

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

GOOGLE LLC

Petitioner

v.

GAMBA GROUP HOLDINGS LLC,

Patent Owner

U.S. Patent No. 9,772,193

Case No.: IPR2026-00156

PETITIONER'S DISCRETIONARY DENIAL OPPOSITION

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I. INTRODUCTION

Patent Owner (PO)¹ deceived the Office to obtain U.S. Pat. No. 9,772,193 (“the ’193 patent”) and now claims that that *deception* is irrelevant to its reliance on the patent’s *validity* for settled expectations. This argument is simply untenable. PO’s misconduct and the Office’s examination errors preclude any settled expectations. The Director should institute this IPR and cancel the challenged claims.

PO deceived the Office to obtain its patent, blatantly misrepresenting its patent’s priority chains as comprising dozens of divisionals in direct violation of 37 C.F.R. §11.18. During examination, PO hid from the Office that, in fact, lots of new matter was added over the 12-year priority claim (*e.g.*, compare the 14-page ’583 patent² with 5 figures (EX1002) filed in 2006, to the 54-page ’193 patent with 13 figures (EX1001), filed in 2017). Pet. §VI. This misled the Examiner into not looking for more recent prior art, and more importantly, it misled the Examiner into not considering PO’s own earlier patents/publications

¹ This term is intended to include the inventor/applicant and now the entity to which the patent rights have been assigned, patent owner Gamba, which bears the consequences of its predecessor’s actions.

² U.S. Pat. No. 7,899,583, the only patent incorporated by reference in the ’193 patent. Pet. §§VI(B); II(C).

as prior art.

PO's discretionary denial brief (DD Brief) tacitly admits to this deceit because the Petition described it (Pet. §VI) and PO does not deny it. Instead, PO asks the Director to overlook it by claiming it is "irrelevant." And PO even seeks a reward for its misconduct by asking for the Director's protection via discretionary denial.

On top of PO's deceit during examination, the Examiner also erred. Although misled, the Examiner nevertheless should have questioned PO's bogus priority claims as they were clearly wrong. *See* §IV(A) *infra*. Also, the Examiner performed an unduly narrow and defective search, demonstrating a fundamental misunderstanding of the challenged claims: (1) the Examiner's search included terms (*e.g.*, "beacon" and "encoding") not found in the challenged claims; (2) the Examiner did not search for the claimed embodiment of using GPS for the vehicle's position; (3) the Examiner failed to search more relevant classifications; and (4) the Examiner failed to find the ***two anticipatory U.S. patent publications*** relied on in the Petition because of this overly narrow search.

II. THE PARTIES

Google is an American success story with over 100,000 U.S. employees and \$850 billion in U.S. economic activity in 2024 alone. EX1023, p. 3.

PO, on the other hand, is a company that did not commercialize (and thus

did not mark) the '193 patent and is now funded by a litigation funder to sue bona fide companies. EX1014; EX1017 (PO's complaint making no mention of any commercialization); DD Brief (PO making no marking argument). PO is a fly-by-night entity, starting out as a foreign entity based in Malta and now is apparently a Nevada LLC. EX1013, pp. 50-53; EX1017, p. 1.

III. DECLARATION EVIDENCE

This opposition is supported by the testimony of Robert W. Bahr, who led this Office's patent examination policy for many years. EX1016, §II, Appendix A. He testifies as to PO's many misrepresentations, its faulty priority claims, and the Office's examination errors. EX1016, §§I-IX.

IV. SETTLED EXPECTATIONS SHOULD NOT APPLY BECAUSE OF PO'S DECEIT AND THE OFFICE'S EXAMINATION ERRORS

PO made many misrepresentations to the Office during examination about its priority claims, discussed below. But, PO nevertheless asserts now that it "has strong settled expectations in the validity of the '193 Patent," a patent that was never properly examined due to PO's very own deceit. DD Brief, p. 3.

