had the ability to control this IPR. Ex. 1014, Declaration of GaoJun Huang (“Huang Decl.”), ¶4. Petitioner provided all funding for this IPR. *Id.*, ¶2. Outside counsel never discussed this IPR with employees from any of the six entities. *Id.*, ¶4. The only tangential involvement by any of the six entities was

from NLT Technologies, Ltd (“NLT”),³ which acted as a quasi-prior art search firm, conducting prior art searching and initial analysis for the patents asserted in litigation and was never involved beyond searching. *Id.*, ¶5. Such involvement does not render an entity an RPI, as the PTO policy does not recognize prior art search firms as RPIs. *See* PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019), 11-14. For the remaining entities, *no employees* had any participation in this IPR. *Id.*, ¶4.

LG’s argues Xiamen Tianma Micro-electronics Co., Ltd. (“Xiamen Tianma”) and NLT should be RPIs because they were identified as RPIs in an earlier IPR. DD Req., 7. But different IPRs can certainly involve different RPIs. Neither Xiamen Tianma nor NLT funded, controlled, or directed this IPR. Huang, ¶4.

LG argues that Xiamen Jincai Industry Development Co., Ltd. (“Xianmen Jincai”), Aviation Industry Corporation of China (“AVIC”), AVIC Innovation Holding Limited (“AVIC Innovation”), and CATIC Shenzhen Holdings Limited (“CATIC”) should be RPIs because they have ownership interest in Petitioner’s

³ NLT was renamed to Tianma Japan, Ltd. in 2017.

stock.⁴ DD Req., 8. But ownership only shows a preexisting relationship, not an RPI relationship. None of Xianmen Jincai, AVIC, AVIC Innovation, or CATIC controlled, funded, or directed this IPR. Huang Decl., ¶4.

Lastly, LG argues that *Yangtze* applies, and the Petition should be discretionarily denied due to national security interests. However, *Yangtze* presented different circumstances because it involved a petitioner that was officially designated on the Bureau of Industry and Security’s (BIS) entity list. *See Yangtze Memory Technologies Co., Ltd. v. Micron Technology, Inc.*, No. IPR2025-00098, Paper 38 at 2 (Jan. 15, 2026) (faulting petitioner for failing to argue that its designation on the entity list was in error). Here, Petitioner is not on any entity list—neither the CMC entity list LG cites nor the BIS entity list in *Yangtze*. Instead, LG points to a congressman’s September 2024, which stated that that Petitioner “is identified by the U.S. Department of State as a subsidiary [of an entity on the CMC entity list].”⁵ Ex. 2018. This letter holds little weight because, neither the CMC entity list before the congressman’s letter nor the CMC entity list

⁴ LG’s allegations regarding AVIC’s ownership interest are unsupported. Of the two documents relied on by LG, EX2015 never mentions Tianma Microelectronics, and EX2016 is an unverified third-party opinion article.

⁵ The letter cites Ex. 2015 as support but this exhibit fails to mention Petitioner.

that the Department of Defense updated after the congressman's letter identified
Petitioner. *See* Ex. 1012 (2025 CMC entity list); Ex. 1015 (2024 CMC entity list).
Thus, *Yangtze* does not apply.

VI. CONCLUSION

Petitioner requests that the Director consider the merits and institute review.

Dated: January 30, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that **Petitioner's Opposition to Patent Owner's Request for Discretionary Denial of Institution** was served on January 30, 2026, via e-mail directed to counsel of record for the Patent Owner at the following:

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Dated: January 30, 2026

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