A. PO violated the Office's certification requirement (37 C.F.R. §11.18)

PO's representations to the Office during examination as well as during this proceeding are governed by 37 C.F.R. §11.18. 37 C.F.R. §42.11(c); EX1016, fn. 12. This provision requires that by presenting a paper to the Office, a party certifies that "*[a]ll statements made therein of the party's own*

knowledge are true....” 37 C.F.R. §11.18(b)(1) (emphasis added). Moreover, the party certifies that “*after a reasonable inquiry*” the “*legal contentions therein are warranted*” and the “*factual contentions have evidentiary support.*” 37 C.F.R. §§11.18(b)(2)(ii), (iii) (emphasis added).

PO violated 37 C.F.R. §11.18 during examination through its misrepresentations, and to the extent it denies those misrepresentations in this proceeding, it would violate that provision yet again. That is presumably why PO is silent in its DD Brief and does not deny the misrepresentations, but instead merely states that they are “irrelevant.” DD Brief, p. 5.

B. PO made numerous misrepresentations

1. PO deceived the Office by adding new matter to its purported “divisionals”

PO represented its priority claim to this Office as all divisionals. EX1013, pp. 55-62; Pet., §§VI(D), II(C); EX1016, §V(B). In labeling an application as a “divisional,” the applicant represents to the Office that no new matter has been added. EX1016, ¶¶9, 29, 45-46. But, even a cursory comparison between the 14-page ’583 patent with 5 figures (EX1002) filed in 2006, to the 54-page ’193 patent with 13 figures (EX1001), filed in 2017 shows this is not true and that extensive new matter was added. In fact, Mr. Bahr compares the ’193 patent application (Appl. No. 15/403,146 - “the ’146 application”) to the two applications claiming priority directly to the provisionals serving as the root of the priority chains. Those applications are Appl. Nos. 11/396,843 (“the ’843

application” issued as the ’583 patent) and 11/429,864 (“the ’864 application”).

Mr. Bahr concludes that it would be a remarkable situation that no new matter was added and that the Examiner should have questioned PO’s representation:

A cursory comparison of the written descriptions of the ’146 application (117 pages – EX1013, pp. 104-220), ’864 application (38 pages), and ’843 applications (33 pages) show a significant difference in the number of pages of description. Google Ex. 1013, pp. 104-220; Google Ex. 1022, pp. 450-487; Google Ex. 1021, pp. 282-314. *For the changes in phraseology permitted between a divisional (or continuation) application and its preceding application to result in this amount of disparity in pages of written description would be nothing short of remarkable. It would certainly warrant a comparison of the claims of the ’146 application to the disclosures of the applications for which it claims benefit to ensure that the claims of the ’146 application were being accorded the appropriate effective filing date.*

EX1016, §VI(B)(1) (emphasis added).

Indeed, one of the very applications in the priority chain identifies itself as a continuation-in-part, thereby *adding new matter by definition*. EX1016, ¶11; MPEP §201.08. The ’735 application is identified on the ’193 patent’s application data sheet (ADS) and the face of the ’193 patent as a divisional, but that application identifies itself as a continuation-in-part of the ’843 application.

Related U.S. Application Data	
(63)	Continuation-in-part of application No. 11/396,843, filed on Apr. 3, 2006, now Pat. No. 7,899,583.
(60)	Provisional application No. 60/670,097, filed on Apr. 12, 2005.

EX1019, p. 1 (highlighting added); EX1031, pp. 129, 151; EX1016, ¶¶30, 48.

PO thus deceived the Office and the Examiner should have investigated the

priority claim.

2. PO misrepresented the '193 patent's priority claim

Also, the '193 patent's priority chain is broken. The '193 patent's ADS identifies Appl. No. 15/086028 ("the '028 application") as a division of the '406 application:

Application Number	Continuity Type	Prior Application Number	Filing or 371(c) Date (YYYY-MM-DD)
15086028	Division of	14285406	2014-05-22

EX1013, p. 58. But the ADS of the '028 application identifies it as a division of Appl. No. 14/285,439 ("the '439 application"), which is now abandoned:

Prior Application Status	Pending	Remove	
Application Number	Continuity Type	Prior Application Number	Filing or 371(c) Date (YYYY-MM-DD)
	Division of	14285439	2014-05-22

EX1020, p. 111; EX1016, ¶¶31, 50. This break in the priority chain "should have been treated as limiting the claims of the '146 application to an earliest possible effective priority date of March 30, 2016" rendering its prior patents/publications as prior art, such as US 2006/0253226, published November 9, 2006. EX1016, ¶¶15, 24, 50, 55. The following table shows other PO patents/publications to which priority is claimed which should have been treated as prior art during examination:

Patent/Publication Number	Publication/Issue Date
U.S. Pat. No. 7,899,583	March 1, 2011
US 2009/0138353	May 28, 2009
U.S. Pat. No. 7,924,149	April 12, 2011
US 2007/0001904	January 4, 2007
U.S. Pat. No. 8,836,580	September 16, 2014
US 2010/0121567	May 13, 2010
U.S. Pat. No. 8,866,673	October 21, 2014
US 2007/0069923	March 29, 2007
U.S. Pat. No. 8,896,485	November 25, 2014
US 2015/0018011	January 15, 2015
US 2012/0064855	March 15, 2012
U.S. Pat. No. 8,941,485	January 27, 2015
US 2014/0213176	July 31, 2014

These priority misrepresentations affected not only the examination of the '146 application, “but the patent examination process as a whole.” EX1016, ¶¶54-55. In fact, the “reliability” of PO’s priority statements “was critical to the examination of the '146 application.” EX1016, ¶55. PO’s prior patents/publications should have been considered as prior art during examination, and the Examiner should have questioned PO’s bogus priority claims, which were evident. EX1016, ¶48.

Incredibly, PO made even more priority misrepresentations relating to Appl. Nos. 14/285,273 (“the '273 application”), 14/285,332 (“the '332

application”), and 14/285,406 (“the ’406 application”). EX1016, ¶¶32-35, §VI(B)(5). As Mr. Bahr explains, “the ’146 application identifies the ’273 application, the ’332 application, and the ’406 application in the two chains of benefit claims leading back to the ’947 provisional....” EX1016, ¶51. But those applications each “contain benefit claims that fail to identify the prior intermediate applications identified in the benefit claims of the ’146 application.” EX1016, ¶52. This terminates the ’146 application’s two chains of benefit claims to the ’947 provisional. EX1016, ¶53.

3. The challenged claims do not have any support in the specification

Moreover, the challenged claims, appearing for the first time when the ’193 patent was filed, are neither supported nor described in either the ’193 patent specification or the ’583 patent specification and, in fact, are completely contradicted by both. Pet., §VI(B); EX1006, §VI(B); EX1016, ¶49. Accordingly, the challenged claims’ earliest priority date is the filing date of the ’193 patent (Jan. 10, 2017).

As explained by Mr. Bahr, Dr. La Porta, and the Petition, the scope of claim 12 must include the embodiment of using GPS alone to identify the exact location of the vehicle because dependent claim 15 requires GPS to determine the vehicle’s location. Pet., §VI(B); EX1006, §VI(B); EX1016, ¶¶49, 57. But, both the ’193 and ’583 patent specifications disparage using GPS, stating

thoroughly and emphatically that it uses RF beacons and does not use GPS. Pet., §VI(B); EX1006, §VI(B). Both the petition and Dr. La Porta's declaration provide many quotes that support this statement. Pet., §VI(B); EX1006, §VI(B). Mr. Bahr concludes that those quotes are "themselves a basis to look into whether the claims of the '146 application are actually entitled to the benefit of the prior application for which benefit is being claimed." EX1016, ¶49; Pet. §VI; EX1006, §VI. In other words, the Examiner should have questioned whether there was support for the challenged claims.

PO attempts to respond to this issue by providing some quotes in its DD Brief at p. 6. But those quotes are ambiguous, never suggesting using GPS alone as the way to determine the vehicle's location. The '193 and '583 patents overwhelmingly disparage GPS as Pet., §VI(B) and EX1006, §VI(B) demonstrate.

C. The Office erred during examination

1. The Examiner's search was defective

The Examiner fundamentally misunderstood the scope of the challenged claims, thus precluding a competent examination. The MPEP requires Examiners to consider both what the claims require and what they do not require when developing a search strategy. EX1016, ¶¶18, 56; MPEP §904.01. The Examiner demonstrated a lack of understanding of the challenged claims' scope by performing an unduly narrow text search and classification search. EX1016,

¶¶57, 60.

First, the Examiner's text queries were unduly narrow, all requiring the terms "beacon" and "encoding" even though those terms do not appear in the challenged claims. EX1016, ¶¶60, ¶¶58-61; EX1013, pp. 036-038. And, importantly, none of the searches include "GPS." Also, the text searches returned no more than 20 hits, which "should have alerted the examiner that the text queries were unduly narrow...." EX1016, ¶¶60-61.

Second, the Examiner's "classification search also does not consider the scope of claims 12 through 21, or show awareness of what these claims require and do not require." EX1016, ¶¶62-65. The Examiner searched a single USPC subclass: class 455, subclass 41.2: short range RF communication under a telecommunications class. But, the challenged claims are not so limited. EX1016, ¶63. A complete USPC search should have included areas "such as class 455, subclass 456 *et seq.* (location monitoring), and a search including location positioning via GPS would have included search areas such as class 342, subclass 356 *et seq.*..." EX1016, ¶63. Additionally, the Examiner searched 4 subgroups in CPC H04W even though the challenged claims were not limited to those types of location positioning or communications. A complete "CPC search...would have included subgroups within G01S," for example, directed to GPS. EX1016, ¶64.

The Examiner should have noticed that the search was defective. For

example, in the reasons for allowance, the Examiner considered Suman (U.S. Pat. No. 6,028,537) to be the best prior art of record, even though it was classified in an area in which the Examiner did not search. EX1016, ¶65. This should have alerted the Examiner that the classification search areas were “unduly limited.” EX1016, ¶58; EX1013, pp. 025-028.

The Examiner’s search strategy shortcomings are best described by Mr. Bahr as follows:

[T]he keyword and classification searches for the ’146 application, as well as the reasons for allowance of claim 12, reveal that ***the examiner did not consider the full breadth of the claims in conducting the search for the ’146 application: i.e., did not consider that the registering an exact parking space location of the vehicle limitation of claim 12 could be met by employing a Global Positioning System (GPS) to register a location of the vehicle. Moreover, beyond not properly considering the breadth of the claims, the keyword and classification searches for what the invention was considered to be were overly restrictive.*** That is, the keyword searches were returning few hits, yet were restricted rather than expanded, and the classification search did not cover a patent document considered to be “the best prior art of record.”

EX1016, ¶66 (emphasis added). As evidence of the search’s shortcomings, the Examiner missed the two anticipatory references (U.S. patent publications Baese (EX1003) and Phillips (EX1004)) that serve as grounds in the Petition. Pet., §IV. In fact, Mr. Bahr testifies that a complete USPC search would have found that prior art:

[A] complete USPC search for the claims of the ’146 application would have included search areas such as class 455, subclass 456 et seq., and a search including location positioning via GPS would

have included search areas such as class 342, subclass 356 et seq. *A search of USPC class 455, subclass 456.6 or 457 would have uncovered Baese, a search of USPC class 342, subclass 357.75 or 357.76 would have uncovered Phillips, and a search of USPC class 342, subclass 357.42, 357.46, or 357.64 would have uncovered Soliman.* As also previously discussed, a complete CPC search would have included subgroups within G01S e.g., subgroup 19/01. A search of CPC G01S 19/ would have uncovered Phillips and Soliman.

EX1016, ¶67 (emphasis added).³

2. The Examiner should have investigated the priority claims, but did not

Lastly, the Examiner had an obligation to determine if the '193 patent contained new matter even though it was identified as a divisional, but failed to do so. EX1016, ¶12; MPEP §§201.06(c), 211.05. Regardless, in §IV(B) above, Petitioner explains how the Examiner was on notice and should have questioned PO's bogus priority claims because (1) a cursory comparison between the first nonprovisionals in the priority chain to the '193 patent application show a very large amount of material added; (2) the '193 patent identifies the '028 application as a division of the '406 application when the '028 application identifies it as a division of the '439 application rendering the '193 patent's earliest possible

³ It is even unclear whether the Office's examination of the '193 patent was performed using the pre-AIA or AIA procedures. EX1016, ¶¶68-69. The Office has conflicting records on this point. *Id.*

priority date March 30, 2016 and making PO's prior patents/published applications prior art; (3) the '193 patent has additional priority claim issues relating to the '273, '332, and '406 applications; (4) the challenged claims were not supported in the specification; and (5) the '193 patent identifies the '735 application as a divisional, but the '735 application (U.S. Pat. No. 9,020,687) identifies itself as a continuation-in-part. EX1019, p. 1. The Examiner therefore erred during examination.

D. Google had no prior notice and diligently filed its IPR

Google had no prior notice of the '193 patent, and Google is the first and only company to file an IPR on any of PO's patents. As mentioned above, PO did not commercialize the '193 patent and therefore could not mark a product. PO nevertheless claims Google had knowledge of the '193 patent *family* (not the '193 patent itself) because PO was able to find a handful of citations scattered in a miniscule fraction of patents/applications in Google's vast portfolio. Even if imputing such to Google were proper, which it is not, when filing a divisional application, the applicant represents that a divisional is patentably distinct and the MPEP treats it as such. EX1016, ¶¶8, 9, fn. 13; MPEP §201.06. Thus, PO's own designation of its family members as "divisionals" precludes this very argument.⁴

⁴ Also, the PTO's search tool shows that none of Google's patents even cite to the

Google had no knowledge of the '193 patent and did exactly what the PTAB's discretionary denial case law suggests: as soon as Google became aware of the '193 patent and saw it being asserted in its space, it diligently filed an IPR. *See e.g., Home Depot v. H2 Intellect LLC*, IPR2025-00480, paper 11, at 2-3 (informational); *Ericsson Inc., et al. v. Procomm Intern.*, IPR2024-01452, paper 16, at 3. PO has not sued any company other than Samsung on any of its patents.

E. Other reasons to deny PO's request

This is a very strong case for *inter partes* review, with two independent anticipation grounds (Pet., §IV). This case also poses very little burden on the PTAB: this case is the only IPR filed against any of PO's patents, and this Petition challenges only 6 claims that are functionally drafted relating to straightforward technology.

V. THE *FINTIV* FACTORS

A. Factors 1-5 favor institution because Google is not a party to the co-pending litigation

Google is not a party to the co-pending litigation, and thus, *Fintiv* factors 1-5 weigh in its favor. Those factors follow: (1) whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; (2) proximity of the court's trial date to the Board's projected statutory deadline for

'193 patent. EX1018, p. 1.

a final written decision; (3) investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; (4) overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; and (5) whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party.

PO chose to sue Samsung, not Google. EX1017. Google is not a party and has no control over that litigation, as conceded by PO (“Petitioner, a non-party to the EDTX Litigation, cannot submit [a *Sotera* stipulation].”). DD Brief, p. 15. Google cannot seek a stay, cannot move to transfer, cannot bind Samsung to a *Sotera* stipulation, nor otherwise do anything that might affect the trial date or influence the *Fintiv* factors. PO’s litigation strategy should not be used to disadvantage Google.

1. PO’s reliance on *Entegris* is unpersuasive because *Entegris* has no precedential value

PO tries to bind Google’s fortunes to Samsung’s schedule because Samsung is Google’s “customer,” but that argument should fail. For this argument, PO relies on *Entegris*, a case with no precedential value as it was neither designated precedential nor informative and, more importantly, was reversed on rehearing. *Entegris v. Inpris*, IPR2025-00267, paper 12 (rehearing granted, paper 21). Also, the rehearing decision itself shows the problem with binding a nonparty to the litigation schedule of another. There, the acting Director reversed discretionary denial because the co-pending litigation

defendant with whom the petitioner had a relationship settled. *Entegris*, IPR2025-00267, paper 21. This shows the danger in granting discretionary denial based on litigation defendants having merely a relationship with the Petitioner. To grant discretionary denial here only serves to advantage PO's litigation strategy: it need only wait until after the deadline for rehearing passes to settle with Samsung. Then, Google would be left out in the cold.

Indeed, up to “97% of patent suits settle” before trial, and Samsung may settle at any time. EX1024, p. 2; EX1025, p. 1 (95% to 97% of patent lawsuits settle); EX1026, p. 1 (95% to 97% of patent litigations settle before trial); EX1027, p. 1 (approximately 97% of patent infringement actions settle). In fact, Samsung's litigation strategy could be only to reach a strong leverage point in the litigation to obtain a nominal settlement as is common in many cases. Google should not be forced to rely on a third party that may settle, foreclosing Google from any *inter partes* PTO proceedings. Additionally, the invalidity contentions include 23 pages of prior art combinations, 12 pages just for the '193 patent alone. EX2007. There is simply no guarantee that the grounds in the Petition would be those that appear at trial, particularly since ground 5 (Phillips and Soliman) does not appear in the invalidity contentions, as PO admits. DD Brief, p. 15.

Moreover, although there are certain agreements that exist between Samsung and Google, PO does not show how any of those agreements are

specific to any technology, let alone any technology at issue. Additionally, PO makes no real-party-in-interest argument because it cannot. Thus, other than some generic agreements, PO simply has shown nothing to justify the extraordinary measure of binding Google to Samsung's litigation.

The proper analysis of *Fintiv* factors 1-5 should be of a potential Gamba/Google litigation. Under those circumstances, institution of this case achieves Congress's intent of a ***low-cost and complete*** litigation alternative.

2. *Home Depot* (informational) shows institution here is appropriate

Nevertheless, if the Director chooses to analyze the Samsung litigation for factors 1-5, *Home Depot* is persuasive as it closely aligns with the facts of the instant case. *Home Depot v. H2 Intellect*, IPR2025-00480, paper 11 (informational). There, the scheduled trial date was 7 months before the projected final written decision (FWD) date and the patent had been in force for over 12 years. *Id.*, at 2. Additionally, the challenged patent had not been commercialized, asserted, marked, licensed, or otherwise applied in Petitioner's technology space. *Id.* Here, the case is much stronger in Google's favor: (1) before the Samsung case, the challenged patent had not been commercialized, asserted, marked, or licensed at all in ***any*** technology space (even today, the Samsung case is the only assertion of any of PO's patents of which Petitioner is aware); (2) Google is not a party to that litigation; (3) Google had no notice of

the patent, including no mention of it in its large portfolio; (4) the projected FWD date is far sooner than in *Home Depot* (there, the projected FWD date was 7 months after the scheduled trial date, whereas here it is only 4 months after the projected trial date; and (5) the patent has been in force for 8 ½ years (under highly questionable circumstances; *see* §§IV(A) and (B) above; EX1016).

B. Factor 6 favors Google

Factor 6 also leans in Google’s favor. Factor 6 considers “other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits.” Here, the instant petition includes two, independent anticipation grounds using U.S. patent publications, reflecting a very strong, meritorious case. PO says nothing to the contrary about that. *See generally* DD Brief.

Also, fairness dictates denial of PO’s request. Google had no notice, was not sued, saw the patent being asserted against its technology, and soon thereafter, diligently filed the instant case, consistent with the PTAB’s discretionary denial decisions. *See* §IV(D) *supra*.

Google has the right to have counsel of its own choosing litigate the validity of this patent, and should not be forced to rely on a third party that may settle, leaving Google with no *inter partes* proceeding options other than district court litigation. To find otherwise, sets a dangerous precedent, precluding Google from challenging patents asserted against any business with which it has any kind of a relationship.

VI. CONCLUSION

PO claims to have settled expectations of *validity* for a patent born through its own *deceit*, a truly untenable position. PO's actions violated 37 C.F.R. §11.18 and prevented this Office from performing a competent examination. The Director should not use his discretion to reward such bad behavior, but should instead institute this case and proceed to cancel the challenged claims.

The Office also erred during examination by not questioning PO's bogus priority claims and by performing an unduly restrictive search. Petitioner respectfully requests that the Director deny PO's request.

Dated: April 3, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

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PETITIONER'S EXHIBIT LIST

April 3, 2025

EX1001	U.S. Patent No. 9,420,193
EX1002	U.S. Patent No. 7,899,583
EX1003	Baese (US 2002/0082025)
EX1004	Phillips (US 2003/0055560)
EX1005	Soliman (U.S. Patent No. 6,081,229)
EX1006	Declaration of Thomas La Porta, Ph.D.
EX1007	<i>The Active Badge Location System</i> , Want, et al., ACM Transactions on Information Systems, Vol. 10, No. 1, January 1992.
EX1008	<i>A New Location Technique for the Active Office</i> , Ward, et al., IEEE Personal Communications, October, 1997
EX1009	<i>The Cricket Location-Support System</i> , Priyantha, et al., ACM, 2000.
EX1010	<i>A Taxonomy of Indoor and Outdoor Positioning Techniques for Mobile Location Services</i> , Zeimpekis, et al., ACM, 2003.
EX1011	<i>Evolution of Mobile Location-based Services</i> , Rao and Minakakis, Communications of the ACM, Vol. 46, No. 12, December, 2003.
EX1012	<i>Survey of Location Based Wireless Services</i> , Mohapatra, et al., IEEE, 2005.
EX1013	File history of '193 patent.
EX1014	'193 patent assignment showing security interest held by Piccadilly Patent Funding LLC (March 25, 2025).
EX1015	<i>Discovering Bluetooth</i> , Miller, Sybex Inc., 2001.

EX1016	Declaration of Robert W. Bahr.
EX1017	Complaint in <i>Gamba Group Holdings LLC, v. Samsung Electronics Co., LTD, et al.</i> , EDTX 2:25-cv-00438-JRG (April 25, 25).
EX1018	PTO Search Results
EX1019	U.S. Pat. No. 9,020,687
EX1020	File History of U.S. Pat. No. 9,420,423
EX1021	File History of U.S. Pat. No. 7,899,583
EX1022	File History of U.S. Pat. No. 8,836,580
EX1023	2024 Google Economic Impact in the U.S. https://storage.googleapis.com/eir-national-report/2024.pdf
EX1024	Berman, <i>Too Many Patent Suits? The Data Suggests There are Too Few</i> , IP Watchdog (April 6, 2023) https://ipwatchdog.com/2023/04/06/many-patent-suits-data-suggests/
EX1025	<i>Why plaintiffs in US patent cases who understand the odds of victory are almost always best off settling</i> , IAM Lexology (February 16, 2018) https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=83faed64-c9ca-47ba-83a2-d80f9ea36c23
EX1026	Mrkonjic, <i>17 Incredible Patent Litigation Statistics [2024 Edition]</i> , The High Court (July 6, 2021) https://thehighcourt.co/patent-litigation-statistics/
EX1027	Van Arnam and Matthews, <i>Patent Litigation Update 2024</i> , Williams Mullen (March 11, 2024) https://www.williamsmullen.com/insights/news/legal-news/patent-litigation-update-2024
EX1028	File History of U.S. Pat. No. 9,491,584
EX1029	File History of U.S. Pat. No. 9,204,257

EX1030	File History of U.S. Pat. No. 9,602,193
EX1031	File History of U.S. Pat. No. 9,020,687

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies service pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.6(e) of PETITIONER’S DISCRETIONARY DENIAL OPPOSITION and related exhibits by filing the documents through the USPTO Patent Trial and Appeal Case Tracking System and by emailing copies to the following email addresses:

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